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Abstract
An Insider Misuse Threat Detection and Prediction Language 
Georgios Vasilios Magklaras BSc (Hons) MPhil
Numerous  studies  indicate  that  amongst  the  various  types  of  security  threats,  the 
problem of insider misuse of IT systems can have serious consequences for the health 
of computing infrastructures. Although incidents of external origin are also dangerous, 
the  insider  IT  misuse  problem is  difficult  to  address  for  a  number  of  reasons.  A 
fundamental reason that makes the problem mitigation difficult relates to the level of 
trust legitimate users possess inside the organization. The trust factor makes it difficult 
to detect threats originating from the actions and credentials of individual users. An 
equally important difficulty in the process of mitigating insider IT threats is based on 
the  variability  of  the  problem.  The  nature  of  Insider  IT  misuse  varies  amongst 
organizations. Hence, the problem of expressing what constitutes a threat, as well as 
the process of detecting and predicting it are non trivial tasks that add up to the multi-
factorial nature of insider IT misuse.        
This thesis is concerned with the process of systematizing the specification of insider 
threats, focusing on their system-level detection and prediction.  The design of suitable 
user audit mechanisms and semantics form a Domain Specific Language to detect and 
predict  insider  misuse incidents.  As a  result,  the thesis  proposes in detail  ways to 
construct standardized descriptions  (signatures) of insider threat incidents, as means 
of aiding researchers and IT system experts mitigate the problem of insider IT misuse.
The produced audit engine (LUARM – Logging User Actions in Relational Mode) and 
the Insider Threat Prediction and Specification Language (ITPSL) are two utilities that 
can be added to the IT insider misuse mitigation arsenal. LUARM is a novel audit 
engine designed specifically to address the needs of monitoring insider actions. These 
needs cannot be met by traditional open source audit utilities. ITPSL is an XML based 
markup that can standardize the description of incidents and threats and thus make use 
of the LUARM audit data. Its novelty lies on the fact that it can be used to detect as 
well as predict instances of threats, a task that has not been achieved to this date by a 
domain specific language to address threats.
The  research  project  evaluated  the  produced  language  using  a  cyber-misuse  
experiment approach derived from real world misuse incident data. The results of the 
experiment  showed  that  the  ITPSL  and  its  associated  audit  engine  LUARM  
provide  a  good  foundation  for  insider  threat  specification  and  prediction.  Some  
language deficiencies  relate to the fact that the insider threat specification process  
requires a good knowledge of the software applications used in a computer system. As 
the  language  is  easily  expandable,  future  developments  to  improve  the  language  
towards this direction are suggested.       
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Information Technology (IT) security threats concern every component of the modern computing 
infrastructure world.  Pfleeger [1] defines the term threat in an IT infrastructure context as “a set of 
circumstances that has the potential to cause loss or harm”. These circumstances might involve 
human-initiated actions (intentional IT intrusions), flaws in the design of the computer system and 
environment factors (natural disasters). Electronic commerce and banking, telecommunications, air 
traffic control [2] and public transportation, energy and water distribution and electronic voting 
systems [3] are some of the examples that emphasize our increasing dependency on computing 
infrastructures and thus highlight the potentially serious impact of IT security threats for the normal 
functioning of our society. 
Various  sources  indicate  the  growing trend of  IT security  threats,  including books [4]  [5]  and 
surveys [6] [7] that reveal the technical, as well the social and economic implications of IT threats. 
The recorded trends indicate that during the last decade, there was a sharp rise in the number of 
security  breaches  that  originated  from  external  (i.e.  unauthorized  users)  sources.  Proprietary 
information theft from large enterprises with serious economic consequences, embarrassing web 
site defacements and denial of service (DoS) attacks that cripple the ability of IT to function are  
some of the examples that IT security specialists have to deal with.
A second and more recently highlighted trend of IT threat occurrence concerns authorized users of 
IT  systems,  commonly known as  insiders.  These  users  abuse  their  privileged  access  rights  by 
committing a series of unintentional or deliberate actions, damaging individuals or organizations in 
many different ways. The dissemination and storage of offensive material through e-mail and the 
stealing of proprietary information for rival companies are probably the most traditional cases of 
insider IT misuse that one observes at the time of writing.  
2
Chapter 1 Introduction
Despite  the  well-documented  seriousness  and  emergence  of  insider  threat  [8],  the  information 
security world lacks approaches that mitigate the problem to a satisfactory extent.  Insider IT misuse 
is  a  challenging  multi-factorial  problem.  It  encompasses  aspects  of  technical  issues  (system 
monitoring, detection and prediction models), human issues (human resource policies, valuing and 
trusting individuals), organizational issues (defining what constitutes a threat, what is the value of 
your trusted information) and legal/ethical issues (how intrusive can you be/need to be, in order to 
have an adequate picture that detects or predict  insider threat).  As a result, it is not a surprise that a 
panacea to address all aspects of the problem does not exist.  
This thesis focuses on certain technical aspects of the insider misuse problem.  In particular,  it  
addresses  the  vital  issue  of  Insider  Threat  Specification  and  Prediction.  One  of  the  most 
fundamental problems of the insider threat domain is to define what constitutes a threat at system-
level, beyond the scope of a security policy.  This was one of the conclusions derived from the 
author’s prior MPhil research entitled  'An Architecture for Insider Misuse Threat Prediction in IT 
Systems' [9]. In order to illustrate the importance of insider threat specification, let us assume that 
an organizational security policy states the following in plain language terms: 
“It is not allowed for employees to use the company computer infrastructure to access and  
disseminate pornographic material.”
The enforcement of this policy assumes a mechanism able to express in a standard way how the act 
of accessing and disseminating pornographic material manifests itself in system terms. In that way, 
it is possible to intercept file access and network connections events, as well as applications that  
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access network connections and thus make a concrete link amongst all these pieces of information 
and a particular threat scenario.
An ability to use a standard vocabulary to define a threat in terms of its observable consequences at 
the Operating System (OS) level forms the core of the proposed Insider Threat Specification and 
Prediction Language (ITPSL). At the time of writing, generic insider misuse specification languages 
do not  exist,  highlighting the novelty of  this  research project  for detecting insider  threats.  The 
proposed language can also act as the foundation for creating Insider Threat signature repositories 
and  facilitate  the  reuse  of  threat  descriptions  (with  minor  adaptations)  on  different  IT 
infrastructures.
A second novel aspect of this research project concerns the ability to predict insider threats. Threat 
prediction is  closely related to threat modeling.  Later chapters introduce the concept of insider 
threat modeling. For the purposes of introduction, it is sufficient to state that the proposed language 
semantics need to encompass decision theoretic information. The process of embedding decision 
theoretic information inside intrusion specification semantics is an important issue of the research 
field that has not been addressed.
Finally, LUARM, the bespoke audit engine designed to log relevant user activities for the purposes 
of misuse detection is unique in its kind, due to the way it structures the data, the format of the audit 
records  and  its  usefulness  to  the  computer  forensics  fields.  A  researcher  using  the  proposed 
language  semantics  and  the  data  acquired  by LUARM can  replay  certain  hypothetical  or  real 
scenarios for the purposes of refining misuse detection tools and threat signatures. 
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1.1 Aims and Objectives
This thesis is concerned with the process of systematizing insider threat specification and predic-
tion. The overall aim is to advance the field of insider IT misuse research by producing a misuse 
specification language that can aid researchers and IT practitioners in the process of detecting and 
predicting insider threats.  The following objectives of equal priority apply, as a guide to break 
down the task of crafting the proposed language:
 Objective 1:  Investigate the problem of insider misuse, encompassing the general nature 
and scale of the threat and examination of the resulting impacts by means of indicative case 
examples.
 Objective 2: Define the problem of insider threat specification and prediction, as part of the 
insider IT misuse problem domain. This definition should emphasize the underlying main 
components of both the insider misuse detection and prediction processes and examine how 
they relate to existing work of the research field.
 Objective 3: Define the functional requirements of the proposed language.  In plain terms, 
this means that it should be clear what the language should do and how it should achieve it.
 Objective 4: Establish the means of acquiring data about user credentials and on-line ac-
tions to facilitate threat detection and prediction. This can be achieved by reviewing existing 
operating system audit mechanisms in accordance to the functional requirements of Objec-
tive number 2.
 Objective 5: Produce the semantics and the syntax for the proposed language.
 Objective 6: Make a prototype system and evaluate the proposed language against a range 
of hypothetical and real insider IT misuse scenarios.
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1.2 Thesis structure
After establishing the objectives of the research project, the thesis begins by tackling the problems 
of Objective 1. Chapter 2 provides a summary of the Insider IT misuse problem as well as an over-
view of notable insider misuse cases and information security surveys, in an attempt to show the 
manifestation of the problem in IT infrastructures. The chapter concludes with a discussion of rele-
vant specification language paradigms and frameworks that influenced the development of ITPSL 
and thus complete a high-level overview of the problem domain.
Chapter 3 starts  by providing an essential definition for the term 'insider threat specification', the 
core concept of this research project.  The problem of insider threat specification relates to the field 
of misuse detection languages. As a result, a detailed discussion of earlier misuse detection lan-
guage paradigms is presented, accompanied by proposing the desired semantic foundations for the 
proposed language (ITPSL). The combined contents of chapters 2 and 3 will address Objective 1 of 
this project, completing the definition of the insider threat specification and prediction problem do-
main.
The fourth chapter is concerned with taxonomic and threat modelling research and development ef-
forts designed to address insider threats, with emphasis on abstracting the domain of insider misuse. 
The domain abstraction is a necessary step in the process of shaping the threat metrics the language 
can express and pave the way for defining the ITPSL functional requirements. After concluding the 
domain abstraction considerations, the chapter concludes by explaining the problems that the ITPSL 
is trying to solve and presents a detailed list of functional requirements, completing Objective 2 of 
the thesis.
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Chapter 5 takes the first practical implementation step and examines the vital issue of how to store 
user activity information in audit logs. Unsuitable information in the audit logs can seriously hinder 
the process of insider threat specification and prediction. Thus, existing audit log mechanisms are 
examined in terms of their deficiencies for insider threat detection and prediction. The mentioned 
deficiencies justify the need for constructing LUARM, an audit log engine specifically designed for 
insider misuse detection and prediction. The construction of LUARM marks the completion of the 
third objective of the research project.
Chapter 6 contains the core proposal of the ITPSL semantics, addressing the fourth main objective 
of the thesis. It starts with a justification of the programming and semantic encapsulation paradigms 
used in the construction of ITPSL. In particular, an XML based Domain Specific Language (DSL) 
paradigm is chosen as the foundation of the proposed language. The rest of the chapter discusses in 
great detail the ITPSL semantics.
Having produced the proposed language semantics, the final objective of the research is addressed 
by putting the semantics into action. A prototype ITSPL compiler is presented in Chapter 7. The 
system provides the ability to use collected data by LUARM. The data are produced by carefully 
crafted experiments that simulate a range of insider IT misuse threats. These data are then played 
back against ITPSL statements, in order to assess the ability of the semantics to express a range of  
scenarios successfully. The ITPSL expression success is judged in terms of detecting and predicting 
certain threats under the conditions of the experiment.
7
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The eighth and final chapter of the thesis provides a critique of the work, addressing weaknesses 
and future research issues related to insider threat specification and prediction.
The thesis appendices provide a plethora of detailed references to relevant technology standards, ex-
periments, as well as copies of publications associated with this research project. 
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2.1 Definition of the problem domain
The problem of insider IT misuse (the term ‘misuse detection’ or ‘misuse’ is also used in the litera-
ture) is a serious threat for the health of IT infrastructures. The introductory chapter defined the 
term 'threat' in an IT infrastructure context as “a set of circumstances that has the potential to cause 
loss or harm” [1]. As a result, in legitimate user context, these circumstances might involve inten-
tional IT misuse activities such as targeted information theft, introducing or accessing inappropriate 
material, and accidental misuse (e.g. unintentional information leak).  In addition, there is also po-
tential for flaws in the design and implementation of the computer system, which could render it 
susceptible to insider misuse.
Numerous studies  have tried to define the term “insider” in the context of Information Security. 
This is because there are many possible sub-contexts that are applicable to shedding light on differ-
ent aspects of what an insider is and what she can do.  For instance, an aspect of insiders relates to  
what they are allowed and not allowed to do in an organizational context. This is often dictated by 
the organization's IT usage policy, “a set of laws, rules, practices, norms and fashions that regulate 
how an organisation manages, protects, and distributes the sensitive information and that regulates 
how an organisation protects system services” [10]. This is also commonly referred to as the IT se-
curity policy. Insiders that do not follow the rules of the IT policy are formally considered as mis-
users.
Other definitions focus more on the attributes of an insider, from an organizational trust point of  
view [11]:”An insider is a person that has been legitimately empowered with the right to access,  
represent, or decide about one or more assets of the organization's structure”. This definition has a 
wide perspective and emphasizes a key aspect of an insider: that of trust. Trust is a property that 
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goes beyond an IT system oriented view (system credentials, actions, indications). Whilst people 
who constitute direct threats might not have access to IT access credentials, they still can decide on 
policies, equipment procurement and other issues that can affect the well being of an IT infrastruc-
ture. A good example is an IT director that spends millions on a state of the art security system but 
does not bother to emphasize or make policies that dictate the flow of information inside the organi-
zation (employee that bypasses the system with a simple USB key, intentionally or accidentally).    
However, trust has an impact on IT level credentials. A narrower but IT system specific definition 
can also be useful, in order to focus on insider actions that can be detected by system methods.  
Hence, an insider is a person that has been legitimately given the capability of accessing one or 
many components of an IT infrastructure (hardware, software and data) enjoying effortless login by 
interacting with one or more authentication mechanisms. The word 'legitimately' differentiates the 
user from an external cracker that masquerades as the user by means of bypassing the authentication 
mechanisms. The implication of 'effortless' is that an insider does not need to consume time and ef-
fort to gain access to a system resource. This also means that they enjoy trust, a vital property of all  
insiders. 
2.2 The manifestation of the insider IT misuse problem
Providing a way to detect threats and sense vulnerabilities is vital for the process of insider threat 
mitigation.  One way to capture the essence of insider threats is to look at the way they occur in the  
real world. There are two sources of information to help us derive conclusions. One consists of in-
sider case reports, as they are reported by the press. The other source of information is an estab-
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lished information security survey. Both sources have pros and cons and we will discuss these in 
this section.
One of the most discussed insider cases is that of the former FBI veteran Robert Hanssen. The 2001 
CSI/FBI survey [12] cited his case in detail.  Hanssen abused his trusted access to the FBI Automat-
ed Case Support  System that contained classified information about  ongoing investigations  and 
handed critical information to Russian agencies. In return, he was receiving large sums of money,  
inflicting a great deal of damage upon the prestigious image of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and the national security of his country. Nobody could imagine that a church-going and patriotic 
family man was betraying his country for money. 
Hanssen developed a more than average level of IT knowledge, as he utilised an unusual way of 
hiding the information he wanted to trade with Russian agents. He followed a process of specially 
formatting 40-track mode diskettes, in order to hide the sensitive information in (what appeared to 
be) a blank area of the disk. This measure made it difficult to discover the hidden insider view in-
formation without the usage of an advanced data forensic tool. The combination of his colleagues’ 
trust and his own data hiding techniques allowed him to operate for certain number of years inside 
various FBI facilities.   
Abdelkader Smires [13], a chief software engineer who worked with Internet Trading Technologies 
is a typical example of what can be achieved by a disgruntled insider. Smires claimed he was under-
paid  by his employer. As a result, he requested a pay rise coupled with a range of additional bene-
fits. When his requests were turned down, he decided to take revenge by using the IT infrastructure 
of his previous employer (Queens College) to launch a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. His actions 
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crippled the operational capacity of Internet Trading Technologies over a three day period resulting 
in substantial revenue loss. 
There are two important points to consider with regards to the Smires case. Firstly, he had legiti-
mate access to another organisation (Queens College) due to an account that should had been erased 
a long time ago. This shows how a bad insider practice (keeping non essential active accounts is bad 
system administration practice) allowed him to conceal (at a first stage) his attack on Internet Trad-
ing Technologies. The second and most important point is the level of systems knowledge he pos-
sessed about Internet Trading Technologies´ IT infrastructure. Smires´ excellent knowledge of the 
IT components  catalysed his ability to exploit vulnerabilities and mount the DoS attack. 
The financial world with its business critical cyberinfrastructures is not immune to insider misuse 
cases.  Garfinkel  and Spafford [14]  mention the „Leeson-Iguchi  case.  Nick Leeson („Barings‟ ‟ 
Bank – Singapore) and Toshihibe Iguchi („Daiwa Bank  - New York) were investment traders‟  
working together for two major financial organisations. They made risky investments and lost large 
amounts of investment capital. However, instead of admitting their losses, they illegitimately modi-
fied computer records to cover their mistakes and continue to be able to request vast amounts of 
money to invest. As a result, Barings Bank was forced to insolvency and „Daiwa  lost its entire‟  
United States customer base. More than 1 billion dollars of investment capital vanished as a result 
of their actions. 
Barings Bank had an internal data audit mechanism that focused on discovering potential external 
breaches, without focusing on insider actions. Clearly, they have underestimated the insider threat 
factor. They could never think that two accountants that had direct access to database records of in-
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vestment funds would commit fraud in this way. This electronic record forgery would probably go 
unnoticed if Leeson and Iguchi managed to stop their losses. They did not and consequently the 
large sums of unaccounted investment capital forced an internal investigation that revealed their ac-
tions.
All of the previously discussed cases were intentional. Legitimate users misused their rights on pur-
pose to achieve the goal. However, non intentional insider misuse cases are also part of the  mani-
festation agenda. The Norwich Union versus Western Provident Association case [15] is a classic 
case example of accidental insider misuse. A Norwich Union employee circulated an e-mail that 
contained what could be considered as a sarcastic (or defamatory) rumour about Western Provident 
going  into  financial  difficulties.  The  e-mail  leaked  outside  the  company (another  internal  user 
thought it was a great joke) and eventually came to the attention of the rival company. Consequent-
ly, Western Provident took legal action against Norwich Union and the case was settled with the lat-
ter paying approximately £450,000 pounds in compensation plus the legal expenses for Western 
Provident. What was initially considered as an innocent joke proved to be the reason for commenc-
ing a rather expensive legal case. 
The most widely known insider misuse cases are usually about intellectual property theft. The arrest 
of Lan Lee and Yuefei Ge by FBI agents [16] is a classic case. The arrested men were engineers of 
NetLogic Microsystems (NLM) until July 2003. During the time of their employment, they were 
downloading trade sensitive documents from the NLM headquarters into their  home computers. 
These  documents  contained detailed  descriptions  of  the  NLM microprocessor  product  line  and 
funded a startup made by the two engineers. Eventually, their ties to the Chinese government and 
military were discovered by investigators.  
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Establishing borders between internal and external cases can be difficult. It is not suggested that one 
should adopt a dualistic view and classify an incident as either internal or external one. An informa-
tion security incident has often many factors. However, the key question in many cases is what cre-
ates the vulnerabilities. In this case, insiders accidentally created vulnerabilities leaving the gates 
open, despite the confirmed external attack origin. Consequently, the gravity of the actions of insid-
ers is greater. This makes one wonder how organizations should assess or model threats in the fu-
ture. For every virus attack, should an IT manager that left systems without proper anti-virus protec-
tion or system patches be blamed instead of the virus distributor?    
There are numerous other cases reported in the press that follow more or less the same line in terms 
of the motives, the abuse of trust and cyber-privileges or the unintentional actions that ended up 
having grave consequences. However, a study of the insider threat manifestation should also in-
clude some quantitative measures that ideally show the frequency of occurrence in the real world. 
Well established information security surveys attempt to provide that level of information and the 
next paragraphs are going to discuss them.
Recent information security surveys document the existence and the seriousness of the problem. 
The Computer Security Institute's “Computer Crime A Security Survey” is a well cited survey that 
has been running for fifteen consecutive years. The 2010 survey [6] reviewed the opinions of 351 
IT security practitioners. Amongst the key findings of this survey was that the insider threat has two 
important vectors:
15
Chapter 2 The insider IT misuse problem
 Intentional (malicious) insiders: Concerning IT misuse incidents that were the results of 
deliberate actions (for example the Robert Hansen case discussed in [12].
 Non malicious (accidental) insiders:  They concern cases where the insider accidentally 
caused an IT misuse incident (a good example of this are users that entrust their account 
password to third party individuals for convenience). 
Figure 2.1 below indicates the percentage of monetary losses reported by the respondents attributed 
to malicious and non malicious insiders that represents one of the key findings of the survey.  59.1 
percent of the respondents believe that non of their losses were due to malicious insiders. However, 
only 39.5 percent could claim that none of their losses were due to non-malicious insider actions, 
hinting that the consensus views the accidental insider threat vector as a more serious one.  
Figure 2.1: Percentage of monetary losses attributed to insiders (source [6])
In terms of frequency of occurrence, the CSI survey [6] reports that 25 percent of their respondents 
claimed that their legitimate users deliberately abused Internet access or email (pornographic ac-
cess, pirated software, etc). In addition, 13% percent claimed that they detected cases of unautho-
rized privilege escalation by insiders (insiders abusing/bypassing their access rights to obtain infor-
mation that should have been restricted to them).   
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The manifestation of insider IT misuse is also verified by another well established survey in the 
field of information security. The InfoSecurity Europe and PwC '2010 Information Security Breach-
es'  (ISBS) survey [7] collected results from 539 respondents and shows a substantial rise of serious 
internal incidents when compared to the figures of previous years, as shown in Figure 2.2 below.
Figure 2.2: Insider incidents for the period 2000-2010  (source [7])
The ISBS 2010 survey looks into internal misuse cases in more detail than the CSI one [6]. In par -
ticular, the survey section with title 'Other incidents caused by staff' sketches the typical profile of  
misuse cases. The survey respondents indicated that an insider is more likely to use the world wide 
web to access inappropriate sites (or sites that have nothing to do with work duties, thus wasting re-
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sources).  The second most frequent type of misuse is that of email (use email for non work purpos-
es,  to spread inappropriate or offensive content), followed by unauthorized access to systems and 
data (by means of masquerading or bypassing authentication procedures). Finally, data theft (breach 
of confidentiality of intellectual property or other valuable data) and breach of data protection rules 
and regulations are the two least frequent types of misuse reported. This picture is summarized in 
Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Type of insider misuse (source [7])
Similar conclusions about the nature (type and frequency) of insider misuse incidents are also de-
rived by Magklaras and Furnell [17] , in a survey dedicated to insider IT misuse. Due to the similar-
ity of the results and the fact that the survey had a rather small number of respondents (50), the de-
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tail is not discussed here, but the reader is prompted to reference the data for further information 
about the findings.
The ISBS 2010 survey [7] also provides some notable cases that verify the CSI 2010 [6] findings in 
terms of the seriousness of accidental insider threats. Some of these cases are quoted below, in order 
to demonstrate the grave consequences of non deliberate insider actions:
“Staff at a London educational institution replied to a phishing email. This resulted in spammers 
sending over 100,000 emails from the compromised accounts, and to the organization’s mail servers 
being blacklisted around the world.”
“A charity infringed data protection laws when it disposed of an old computer without wiping the 
hard drive. The staff member concerned was blasé, saying he had deleted the ﬁles and trusted the 
person to whom he had sold the computer.”
The conclusion from digesting the data from various surveys is that one cannot derive safe conclu-
sions about the quantification of the insider IT misuse problem (frequency of occurrence, financial 
impact). The CSI 2010 survey [6] claims a statistical confidence of 95 percent with an associated 
+/- 5.25 percent margin of error for the quoted figures. The respective figures for the ISBS 2010 
survey [7] are also high: a 95 percent confidence rate with +/- 6% error margin.  These figures 
might be true for the sample population of the surveys, however they do not account fully for the  
following facts:
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 The sample population of the surveys is different between the two surveys: A different 
number of respondents from different geographical populations (and hence different IT reg-
ulations) makes it difficult to compare the quantified figures and make conclusions about the 
true scale of the problem.
 The sample population varies significantly on every survey edition: In their latest edition 
at the time of writing, both of the quoted large scale surveys [6] [7] record a notable drop in 
the number of respondents coming from the financial and private sector. This could affect 
substantially the scale of the insider problem (number of incidents).  
For these reasons, surveys are good in qualifying the problem and enlighten on the various different  
types of insider misuse manifestation. That's despite the important differences recorded amongst 
major surveys about the frequency of occurrence and perceived importance of insider incidents, 
which could be attributed due to differences in their respondent sampling procedures.  In compari-
son, reported cases in the press provide some aspect of problem qualification, but they often omit 
important aspects of the case, things that could be of use to insider misuse researchers. Neverthe-
less, the data do converge into various conclusions:
 The insider problem is real, it affects all types of businesses in a serious manner and is here  
to stay.
 The insider threat has two important types: Deliberate and accidental misuse. 
 A typical insider according to the surveys respondents is likely to abuse the web and email 
resources and manipulate authentication or other internal systems to commit fraud or infor-
mation theft.
 The nature of the insider misuse problem is variable. Different organizations have different 
criteria of what is considered misuse or not that are applicable to different environments. 
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2.3 Intrusion specification languages and frameworks
While the previous chapter sections provided an overview of the problem domain, the focus must be 
shifted to intrusion specification.  One of the conclusions of the previous section was that insider IT 
misuse is a variable problem. Neither the information security surveys nor the stories in the press 
can provide a clear picture of the mechanism with which the problem manifests itself in IT infra-
structures, This clear picture should ideally display a mechanism that shows how a threat is realized 
into a misuse act. The field of intrusion specification provides fundamental tools to obtain such a 
picture. 
ITPSL is all about insider threat specification. Threat specifications follow the principles of intru-
sion specification, a concept which is not new in the information security world. Techniques to de-
scribe threats exist for an entire range of information security products, from anti-virus software to 
several intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS) [17], where  specified rules are used to de-
scribe a particular range of threats. However, this section focuses on generic threat specification. 
Most products might focus on specific types of threats (anti-virus products relate to malware detec-
tion, IDS products might focus on network threats, etc). 
When it comes to generic intrusion specification languages, we have two notable examples. The 
Common Intrusion Specification Language (CISL) [17] and Panoptis [18]. The next paragraphs are 
going to describe these two languages and discuss their significance for ITPSL. 
CISL[17] consists of a semantic framework to unambiguously describe intrusive activities together 
with proposed data structures that store the event information and can form standardized messages 
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exchanged by various Intrusion Detection System (IDS) components. The semantic representation 
of intrusive activities is achieved by the formation of an S-Expression. This is a recursive grouping 
of tags and data, delimited by parentheses. The tags provide semantic clues to the interpretation of 
the S-Expression and the data might represent system entities or attributes. For this reason, the tags 
are also called Semantic Identifiers (SIDs). 
The best of way of illustrating how CISL works is by considering an example. The statement (Host-
name ‘frigg.uio.no’) is a simple S-Expression. It groups two terms, without semantically binding 
them. One can guess that it refers to a computer system with the FQDN name ‘frigg.uio.no’, but the  
true meaning of the statement is still vague. In fact, the full semantic meaning of S-Expressions be-
comes apparent when one forms more complex S-Expressions, by means of combining several SIDs 
into a sentence.
Figure 2.4 illustrates a suitably crafted CISL intrusion specification which could be translated in the 
following plain English translation:
“On the 24th of February 2005, three actions took place in sequence in the host ‘frigg.uio.no’.  
First, someone logged into the account named 'tom' (real name ‘Tom Attacker’) from a host with  
FQDN 'outside.firewall.com'.  Then, about a half-minute later,  this  same person deleted the file  
'/etc/passwd' of the host.  Finally, about four-and-a-half minutes later, a user attempted but failed  
to log in to the account 'ksimpson' at 'frigg.uio.no'.  The attempted login was initiated by a user at  
'hostb.uib.no'.”
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The particular CISL sentence describes a malicious attack that erases an important system file of a 
UNIX system and consists of three multi-SID S-Expressions. In general, a sentence can be formed 
by one or more S-Expressions nested at different levels.
Verb SID’s are joined together in a sentence by conjunction SIDs. In the  example of Figure 2.4, 
‘And’ is the conjunction SID that holds together the three SIDs that form the sentence. In addition, 
a CISL sentence might employ role, adverb, attribute, referent and atom SID types. Role SIDs indi-
cate what part an entity plays in a sentence (such as ‘Initiator’). Adverb SIDs provide the space and 
time context of a verb SID. Attribute SIDs indicate special properties or relations amongst the sen-
tence entities, whereas atom SIDs specialise in defining values that are bound to certain event in-
stances (for instance ‘Username’).  Lastly, referent SIDs allow the linking of two or more parts of a 
sentence (‘Refer to’ and ‘Refer as’). There are additional SID types, but the aforementioned ones 
are the most commonly employed.
One can clearly observe a structural hierarchy for forming complex sentences that also contributes 
to the semantic meaning. This semantic structure is inspired by the syntax of natural languages. A 
verb is always at the heart of every sentence and is followed by a sequence of one or more qualifiers 
that describe the various entities that play parts in the sentence, or qualify the verb itself.
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(And
        (OpenApplicationSession
            (When
                (Time 14:57:36 24 Feb 2005)
            )
            (Initiator
                (HostName 'outside.firewall.com')
            )
            (Account
                (UserName 'tom')
                (RealName 'Tom Attacker')
                (HostName 'frigg.uio.no')
                (ReferAs 0x12345678)
            )
            (Receiver
                (StandardTCPPort 22)
            )
        )
        (Delete
            (World Unix)
            (When
                (Time 14:58:12 24 Feb 2005)
            )
            (Initiator
                (ReferTo 0x12345678)
            )
            (FileSource
                (HostName 'frigg.uio.no')
                (FullFileName '/etc/passwd')
            )
        )
        (OpenApplicationSession
            (World Unix)
            (Outcome
                (CIDFReturnCode failed)
                (Comment '/etc/passwd missing')
            )
            (When
                (Time 15:02:48 24 Feb 2005)
            )
            (Initiator
                (HostName 'hostb.uib.no')
            )
            (Account
                (UserName 'ksimpson')
                (RealName 'Karen Simpson')
                (HostName 'frigg.uio.no')
            )
            (Receiver
                (StandardTCPPort 22)
            )
        )
    )
Figure 2.4: CISL sentence syntax example
25
Chapter 2 The insider IT misuse problem
CISL [17] is not only about semantic rules. Its authors were concerned with the encapsulation of the 
structured semantic  information into the ‘Generalised Intrusion Detection Object’  (GIDO), data 
structures that hold the encoded event information. The purpose of encoding the information in a 
standard way is to make the process of exchanging the information amongst various IDS compo-
nents easy.
Unfortunately, despite the well-conceived interoperability target, the CISL GIDO encoding process 
introduced many problems. Doyle [19] has criticized many of the aspects of the CISL GIDO struc-
ture.  Although the purpose of the document was to evaluate the fitness of CISL for use in the  
DARPA Cyber Command and Control (CC2) initiative, the paper identifies serious inadequacies 
that concern the CISL time resolution data representation facilities, as well as data throughput limi-
tations caused by the fixed size of the GIDO data structure. Finally, Doyle comments on the lack of 
support for the next generation Internet Protocol (Version 6). Whilst these points are fair, they could 
easily be corrected by making the necessary changes to the relevant data types and overcome the 
perceived obstacles. In fact, section 7 of the CISL standard [17] contains specific guidelines that ex-
plain how to add information to a GIDO, to clarify or correct its contents. This suggests that the en-
coding principles are certainly extensible.
A more serious aspect of Doyle’s critique [19] refers to the semantic structure of the CISL lan-
guage. In particular, his criticism that CISL has “no facilities for representing trends or other com-
plex behavioral patterns; ill-specified, inexpressive, and essentially meaningless facilities for repre-
senting decision-theoretic information about probabilities and utilities” indicates that the language 
would be a bad choice for describing threat prediction related information. The basic reasoning be-
hind this critique is that CISL is too report-orientated and threat mitigation requires a different level 
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of information, not just mere report structures of what is happening on one or more systems. These 
indeed represent more serious limitations that would require a more radical re-design of the CISL. 
In addition to Doyle's  criticisms, from a threat specification perspective,  we note the following 
omissions/weaknesses in CISL:
 Inability to express variability in intrusion events: For example, all the necessary time pat-
terns to specify recurring events of significance: The 'When', 'Time' and others SIDs can 
bind an event to an accurate time and date location. However, this is of little value to a threat 
specification as the accurate time of an intrusion event is rarely known. An SID operant such 
as 'afternoon-hours', 'evening-hours' would be more functional. This is true for other type of 
SIDs such as 'FileSource',  network SIDs, etc. The expressions clearly lack the necessary 
polymorphism required to describe a range of possible events.
 The nesting of S-Expressions does not facilitate logical operands/operators, in order to de-
scribe alternative events. This affects the overall polymorphic description at event level.   
 General lack of a mechanism to express confidence of a particular metric: Decision theoretic 
information is a desired feature of threat specification. The process of specifying a threat 
might include the description of various events. Not all of them have the same level of relia-
bility and as such, a language that omits a mechanism of expressing a confidence in a partic-
ular event is a serious issue.  This omission also limits  the ability to build up user profiling 
information.    
Nevertheless, Amoroso [20] characterizes CISL [17] and its associative Common Intrusion Detec-
tion Framework (CIDF)  [21] as a “good piece of computer science”, despite the fact that it has not 
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managed to infiltrate the IDS/IPS vendor market as a product interoperability platform.  CISL is 
significant for the development of ITPSL for the following reasons:
 It's the first language framework for generic intrusion specification with system interoper-
ability as its design goal, attempting to bridge the gap between language semantics and oper-
ating system/IDS product implementation details. This is a desirable feature because a good 
threat specification mechanism should focus on the threat itself and less on platform specific 
issues.
 It introduces the S-expression as a way to group the SIDs with the actual data in a hierarchi-
cal semantic notation which can nest expressions. Despite the previously discussed weak-
nesses of its proposed semantic identifiers, the suggested combination increases the clarity 
of the expression and the S-expression nesting capability increases the specificity of the 
statement in a consistent manner (the more S-expressions nested together in a the more spe-
cific the conditions of the match).  
Panoptis [18] is another interesting and more recent intrusion specification language paradigm. The 
language sits on top of an anomaly detection system which parses standardized UNIX audit process 
logs. After establishing a user profile based on a number of different criteria, the audit logs are 
parsed and then checked against the profiling data. A sample of the entities and quantitative criteria 
that the panoptis system checks against is given below. These include: 
 Discrete entities are organized in database tables such as:
◦ tty UNIX terminals.
◦ uid Users.
◦ uidtty Users logged in on a specific terminal.
◦ comm Commands.
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◦ uidcomm Users executing a specific command.
 Process accounting data such as:
◦ maxaxsig Signal exit status.
◦ maxhog Maximum CPU hog factor (CPU time over elapsed time).
◦ maxmem Maximum memory usage.
◦ maxavrw Maximum average disk block input/output.
◦ maxstime Maximum system time.
◦ minbmin Minimum daily start time (start time whithin the 24 hour interval).
◦ maxutime Maximum user time.
◦ maxbmin Maximum daily start time.
◦ maxasu Superuser status.
◦ maxcount Maximum number of times a given record has appeared in the database.
◦ maxrw Maximum disk block input/output.
◦ maxacore Core dump flag.
◦ maxavio Maximum average character input/output.
◦ maxafork Fork status.
◦ maxetime Maximum clock time.
◦ maxavmem Maximum average memory usage.
◦ maxio Maximum character input/output.
In essence, panoptis is an anomaly detection system envisaged to detect a number of attacks such as 
data leakage, wiretapping and user masquerading amongst others. The semantics are restricted to 
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configuration file options such as the one illustrated by Figure 2.5. Declarations of the type vari-
able=value and a keyword(entity, value(s)) combination make up the syntactical convention. 
HZ = 100                # "Floating point" value divisor
bigend = FALSE          # Set to TRUE for big endian (e.g. Sun), FALSE 
        # forlittle endian (e.g. VAX, Intel x86)
map = TRUE              # Set to TRUE to map uid/tty numbers to names
EPSILON = 150           # New maxima difference threshold (%)
report = TRUE           # Set to TRUE to report new/updated entries
unlink = FALSE          # Set to TRUE to start fresh
# Reporting procedure
output = ’| /usr/bin/tee /dev/console | /bin/mail root’
# Databases and parameters to check
dbcheck(tty, minbmin, maxbmin, maxio, maxcount)    # Terminals
dbcheck(comm, ALL)                                 # Commands
dbcheck(uid, ALL)                                  # Users
dbcheck(uidtty, maxcount)                          # Users on a terminal
dbcheck(uidcomm, minbmin, maxbmin, maxutime,       # command
            maxstime, maxmem, maxrw, maxcount, maxasu)
# Map users and terminals into groups
usermap(caduser, john, marry, jill)
usermap(admin, root, bin, uucp, mail, news)
Figure 2.5: A configuration file sample showing the DSL syntax of 'panoptis'
For  instance,  the  statement  dbcheck(tty,  minbmin,  maxbmin,  maxio,  maxcount)  will  check  the 
UNIX terminal entity activity against the normal minimum and maximum startup time, as well as 
the maximum character input/output and the maximum number of times a given record has ap-
peared in the database. If any of these figures exceeds the preset epsilon threshold normal value by 
150% (EPSILON=150 declaration), the observation will be flagged as an intrusion. Note that these 
checks will be performed against the records of certain users as defined by the usermap statements 
(caduser, john, marry, jill as user group 1 and admin, root, bin, uucp, mail, news as user group 2).
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The simplistic semantics of panoptis suffer from many of the previously discussed drawbacks of 
CISL. Development on the 'panoptis' system has been discontinued and thus, it is not fair to really 
judge the effort on the basis of the presented system. The panoptis authors were more interested to 
present a paradigm whose scope was to parse system audit logs and not a full intrusion specification 
language.
However, the panoptis approach is an important paradigm for an insider misuse specification lan-
guage  for two reasons:
 It is one of the first specification language approaches that target insider misuse incidents. 
The authors claim that under certain conditions, panoptis could “detect an employee trans-
ferring inordinately large amounts of data to a computer outside the organisation even if that 
employee had proper system authorisations to perform.”[18]
 It is one of the first systems that employs a Domain Specific Language approach, in order to 
design the intrusion specification semantics and capture precisely the domain's semantics. 
Chapter  7 will examine the Domain Specific Language more closely.
For all these reasons, both CISL [17] and Panoptis [18] play an important role for  the development 
of insider misuse specification languages. 
CIDF's work was continued by the IETF Intrusion Detection Working Group  (IDWG).  It ad-
dressed most of the CISL's GIDO encoding issues by introducing a new Object Oriented format for 
encoding and transmitting Intrusion Detection related information. The Intrusion Detection Mes-
sage Exchange Format (IDMEF) [22] enriched the type of standardized information that IDS sen-
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sors may represent, as well as the process of standardizing the exchange of messages using proto-
cols such as IDXP [23] and data exchange languages such as XML [24].
For example, the IDMEF “Confidence” and “Impact” classes can now be used to represent decision 
theoretic information. The earlier can assign a confidence and thus a probability to an observed 
event, whereas the latter relates the occurrence of a privilege escalation event  to a numeric integer 
that indicates the seriousness of the event in a running system . This functionality can serve as the 
basis for encoding decision theoretic information. 
The IDMEF standardization features were an important step towards facilitating intrusion and threat 
alert specification and ensuring better interoperability amongst Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
products. The IDWG work has concluded without correcting and standardizing the semantic struc-
ture of the CISL language. The IDMEF draft [22] proposes encoding and data structures for alert in-
formation exchange, but it does not suggest semantic guidelines like the ones proposed by the CIDF 
framework. Consequently, for IDMEF, the term „language  refers to the data types and encoding‟  
principles for IDS alert data and not to the syntactical guidelines of an Intrusion Specification Lan-
guage. 
IDMEF's XML adoption as a mechanism to encode and validate IDS alert data is an important foun-
dation that influences the design of the ITPSL semantics. Chapter 6 elaborates more on the pros and 
cons of using XML as the basis for encoding the ITPSL semantics. 
At this point, this Chapter has identified the problem domain outlining the profile of a typical insid-
er and discussed relevant intrusion specification research efforts, in order to provide the basis for 
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specifying insider threats. Specification is an important step in the process of understanding the na-
ture of a threat. If one is able to specify a problem, it can be inferred that the problem is sufficiently 
understood, in order to make the first step towards its mitigation. Despite the fundamental research 
paradigms presented by intrusion specification research efforts  the field produced frameworks that 
were not interoperable and descriptive for insider threat specification. 
The transition from intrusion to insider threat specification is a new research area and a core issue 
of IT misuse. A good understanding of what constitutes an insider threat is derived by the ability to 
systemically define the threat. Thus, the next Chapter makes the transition from generic threat spec-
ification to insider threat specification, introducing essentials concepts and misuse language para-
digms. 
2.4 Conclusions
This Chapter defined the IT misuse problem domain by means of providing essential definitions for 
the terms insider and misuse. Case studies and recent survey data were presented to prove that legit-
imate users can pose a serious threat for the health of IT infrastructures, either by means of inten-
tional  (malicious)  actions or by accident.  Finally,  two relevant  intrusion specification examples 
(CISL, Panoptis) were discussed, in order to set the scene for the concept of insider threat specifica-
tion.    
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Chapter 3 Insider Threat Specification
3.1 Defining insider threat specification
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Chapter 1  defined the term 'threat' [1], whereas the second chapter elaborated on the term insider 
[11]. Drawing upon these definitions, we must now define the term 'insider threat specification', as 
ITPSL is concerned with specifying insider threats.
Insider Threat Specification is the process of using a standardized vocabulary to describe in an ab-
stract way how the aspects and behavior of an insider relate to a security policy defined misuse sce-
nario.
The need for a standardized vocabulary is satisfied by the existence of taxonomies of the research 
domain, many of which are discussed in later paragraphs. These taxonomies form the foundation for 
designing suitable ITPSL semantics. The way they describe and abstract threat issues shapes what 
ITPSL should be describing. 
Personality, organizational role, financial status and access credentials are some examples of insider 
aspects. In contrast, the insider behavior refers to the actions of an individual for accessing, repre-
senting or deciding about organizational assets.
A security policy defined misuse scenario implies the existence of a monitoring policy. Chapter 1 
mentioned the security policy [10] that defines in plain language the borders between acceptable 
and unacceptable usage of IT resources. However, this plain language description must then be con-
verted into suitable monitoring statements. Bace [25] discusses the difference between a security 
and a monitoring policy by providing the following example: Assume that an organization has the 
following line in its security policy:
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'Access to the patient financial information is restricted to the accounting clerk.' 
This should be translated to the following monitoring policy statement, representing an if-then rule-
based pseudo-code of a system-level monitoring application:
'If patient financial information is accessed and subject is not a member of the group “account-
ing-clk”, then generate an alert'.
An important observation to make in this case is that the transition from security to monitoring poli-
cy adds system-level specificity. From a generic statement, we go to a more specific one, expressing 
a policy in terms of the subject user (potential misuser), a user group (part of an IT infrastructure's  
authentication system) and the act of accessing the information. 
This shift towards more IT system specific (yet still abstracted) parts and user actions is indicative 
of what a misuse detection and prediction language should describe. ITPSL is closer to the monitor-
ing policy of an organization. A misuse monitoring policy examines user actions against misuse 
scenarios.  Figure 3.1  illustrates the relations between user entities, the security and monitoring 
policies and the various components of the IT infrastructure. 
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Figure 3.1: Misuse detection information flow 
The security analyst  translates the Security (and resulting monitoring policy) into a set of misuse 
scenario signatures. The involvement of a specialist  is necessary as the process of translating from 
security to monitoring policy is error prone. A signature is a convention to encode a pattern of 
events that is known to be part of a misuse act. Misuse detection [25] employs pattern matching 
techniques expressed by signatures to detect known threats. In contrast, anomaly detection [25] is 
another major technique that facilitates detection of threats by means of sensing deviation from a 
normal behavior. Both techniques complement each other and it is possible to use signatures to em-
ploy both traditional misuse detection and anomaly detection criteria. This is demonstrated in later 
sections of the document that discuss the proposal of ITPSL semantics.
37
Chapter 3 Insider Threat Specification
The misuse scenario signatures and collected audit data [25] from the IT infrastructure are fed into a 
misuse detection engine that infers the presence of threats. The presence of reliable and relevant au-
dit data is very important, in order to make use of the produced misuse signatures. Chapter 5 pro-
vides an in-depth discussion of the audit data requirements for insider threat specification and pro-
poses a suitable audit engine for that purpose.
 
Lastly, how the threat description relates to a misuse scenario provides two important contexts for 
insider threat specification:
 The threat detection context: Concerns detecting the occurrence of the threat scenario.
 The threat prediction context: Concerns detecting signs of the threat scenario.
A clear distinction between the two contexts is important for specifying insider threats. Threat de-
tection should encompass all the essential events that constitute the threat scenario as part of the 
specification. On the other hand, a threat prediction context should include all the essential events 
plus relevant event precursors. The prediction process is of course concerned with assessing the rel-
evance of the event precursors to a particular threat. This implies that insider threat specification in 
a prediction context should adequately describe both the precursor, as well as their relevance to 
what is being predicted.  This is the role of decision theoretic information being incorporated inside 
the threat specification process. This gives ground to Doyle's criticisms [19] of CISL [17].
Another attribute of the distinction between the insider threat detection and prediction contexts con-
cerns the ability to specify the temporal basis of events. The graph of Figure 3.2 below illustrates 
the concept.  Imagine that an organization has an explicit rule that forbids the downloading of pirat-
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ed material using peer-to-peer applications within the local IT infrastructure. As a result, a security 
analyst uses a  specification mechanism (in threat prediction context) to tackle the threat. If the x-
axis represents time, the significance of events (y-axis) increases the closer we get (time-wise) to 
the actual downloading of the pirated material. Each sub-block specifies a unique combination of 
events.  If the user searches for P2P applications on a search engine (event 1), up to the point where 
he executes the installed P2P application, he is not breaking the rule. Hence, events 1 to 3 constitute 
the threat precursors and a clear security policy should distinguish between the precursors and the 
threat (event 4). However, the event correlation is time dependent (sequence of events) and hence 
temporal information is important for specifying threats.
Figure 3.2: Temporal information in threat prediction context
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3.2 An overview of misuse detection languages
The previous section concluded with a discussion of the importance of temporal information as part 
of the threat specification process. The temporal indications as well as the discrete events identified 
as part of a misuse signature (Figure 3.2) are at the heart of the design of misuse detection lan-
guages. In the context of information security, misuse detection languages are research tools that 
describe misuse activities in a consistent manner. Consequently, it is important to consider notable 
some examples of these tools and decide which of their design aspects can be borrowed by ITPSL.  
The field of misuse detection has devised two types of languages:
 Textual representation misuse detection languages: These languages use purely text sig-
natures to represent a misuse detection scenario. 
 Graphical representation misuse detection languages: This type of misuse detection lan-
guages employs a range of state transition analysis [26] methods (Finite State Automata 
[27], Colored Petri Nets [28] ) to model and study intuitively misuse scenarios.
Notable examples of textual representation misuse detection languages are the Production-Based 
Expert System Toolset (P-BEST) for the EMERALD project [29] and the Rule Based Sequence 
Evaluation Language (RUSSEL) for ASAX [30].  Both of these language paradigms are based on 
'if-then' rules that are wrapped around semantics to infer attacks. The inference ability is important 
because it forms the basis to encode decision theoretic information, a desired property of insider 
threat specification.
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P-BEST [29] is of particular importance, as it is one of the first systems that facilitates host and net -
work based misuse detection by means of combining a 'modus ponens' inference schema with suit-
able system-level semantics. In formal logic, a 'modus ponens' (MP) assertion is a simple argument 
form by which we can infer q from p if : (p => q) and p we deduce q. In other words, if we have a 
set of events/facts that are part of a threat (threat detection context) or precursors of a threat (threat 
prediction), we can infer the threat by means of MP statements that are called production rules. The 
events/facts are often implemented by semantic attributes and their values represent the state of the 
domain we are examining. 
Figure 3.3 below contains the semantics of a P-BEST production rule that infers a buffer overflow 
attack. The 'rule' keyword associates a block of conditions and an inferred event (buffer overrun at-
tack) via the '==>' operator. Each of the conditions is the result of an Operating System audit record 
reduction operation ('AUE_EXEC' and 'AUE_EXECVE' are special audit record flags that mark the 
execution of a program, whereas the '^\\' string indicates some arguments of interest that are known 
to cause buffer overflow conditions for specific applications). We can also observe a semantic con-
sistency: Each of the conditions is enclosed in square brackets and the entire production rule is con-
tained within a square bracket block preceded by the 'rule' keyword.
 rule[BSM_LONG_SUID_EXEC(*): 
[+e:bsm_event] 
     [?|e.header_event_type==’AUE_EXEC|| e.header_event_type==’AUE_EXECVE] 
     [?|e.subject_euid != e.subject_ruid ] 
     [?|contains (e.exec_args, "ˆ\\") == 1] 
    [?|e.header_size > ’NORMAL_LENGTH] ==> 
 [!|printf("ALERT: Buffer overrun attack on command %s\n", e.header_command)] 
 ] 
Figure 3.3: P-BEST production rule semantics to detect a buffer overflow
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The P-BEST work is important not only for setting the foundations of expert systems in misuse de-
tection. It was also one of the earlier examples of cross-platform misuse detection languages, as it  
spanned an entire range of research and development Operating Systems that were used at the time, 
from Free-BSD and Solaris to Linux. Moreover, section 8 of the P-BEST paper [29] provided one 
of the first acknowledgments of the need to create public misuse detection signature creation tools, 
by envisaging a web service that would allow users to create their own rule sets and apply them to 
their environment. 
rule Masquerader() 
  begin 
  i f evt=‘login’     and     not habitual_term( userid, terminal) 
                      and     not habitual_time( userid, timestp) 
       —>     Trigger off for next Watch(userid, profileof(userid) ) ; 
  fi ; 
  Trigger off for next Masquerader() 
  end 
 rule Watch ( suspectid: integer ; profile:table[cmnd:byte_string, maxtimes:int] )
  i f userid = suspectid and evt=‘login’ 
       and habitual_time( userid, timestp) and habitual_term( userid, terminal) 
       —> skip; 
       userid = suspectid and is_an_entry_in( evt, profile) 
       —> begin maxtimes := select(evt,profile); 
                        Trigger off for next 
                          Count_rule3 (suspectid, maxtimes, timestp+ 3600, evt ); 
                        Trigger off for next Watch( suspectid, profile) 
              end ; 
       true 
       —> Trigger off for next Watch( suspectid, profile) 
  fi 
Figure 3.4: RUSSEL semantics to detect a masquerader
RUSSEL [30] maintains the 'if-then' structure but also provides additional programming constructs 
to specify and infer intrusive activities. These programming constructs include (beyond the condi-
tional part of a production rule) structures to describe repetitive events, compound actions and logi-
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cal operators to express event variance. This is an important aspect of the semantic structure of a 
threat specification, as it increases its expressive power. Figure 3.4  provides a RUSSEL example.
This RUSSEL example is concerned with detecting masqueraders, legitimate users that try to dis-
guise in the system as a different person/user. Detection is performed by means of a compound ac-
tion: A set of conditions on the 'Masquerade' rule  triggers the detection of criteria described in a 
different rule ('Watch'). Apart from the trigger mechanism, one should take note of the logical oper-
ators (AND, NOT), as well as the fact that the layout resembles procedural programming languages 
('begin' and 'end' keywords).
On the other hand, language designs such as the Event Description Language EDL [31], STATL 
[32], SUTHEK [33] and IDIOT [34] are examples of graphical representation misuse detection lan-
guages. Instead of using just a textual representation of the events that constitute a threat, a graphi-
cal representation can provide a more intuitive understanding of the threat scenario. This is because 
it provides a level of abstraction that separates the detection rule semantics from the actual algo-
rithms [33], a desired property for insider threat modeling.
Figure 3.5 illustrates a state diagram and the associated STATL semantics to encode an ftp-write at-
tack. In this attack (which is now addressed in most FTP server systems), a malicious user of the 
FTP service creates a .rhosts file in a world writeable directory. The created file contains the IP ad-
dress of a remote host and can then be used to bypass the authentication system of the FTP server (a 
valid login name and password are no longer required by the FTP server). Thus, the malicious at-
tacker can obtain illegal access to the FTP service.
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Use ustat;
scenario ftp_write
{
int user;  int pid;  int inode;
initial state s0 { }
transition create_file (s0 -> s1)
                nonconsuming
             { [WRITE w]: (w.euid != 0) &&
                  (w.owner != w.ruid)
                { inode = w.inode; }
   }
State s1 { } transition login (s1 -> s2) 
  nonconsuming 
{  [EXEC e] : match_name(e.objname, "login") 
  {  user = e.ruid; pid = e.pid; } } 
state s2 { } 
transition read_rhosts (s2 -> s3) 
  consuming 
{ [READ r] : (r.pid == pid) && (r.inode == 
inode) } 
state s3  { { 
  string username; userid2name(user, username); 
  log("remote user %s gained local access”, 
username); }}}
Figure 3.5: FTP write attack in STATL [32]
The state transition diagram (STD) of Figure 3.5 contains the discrete states of the attack. A state 
represents a snapshot of the system condition. Obviously, for the purposes of conceptualizing the 
misuse attack, we are not interested in representing the complete state of the operating system (file,  
network, kernel structures, etc) but only the events that are important for the attack to occur. State  
transitions (denoted by the arced arrows) represent an action that will change the system condition 
and help the attack evolve. 
How the misuse attack evolves is the important thing to consider in a state transition diagram. Fig-
ure 3.5 illustrates three different types of arced arrows:
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 Solid arc with single arrowhead: This type of transition indicates a non-consuming state 
transition. A non-consuming state transition is one that cannot prevent the execution of fur-
ther instances of the misuse attack. In other words, both the source state and destination state 
for the transition are still valid.
 Solid arc with dual arrowhead: This type of transition indicates a consuming state transition. 
A consuming state transition prevents the execution of further instances of the misuse attack. 
The source state of the transition is no longer valid, as the consuming state moves the mis-
use one step further.
 Dashed arcs: An unwinding transition invalidates all events between the source and destina-
tion state, so it rolls the snapshot of the system back. 
Considering  the  exact  specification  of  misuse  detection  event  instances  is  fundamental  in  the 
process of insider threat specification. If one is able to distinguish between different occurrences of 
a specified misuse detection attack, this means that they are able to correlate events and provide a 
more precise detection mechanism.
 
In the FTP write attack example of Figure 3.5, states s1 to s3 involve  non consuming transitions. 
This means that there are multiple login processes on the FTP server, however, we are only interest-
ed in ones that read the .rhosts file after the login procedure is invoked (consuming state), indicating 
the evolution of the attack scenario. Alternatively, if the user deletes the .rhosts file prior logging 
into the server, that would roll the system back to an earlier snapshot, as the STD indicates.
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The rest of the mentioned graphical misuse languages follow similar approaches and they model the 
state transitions using slightly different methodologies. EDL [31] uses Petri nets to study not only 
the state transitions, but also note pre and post conditions for each event described in the signature. 
In addition, EDL introduces the notion of signature re-use, by means of detecting signature similari-
ties amongst a set of sequences. Like the authors of P-BEST [29], the EDL creators place emphasis 
on the creation of signature repositories. EDL emphasizes the importance of systemically producing 
accurate signature repositories by abstracting the relations amongst a set of signatures. In this case, 
abstraction means generalizing the signatures by taking away all the attack specific specifications. 
Figure 3.6: A signature abstraction tree (SAT) in EDL [31]
Figure 3.6 shows how the signature abstraction can be mapped by using a signature abstraction tree 
(SAT). Consider an initial signature S that is valid (carefully crafted by an expert analyst and veri-
fied to detect a known misuse incident). The objective is to produce valid signatures that detect 
variations of the initial misuse incident S, as well as valid signatures that detect more complex 
events. Starting from the root node S, we iteratively transform the original signature by discrete 
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transformation processes T. For example, signature AS1 is abstracted by signature S by means of 
transformation T1. AS1 can then be further abstracted to produce another signature AS5. 
An abstracted signature associated to a node of the abstraction tree may detect all signature mani-
festations of the signature of the parent node. Thus, a SAT defines a set theory [35] inclusion opera-
tion over all nodes that represent attack manifestations. In particular, if one considers MS , MAS1 
and MAS5 to be discrete manifestations of the misuse signatures S, AS1 and AS5 respectively, then 
the following set relation is true: MS  MAS⊆ 1   MAS⊆ 5 .
At this point, the previous discussion of misuse detection languages reveals notable characteristics 
that an insider misuse specification language should have:
 The semantics should facilitate a 'modus ponens' inference rule structure (if-then).
 It  should  express  event  timing  information,  describing  either  relative  or  absolute  time 
stamps or events in sequence.
 It should enable the language user to focus on system-level specific events, describing file, 
network and process execution activities.
 The semantics should enable the language user to detect discrete manifestations of misuse 
incidents (one or more).
 Utilities to re-use signatures (repositories) should be available.
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3.3 The semantic properties of misuse signatures 
The last section provided an important wish-list of insider threat specification characteristics . This 
list was drawn by reviewing a number of existing misuse detection languages. However, the critical 
question is how to design semantics so that it is easier for analysts to devise valid signatures, avoid-
ing scenarios of false negative and positive detection. Meier's seminal work  on misuse languages 
semantics [36] is a useful guide that emphasizes the importance of the semantic design by stating:  
”wrong understanding of the semantics of attack signatures is one of the main sources of false alerts  
or undetected attacks”. The same work also sets the foundations for facilitating the encoding of de-
cision theoretic information in a semantic framework and provides a checklist of “must-have” valid-
ity and expressiveness features of a misuse detection language. Thus, it is worth considering it care-
fully in the following paragraphs. 
Meier's work [36] re-iterates a number of points that have been covered in earlier paragraphs, such 
as the need for temporal event descriptors, the need to detect discrete manifestations (instances) of 
misuse incidents and the need to distinguish between consuming and non consuming steps. He de-
fines a complex event as a set of interrelated simple atomic steps (as recorded by the audit system). 
The occurrence of the complex event is matched by the occurrence of one or more  of the interrelat-
ed steps (which he calls basic events).
Meier's work goes into much more depth when it comes to systematizing the various levels of se-
mantic event descriptions. In particular, the work defines three dimensions of semantic event de-
scriptions:
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 Event pattern dimension  : This dimension examines how the event occurs examining aspects 
of:
 Type and order: Basic events may occur in sequence, in variations (disjunction – log-
ical OR operator), concurrently (conjunction – logical AND operator), or simultane-
ously (in parallel) as part of a complex event scenario. In some circumstances, one 
should also be able to express basic events that are not allowed to be part of the com-
plex event (negation – logical NOT operator).
 Repetition: This aspect facilitates the useful ability of specifying the number of times 
a basic step must occur in order to match the complex event (i.e. number of unsuc-
cessful login attempts within the hour).
 Continuity: If one considers a stream of consecutive events of type A,B and C, are 
we allowed to have an event instance c occurring between event instances a and b?
Concurrency: When specifying more complex event patterns (complex events that 
contain other complex events), it is necessary to be able to state whether the consti-
tuting  complex events may overlap or not overlap.
 Context conditions: Sometimes it is necessary to specify constraints on the context in 
which a complex event occurs. This increases the language specificity. For instance, 
we might define a particular set of conditions inside a single event specification to a 
specific file,  computer host or network connection.  This is  an example of an in-
tra-event context condition. In direct contrast, an inter-event context condition is one 
that matches at least two events. For example, the same set of conditions could be ap-
plied to a specific file in two different computers (two matching events in computers 
x and y). Inter-event context conditions are the basis for event correlation.
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The reader might assume at this point that some redundancy exists between the conjunctive 
and simultaneous operators of the 'type and order' aspect and those of the 'concurrency' as-
pect. This is not the case. The 'type and order' concurrency operators are used to express 
concurrency at the basic  event level, whereas the ones of the 'concurrency' aspects regulate 
the overlapping of complex events. The combination of the two in a complex event pattern 
(complex event of complex events) creates different possible scenarios for event execution 
flow. Figure 3.7 illustrates the difference between the two types of concurrences. 
Figure 3.7: Event concurrency operators by Meier [36]
Let us consider the following complex events: X:=(A; B; C) , Y:=(D; E; F) Z1:=non-overlap 
(X; Y), Z2:=overlap(X; Y) and finally Z3:=(X AND Y). A non-overlapping sequence of 
complex events X and Y (Z1) prohibits any overlap between the events: if event D was 
found before event C, that would not match the pattern Z1. On the other hand, for an over-
lapping specification of the same complex event pattern (Z2), if events D and E occurred at 
the same time as A and B, but the entire sequence finished with F, the event pattern would 
match the event specification. Finally, if we applied the 'type and order' conjunction opera-
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tor, what we really mean is that we have an execution...Overlapping specification is often 
considered the default specification. 
 Step instance selection dimension  :  Instance selection has been discussed in earlier  para-
graphs, referencing the STATL [26] semantics. Consider an event type pattern E3:= (A; B; 
C) where events of type B correspond to log events that document the values of a network  
event e.g. the number of occurrences of a specific network endpoint. In addition, suppose 
the following audit trail t2 records the following event instances: t2:= {a1 b1 b2 b3 c1}. The 
question now is which instance of type B events shall be selected as a valid match for event 
type B. There are three possibilities:
 Selecting the first instance: Often used as the default choice, this would validate an 
event instance pattern {a1,b1,c1} to match the event pattern E3. 
 Selecting the last instance: If we use the last instead of the first event instance, the 
following pattern {a1 b3 c1} will match event pattern E3. 
 Selecting all instances: This means the pattern {a1 b1 b2 b3 c1} would match the 
event pattern E3.
 Step instance consumption dimension  : This final dimension is concerned with detailing the 
description of consuming and non-consuming events, as described in Figure 3.5 (FTP write 
attack example based on STATL [26] ). In contrast to concurrency operators that concerns 
events, instance consumption concerns individual events. An event is consuming when its 
occurrence cannot create a partial event instance, and non-consuming when its occurrence 
can create a partial event instance. To illustrate the concept more formally, consider the 
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event patterns E5:=(A; consuming B; C), E6:=(A; non-consuming B; C) and the audit trail 
t3:={a1,b1,a2,b2}:
 If we try to detect pattern E5, valid matches are the {a1,b1} and {a2,b2} subsets. 
This is because b1 consumes a1 and does not allow partial considerations of further 
occurrences of B in the event stream.
 If we try to detect patter E6, we have four valid subsets of t3: {a1,b1} , {a1,b2}, 
{a2,b1} and {a2,b2}.
Whether we choose to mark a step as consuming or non-consuming depends on its nature. 
For example, when describing events at system-level, a process fork [30] should normally be 
a non-consuming step, as any of the process children might be relevant to the misuse inci-
dent. On the other hand, exit events (destruction of a process or deletion of a file) are consid-
ered consuming steps. 
Meier's dimensions [36] act as a good benchmark of the expressive and precise definition facilities 
of a misuse detection language. None of the previously  discussed intrusion specification and mis-
use languages are complete in terms of fulfilling features like step instance selection and consump-
tion. However the work does not propose specific semantics. His criteria determine the abstracted 
functional role of semantics. This is one important aspect of designing semantics. The other one is 
the selection of words and structures to express the context and domain of misuse detection.
Magklaras and Furnell [37] propose a methodology for deriving semantics for insider misuse detec-
tion and prediction that includes three important steps:
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 the abstraction of the domain, which involves the removal of all the unnecessary details of 
the environment;
 the systematic categorization of the necessary (abstracted) details into language semantics;
 the process of engineering the developed semantics into software.
The domain abstraction is a critical part of the overall language design process  and raises the ques-
tion of which entities and data are relevant to the insider threat domain. Meier's abstraction [36] and 
the domain abstraction of [37] are examples of models. The following chapter will introduce the 
concept of insider threat models and will discuss further the ways of abstracting the insider threat 
domain. 
One final note prior to closing this section should be devoted to the issue of specifying insider threat 
prediction. Figure 3.2 illustrated the temporal nature of insider threats. Moreover, earlier paragraphs 
discussed the issues of step selection and consumption as they were derived by graphical misuse de-
tection languages. These two concepts provide the foundation for the partial detection of threats and 
the basis of insider threat prediction. However, none of the previously discussed misuse detection 
language efforts provide a mechanism for assessing the weight of each step, in a multi-step misuse 
detection scenario. This is a serious omission and later parts of this thesis discuss the necessity of 
such a mechanism, in order to predict threats.
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3.4 Conclusions 
In summary, this chapter defined the term insider threat specification and its two important con-
texts: the insider threat detection context, where the goal is to detect a particular type of threat, as 
well as the insider threat prediction one which aims to predict threats, both considered as insider 
threat mitigation measures.  Relevant misuse detection language studies were also discussed, in or-
der  to identify important insider threat specification functional capabilities, such as the 'modus po-
nens' rule inference structure, the ability to express event timing information, the focus on express-
ing system-level events, the discrete event specification capability and the ability to re-use specifi-
cation rules easily. The identification of these capabilities and their rigorous examination by Meier 
[36] creates the ground for  drawing a set of functional specifications for designing an insider threat 
prediction and specification language. These issues are examined in great detail in the next Chapter.
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Chapter 4 Insider threat taxonomies and models
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The previous chapter presented the essence of the insider threat specification and prediction con-
cepts, a number of misuse detection languages and concluded with a discussion of essential insider 
misuse signature properties. Hence, it provided one of the foundations of the proposed insider threat 
prediction and specification language (ITPSL). This chapter will provide an additional foundation 
by abstracting the problem domain, categorizing important semantic entities for ITPSL and listing 
the scope and functional requirements of our proposed language.
4.1 Insider misuse taxonomies 
In Chapter 2, the CISL [17] and Panoptis [18]  paradigms  proposed certain types of data to moni-
tor, without giving a concrete explanation on why these data were chosen and how they can aid the 
threat detection/prediction process. The first chapter of the thesis presented notable insider misuse 
case studies and surveys and concluded that whilst generic trends can be spotted, this is not enough 
information to have a concrete picture of the problem. In order to select with confidence a range of  
insider misuse threat descriptors, a more systemic view of the problem is needed. Information secu-
rity taxonomies and threat models provide the answer to these questions.     
Taxonomies are efforts to classify information. Threat Models are attempts to make use of the sys-
temic knowledge of the taxonomies and estimate threat levels and/or simulate threat scenarios to 
help insider misuse researchers understand better important concepts and ultimately estimate threat 
levels. A model is an “abstraction of the system being studied rather than an alternative representa-
tion of that system” [38]. This abstracted representation of the system should closely resemble its 
real-world behavior. The process of abstracting a real-world situation implies that not all  informa-
tion about its attributes and functions is transferred into the model. Only those attributes and func-
tions that are relevant for the study of certain aspects of the entities involved are included.  Thus, in-
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sider threat model designers need to consider carefully which attributes and behavioral characteris-
tics of a legitimate user are important to a threat estimation process. Later paragraphs of this chapter 
will discuss these issues in more detail.
As with intrusion specification languages, intrusion specification taxonomies are not a new idea in 
the information security field. An overview of intrusion specification taxonomies is provided by 
Furnell et al [39]. Amongst these taxonomies, one that specifically addresses insider IT misuse inci-
dents  is  given by Tuglular [40].  This taxonomy integrates an established security policy to the 
process of classifying computer misuse incidents in three dimensions: incident, response and conse-
quences. These dimensions can be divided into additional sub-dimensions that further classify a par-
ticular misfeasor. Tuglular’s paper is one of the first to suggest a ‘target-type of threat’ association 
as a way to prevent insider misuse. The target is an ‘asset’ and the rule is called a ‘strategy’ in the 
terminology he proposes. The suggestion is mentioned in a single sentence and forms the basis for a 
methodology to predict insider misuse threats. If one can associate successfully certain actions to 
threats then it establishes the first step towards systematizing insider IT threat prediction. 
Most research efforts in the field of intrusion taxonomy classification are still at an early stage. The 
Tuglular taxonomy, and others mentioned in [39], are useful for the systematic study of intrusions, 
but they offer little help to a process designed to automatically detect intrusive activities. This is be-
cause the classification criteria employed by these taxonomies cannot be qualified or quantified 
very easily by an Intrusion Detection System with the level of information they exhibit. Moreover, 
none of these taxonomies is tailored for the process of estimating the likelihood of Insider Threat.
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The best way of enhancing the expressiveness of an intrusion taxonomy scheme for insider misuse 
activities is to focus on the human actions and how their consequences impact the elements of the 
IT infrastructure that are being targeted. The idea is that it is easier to detect which particular ele-
ment is affected by a potentially intrusive action, rather than focusing on the task of sensing the mo-
tives for initializing an attack or focusing on other non-system detectable factors of the insider mis-
use domain.
The first thesis chapter demonstrated the perplexing variable nature of insider IT misuse. What is 
considered as misuse by a well-defined IT usage policy is not the same across different organiza-
tions. Hence, another important property of a suitable Insider IT misuse prediction taxonomy is the 
freedom of the security architect to choose what can be considered as an Insider IT misuse threat in-
dicator  and even decide  on the confidence of  each indicator.  Most  taxonomies  enforce a  rigid 
framework for classifying phenomena with clear borders of distinction that offer little space for sub-
jective or varying interpretation of facts. This schema does not fit the case of Insider IT misuse pre-
diction. As a result, one can construct a suitable threat prediction taxonomy based around conse-
quences detected at system level [37]. Figure 4.1 below displays the top level of the taxonomy 
structure  indicating  the  three  primary,  non-mutually  exclusive  levels  that  address  these  conse-
quences.
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Figure 4.1: Top hierarchy level of an insider misuse taxonomy
Figure 4.2: File-system manipulation O/S consequences
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The Operating System (O/S) based consequences are branched down to two sub-levels of file-sys-
tem and memory manipulation, illustrated by Figures 4.2 and 4.3 respectively.  A justification for 
this is that a large number of security faults [41] involve filesystem and memory management is-
sues, and indeed the core modules of UNIX [42] and Windows-based [43] operating systems pro-
vide (amongst others) specific support for the related functions. Hence, it is safe to assume that 
these two kernel functional attributes can be used as a strong criterion for further classifying legiti-
mate user activities.
Figure 4.3: Memory manipulation O/S consequences
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At File/Directory level, a misuser may attempt to read or alter (write/create) certain files. These 
files might contain sensitive or unauthorised information (information theft or fraudulent modifica-
tion of vital information). A knowledgeable insider might also attempt to read or modify file infor-
mation that is not directly related to its content. Bach [42] and Richter [43] emphasize that most Op-
erating Systems allow a file to contain additional information such as access/creation/modification 
times as well as information that relates the file to its owner and permits access to it under certain  
conditions. Although the mechanisms that implement these file attributes are different amongst Op-
erating Systems, they are collectively known as file metadata and they are vital mechanisms to se-
cure the privacy, availability and integrity of the file contents. Consequently, they are good candi-
dates for exploitation by a legitimate user who is about to perform a deliberate or accidental misuse 
act. 
The points mentioned in the previous paragraph are also valid for ‘filesystem’ related data. Every 
Operating System organizes its files and directories by means of a specific set of rules that define 
how a file (contents and metadata) are about to be stored on the physical medium. The Operating 
System sub-modules that handle these issues are known as filesystems. Attempts to read or alter the  
physical medium’s Master Boot Record (MBR), intentional or accidental modification of partition 
table data are some of the most notable auditable actions that could point to legitimate user misuse 
acts. Chapter 1 mentioned Robert Hanssen’s attempt to hide information in modified floppy disks 
[12]. This is a classic reminder of this kind of activity. 
In addition to filesystem content and metadata modification, a small-scale survey of insider misuse 
conducted by Magklaras and Furnell [44] showed that excessive disk space consumption is per-
ceived as a problem for many of the respondents. Under certain conditions that depend on the con-
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figuration of the IT infrastructure, a legitimate user might produce a deliberate or accidental Denial 
of Service attack (DoS). 
Memory inspection is the best way to see if a legitimate user attempts to run or even install a suspi-
cious program.  Indeed, it is one of the core techniques used in the detection of overtly malicious 
code, such as viruses and Trojan horse programs.  The usage of unauthorised programs is a serious 
issue that can also create a way for accidental misuse by introducing a number of system vulnerabil-
ities, as described by Papadaki et al [45].  The execution or installation of these programs could be 
intercepted by either recognising a program’s footprint in memory or by intercepting a well-known 
series of system calls produced by various suspicious programs. For example, the fact that a non-ad-
vanced user is trying to compile an advanced vulnerability scanning tool is an event that should be 
noticed and serve as a good indicator of potential misuse activities that are about to follow.
In addition, attempts to consume large memory portions of an operational system that are related to 
a legitimate user account can serve as good indicators of (intentional or accidental) insider misuse at 
Operating System level. One might argue that the ‘irregular memory usage’ sub-categories should 
really belong under the ‘Program execution’ hierarchy of events. However, it is possible that some-
one will produce a quick and easy Denial of Service attack on a running system by forcing the host 
to commit large portions of system memory to a process, as demonstrated in various case studies 
described by Moore et al [46]. Moreover, a large category of security faults can be achieved by 
means of accessing normally restricted memory areas, creating what is commonly known as a “buf-
fer overflow” attack [47]. As a result of these issues, it was felt that a separate sub-category hierar-
chy should exist to describe these events (Figure 4.3).
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The filesystem and memory manipulation consequences conclude the O/S consequence category of 
the proposed taxonomy (Figure 4.1). The next category, “network consequences”, represents anoth-
er distinct set of factors that could be taken into consideration in order to classify insider misuse 
threat indicators. Figure 4.4 illustrates the network-related consequences of acts that could be used 
as legitimate user threat indicators. 
Figure 4.4: Network consequences of the insider IT misuse prediction taxonomy
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Network packets that are associated with certain legitimate users and indicate the usage of a variety 
of network protocols and applications that might introduce certain vulnerabilities are also distinct 
ways of accidental or intentional IT misuse. For example, it could be said that a user that employs  
the TELNET [48] protocol to login to a multi-user system is more likely to have her account com-
promised than a user who logins via the Secure Shell (SSH) application [49] due to the fact that the 
earlier application transmits the user password in clear-text form across the network, whereas the 
latter one encrypts it.
Someone might also like to differentiate between TCP and UDP based applications/protocols. From 
a potential threat point of view, UDP services are less secure than TCP based ones. For example, 
Ziegler [50] discusses in detail how UDP’s lack of flow control and state mechanisms can create 
various data security problems. Consequently, the distinction between the usage of UDP and TCP 
services can serve as a potential insider misuse threat indicator, on the basis that UDP services are 
more likely to be accidentally (or intentionally) abused by a legitimate user.
Although the ‘Filesystem Manipulation’ subcategory of the taxonomy indicates ways with which 
disk storage capacity can be misused, the results of over-utilization can also affect network capaci-
ty. For instance, a legitimate user could start downloading massive quantities of data, exceeding the 
network bandwidth cost budget of a business (Downloading over X Mbytes of data in a period Y). 
The X and Y number limits can be selected by the network administrator according to the company 
budget requirements.
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In addition, a legitimate user might also cause network congestion by exceeding the data network’s 
‘burst’  or throughput capacity or exhausting the number of available network endpoints,  as de-
scribed by Sharda [51]. Bandwidth hungry applications, such as video streaming players, and multi-
ple data transfers can cause congestion that can severely impact the performance of a data network 
or affect the Quality of Service (QoS) of certain applications that require sustained data network 
throughput.
Finally, incoming or outgoing SMTP headers or attachments might indicate activity related to e-
mail misuse that can certainly be traced in network or host level. Outgoing e-mails that contain a set  
of particular files as attachments (e.g. password database files, other sensitive material) and have 
unusual destination addresses (e.g. unknown Hotmail accounts, a large number of recipients) should 
serve not necessarily as intrusion indicators but as insider threat estimators. The plethora of mali-
cious code efforts and phishing techniques may have an external origin, but the threat is realized by 
the actions of unsuspecting legitimate users. In addition, proprietary information theft could also be 
realized by means of emailing sensitive material to non-authorized external entities. 
The last system consequences category (“hardware”) plays an important role in preventing a num-
ber of computer system threats. Insiders can often access the physical hardware of the machine very 
easily. Thus, removal or addition of hardware components, as well as modifications of their default 
configuration are some of the events that may act as important indicators of insider misuse predic-
tion in a computer system.
At this point, we have a taxonomy tailored to the needs of automated Insider Threat detection and 
prediction because:
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 It is heavily based on factors that are easily qualified/detected at system level.
 It is flexible enough to allow the security architect to define what is considered as a threat 
element. For example, he could define which user network protocols are more likely to pose 
a threat to the system when they are utilised by a particular legitimate user. This is a neces-
sary requirement because what can be considered as legitimate user misuse varies amongst 
different organisations.
However, in order to make use of these threat indicators, we need a way to quantify them. This  
paves the way for the discussion of  various Insider Threat Models presented in the following para-
graphs.
Earlier paragraphs defined the notion of a model as  an “abstraction of the system being studied 
rather than an alternative representation of that system”. Consequently, the first important step of 
deriving an Insider Threat Prediction Model is to decide which attributes and behavioural (function-
al) characteristics of a legitimate user are important to the Threat Estimation Process. This will pro-
duce a set of Insider Threat Qualification Attributes (ITQAs). The whole process is discussed in the 
next section of this chapter.
4.2 Insider Threat Models
The next step in the process of establishing our proposed language is to look into insider modeling. 
An insider threat model's purpose is to describe how the ITQAs can be quantified, in order to esti-
mate the level of insider threat per individual user. This will involve the establishment of a suitable 
mathematical function, which will take as input a number of ITQAs and will associate them with a 
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certain level of threat. We shall call this function the Estimated Potential Threat function, which 
quantifies the ITQAs. At this point, the overall target of our ideal model will be achieved: the estab-
lishment of a mechanism that will map ITQAs to certain threat levels. 
The development of insider threat models is a relatively new idea. Wood [52] provides an excellent 
basis for qualifying a set of metrics to mitigate insider threat. Most of these criteria are in line with 
the conclusions discussed as part of the previously described insider misuse taxonomy by Magk-
laras and Furnell [37].
 
In particular, Wood suggests that a malicious insider can be qualified in terms of distinct attributes:
 Access: The insider has unlimited access to some part or all parts of the IT infrastructure and 
the ability to physically access the equipment hardware. Consequently, the insider can initi-
ate an attack without triggering traditional system security defenses.
 Knowledge: The legitimate user is familiar with some or all the internal workings of the tar-
get systems or has the ability to obtain that knowledge without arousing suspicion.
 Privileges:  The malicious  insider  should not  have problems obtaining  the  privileges  re-
quired to mount an infrastructure attack.
 Skills: The knowledgeable insider will always have the skills to mount an attack that is usu-
ally limited to systems that he/she is very familiar with. The model assumes that a given ad-
versary is unlikely to attack unfamiliar targets.
 Tactics: This attribute refers to the methods used to launch the malicious attack. They are 
dependent on the goal of the attack and might include a variety of scenarios such as plant-
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hit-and-run, attack-and-eventually run, attack-until-caught as well as passive information ex-
traction acts.
 Motivation: Insiders might launch the attack for profit or sabotaging the target organization. 
Some of them might mount an attack for personal reasons such as taking revenge against the 
enterprise or even satisfy their plans to invoke some policy change inside an organization.
 Process: The model assumes that a legitimate user follows a basic predictable process to 
mount an attack that consists of distinct stages. First the malicious adversary will become 
motivated to mount the attack. The next logical stages involve the identification of the tar-
get, the planning of the attack and finally the act of mounting the attack itself. 
All of the previously mentioned attributes emphasize important aspects of the insider misuse prob-
lem. The discussed insider case studies of Chapter 1 have presented comments on the importance of 
insider attributes such as role, knowledge and privileges.  A very useful comment with respect to 
the Insider Threat Estimation modeling comes from the process attribute. The fact that Wood char-
acterizes an insider attack as a ‘predictable’ process is a positive sign for the goal of establishing an 
insider threat model.     
However, Wood’s criteria do not necessarily represent a clear picture for the establishment of an in-
sider threat prediction model. Not all stages of an insider attack can be safely predicted. Some of the 
previously mentioned attributes are difficult to qualify by an Intrusion Detection System. The ‘moti-
vation’ adversary attribute is one of them. 
It is very difficult to establish a set of sensors that could reliably deduce when an individual be-
comes motivated to misuse a system.  For instance, let us suppose that IDS sensors record that a 
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commercially important file is transferred from a disk to an external storage medium in the early 
morning hours. The fact that this particular file transfer took place could be related to a malicious 
act or an innocent file backup process performed by the system administrator as part of a system re-
covery process. It is important to maintain a record of these types of events, but their existence does 
not necessarily indicate an insider misuse event in progress. The plethora of the potential origins of 
such an event would increase the amount of information to be evaluated. Consequently, the com-
plexity of  the algorithms to capture and evaluate  this  type  of information would deem this  at-
tribute’s exploitation impractical. At the time of writing, there is not a known algorithm, which is  
able to capture and evaluate that kind of information in existing Intrusion Detection Systems.
If  someone observes the different stages of the ‘process’ insider-modeling attribute,  it  becomes 
clear that the closer we get to the actual attack itself, the stronger the indicators of insider threat. Al-
though  detecting  motivation  might  be  tricky,  with  a  carefully  chosen  quantification  scheme of 
ITQAs,  someone could  sense  an  adversary during  the  target  identification  and attack  planning 
stages. This strategy goes along the line of thinking of our proposed misused taxonomy being based 
on system-level factors.
In addition, other attributes seem to be so closely related that might be redundant. For instance, it  
would be more logical to combine the attributes of ‘access’ and ‘privileges’ into one ‘insider access 
rights’.  The issue of obtaining a privilege to mount an attack should include logical and physical 
means of interacting with the systems. The same could be said for the attributes of ‘knowledge’ and 
‘skills’, because the ways in which a legitimate user gets to know a system and what can be inferred 
from the insider’s system knowledge are issues that are closely interrelated.
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Due to its introductory scope, Wood’s paper [52] does not deal with the quantification of insider 
threat attributes. It is unknown whether this means that a suitable threat modeling function has been 
deduced as part of the preliminary model mentioned in this paper. The author has yet to publish a 
completed version of the model for verification.
A more recent research effort by Schultz [53] presents a preliminary framework for understanding 
and predicting insider attacks by providing a combination of behavioural and system usage ITQA 
metrics.  The paper mentions the detection of system usage patterns that may act as “signatures” of 
a legitimate user or certain indicators of an attack preparation (“deliberate markers” and “preparato-
ry behaviour”). Legitimate users might also make noticeable mistakes in the process of misusing a 
system (meaningful errors). Finally, “correlated usage patterns” refers to sequences of actions that 
might not be detected in individual systems but they could certainly indicate misuse when consid-
ered against multiple systems.
Schultz also suggests that certain aspects of a legitimate user’s personality could serve as threat in-
dicators. In particular, on-line (e-mail, IRC or other forms of computerised human-to-human com-
munication) verbal behaviour with signs of aggression, dominance towards particular people might 
serve as a good prognosis factor of certain attacks (“verbal behaviour”). Furthermore, based on the 
works of Shaw et al [54], the research suggests that it is possible to examine other “personality 
traits” as potential threat indicators. 
The Schultz preliminary framework even suggests a way to quantify all these metrics by means of a 
multiple regression equation that consists of the summation of the ITQA metric variables multiplied 
by their weightings. If X1, X2, X3… XN represent the quantified ITQA metrics,  Wi (i=1, i=N) their 
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respective weights and C an arithmetic offset constant, then the expected estimated threat Xe is de-
rived in Figure 4.5 below.
Xe = (Σ WiXi) +C = W1.X1 + W2X2 + W3X3 + …+ WNXN  + C
Figure 4.5: Schultz threat model equation
One notable absence of the Schultz insider threat prediction scheme is that there is no direct associ-
ation between the estimated level of threat and the legitimate user’s level of technical knowledge. 
Although the proposed metrics can provide evidence that could be used to infer the level of user so-
phistication, there is no mentioning of a mechanism that takes that into consideration. Given the fact 
that, at the time of writing, the field of Insider Threat modeling is premature to reveal any usable re-
sults, it is difficult to prove the real impact of user sophistication on the threat level. On the other  
hand, Wood’s model, a number of case studies and the survey results (chapter 1) provide strong in-
dications that there is a direct relationship between these two concepts. In that sense, the lack of a 
legitimate user sophistication gauging component could present a serious omission of the Schultz 
framework.
In addition, the exploitation of future mechanisms that will associate personality traits to potential 
misuse threat levels raises certain ethical and feasibility concerns. It is outside the scope of the the-
sis to examine ethical issues and the various laws that are associated with them. Nevertheless, the 
process of designing a model that is going to be employed in the real world should take into consid-
eration its troublesome aspects.  A metric that penalizes real people in terms of their character traits  
will be considered unethical by many and depending on regional legislation may be also not feasi-
ble to implement.  
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In summary, the Schultz framework is more refined than Wood’s earlier Insider Threat model in 
that it provides more concrete examples of ITQA metrics as well as a basic quantification mecha-
nism for them. However the framework is still in its infancy. The author acknowledges that the cho-
sen metrics need further refinement in order to prove their usefulness in a threat estimation process.
Both models concentrate on malicious (i.e. intentional activities) without considering accidental in-
sider misuse actions. This can be a serious omission for a model that aims to address all aspects of  
the insider threat issue, as the problem of accidental insider misuse does exist and can have serious 
consequences (as shown in the Norwich Union  versus Western Provident Association case  [15], 
previously mentioned in Chapter 1). 
Brancik's [55] seminal work on the insider threat modeling should be referenced as a good source of 
information. Brancik's efforts center around information alteration, which is an important element 
of insider fraud,  despite the fact that insider misuse surveys indicate that the frequency of these in-
cidents are lower than other most common misuse incidents (web and email abuse).  His Tailored 
Risk Integrated Process (TRIP) is the most important contribution. However, a risk management 
process deviates from traditional modeling approaches. This is because it focuses on factor evalua-
tion. Detection of threat metrics is not addressed extensively.
Finally, all of the aforementioned research efforts do not address the issue of managing the repre-
sentation of the data that feed the model component functions. One could argue that a preliminary 
model design needs to focus more on the scope, quality and quantity of its insider threat modeling 
functions. On the other hand, a well-thought definition of the procedures that represent and store the 
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data that feed the threat modeling functions may have a notable impact on the computational effi-
ciency and acceptance of the model. The reasons that support the need for this requirement are go-
ing to become apparent in the following paragraphs.
For all these reasons, a more formalized and broader model description is needed. An Insider Threat 
Prediction Model that attempts to overcome the shortcomings of previous research work has been 
published by Magklaras and Furnell [56]. 
Considering a legitimate user population that has access to various components of an IT infrastruc-
ture, the core of the Insider Threat Prediction Model is a three-level hierarchy of mathematical func-
tions evaluated in a bottom-up approach. At the top level, the Evaluated Potential Threat (EPT) 
function provides an integer value that quantifies and classifies the potential threat for each legiti-
mate user into three different categories.  If  x denotes the computed EPT for a legitimate user, 
EPT_MAX a threshold EPT value for considering the user a threat and EPT_MIN a threshold EPT 
value for considering the user’s on line presence as suspicious, then:
 Important internal threat (x ≥ EPT_MAX): It indicates a high potential of a particular user 
misusing the system.  
 Suspicious (EPT_MIN ≤ x < EPT_MAX): This flags a condition where a particular user be-
haves in a manner that does not constitute a substantial threat but it is still a concern.
 Harmless (0 ≤ x < EPT_MIN): To indicate that the potential of misuse is nearly non existent 
for a particular user. 
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It should be emphasized that the derived EPT value is an integer that represents a measure of the  
likelihood of system misuse, ranging from 0 to 100 points. Higher EPT scores indicate more proba-
ble threats. However, it should be noted that the model equations presented in this Chapter do not 
represent a validated probabilistic model. Since EPT represents likelihood of Insider IT misuse oc-
currence, one would expect the formulae to map a series of data to a probability figure. Although 
this is the aim of the model, in addition to the EPT function, one would then have to carefully relate 
the derived EPT score to the fact of whether the event really occurred or not. This comparison 
would facilitate the construction of proper probability distribution function, which relates a range of 
data to a probabilistic value of incident occurrence. As a result, the reader should be aware that 
there is a difference between the EPT score and an actual probabilistic figure. 
Each of the threat component functions models particular aspects of insider attributes and behavior. 
At the moment, in order to devise a well structured organization of threat components, the sugges-
tion is to provide two threat component functions. The first one considers legitimate user attributes 
such as access rights and professional role, whereas the second evaluates potential threat simply by 
examining aspects of user behavior at the system level, as shown in Figure 4.6.
EPT =  FITPQA = Fattributes + Fbehavior =>
EPT = Crole+Faccessrights+Fbehavior       =>
 EPT =  Crole  + Csysadm + Ccriticalfiles + Cutilities +       
Cphysicalaccess + Fsophistication + Ffileops + Fnetops + Fexecops
Figure 4.6: The Magklaras and Furnell model equation
74
Chapter 4 Insider threat taxonomies and models
It is envisaged that Fbehavior has a greater weight in the process of calculating the user EPT than Fat-
tributes. Legitimate user attributes are important and should always be taken into consideration. How-
ever, it is expected that amongst two users that have the same attributes, it is the gauging of their 
behavioral characteristics that can decide which one is more likely to constitute a greater level of 
threat for the system.  Hence, a total of 30 points will be contributed to EPT by F attributes and 70 
points by Fbehavior.  Fbehavior is expanded in a number of sub-functions, namely Ffileops,  Fnetops and Fexecops, 
corresponding to file, network and process execution operations in agreement with the proposed in-
sider threat taxonomy described in Section 4.2.
In addition, Table 1 lists the maximum weights of the nine top-level EPT formula components that  
are explained in detail in later sections of this chapter.  Some of these components are constants 
(Crole, Csysadm…etc) that belong to the Fattributes function, whereas others constitute sub-functions of the 
Fbehavior function that address the assessment of the legitimate user on-line behavior. 
The sum of the weights adds up to 100. This corresponds to a probability range of 0%-100%. The 
derivation of the defaults maximum values is a consequence of the aforementioned ratio between 
Fattributes and  Fbehavior. Due to the initial choice of weights between the Fattributes and Fbehavior functions, 
the 5 constants of Fattributes have a maximum score of 6 points, contributing a total score of 30.  The 
rest of the EPT components, should total a score of 70 points attributed to Fbehavior. Fsophistication at-
tributes 10 of these 70 points and the rest of the sub-functions can score a maximum of 20 points 
each. Consequently, the default values preserve that ratio and attribute almost equal weights for 
each sub-function component. 
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It should be emphasized that the proposed maximum weights on table 1 are not meant to be fixed. A 
system administrator/security specialist can re-define the maximum weights, in order to reward a 
particular metric that he trusts more than the others. For this reason, the nine weights of Table 1 
constitute the Weight Matrix, a very important parameter for the ITPM system. The Weight Matrix 
allows a specialist to further tune the sensitivity of the model, depending on the way he constructs  
misuse signatures, his confidence on the various metrics and the nature of the incident he is trying 
to predict. The security specialist would have to tune the weights of the various metrics by means of 
trial and error, based on good knowledge of the impact one or more IT misuse actions would have 
on the system. This feature enhances the adaptability of the proposed model scheme and enables to 
represent decision theoretic information.
EPT Component Maximum Weight Meaning
Crole 6
The documented role of the user 
inside the organization
Csysadm 6
 User has access to Operating 
System administration utilities
Ccriticalfiles 6
User has read/write access to 
commercially sensitive files 
Cutilities 6
User is able to execute 
application critical utilities 
Cphysicalaccess 6
User has physical access to 
critical parts of the IT 
infrastructure
Fsophistication 10
Rating of computer system user 
knowledge
Ffileops 20 Presence of signs of 
forthcoming insider misuse at 
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file-level
Fnetops 20
Presence of signs of 
forthcoming insider misuse at 
data network level
Fexecops 20
Presence of signs of 
forthcoming insider misuse at 
program execution level
Table 1: A sample Weight Matrix in the Magklaras and Furnell model 
The reader can refer to chapter 6 the Magklaras MPhil thesis [9] for more details of the model and 
the reasoning behind the design of the proposed threat estimation functions. Two important things 
from this model should be emphasized here: 
 the inclusion of various ITQAs at various levels (file, network, process execution) to repre-
sent a variety of system detectable user events.
 The introduced Weight Matrix concept as a mechanism of expressing different levels of 
confidence for the various ITQAs for a particular threat description.
Both of these things play a great role in the design of the ITPSL. The next section will explore the 
ITPSL relationship to the threat model process, as well as the overall scope of its inception.
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4.3 The scope and functional requirements of ITPSL
Information security surveys and notable insider misuse cases reported by mass media were dis-
cussed in chapter 1 of this thesis. In addition, earlier sections of the present chapter provided a de-
tailed presentation of the insider misuse domain by introducing a suitable insider taxonomy and a 
resulting insider threat model. However, how a threat model fits to a threat description language is 
not very clear. Understanding the relationship between the two is vital for setting the scope of our 
proposed language.  Figure 4.7 illustrates the relationship of the ITPSL and the proposed ITPM 
model.
Figure 4.7: The relationship between ITPSL and a threat model
The flow of information starts with a security analyst writing a description of the particular insider 
misuse scenario, using the ITPSL semantics. The signature is validated by a compiler that translates 
the signature directives to query commands and makes use of an event logging infrastructure, in or-
der to examine whether the ITQAs the signature mentions exist in the system. Apart from the se-
mantics that qualify/quantify the ITQAs, the signature embodies a Weight Matrix statement which 
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indicates the confidence of each specified ITQA. The results are passed to the ITPM engine which 
then derived an EPT value, indicating that a likelihood of a particular threat. 
Figure 4.7 also includes the security analyst/system specialist both at the beginning of the informa-
tion flow (misuse signature construction) and at the final stage, where the final assessment is done. 
This emphasizes that the analyst is in charge of the process, both in terms of defining what consti-
tutes a threat and also in terms of judging whether the likelihood expressed by the model is accu-
rate. 
This places the foundation of the context of ITPSL as a component of an entire Insider Threat man-
agement architecture, as discussed in Chapter 7 of the Magklaras MPhil thesis [9]. The model esti-
mates a threat which is described by a language and the likelihood is judged by the IT specialist. 
The emphasis is on the description and thus, the language addresses the lack of case repositories 
that express details of insider misuse incidents is apparent. An early report outlining aspects of the 
insider threat to the US government information systems published by the NSITSSAM Committee 
[57] considers the absence of case repositories as one of the limiting factors in the field of insider IT 
misuse mitigation research. In addition, the Carnegie Mellon University CyLab’s ‘Common Sense 
Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats’ publication [58] states clearly the need to 
keep detailed records of employee actions in relation to file access, application usage and network 
connection matters.   
ITPSL could also be a tool for digital forensic investigators. Digital forensics is an important re-
search discipline of the information security field that is concerned with providing evidence to legal 
proceedings by means of gathering data to determine exact details of various types (internal and ex-
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ternal origin) of system attacks. Brancik [55] mentions the importance of suitable tools to produce 
Key Fraud Signatures (KFS) to aid insider threat mitigation and thus signifies the overlap between 
insider misuse and the field of digital forensics.  
The most widely used form of digital forensic investigation is quiescent or static analysis. For such 
type of analysis, an investigator would utilize a number of toolkits  to make a forensically valid 
copy of the affected system's non-volatile data storage media and perform a “post-mortem” exami-
nation of the copied media. The goal is to examine static data (documents, images, email and sys-
tem files) for digital evidence.  AccessData's Forensic Toolkit [59] and Guidance Software's Encase 
[60] are two well known toolkits that perform, amongst other things, static digital forensic analysis.
However, static digital forensic analysis reveals an incomplete picture of the system in question. It  
cannot portray accurately the non-quiescent (dynamic) state of the system under investigation. In-
formation such as active network endpoints, running processes, encryption keys for decrypted on-
disk content, user interaction data (number of open applications per user, exact commands), as well 
as the content of memory resident processes may not be recorded accurately on non-volatile media. 
Hay et al. [61] discuss the shortcomings of static digital forensics analysis in detail. In order to 
overcome the barriers of static analysis, Adelstein [62] discusses the virtues of non-quiescent or live 
analysis, which essentially gathers data while the system under-investigation is operational.  Micro-
soft's Computer Online Forensic Evidence Extractor (COFEE) [63] and FATkit [64] are two exam-
ples of tools that are able to extract live forensic data from volatile storage locations of a computer  
system. 
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Live data forensics analysis fills the gap of static examination methods, but it has its own disadvan-
tages. Carrier [65] and Hay et al [61] discuss the risks associated with acquiring live digital forensic 
data. In particular, live analysis methods suffer from three basic problems:
 Investigator privileges: The investigator needs administration or escalated privileges to run 
the live analysis utilities. This could present a number of problems in environments where 
access policies prohibit escalated privileges from external entities to computer systems.
 System and data integrity:The data gathered during the live analysis phase might be compro-
mised due to system (due to rootkit infection, misconfiguration or intentional alteration of 
data by one or more system users). Whilst the memory data retrieval issue has been ad-
dressed by some complex hardware  configurations  whose  purpose  is  to  reliably acquire 
volatile data from system memory, the rest of the data acquisition issues are serious and they 
stem from the fact that data are logged on the system under investigation and not on a safer 
area before they are analyzed.
 The “observer effect”: When static analysis methods are used, the investigator can examine 
the data without affecting the source media state. Unfortunately, that is not true for live anal-
ysis where the investigator's actions can affect the data. One would have to separate careful-
ly the implications of the investigator's actions from the original data. 
The previously mentioned needs in addition to the previously discussed desirable characteristics of 
Chapter 3 (Sections 3.2 and 3.3) shape the scope of the Insider Threat Prediction Specification Lan-
guage (ITPSL): A specialized language that is able to encode system level data that concern legiti-
mate user actions, in order to aid the process of misuse threat prediction and assist computer foren-
sic officers in the process of examining insider misuse incidents. As such, ITPSL’s target audience 
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is the security analyst/expert, as well as the seasoned IT administrator in charge of system operation 
and security issues. Both of these types of domain experts should be able to express insider misuse 
scenarios by using the language semantics to construct signatures of threat scenarios. 
More specifically, the ITPSL language should be able to meet the following high level functional 
requirements:
 FR1:Store and analyze the data away from the target system(s) to minimize issues with ma-
liciously or accidentally altering/deleting the data.
 FR2:The architecture of the language should facilitate the creation of suitable insider threat 
signature repositories, so that security specialists/system administration could easily browse 
for signatures of various threat scenarios. This feature aims to address the lack of suitable 
case repositories discussed in the earlier paragraphs of this section. The need for facilitating 
signature repositories was first discussed in section 3.2 of the third thesis chapter, when we 
reviewed a number of misuse detection language paradigms.
 FR3:Its semantics and logging mechanisms should facilitate the description of both static 
and live forensic insider misuse system data at the network, process and filesystem layer, in 
response to the issues discussed by Hay et al [61]. 
 FR4:The semantic description of user actions should satisfy Meier's event description di-
mensions [36], as discussed in section 3.2 of the third thesis chapter. In summary, the lan-
guage should be able to: 
◦ encompass temporal indicators so that sequences of events could clearly be expressed 
and logged.
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◦ Its semantics should identify event step instance selection by being able to select a single 
or multiple occurrences of events and event steps.
◦ Finally, ITPSL semantics should help the language user express step instance comple-
tion, by listing the desired first, last or intermediate occurrences of relevant events. 
 FR5:The language should be able to represent decision theoretic information to address the 
criticisms of earlier intrusion specification examples such as CISL [17]. This implies the 
ability to consistently express various potentials scenarios of insider actions, giving the sig-
nature polymorphic properties.
 FR6:The semantics of the language should offer a consistent hierarchical way of describing 
a variety of scenarios and should be easily readable by humans and software modules. 
 FR7: ITPSL should have an operating system agnostic scope. The signature author should 
use the same semantics to express the various misuse threat scenarios regardless of whether 
the underlying operating system is Microsoft Windows, Linux/Unix, MACOSX or other ap-
plicable platform. The language semantics should bridge any gaps created by operating sys-
tem esoteric peculiarities that could affect the process of expressing threat indicators.
 FR8: The language semantics should also facilitate event correlation across multiple moni-
tored systems.  An insider threat scenario might be realized by means of involving multiple 
components of an IT infrastructure.  
The previously listed functional requirements that were deducted from previous discussions serve as 
a guide for the start assembling the ITPSL building blocks. The next chapter presents one of the 
most important functional blocks of the proposed language: the audit engine.
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4.4 Conclusions
This Chapter discussed the role of taxonomies in insider IT misuse research and presented an insid-
er IT misuse taxonomy tailored to the needs of automated misuse detection and prediction. It also 
presented relevant misuse modeling efforts. A combination of a suitable taxonomy and model can 
form the basis of a language for detecting and predicting insider threats. Beyond the tasks of detec-
tion and prediction, the language semantics should also describe data in a complementary way to 
existing forensic tools, expressing static and dynamic computer forensic analysis data, in order to 
provide strong accountability of user actions.  A detailed breakdown of the functional requirements 
of such a language concluded the chapter. 
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Section 2.3 placed the origin of threat specification to the area of Intrusion Detection/Prevention 
System (IDS/IPS) [25]. Moreover, Figure 3.1 illustrated the information flow in a misuse detection 
language. One of the important building blocks of that flow was that of the audit record storage and 
this is the subject of this Chapter. In particular, the discussion examines the vital relationship be-
tween the audit record format and misuse detection language expressiveness. This will be followed 
by a presentation of existing audit record engines and a critique of them in terms of their suitability 
for insider threat specification. The chapter ends with a proposed logging engine that  provides 
structured audit records made specifically for specifying insider threats, according to the functional 
requirements of ITPSL.
5.1 Audit record and insider threat specification expressiveness
Bace [25] discusses intrusion detection (and hence misuse detection) as an audit reduction problem. 
Audit reduction is the process of filtering the relevant information out of the audit records, in order 
to infer a partially or fully realized threat and excluding information that is irrelevant or redundant. 
In the process of designing an insider threat specification language, a great deal of emphasis should 
be placed on the content and structure of audit records, as they constitute the source of information 
of every misuse detection system. 
The following paragraphs show that the expressive power of a misuse detection language is based 
on the wealth of information encapsulated in the audit record. The balance between too little and 
too much information on the audit record is a difficult one. Providing too much information makes 
the task of audit reduction difficult and not scalable, as the number of monitored system grows. In 
addition, redundant or irrelevant information might be difficult to relate to language semantics. In 
contrast, collecting data at a too coarse a level of detail can exclude vital information for the pres-
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ence of a threat, cause false negative assessments and reduce the expressiveness of a misuse detec-
tion language. 
The structure of an audit record is also important for a misuse detection language. A good structure 
has well defined fields that can be easily parsed and subsequently matched to data structures that  
represent language semantics. Moreover, the structure of the audit record should easily facilitate re-
lational type [66] queries. This is because it is necessary for the information to be applied on the 
disjunction (OR), conjunction (AND), and negation (NOT) operators, as dictated by Meier's [36] 
event pattern dimension descriptors (Section 3.2) and ITPSL functional requirement FR4 (Section 
4.3).
A final desired aspect of the audit record format is derived by the ITPSL nature. In essence, ITPSL 
describes insider actions. This means that the audit record should easily provide user entity account-
ability for each recorded action. Hence, a system action such as a file access should map clearly to a 
user entity. This desired mapping means that each recorded action could also be correlated to other 
actions of the same user, so that a set of actions can be related to a threat and the query language has 
enough information to perform step instance selection. Figure 5.1 illustrates such a correlation, by 
showing parts of the process execution and network endpoint creation log of a hypothetical audit 
record engine.
Let  us  assume that  we wish to find whether  user  'toma'  has  accessed the website  'www.suspi-
cious.org', via a web browser, between 13:40 and 14:00 hours on the 25th of September 2010. In or-
der to find such an event, we need to intercept the launching of a web browser process by user enti-
ty 'toma'. We would assume that the web browser will generate a network connection to 'www.sus-
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picious.org'. The way one can relate the two events as part of a complex event (step instance selec-
tion) is to match the two events against a set of common identifiers, such as the process ID (PID), 
parent process ID (PPID) and username. This assumes that the process ID launching record has both 
PID and PPID data inside each process execution record. It also assumes that the corresponding net-
work endpoint log structure has a corresponding PID and username field that could be correlated.
Process execution logs:
......
Logrec 158: /bin/bash, 13:55:16, 25/09/2010, 24208, 4288, toma  
Logrec 159: /usr/bin/mapview, 13:55:18, 25/09/2010, 24209, 19504, nickb
Logrec 160: /usr/bin/firefox, 13:55:19, 25/09/2010, 38416, 2614,toma
Logrec 161: /usr/bin/firefox, 13:55:20, 25/09/2010, 24210, 24208, toma
Logrec 162: /bin/bash, 13:56:04, 25/09/2010, 43210, 8208, katbz 
......
Network endpoint logs:
......
Logrec 256: localhost:43455, www.bbc1.co.uk:80, 13:23:01, 25/09/2010 ,34671, nickb
Logrec 257: www.bbc1.co.uk:80, localhost:43455, 13:23:02, 25/09/2010 ,34671, nickb
Logrec 258: mysql1.internal.domain:3346, localhost:5000, 13:38:14, 25/09/2010 ,14200, mysql
Logrec 259: localhost:8210, www.google.com:443, 13:55:20, 25/09/2010 ,38416,toma
Logrec 260: localhost:20310,www.suspicious.org:80, 13:55:21, 25/09/2010 ,24210,toma
Logrec 261:
......
Figure 5.1: Log event correlation and step instance selection
The log snapshot of Figure 5.1 shows that there are two instances of user 'toma' executing a web 
browser. Only one of them is relevant and the correlation can be performed because the PID and 
username are recorded in the network endpoint and the process execution audit records. In particu-
lar, only PID 24210 has connected to www.suspicious.org, which was started by a shell process 
(PPID 24208) of user 'toma'. The wealth and replication of vital information in various types of au-
dit records is a requirement for proper event correlation and step instance selection.
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Another important issue of audit record engines is that of referencing time. In large IT infrastruc-
tures that span several networks and time zones, audited systems might report in different time for-
mats. They can also face 'clock skew' [25], a difference in time recorded amongst computer systems 
due to computer clock hardware inaccuracies, especially when an NTP [67] server is not available 
to provide a reliable time source. Clock skew is common amongst mobile components of the IT in-
frastructure, as well as amongst operating systems that run in virtual mode [68].  An audit record 
engine should resolve that problem and make sure that every record is entered into the log set by 
having a correct time stamp.
Finally, audit record engines should provide a scalable storage system to keep a large number of au-
dit records available for future reference. Modern IT environments that consist of a large number of 
multi-user serving devices of different kinds can easily produce a large amount of data. If the stored 
information is consolidated to a single place, a natural choice for data availability and correlation, 
the amount of data can quickly overwhelm traditional file based storage approaches. 
5.2 Existing audit record engines
Audit record engines have been around for a long time, since the very early days of operating sys-
tems. The following paragraphs will review a number of existing audit record engine specifications 
and solutions. The goal is to show that they do not fit all the requirements of misuse detection en-
gines, as discussed in the previous paragraphs.    
One of the earliest and most commonly referenced works that concern the format of audit records is 
the US Government's Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC – 'Orange Book') [69]. 
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This was a structured evaluation process (Trust Levels) that specified the features and assurances 
required for operating systems  and application software to contain and process classified informa-
tion. As part of these assurance features, the 'Orange Book' specified extensive lists of events that 
audit systems should monitor. However, these lists were provided without guidelines for selection, 
so that an analyst could abstract what is being monitored and choose a set of them. Moreover, the 
'Orange Book' audit requirements did not provide any specification for the structure and storage of 
audit records. 
These omissions, as well as the age of the drawn requirements led to the cancellation of the Orange 
Book [69] by the US Department of Defense. The work is now  purely a historic evidence of the 
need to draw audit requirements for operating systems. Instead, the Common Criteria for Informa-
tion Technology Security Evaluation (CC) [70] standards have taken over the Orange Book's role. 
The CC effort does not fully address the previously mentioned audit record requirement omissions 
of its predecessor, the Orange Book. Despite enjoying an impressive industry product certification 
scheme and some criticism over the feasibility of implementing the listed requirements due to com-
plexity [71], the CC effort has still to produce a comprehensive array of audit requirements. In com-
parison to the Orange Book, the CC provide a more structured audit functional requirement list, but 
still, no substantial discussions with regards to the content, format and storage of audit records. 
However, we do take note of some of the high level functional audit requirements of their 321 page 
document [70]. In particular, CC requirement 88 of section 8.2 [70] states that: “At FAU_GEN.2 
User identity association, the TSF shall associate auditable events to individual user identities.” In 
CC terminology TSF stands for Target of evaluation Security Functionality, meaning essentially the 
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software and hardware under evaluation . This particular requirement we have already discussed 
with reference to step instance selection (Figure 5.1).
The CC effort [70] also states the minimum requirements for the content of an audit record by stat-
ing in requirement FAU_GEN.1.2: “The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the fol-
lowing information: a)Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and 
the outcome (success or failure) of the event; ...”. This is also in-line with the previously discussed 
issues about user accountability and temporal information. The outcome of the event might be a 
tricky to implement, depending on the context of the event. For some types of events that are atomic 
(i.e., an attempt to execute a file), logging success or failure is meaningful (i.e. to log that an at-
tempt was made to execute a file might be an interesting fact) and feasible (this can be easily per -
formed by monitoring for exit codes or testing for the execution of the program by using the userid 
credentials) . For other types of events that are more complex and concern many intermediate steps 
(binary program that performs many actions that do not always follow the same order/execution 
path) this is less trivial to implement, as it requires tapping to the actual system calls level or other  
proprietary application logs. 
In addition to the minimum requirements for audit record content, the CC effort [70] defines desired 
ways of searching audit data by stating in requirement FAU_SEL.1.1: ”The TSF shall be able to se-
lect the set of events to be audited from the set of all auditable events based on the following at-
tributes: a)[selection: object identity, user identity, subject identity, host identity, event type] b [as-
signment: list of additional attributes that audit selectivity is based upon] ”. This CC functional re-
quirement implies that audit records need to be structured in ways that speed up or make easy the  
retrieval of data by different criteria.
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Finally, the CC document [70] lists some notable high level functional requirements for the storage 
of audit records. The first one concerns the maintenance of the users that have access to the audit  
data (requirement 106, part of FAU_SAR.1): “maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of the 
group of users with read access right to the audit records. ” Setting up a proper access controls poli-
cy for the audit data is a vital issue. The high-level approach of this requirement does not specify 
how the access control should be implemented. However, one can assume that isolating the creden-
tials of the audit reviewers from the normal user authentication system is a useful step. This mea-
sure could be an important deterrent for accidental or intentional leakage of valuable audit data to 
ordinary users. It could also make the management (and activity logging) of audit data reviewers 
easier.
The second CC requirement that concerns audit record storage is that of FAU_STG (section 8.6) 
[70]. Actually this is a set of requirements that concern various aspects of the audit record storage.  
We quote from the requirements text:
“At FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage, requirements are placed on the audit trail. It will be 
protected from unauthorised deletion and/or modification. FAU_STG.2 Guarantees of audit data 
availability, specifies the guarantees that the TSF maintains over the audit data given the occurrence 
of an undesired condition. FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss, specifies actions 
to be taken if a threshold on the audit trail is exceeded. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss, 
specifies actions in case the audit trail is full. “. Once again, the requirements are given in high-level 
terms, specifying that:
 unauthorized deletion and/or modification of audit records
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 any other condition that could cause storage failure.
should be mitigated.
The point behind the Orange Book [69] and CC [70] is that they are both specifications and not im-
plementations of audit record engines. However, several audit record engine implementations can 
be found in the literature. 
The most common variety of audit record engines uses information that comes directly from the 
Operating System. Characteristic examples of this category of engines are Oracle's Basic Security 
Module (BSM) auditing system [72] and its open source implementation OpenBSM [73], the psacct 
audit package [74], as well as the syslogd [75] and WinSyslogd [76] applications (the latter runs on 
Windows operating systems).
Figure 5.2: BSM audit record format and example
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The BSM audit system [72] [73] has seen widespread deployment in commercial server grade oper-
ating systems. It structures its audit records in binary (non human plain text readable) files. Audit 
trail management commands are then used to decode the binary form of these files and produce hu-
man readable output. 
Each BSM audit record is a series of byte encoded tokens. Figure 5.2 shows a typical structure of a 
BSM audit record and a corresponding decoded plain text example of an audited successful login 
entry. Actual audit records might vary in terms of the type and order of tokens. The Header token 
marks the start of the audit record. Argument and Data tokens normally contain data about the com-
mand and the arguments that caused an event. The Subject token states which process triggered the 
generation of the audit record. Finally, the Return token contains values that are returned by the 
process execution and can help the audit reviewer determine the success or failure  of a command 
(the reader might recall CC [70] requirement FAU_GEN.1.2).  
The OpenBSM initiative [73] has similar audit record structure with minor differences in the encod-
ing of the different token types.
Pssact [74] is another audit  system that generates operating system based audit  trails.  Although 
psacct can be used for security purposes (system administrators can check login attempts and user 
activity per user), its facilities are oriented towards resource usage accounting. Thus, a system ad-
ministrator can employ psacct to produce nice reports about the number of CPU hours spent per 
command or user. Figure 5.3 shows sample psacct output from the  Linux operating system.
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Syslogd [75]  and Winsyslogd [76]  are  examples  of  widely employed Security  Event  Manager 
(SEM) applications. An SEM aggregates various types of audit records into a single interface. Audit 
record aggregation means that information is accepted not only from operating system audit trails,  
but also from third party sources such as security tools or even software application logs. The inter-
face could be as simple as a human readable text file (Figure 5.4) or it can have its own sophisticat-
ed Graphical User Interface (GUI), as shown in the screenshot of Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.3: psacct based resource auditing 
Figure 5.4: Syslog based audit record aggregation on a plain text file
This is a small sample of audit record engines and SEM tools. One obvious thing to observe is that 
there is not a consistent audit record format amongst these log engines. This format diversity might 
suit  specific  operating system environments but  it  creates many problems, especially when one 
needs to devise a mechanism to consolidate logs from different operating systems and resources. 
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Bishop [77] was one of the first to discuss these issues in the context of distributed audit record en-
gines and to propose various solutions for standardized audit record formats. 
Figure 5.5: WinSyslog event management console
Figure 5.6 shows a sample of a proposed standard audit record format by Bishop [77], together with 
special purpose plain text ASCII based [78] field separators. The purpose of these field separators is 
to  maintain  compatibility  amongst  the  character  encoding  sets  of  different  operating  systems. 
Whilst many characters encoding differences have now been addressed by the Unicode standard 
[79], Bishop's work  is an interesting reminder of the need for a standard audit record format.
Another notable research effort in the field of producing suitable audit record engines is that of Lar-
son et al [80]. The authors present a tool that automatically extracts attack manifestations from audit 
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records, as shown in Figure 5.7. The process of comparing data generated during normal operation 
to data generated during a successful attack enables METAL to identify all processes that may be 
affected by the attack and the specific system call sequences, arguments and return values that are 
changed by the attack. Hence, it is possible to analyze many attacks in a reasonable amount of time, 
as well as locating groups of attacks with similar properties. Their approach proves how important 
is the design and format of audit records for detecting (and thus describing) insider threats. It also 
shows that it is possible to calibrate the content and format of audit records, by looking at particular 
threat types. 
Figure 5.6: Standard audit record format by Bishop
Figure 5.7: Manifestation Extraction Tool for Analysis of Logs (METAL)
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Looking back at the previously discussed audit system approaches, serious deficiencies can be lo-
cated in terms of using them for insider threat prediction. These deficiencies can be inferred by 
means of assessing the existing audit record engine features with the ITPSL functional requirements 
of Section 4.3  of the thesis and some of the CC requirements discussed in the earlier paragraphs of 
the current section. 
Firstly, we have issues that concern the bridging of the format variability (structure and content) 
that break ITPSL requirements FR6 and FR7. Modern SEMs might consolidate information from 
various different devices and operating system vendors, but they are far from describing sufficiently 
issues in an operating system agnostic way. 
In addition, process accounting tools might not cover sufficiently the variety of different system 
level information (file, process execution and network level), invalidating ITPSL requirement FR3. 
In fact, some of them might miss data as described in [81].     
Several audit record systems do not report consistently the timing of audit record generation. For in-
stance, many implementations of the syslog audit standard [75] and psacct tools [74] generate the 
audit record by entering the time stamp of the client system. If the client system does not have a re -
liable time source, this generates inaccurate information and thus conflicts with the temporal indica-
tor aspect of ITPSL requirement FR4.  
Moreover, some audit record engines might not meet the scalability and data integrity requirements 
set by CC requirement FAU_STG.1. Syslog [75] will not always consolidate data in a central loca-
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tion away from the audited client. The same can be said for the BSM standard [72] [73], leaving the 
integrity of audit data at risk. In addition, storing data in binary or text files might raise issues of 
storage efficiency and scalability. 
Finally, one of the most serious drawbacks of existing audit approaches is the inability to store the 
audit information in form that can perform relational queries. This is necessary to satisfy ITPSL re-
quirements FR4 and FR5 that concern the core functionality of the language semantics.
For all these reasons, this research project has designed and built a prototype  audit record engine 
from scratch. This prototype should address most of the previously discussed issues and provide the 
data layer that the ITPSL can query. It should also act as a complement for existing forensic tools  
and provide the researchers enough information to replay/reconstruct insider threat scenarios. The 
next and final chapter section will present the design and features of this special audit engine.
5.3 The LUARM audit engine 
This chapter started by explaining the vital relation between the audit record and the insider threat  
specification/prediction process. The previous section presented existing audit engine standards and 
found then unsuitable to meet all the proposed ITPSL requirements, as discussed in Section 4.3.  
Beyond addressing the ITPSL requirements of Section 4.3 and the discussion of existing audit log 
engine deficiencies of the previous section, the fundamental problem that an insider misuse audit 
log engine has to tackle is how to reliably correlate data from different audit levels. Figure 5.8 dis-
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plays an abstract view of a computer system audit log, in order to demonstrate the need to clarify 
how information from different audit data levels can be correlated. 
Figure 5.8: An abstract view of a computer system audit log
A number of time ordered discrete events at the filesystem (Fevent), process execution (Pevent), net-
work (Nevent) and hardware monitoring level (Hevent) can be used to shape a picture of what is hap-
pening in a computer system. The Magklaras and Furnell taxonomy [37] justified the role of the dif-
ferent audit levels. The separation of audit levels is also useful because each level requires different 
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mechanisms to reliably record information. Later paragraphs are going to discuss these mechanisms 
in detail.
Apart from the time series of the four audit event types, Figure 5.8 displays the discrete user entities 
(User1...UserN). Their role is important in the abstraction schema because they must be relate to 
discrete audit events, in order to aid the task of accountability. In plain words, the audit record 
structure needs to ascertain statements such as:
 Network endpoint event Neven3 was started by process event Pevent7
 User entity User3 accessed file X according to Fevent20, which resulted in the launch of 
program Y (Pevent135) which created two network connections at port TCP 80 and 443 
(Nevent 200,Nevent201).
Thus, it is important not only to interrelate different types of events, but also to link with certainty 
user entities to various related events. None of the currently existing audit/log engines is built to  
provide that level of event and user entity correlation.   
The proposed engine addressing the previously mentioned deficiencies is called LUARM, which 
stands for Logging User Actions in Relational Mode [82]. It is an Open Source audit record engine 
that uses a Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) [83] for the storage and organiza-
tion of audit record data.
The employment of an RDBMS system is a core design choice for the LUARM engine. It offers the 
necessary data availability, integrity and scalability features, as discussed in previous paragraphs, 
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because most RDBMS tools are explicitly designed to organize and store large amounts of data 
[83]. However, the main reason of placing an RDBMS engine at the core of LUARM is the ability 
to have a tremendous flexibility in the process of querying audit records in a standard manner. The 
Structured  Query Language (SQL)  [84]  is  a  declarative  computer  language used  to  query and 
process the data stored by RDBMS systems. SQL adheres to the relational model [66] and this 
means that it can easily match ITPSL requirements FR2 (signature repository creation) and FR4.
 
In terms of ITPSL FR4, the reader can recall Meier's feature specification list for misuse detection 
languages [36] (Section 3.3). Most of the event pattern dimension expression requirements can be 
facilitated by the SQL standard.  In particular,  features such as the disjunction,  conjunction and 
negation operators are part of the language. SQL calls these predicates and it used them to specify 
conditions in an accurate manner. Boolean (true/false/unknown) truth values are used to limit the 
effects of statements and queries. In addition, step instance selection and completion, as well as data 
correlation can be performed by using SQL clauses such as 'FROM' and 'WHERE'. Later para-
graphs provide LUARM examples using standard SQL queries.
Figure 5.9 displays the module client-server architecture of the LUARM audit engine. On the left of 
the figure, we can see a set of audited computer clients. Every client is running a unique instance of  
a set of monitoring scripts. Each of the client scripts audits a particular system level aspect of the  
operating  system:  'netactivity.pl'   audits  the  addition  and  creation  of  endpoints,  'fileactivity.pl'  
records various file operations, 'psactivity' provides process execution audit records and 'hwactivity' 
keeps a log of hardware devices that are connected or disconnected from the system. The right hand 
side contains the centralized server part of the architecture where audit data are stored, maintained 
and queried in a MySQL [88] based RDBMS. The Perl programming language [89] is used to im-
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plement the modules and the communication between client and server is performed via a Perl DBI 
[90] interface. Appendix A contains the table schema structure and the code for LUARM.
Figure 5.9: The LUARM architecture
The client-server architecture avoids leaving the data in vulnerable clients. To prevent issues that 
affect the scalability of operations and satisfy data access control isolation ( addressing the CC [70] 
requirements FAU_SAR.1 and FAU_STG.1). The central host MySQL server has its own authenti-
cation system responsible for controlling who has access to the audit data. By authenticating audit 
reviewers against the RDBMS authentication system, we de-couple the users being audited from the 
auditors, a desirable property that ensures that audited insiders cannot easily manipulate audit data. 
Furthermore, by assigning a separate database instance per audited client, we reduce the likelihood 
of compromising the data for all clients (if the database access credentials of one client are compro-
mised, the damage is limited to the audit data for that client only). 
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The client scripts were designed to examine every aspect of system level events, as dictated by the 
Magklaras and Furnell insider misuse taxonomy in [37]. Figure 5.10 displays the relational table 
format for the four types of recorded audit data in LUARM: fileaccess, process execution, network 
endpoint and hardware device information.   
Temporal  information  is  provided  by  event  creation  time  stamps  (cyear,  cmonth, 
cday,chour,cmin,csec)  and  respective  event  destruction  time  stamps  (dyear, 
dmonth,dday,dhour,dmin,dsec). The combination of the two types of timestamps can pinpoint exact 
time intervals for events in a consistent format for all recorded event types. In contrast, most audit 
systems may provide only event creation time references without hinting for the duration of an 
event.
The sampling frequency for recording events is that of a 100 milliseconds.  Although the sampling 
frequency can be adjusted in the various LUARM modules, a value of 100 milliseconds was an in-
tentional decision. At first, this might seem problematic as many attack steps can occur in sub sec-
ond times. However, time resolution varies amongst operating systems. In Linux, the finest granu-
larity of timing for most computing devices varies from approximately 10 milliseconds all the way 
down to a 1 microsecond, depending on the hardware details [85]. The Windows 7 operating system 
(and its various derivatives) has a timer granularity of 15.6 ms [86]. For these reasons, LUARM re-
lies on the Perl Time::HiRes module [87] to bridge the gap between the different operating system 
timer implementations. A 100 millisecond sampling frequency is also a good compromise between 
accuracy and scalability. The more granular the time resolution, the greater the computational load 
for both the client and the server LUARM parts.
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Figure 5.10: LUARM audit data table format
Each audit record of an event table is identified by a unique table key of bigint MySQL type [88]. In 
version  5.1  of  the  MySQL  RDBMS,  a  'bigint'  numeric  type  can  create  up  to 
18446744073709551615 unique keys, a number large enough to archive a useful number of events 
in each LUARM event table.
Another important design decision that concerns the format of the audit table was to include com-
mon attributes amongst different event tables for the purposes of increasing the ability to correlate 
events and provide user entity accountability. This is in response to ITPSL requirement FR8 and CC 
[70] requirements FAU_GEN1.2 and FAU_SEL1.1. For instance, fields such as 'username' (user 
entity), pid (numeric process ID of the program responsible for the event creation) and application 
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(string that represents the name of the application that matches the pid) can be found in most of the 
event tables. This enables the audit reviewer to use SQL and relate events, so he can form queries of 
the type “Find the network endpoint created by program x of user y” in an easy manner.  
The use of the MD5 cryptographic hash function [91]  (md5sum field) is used on all event tables for 
performing audit record updates in an efficient manner. In particular, every time LUARM inserts an 
audit record in a table, it calculates an MD5 sum of several relevant table fields, in order to uniquely 
identify the event and keep track of the record being inserted in the database. On the next audit 
record insertion cycle, LUARM generates an MD5 sum of the live records and compares them to 
the stored MD5 sums of every active stored record (a record that has a NULL value for the d* time-
stamps). If the MD5 sums do not match the record is inferred as a new one and is inserted to the 
database. This is a more efficient way than comparing multiple fields, in order to perform record 
updates. For more information about the implementation of record updates, the reader should con-
sult Appendix A.
It should be noted that MD5 hash functions do exhibit cryptographic vulnerabilities, as their colli-
sion resistance is limited [92] [93]. This means that as the size of the MD5 function input increases,  
so does the probability of having the same MD5 sum output for different inputs (collision). This  
could pose a problem in the LUARM mechanism for record updates. . The collision resistance of 
the MD5 hash function is estimated to 220.96 [93]. In practical terms, this means that there is strong 
probability to find a pair of inputs that produce the same hash value roughly for every 2039805 in-
puts. This would erroneously disregard a record and thus miss important system activity informa-
tion. However, the size, as well as the number of records stored for every monitored client is in the 
order of hundreds of thousands for a period of several months. For this reason, we conclude it is  
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safe to rely on MD5 hashes for the moment and consider shifting to another more collision resistant 
hash function in future LUARM versions.
The Magklaras and Furnell taxonomy [37] specified that file operations are an important part of 
misuse specification. The 'fileinfo' table stores file access related events. The filename specification 
consists of two parts. The 'filename' field which holds the filename with the file extension (i.e. da-
ta.txt) and the 'location' field which contains the absolute path of the file. The fact that the two are 
divided in separate fields makes it easier to search by location or by field name only, increasing the 
versatility of mining file data. In order to populate the data on this table, LUARM relies on the 'lsof'  
utility [94]. The utility is versatile and can record a variety of events including file and network end-
points in real time. It exists for an entire range of UNIX/Linux and Mac OS X operating systems,  
covering  a  large   spectrum of  computing  devices.  The  Windows  operating  system family  has 
'psFile', a utility that it is part of the PsTools package [95] and offers the equivalent functionality of 
'lsof'.   
The 'netinfo' table covers the network operations part of the proposed taxonomy [37]. It logs the 
creation and destruction of network endpoints. In the context of LUARM, the term 'network end-
point' refers to the operating system data structures  employed to facilitate network connectivity via 
the TCP/IP protocol suite [96].  Network endpoint activity is considered as live forensic data.  A se-
ries of table fields are used to record endpoint details ('sourceip', 'destip', 'sourceport' , 'destport' and 
'transport' record source and destination IP addresses, source and destination port and transport pro-
tocol respectively). The fields 'sourcefqdn' and 'destfqdn' hold the DNS [97] resolved Fully Quali-
fied Domain Name (FQDN) for the source and destination hosts. 
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A small LUARM implementation detail concerning the 'sourcefqdn' and 'destfqdn' fields is that they 
are not populated by the client LUARM routines. In contrast, they are populated on the LUARM 
server side. Due to the criticality of correct DNS data  for the audit records, the frequent DNS con-
figuration errors [98], aspects of DNS operational security [99] and client performance, the end-
point name resolution is left on the server side. This provides a greater control on DNS derived data 
and does not rely on vulnerable clients (malicious insiders or software vulnerabilities) for auditing 
network connections.
Network endpoint auditing is not the only “live” network activity data recorded by LUARM. Figure 
5.11 shows the structure of the 'netint' and 'netroute' tables. They record network interface and rout-
ing information respectively. The recording of network interface information allows the audit re-
viewer to know to which networks a particular device has been connected to. This is particularly 
useful for mobile devices (i.e. laptops), where it might be useful to know the location of a device. 
The network routing information can be used to correlate information of network endpoint activity, 
or the transmission of information via insecure or unauthorized networks, in connection with file 
and process execution activity.
Aspects of the Magklaras and Furnell insider misuse taxonomy [37] require the recording of net-
work connection content or payload. For example, Figure 4.4 mentions the example of suspicious 
SMTP traffic in terms of email addresses and attachments. Email attachments and addresses are 
placed in the payload section of a TCP/IP packet. Inspecting the payload of network packets is the 
job of Network based Intrusion Detection Systems [25]. However, Schneier [100] doubts about the 
feasibility of network packet payload inspection. In an era of increasing network speeds and Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) technologies [101], decoding network payload in near real time to infer 
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threats from the content of the payload can be a computationally expensive or impossible process. 
For these reasons, LUARM does not record payload content. It focuses instead on network endpoint 
presence and creation and the correlation of network data with file and process execution activities.
Figure 5.11: Recording network interface and routing information 
Process execution activity is recorded in the 'Procinfo' table (Figure 5.10). This table records 'live' 
forensic data. The table includes both the proces ID ('pid') and parent process id ('ppid'), so that 
process execution flow can be traced back to the original process. In order to speed up process exe-
cution searches, the LUARM engine also separates the executed command ('command') from its ar-
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netintid bigint
md5sum text
ipversion tinyint
ip tinytext
subnet tinytext
macaddr tinytext
intname text
cyear int
cmonth tinyint
cday tinyint
chour tinyint
cmin tinyint
csec tinytint
dyear int
dmonth tinyint
dday tinyint
dhour tinyint
dmin tinyint
dsec tinyint
routeid bigint
md5sum text
ipversion tinyint
netip tinytext
routenetmask tinytext
defgw tinytext
intname text
cyear int
cmonth tinyint
cday tinyint
chour tinyint
cmin tinyint
csec tinytint
dyear int
dmonth tinyint
dday tinyint
dhour tinyint
dmin tinyint
dsec tinyint
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guments ('arguments'). One might like to search them separately in the process of mining process 
execution data. The 'pcpu' and 'pmem' fields address process over-utilization issues, as described in 
Figure 4.3 ([37]). 'pcpu' contains the CPU time used divided by the time the process has been run-
ning (cputime/realtime ratio), expressed as a percentage. 'pmem' is the ratio of the process’s resident 
set size  to the physical memory on the machine, expressed as a percentage. The 'ps' UNIX/Linux 
utility [94] is used to collect process information. For all active processes (whose d* temporal fields 
are NULL), LUARM updates in near real time these two fields.   
The 'hwinfo' table logs 'live' device connection and disconnection events, in response  to the 'hard-
ware' OS consequence of the Magklaras and Furnell taxonomy. All events generated by devices that 
connect  to  the Peripheral  Component  Interconnect  (PCI and PCI-Express) and Universal  Serial 
(USB) buses [102]. These two buses are commonly found on a large array of computing devices, in-
terconnecting various peripherals such as portable storage media, as well as sound and video inter-
faces amongst others. For instance, an audit reviewer or forensics analyst might be interested to cor-
relate file activity to a portable storage medium connection, as part of an intellectual property theft  
scenario. In that case, the 'hwinfo' table logs information in various fields that help identify the at -
tached device ('devstring', 'devvendor'), the bus the device was connected to ('bus') and correlate the 
device attachment event against a number of users that are logged into the system at the time of the 
device attachment ('userslogged'). 
An additional number of LUARM tables help the engine perform housekeeping functions, such as 
keeping details of the registered host, the number of registered users. As these are not core function-
ality issues, the reader can refer to Appendix A for more details.
110
Chapter 5 The LUARM audit engine
Having a proposed structure and content for the various categories of audit events, we can now is-
sue sample SQL statements to illustrate how audit data mining is performed. Figure 5.12 displays 
sample queries that demonstrate the expressiveness of LUARM's audit record content and structure. 
Find all accesses of the file 'prototype.ppt' by users 'toms' OR 'georgem' between 9:00 and  
14:00 hours on 23/10/2009.
SELECT  *  FROM  fileinfo  WHERE  filename='prototype.ppt'  AND 
((username='toms') OR (username='georgem')) AND cyear='2009' AND cmonth='10' 
AND cday='23' AND chour >= '9' AND chour <= '13' AND cmin >= '0' AND cmin >= 
'59';
Find all USB devices that were physically connected  to the system when users 'toms' OR 
'georgem' were logged on 23/10/2009.
SELECT * from hwinfo WHERE devbus='usb' AND ((userslogged RLIKE 'toms') OR 
(userslogged RLIKE 'georgem')) AND cyear='2009' AND cmonth='10' AND cday='23' 
AND chour >= '9' AND chour <= '13' AND cmin >= '0' AND cmin >= '59';
Find whether users 'georgem' or 'toma' have tried to move or copy a file called  
'prototype.ppt' (irrespective of location) under the directory '/media' between 9:00 and  
13:00 hours on the 23rd of October 2009. 
select * FROM psinfo WHERE ((command='cp') OR (command='mv')) AND (argu-
ments  RLIKE  'prototype.ppt'  AND  arguments  RLIKE  '/media')  AND 
((username='georgem') OR (username='toms')) AND cyear='2009' AND cmonth='10' 
AND cday='23' AND chour >= '9' AND chour <= '13' AND cmin >= '0' AND cmin >= 
'59';
Figure 5.12: Using SQL to mine data in LUARM
There are a few important observations to make about the example LUARM SQL queries. The first 
one concerns the embedding of system specific knowledge inside the statement. For instance, the 
third SQL statement example of Figure 5.12 defines in essence a step of an insider trying to transfer 
a sensitive file to a portable medium. One has to know the name of the sensitive file 'prototype.ppt'  
and also the fact that '/media' is used as a mount point for portable media for that host. Additional  
possible destination locations could be specified by means of OR operators. This is a nice example 
of how the structure of an SQL relational query fits Meier's event pattern expression requirements 
[36].
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An additional point relates to the use of the 'RLIKE' operator [103], always in relation to the second 
and third examples of Figure 5.12. The operator implements a regular expression type of match 
[104]. Apart from the conjunction operator (OR), regular expressions give the specification poly-
morphic properties (one specification string, many matching results), a desirable property for com-
pact misuse detection language statements. In Chapter 6  we will discuss the proposed ITPSL se-
mantics and elaborate more on the issue.
Finally,  the last observation is despite the powerful abilities of the SQL interface,  writing SQL 
statements is a quite cumbersome process. A more user friendly interface is required that will be 
more expressive and will allow for easy event correlation. This is the territory of the ITPSL seman-
tics. 
5.4 Conclusions
In summary, this chapter has presented LUARM, a logging engine with an audit record specially 
designed to store insider misuse system-level oriented information. LUARM addresses a number of 
deficiencies found in commonly employed logging mechanisms. These deficiencies make the exist-
ing logging engines unsuitable for the task of insider IT misuse auditing. LUARM addresses those 
deficiencies and it follows the derived IT misuse taxonomy (Chapter 4) to shape an audit record for-
mat that   provides user accountability. The next chapter discusses further details about the ITPSL 
construction process and presents the proposed semantics. 
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The previous chapter addressed objective 3 of this research project (Section 1.2) by producing an 
audit engine tailored to the process of insider threat specification. The fourth thesis objective is the 
subject of this chapter. Having defined the problem domain, a suitable taxonomy and the structure 
and form of audit records, it is now time to introduce the Insider Threat Prediction and Specification 
Language (ITPSL), the core deliverable of the thesis. 
The chapter will start by presenting ITPSL as a Domain Specific Language (DSL), an important 
programming concept employed as a guide to build the language. The second chapter section intro-
duces the notion of semantics and discusses the methodologies to describe them as part of a lan-
guage design process. The section concludes with the crucial choice of the translational semantic 
description methodology as a tool for the design of ITPSL semantics. The third chapter section fol-
lows with a justification of the reasons ITPSL was chosen to be an XML [122] based language. The 
section also provides an introduction of  XML based technologies applicable to ITPSL. The rest of  
the chapter sections detail the ITPSL semantics in the context of describing insider misuse incidents 
and threats with examples that clarify their use in various simple scenarios.
6.1 ITPSL as a Domain Specific Language
The ITPSL scope defines clearly a specific task of expressing insider threat metrics. This paves the 
way for the selection of a mechanism that allows the language designer to focus on the problem in 
question. A Domain Specific Language (DSL) is a semantic mechanism tailored specifically for de-
scribing the details of a particular task. The main goal is the usage of appropriate semantics to re-
duce the effort required to reference and manipulate elements of that particular domain.  
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Spinellis [105] defines a Domain Specific Language as “programming language tailored specifical-
ly to an application domain: rather than being for a general purpose, it captures precisely the do-
main's semantics”. DSL schemata have been employed successfully in a number of different areas. 
Consel [106] discusses the range of applications that have employed a DSL which includes device 
driver construction,  active networking and operating system process scheduling. Moreover, Eric 
Raymond [107] outlines some widely known ‘mini’ languages employed in the Unix community 
(regular expressions, awk, m4) and beyond (Postscript, SNG, Glade) as examples of domain specif-
ic languages.  This list is by no means exhaustive, as many more DSLs exist today. A DSL is really 
a framework that offers the ability of building specific and concise notations to express a problem 
domain, as well as safe (as predictable) code due to semantic restrictions. Both of these properties  
are very desirable in the process of developing insider threat specifications.
DSLs are also categorized as external and internal in terms of the way they are implemented [108]. 
External DSLs are discrete systems, independent from any host language and they contain their own 
interpreter or compiler to parse the language statement and perform post interpretation/compilation 
actions. In contrast, internal DSLs are semantics embedded inside a general purpose programming 
language and thus are dependent from the interpreter/compiler of the host language. Examples of 
external DSLs are the ‘mini’ Unix languages mentioned by Raymond in [107], whereas internal 
DSL languages tend to be embedded in programming languages such as Lisp [109], Smalltalk [110] 
and Ruby [111]. Also notable is the new Grammar Engine  (PGE) of 6th version of the Perl language 
[112] that allows one to construct localized version of the Perl language and could form the basis to 
build DSLs.
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The process of deciding which DSL approach to follow for implementing ITPSL is important. Ex-
ternal DSL approaches offer a greater freedom to experiment with the process of constructing insid-
er threat semantics but they provide a higher overhead when it comes to development issues com-
bined with a higher learning curve for the language users. On the other hand, internal DSLs offer 
less development overhead as parsing, interpretation and compilation issues are handled by the host 
language environment. If one takes into account that the host general programming language will 
have already mature semantics and an established user base, it is easy to conclude that an internal 
DSL would have less steep learning curve than an external DSL approach.   
However, the internal DSL dependency on the host language environment might create problems 
for the language designer. The most important issue might arise from a mismatch between the sym-
bolic integration of the embedded DSL and the general vocabulary of the general purpose host lan-
guage. General purpose language vocabularies are rich enough to express a variety of scenarios in 
an abstract way. For example, on a network access scenario, a general purpose programming lan-
guage vocabulary can express details of the origin and destination of a network connection but not 
express network access patterns. In that case, if one tries to engineer the additional functionality 
into the general language, the process of constructing meaningful semantics might be impaired due 
to the general language syntax or due to the host language underlying data structures that might not 
be able to represent fully the required domain information.
A secondary practical problem of adopting an internal DSL approach might include parameter eval-
uation and performance issues. An insider threat prediction operational environment requires the 
evaluation of various parameters at runtime. If a statically compiled host general language is used 
(such as C/C++), runtime evaluation of parameters might pose a challenge. There are of course 
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scripting languages [113] where runtime evaluation is not an option, but they might be slow. Ways 
to combine compile and runtime languages do exist (i.e. a Perl Script calling a C/C++ library via 
API wrappers), however the complexity of combining domain specific semantics with more than 
one language should not be underestimated.
For all these reasons, ITPSL follows the external DSL approach allowing for freedom to create the 
semantics from scratch with commonly changed parameters to be altered without recompilation is-
sues and no dependence on host language idiosyncrasies. The issue of the learning curve for a do-
main expert to learn yet another language is of course considerable. However, the narrow scope of a 
DSL language combined with carefully crafted semantics should create a low complexity interface 
of relatively few (when compared to a general purpose language) statements and thus make the lan-
guage easy to learn. This approach has been followed by a number of security related research 
DSLs such as CISL [17] and Panoptis [18], as discussed in chapter 2. For now, it should be noted 
that both of them can be categorized as external DSLs using configuration files to encode state-
ments that have no resemblance to general purpose programming languages. 
There are also a number of external DSLs that utilize XML to convey information. The next section 
discusses the use of XML as a markup to construct DSLs and shows that this is a common ap-
proach.
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6.2 Designing the ITPSL semantics
Prior describing the ITPSL semantics, it is important to explain the notion of the term 'semantics'. In 
broad terms, semantics is simply another word for meaning. However, the term encompasses many 
important concepts that merit a careful description.
Ogden and Richards, two important linguists and philosophers of the first quarter of the 20 th century 
wrote a book entitled “The meaning of the meaning” [114]. Their work describes important ideas of 
the semantic and semiotic fields [115]. They state the idea of the “meaning triangle”, a triangular re-
lationship  amongst ideas, linguistic symbols like words and the real world. In essence, every person 
links a word to a real world item through a mental concept. This means that semantics have a sub-
jective nature and  this fact is fundamental for the design of languages based on semantics.
Software language engineers relate semantics to the term language by using the following defini-
tion: “A description of the semantics of a language L is a means to communicate a subjective under-
standing of the linguistic utterances of L to another person or persons.” [116]. 
Figure 6.1: Semantic mapping in ITPSL and the meaning triangle
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Whilst the previous definition makes sense for spoken (natural languages), the semantics of a soft-
ware language (and thus a DSL) have a different scope. At present, computers do not have the capa-
bility of constructing their own mental reality. Hence, software language semantics target only hu-
mans, even if they describe aspects of computer system operations. For this reason, semantics facili-
tate the mapping between the human concept, the language symbols and what actually happens in 
the computer system.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the role of semantics in ITPSL. The semantic mapping is all about connecting 
the symbols of ITPSL to the human expert's view of how insider misuse incidents or threats occur 
in a computer system. The concept at the top is formed by both the insider threat taxonomy and 
models described in Chapter 4, as well as by LUARM's specialized audit record format discussed in 
Chapter 5. These represent human abstractions of the problem domain. On the right hand side of the 
triangle resides the real world system view. Thus, the hypotenuse of the triangle symbolizes the dif-
ferences between the concept and the real world manifestations of threats and misuse incidents. 
Successful  semantic mappings adapt to their target audience and reduce the distance between sym-
bols and a well formed concept. This in turn results in a smaller hypotenuse indicating more accura-
cy for the concept with respect to what is actually happening  in the computer system.
Having defined the role and scope of semantics in a problem domain, the next important question to 
raise is how one describes the semantics.  This task is at the core of a language construction process. 
Software languages require formal methodologies to describe semantics, as it is important to elimi-
nate ambiguities that occur in natural languages.  The proposed insider threat model of Chapter 4, 
and the relational description of events facilitated by LUARM provide the formal foundation for the 
description of system-level events that can describe insider IT misuse and threats. However, the 
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linking of the formal foundations to symbols is the next step. Choosing the right methodology at 
this stage is very important.
In general, there are four methods to formally describe semantics [116]:
 The denotational method: Mathematical objects (denotations) are constructed that repre-
sent the meaning of the chosen semantics.
 The pragmatic method: This involves the execution of the semantics by the 'reference im-
plementation' tool, a program designed to produce specific outputs given specific semantic 
inputs.
 The translational method: This method translates the semantics into another language that 
is well understood.
 The operational method: A set of syntactically validated semantics is intepreted as a series 
of computational steps.  
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Figure 6.2: Denotational semantics to describe an interactive file editor [117]
The denotational method [117] is based on complex mathematical constructs that resemble ideas of 
Object Oriented [118] and Functional [119] Programming paradigms. There are actors, objects to 
act on and domains, connected together to form concepts of computer system events by means of 
set theory operations. The method combines mathematical formalism and notational elegance in or-
der to attack successfully the issue of natural language ambiguity. 
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Figure 6.2 provides an example of denotational semantics for the purpose of describing an interac-
tive file editor. The overall concept is decomposed down to a series of operations on objects (file,  
filesystem) and each set of operations has its own domain. Despite the rigor of this method to de-
scribe systems effectively, it is fair to say that it is complex, as the intended audience is normally 
limited to mathematicians or computer scientists that have mastered the use of denotational seman-
tics.  The intended ITPSL audience consists of IT system professionals (system administrators and 
security specialists). It is not safe to assume that every IT system professional is (or will become) 
familiar with denotational semantics. Thus, using the denotational method as the basis for ITPSL 
semantics is a poor choice.
Figure 6.3: Pragmatic semantic description
Pragmatic semantic description is the simplest of the four previously mentioned semantic descrip-
tion methods. It can be best described by the illustration example of Figure 6.3. The black box is the 
“reference implementation” module that acts on the semantics. It takes various sets of discrete sym-
bols as its input on the left and outputs pre-defined symbols on the right. The contents of this black 
box are not known. As a result, the only thing one can do to figure out the meaning of the input  
symbols is to execute various input combinations and observe the respective outputs. This method 
is normally used in the process of reverse engineering software systems [120].  
122
Chapter 6 The Insider Threat Prediction and Specification Language
Figure 6.4: Translational semantic description in ITPSL
The downside of the pragmatic semantic description is that it requires a reference implementation 
and it lacks descriptive power. For example, it is not known how many inputs have to be issued, in 
order to get a sufficient amount of output to infer what actually happens inside the black box. The 
equivalent paradigm transferred to the ITPSL domain means that one would have to submit the ITP-
SL semantics to a reference implementation of the language compiler and then watch whether the 
compiler reacts on certain events. This might be desirable as a language validation mechanism. 
However, this is the reference implementation,  the deliverable for the project and not the initial 
condition. Hence, the pragmatic semantic description is written off the list of desirable methodolo-
gies. 
This  leaves  the  options  of  translational  and  operational  semantic  description  methodologies  to 
choose from. There are many similarities between the two. The most important of them is that they 
both converge around the problem of translating a set of symbols into a known target language to 
facilitate semantic mapping. Figure 6.4 exemplifies the principle of these two semantic description 
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mechanisms by using the mapping triangle concept of Ogden and Richards [114]. It displays what 
happens when one tries to specify an Intellectual Property (IP) theft scenario. In this scenario, an in-
sider masquerades as another user, reads the sensitive file and then copies the file into a portable 
storage medium. 
The isosceles triangle on the left represents the role of the translation procedure from the ITPSL se-
mantics to the well known target language. The term 'well known' does not only mean familiar in 
this case. A target language is well known also because it can sufficiently represent the concept of 
the misuse/threat scenario in system related terms, bringing it close to the set of processes that rep-
resent the actual IP theft occurrence in the computer system (right hand side of the orthogonal trian-
gle). For ITPSL, that target language is no other than the LUARM SQL schema [82], as described 
in Chapter 5. The LUARM audit record and the ITPSL symbols are implicitly known by the target 
audience because they can both represent the two parts of the run-time environment of the computer 
system: the data and the processes. It is this translation that maps a set of ITPSL symbols to a set of  
LUARM SQL statements which in turn try to relate to the real system.
Operational semantics are used in a similar manner. They do need a translation between language 
symbols and a well known target language.  However, an operational semantic approach introduces 
the concept of state transitions [26]. State transitions can create a particular problem in the process 
of expressing computer system run-time environments: They separate the data and the processes. 
This can have profound implications for a specification language, as it forces the language user to 
describe both the run-time state and tie it to specific symbols. When one does not know the possible 
combination of states (aka processes that relate to a threat or misuse) and ITPSL symbols, it be-
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comes virtually impossible to correlate a set of events and provide functions like threat prediction 
(not only misuse detection).
In formal computer science terms, ITPSL semantics need referential  transparency, an important 
principle of functional programming [119] which allows an expression to replace its value without 
changing the program it is part of (in other words, yielding a program that has the same effects and 
output on the same input). This cannot be facilitated by an operational semantic description map-
ping approach. As a result, the only suitable methodology for describing ITPSL semantics is that of 
translational semantics.
The next section discusses the thinking behind the choice of a suitable ITPSL translational semantic 
approach.  
6.3 XML as the basis for ITPSL code generation    
The previous section presented the various semantic description methods and justified the choice of 
translational description as the method of choice for the ITPSL semantics. Translational semantics 
are all about code generation. In the case of ITPSL, a code generator specifies how the ITPSL sym-
bols will be translated to LUARM [82] SQL statements. 
Compilers [134] are software programs that perform the code generation. There are various ap-
proaches for building a code generator. During the early days, most code generation was hard cod-
ed. This means that the logic of the software generator would implement operations to parse the in-
put language, validate its syntax and then transform the statements into the target language accord-
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ing to pre-set rules that were written by hand. This early approach required a lot of work for com-
plex code generation and was rather inflexible.
More recent  approaches introduce more flexibility by viewing a code generator as a model trans-
formation formalism. The 'Query/View/Transformation'  QVT formalism [121] is a characteristic 
example of this type of code generation approach. A generic tool takes as input the source language 
symbols as well as a set of model transformation rules and produces the symbols of the target lan-
guage. Figure 6.5 displays a simple example of a QVT rule that converts book data to a standard 
publication reference format
Figure 6.5: Query/View/Transformation rules [121]
However, QVT formalisms are based on operational semantics [121]. The previous section dis-
cussed the need for referential transparency and thus adopting a QVT formalism for generating the 
LUARM SQL statements is not a good option. However, there is a good equivalent that will avoid  
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the need for hard coding and will also satisfy the referential transparency of the functional program-
ming paradigm.
  
The Extensible Markup Language (XML) [122] appeared as a W3C recommendation in 1998. Since 
then, XML has enjoyed considerable popularity as an interoperability solution for data exchange 
amongst heterogeneous computer systems.
In essence, XML is a syntax for creating a ‘markup’. A ‘markup’ is a set of elements, attributes, and 
other structures that facilitates meaningful labeling of data so that other human beings or software 
can understand and interpret information. The combined human and machine readability features of 
the XML markup and the well formed standardized data description rules it imposes [122] make it 
ideal for usage in ITPSL signatures for a number of reasons:
 XML's declarative syntax and tag naming flexibility make the process of creating various 
types of insider data easy.
 XML's hierarchy imposes a universal well agreed structure on how the information is pre-
sented and interpreted.  
 XML standards such as that of XSLT [131] can provide a good basis for referential integri-
ty, as discussed in section 6.2. In fact, XSLT can be a fully fledged programming language 
having a lot of common attributes with functional programming [123].  Its declarative orien-
tation provides a good ground for making translational semantics.  
In addition, reliable XML parsers (tools that extract data from XML semantics in a consistent fash-
ion) are readily available in a variety of programming languages. This could save a lot of effort in 
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the process of designing a language schema that could be parsed easily.  Thus, if one is about to em-
bed a DSL grammar in an XML markup, he could gain many advantages over a non-XML markup: 
the ability to have embedded well formed rules that are standard and can represent hierarchical in-
formation and relative ease of developing parsing routines on well tested software. Later paragraphs 
of this section will elaborate on how this applies to ITPSL. 
Software developers have criticized XML's characteristics. No language design decisions should be 
dictated by implementation details, especially when there are arguments against using XML to de-
sign DSLs. While there are no guidelines on when to employ XML in relation to DSL construction, 
Bell [124] notes some overheads of XML when it comes to the excessive tag space occupied in re-
lation to expressing simple data such as non hierarchical name-value pairs and doubts about the fea-
sibility of XML enabling generic programming language constructs such as loops and conditionals. 
Moreover,  many DSL or generic programming developers cast doubt over the general human read-
ability of XML [125], as well as XML performance [126]. The following paragraphs will address 
these concerns in relation to the ITPSL requirements. 
Starting with the issue of using XML to make a DSL, Bell's criticisms about the excess disk space 
are valid. However, they become an important hinter on data intensive paradigms. ITPSL signatures 
will range on average around 2 Kilobytes in size. If one multiplies 2 Kbytes by an estimated couple  
of thousand signatures that might be applicable for an IT infrastructure, we get 4 Gigs of signature 
data. In the Tbyte era of cheap disk storage and with various portable media been able to hold many 
times that amount of space, this is not a problem for our domain.
128
Chapter 6 The Insider Threat Prediction and Specification Language
Bell [124] also addresses the complexity of building generic programming language features such 
as loops and conditional statements in XML schemata. This is also a valid criticism. XML was not 
designed to incorporate features of generic programming languages, as it is primarily optimized for 
the expression of declarative rules. Of all the generic programming features, ITPSL will need to im-
plement conditionals and binary operators, in order to satisfy the functional high level requirement 
of representing decision theoretic information, as stated in section 4.3. This is a necessary overhead 
implemented in ITPSL by means of special XML tags such as <ifexists>, <AND> and others. Later 
sections of this chapter will present these semantic details.
  
Human readability is an important factor for the design of ITPSL semantics, as they are also intend-
ed  for human consumption besides being a target for code translation by a code generator. The dis-
cussion on the human readability of XML [126] is contested. Human readability is a strong plus for 
every kind of programming language (generic and DSL). The XML readability issue seems to cen-
ter around the fact that the mark-up overwhelms the data content in between, and “line after line of 
opening tag almost next to the identical closing tag is hiding the essential data by their redundancy”, 
as noted by Bos [127]. Whilst this is true, it does not mean that XML is completely unreadable. 
Some effort is required for reading XML statements. The usage of meaningful tag names that comes 
with the freedom of being able to create them reduces that effort and makes human readers be able 
to interpret the document easily, even without being familiar with the tag structure [128].  In addi-
tion, various XML editors and tools are able to display XML information in a more structured man-
ner to aid the understanding of the information conveyed in the XML document. Thus, we conclude 
that although reading XML pages requires some effort by human readers, this is a small price to pay 
in order to have a well formatted descriptive structure as the basis for ITPSL.
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Finally, the issue of performance raised in [126] does not really affect ITPSL. The ITPSL signature  
is not the basis of computation for the language to work. The signature holds data to express the ba-
sic elements of a particular threat. The data will have to be parsed and used in various modules to 
check for the type of threat, but the basis for computing the checks is not XML based. Consequent -
ly, any overhead encountered by the XML parser extracting the signature data is small compared to 
the non-XML based computational overhead of making sense of the data.
In support of XML, it is also worth emphasizing that a number of security specification languages 
are based on it. The specification for Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XC-
CDF) [129] and the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [130] are two exam-
ples of research work that encapsulate their semantics in XML markup.
A final comment in favor of XML concerns three of its key technologies that relate  to the ITPSL 
structure and function: 
 The Extended Style Language Transformations (XSLT) standard [131]: A technology that 
transforms XML documents to any other type of document.
 The XML Path Language (XPath) standard [132]: A mechanism for selecting precisely parts 
of XML documents by specifying their exact location inside an XML document.
 The XML Schema standard [133]:  An XML schema defines the structure, content and se-
mantics of XML documents. As such, it can be a mechanism for validating the semantic 
structure of documents.
130
Chapter 6 The Insider Threat Prediction and Specification Language
Figure 6.6: ITPSL XML components
Figure 6.6 above illustrates how these XML technologies are used in the  information flow of the 
ITPSL 'compiler'. The ITPSL compiler will accept an XML based signature and will generate as 
output a set of LUARM based SQL statements, in order to mine relevant audit data, as described in  
Chapter 5. Letting the issue of the language semantics to the side for the moment, we assume that 
XML will provide the ITPSL structure. We can then show the multiple advantages of using an 
XML based approach over traditional approaches of constructing compilers.
On the top left, we have an XML document that contains the threat signature. The XML standard 
can guarantee the well-formed features of the markup [122] but not the syntactic validity of the ITP-
SL statements. If we were to build up a compiler, we would have to devise a regular grammar, build 
a lexer and tokenizer [134] and then write the parser routines, in order to make sense of the input 
file and infer its syntactic validity. This process can be cumbersome and time consuming. In con-
trast, this is a relatively easy process with the XML Schema standard [133]. The tool can reference 
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an XML Schema Definition file (XSD), where the language author can encode (in XML) the syn-
tactic rules and form. The XSD file and the input ITPSL threat signature are then fed into widely 
available XML Schema Validator modules. Such a module can reliably infer the syntactic validity 
of the signature file. Writing XSD files has of course its own learning curve, but it is a much sim-
pler process than writing various compiler sub-modules from scratch.
After this initial pre-processing step, the syntactically valid ITPSL signature file is based on the ac-
tual ITPSL compiler. At this point, the XPath standard [132] and the Perl oriented XML::Twig 
module come [135] into the picture. This helps the compiler parse the ITPSL signature document by 
pointing at specific parts of the XML document, extracting the data and initiating actions depending 
on the data content. The actions are constructed LUARM SQL statements, bridging the gap between 
language semantics and audit data mining. 
Appendix B provides sample code for both the XSD and the implemented prototype of the ITPSL 
Compiler, which is described in detail in Chapter 7 of the thesis.
For all these reasons, XML is a good standard to base the semantics of ITPSL, trading off a small  
part of the signature's human readability for having consistent structure and easiness in the construc-
tion of the ITPSL compiler. The next section will present the ITPSL language semantics. 
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6.4 An introduction to the ITPSL markup
The previous chapter sections discussed the programming paradigm and the markup basis for con-
structing ITPSL. It is now time to present the semantic framework of ITPSL, the core issue of this 
research project.
At the heart of the semantic framework lies the form of the ITPSL signature, a semantic structure 
that represents the encoding of an insider threat. Figure 6.7 shows the general structure of an ITPSL 
signature. It consists of a header section followed by the main body of the signature where sub-
blocks of file, exec, network and hardware statements are encapsulated, in accordance to the differ-
ent types of LUARM audit log data.
All ITPSL signature sections conform to the XML well formed rules [122] and a specific XML 
schema [133] against which are validated. Appendix B contains a suitably crafted XML Schema 
Definition file (XSD) that encodes the ITPSL content and syntactic rules. The rest of this section 
describes what constitutes a valid ITPSL signature in detail and cross-referencing language features 
with the ITPSL functional requirements of section 4.3 .
The ITPSL header section provides important signature classification information. This is in re-
sponse to ITPSL functional FR2 (building of signature repositories). The <signid> tag marks the 
signature’s unique identification number. At the time of signature creation, the system takes the cur-
rent date and time combined with some other semi random metrics and creates a unique MD5 hash 
[91], in order to make a unique signature ID. The <signdate> section is self-explanatory. 
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<itpslsig>
<itpslheader>
<signid> <md5sum of date and second, type of OS, current number of processes> 
</signid>
<signdate>
<year> dddd </year>
<month> dd </month>
<day> dd </day>
</signdate>
<ontology>
<reason> “intentional” | “accidental” </reason>
<revision> d.d </revision>
<user_role> “admins” | “advanced_users” | “ordinary_users” </user_role>
<detectby>  “file” | “exec” | “network” | “hardware” | “multi” </detectby>
<multihost> yes | no </multihost>
<hostlist> host1,hostgroup1,...hostn,hostgroupn </hostlist>
<weightmatrix>nevents, wevent1,wevent2,...,weventn </weightmatrix>
<os> “linux” | “windows” | “macosx” | “unix” </os>
<osver> “2.4” | ”2.6” |  “2000” | “Vista” | “7” </osver>
<threatkeywords> keyword1 keyword2 ... keyword5
 </threatkeywords>
[ <synopsis> “text that describes the signature’s purpose and function” 
</synopsis>]            
</ontology>
</itpslheader>
<itpslbody>
<mainblock>
<mainop> “AND”|”OR”|”XOR”|”as_a_result_of” | “justone”</mainop>
<subblock>  
<subop> “AND”|”OR”|”XOR”|”as_a_result_of”| “single” </subop>
<filestatements> ….</filestatements> 
<execstatements>….</execstatements>
<netstatements>…</netstatements>
</subblock>
<subblock>
<subop> “AND”|”OR”|”XOR”|”as_a_result_of”| “single” </subop>
<filestatements> ….</filestatements> 
<execstatements>….</execstatements>
<netstatements>…</netstatements>
</subblock>
</mainblock>
</itpslbody>
</itpslsig>
Figure 6.7: General ITPSL signature structure
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The ontology header subsection is of particular importance for the creation of signature repositories. 
An ontology is a data model [136] that represents a set of concepts within a domain (or formally 
known as domain of discourse in linguistic terms [137]) and the relationships between those con-
cepts. A variation of the threat model published by Furnell and Magklaras [56] and the audit engine 
data constitute the data model and the domain that the proposed markup language addresses. 
As discussed in section 4.3, one of the problems ITPSL is trying to address is the lack of insider  
threat scenario repositories . When such a repository is constructed, facilities to search and relate 
signatures (descriptions of threat scenarios) will be important and thus the language must have both 
semantic and data identifiers to allow security specialists to locate a class of signatures. For exam-
ple, one could select all signatures that use network detection criteria, or all signatures that target 
p2p client installation and detect their presence at multiple levels ('multi' refers to a combination of 
employing 'file', 'exec', 'network' and 'hardware' detection statements). A third example could be the 
last two revisions of a particular set of signatures or a set of signatures whose weight matrix places 
more emphasis on network detection criteria. 
The <reason> tag specifies whether we are searching for a threat that is a result of deliberate actions 
(intentional) or accidental mistakes (accidental). The <revision> tag makes possible to trace signa-
tures whose detection criteria are modified to improve the accuracy or to examine slightly different 
aspects of the target problem. In that case, the ‘signid’ identifier remains the same amongst the re-
lated signatures.
The <multihost> and <hostlist> tags bind the signature to a particular host or group a host in two 
ways:
135
Chapter 6 The Insider Threat Prediction and Specification Language
 No cross-host correlation binding: A <multihost> no </multihost> value combined with 
one or more hosts in the <hostlist> tag will apply the signature in each of the specified hosts 
(or host groups), looking for events on a single host at a time. This way should be used when 
we wish to bind the signature specification on one or more computing hosts and all the  
events concern the single specified hosts.
 Cross-host correlation binding: A <multihost> yes </multihost> value combined with two 
or more hosts in the <hostlist> tag will apply the signature across multiple hosts. This signa-
ture binding facilitates events that occur in multiple hosts, satisfying the ITPSL requirement 
FR8 (event correlation over multiple hosts). In such a case, each individual ITPSL sub-block 
event definition should specify the <onhost> tag, in order to bind the event to one or more of 
the specified hosts.
ITPSL uses a modified version of the weight matrix concept [56] discussed in section 4.3 of the the-
sis. This modification allows a signature author to further tune the sensitivity of the ITPM model 
[56], and is included in the signature ontology header (<weightmatrix> tag).  There are two impor-
tant operation modes defined by the content of the weightmatrix attribute in an ITPSL signature:
 Detection mode:  This mode forces the signature to be interpreted as a way to detect an 
event. It is triggered by a weightmatrix directive of  <weightmatrix> 0 </weightmatrix>. 
This indicates that the signature will produce a true or false result on the basis of whether 
the criteria described in the ITPSL body are met or not.
 Predictive mode: Any non zero weightmatrix directive (example <weightmatrix> 2,45,55 
</weighmatrix>) triggers the interpretation of the signature in predictive mode. This means 
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that the signature will be interpreted in a way that will provide a likelihood of the occurrence 
of the described IT misuse incident.
The original version of the weight matrix concept [56] allowed the signature author to express his 
confidence on the various metrics and the nature of the incident he is trying to predict.  The author 
would  use a parenthesized list of nine digits, encoding the relative weights of the various ITQAs, as 
listed in Table 1 of section 4.3. This approach is a theoretical way that emphasizes the importance 
of grading the different threat qualifiers by using different categories of operating system data (file, 
network, process execution and attributes), but it can be inflexible. For instance, consider a  signa-
ture that consists of network criteria only. In such a case, it is not clear how the weight distribution 
should occur in the Weight Matrix. 
In order to resolve this issue and make the weight matrix concept more flexible for the encoding of 
insider threat signatures, the weight matrix should have the form of Figure 6.8. The Evaluated Po-
tential Misuse Occurrence (EPMO) is defined as the sum of the weights of all the events encoded 
in the signature. In ITPSL, an event is a discrete specification of a system-level act (file, network, 
process  execution,  hardware  device  attachment)  dictated  by  the  LUARM  audit  record  format. 
Events are described inside an ITPSL sub-block (<subblock></subblock>). Later paragraphs will 
discuss the context, structure and role of subblocks, when we examine the main body of the ITPSL 
signature. Hence, the content of the weightmatrix tag consists of a series of numbers: The first of 
them describes the number of events and the rest of the numbers are the weights for each event sub-
block. This adaptation of the  Weight Matrix concept is a more flexible way to express the confi-
dence of certain actions for threat prediction purposes and satisfies ITPSL requirement FR5 (encod-
ing of decision theoretic information).
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∑weventn = EPMO
EPMO -> Evaluated Potential Misuse Occurrence (0...1)
n-> number of specified events
<weightmatrix>nevents, wevent1,wevent2,...,weventn </weightmatrix>
Figure 6.8: Weight Matrix in ITPSL
<itpslsig>
<itpslheader>
<signid> 69754c2b65627a098d02eb6244e40e69 </signid>
<signdate>
<year> 2007 </year>
<month> 08 </month>
<day> 25 </day>
</signdate>
<ontology>
<reason> intentional </reason>
<revision> 1.0 </revision>
<user_role> ordinary_users </user_role>
<detectby> multi </detectby>
<multihost> no </multihost>
<hostlist> cn1.abc.com </hostlist>
<weightmatrix> 2,40,60 </weightmatrix>
<os> linux </os>
<osver> 2.6 </osver>
<threatkeywords> p2p installation azureus </threat>
[ <synopsis> “This signature estimates the threat of installing and using the 
azureus p2pclient” </synopsis>]            
</ontology>
</itpslheader>
<itpslbody>
.....
</itpslbody>
</itpslsig>
Figure 6.9: An example ITPSL signature header
Figure 6.9 provides an example of an ITPSL signature header (the signature main body is excluded) 
made in August 2007, targeting an intentional misuse act that concerns the installation of an azureus 
p2p client by the 'ordinary_users' category for the Linux operating system. The weightmatrix in-
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forms  that  there  are  two event  definitions  (thus  two subblocks  in  the  signature),  with  relative 
weights of 40 and 60 respectively.
In summary, the signature header provides threat signature metadata and helps the ITPSL signature 
author to create signature repositories, as well as to apply the signature to particular computing de-
vices. We can now move to the ITPSL body (<itpslbody></itpslbody>), the main part of the signa-
ture where the encoding of the insider threats takes place.
Figure 6.10 displays the structure of the signature body (the header and the rest of the markup is ex-
cluded  for  illustration  purposes).  The  ITPSL  body  contains  one  main  statement  block 
(<mainblock>). Each of the file, process execution, network and hardware statements are contained 
within statement sub-blocks (located always inside the main block) whose start and end are marked 
with the <subblock> tag. 
Previous paragraphs have already explained  that a sub-block defines an event, a discrete specifica-
tion of a system-level act, as recorded by a LUARM audit record. The various types of sub-blocks 
and  their  encapsulating  statements  can  be  combined  to  create  complex  scenarios  by using  the 
<mainop> and <subop> tags. These tags act as logical operators. The <mainop> tag applies the 
AND OR XOR, as well as the “justone” operator, in order to define how to consider the content of  
various sub-blocks. These operators provide the foundation to express various aspects of ITPSL re-
quirement FR4.  The <subop> tag does the same job for the statements contained inside the scope 
of a sub-block. The inclusion of these logical operators in the language aims to enable the descrip-
tion of various potential scenarios (polymorphism), as dictated by requirement FR5 (Section 4.3). 
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<itpslbody>
<mainblock>
<mainop> “AND”|”OR”|”XOR”|”as_a_result_of” | “justone” </mainop>
<subblock>  
<subop> “AND”|”OR”|”XOR”|”as_a_result_of”| “single” </subop>
<filestatements> ….</filestatements> 
<execstatements>….</execstatements>
<netstatements>…</netstatements>
</subblock>
<subblock>
<subop> “AND”|”OR”|”XOR”|”as_a_result_of”| “single” </subop>
<filestatements> ….</filestatements> 
<execstatements>….</execstatements>
<netstatements>…</netstatements>
</subblock>
</mainblock>
</itpslbody>
Figure 6.10: The ITPSL signature body
The ‘as_a_result_of’ operator is an operator that enables the expression of sequenced events.  Its 
scope is always inside the mainop block. The event sequence description provides the ability to cap-
ture a sequence of events in order to increase the confidence of detecting the right conditions for the 
threat the signature addresses ( ITPSL requirement FR4 ). Figure 6.11 provides an example of this 
feature.
What this description expresses is that the events described by the three sub-blocks should be cap-
tured by the audit engine one after the other. The first of the listed sub-blocks represents the final 
event. The very last sub-block describes the first event. This semantic structure was chosen, in order 
to make the first specified event appear as the consequence of all the previous events and enhance 
the relation between the steps that constitute a threat scenario. The same holds true for the subop 
operator inside each sub-block.
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<itpslbody>
<mainblock>
<mainop>  as_a_result_of  </mainop>
<subblock>
<subop>  OR   </subop> 
ITPSL directive1 ITPSL directive 2
</subblock>
<subblock>
<subop>  AND   </subop> 
ITPSL directive1 ITPSL directive 2
</subblock>
<subblock>
<subop>  AND   </subop> 
ITPSL directive1 ITPSL directive 2
</subblock>
</mainblock>
</itpslbody>
Figure 6.11: The 'as_a_result_of' operator (main block scope)
There are four broad categories of threat detection statements (ITPSL directives), reflecting the core 
based consequences of the Magklaras and Furnell insider misuse taxonomy [36] and the respective 
audit record types of LUARM: file statements, execution statements (originally referred to as mem-
ory manipulation in the taxonomy) network statements and hardware statements. File statements 
provide the ability to describe aspects of threats that relate to operating system file operations. The 
execution statements help the signature author to describe threat elements associated with the exe-
cution of programs.  The ‘netstatements’ are designed to facilitate threat prediction by looking for 
signs of certain network activities. Finally, hardware statements describe the attachment of hard-
ware devices to the system. The inclusion of these four basic types of statements in the ITPSL se -
mantics mixes the ability to specify static and live forensic data as dictated by ITPSL requirement  
FR3.  
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<itpslsig>
<itpslheader>
…
<detectby>file</detectby>
<weightmatrix>3,50,20,30</weightmatrix>
…
</itpslheader>
<itpslbody>
<mainblock>
<mainop> AND </mainop>
<subblock>
....
</subblock>
<subblock>
....
</subblock>
</mainblock>
</itpslbody>
</itpslsig>
Figure 6.12: Example of an invalid ITPSL signature
The various types of ITPSL statements can be entered in any order and not all of them are obliga-
tory.  Signature authors should also know that there needs to be consistency between the content of 
the header and body ITPSL parameters. For example, if one specifies two sub-blocks in the main 
body and three event weights in the Weight Matrix header tag, the signature will be invalid (Figure 
6.12). 
Beyond the ITPSL XML Schema validation that dictates the syntax and content of the language 
markup, a number of additional validity issues are checked by the ITPSL compiler, as part of the  
signature’s validation procedure. If an inconsistency is found, the ITPSL signature parser will reject  
the signature and output a suitable error message to flag the problem. Further examples of valid and 
invalid signatures will be given throughout the text of the next chapter sections.
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6.5 ITPSL file and directory statements
Having introduced the basic structure of the proposed language markup, this section now outlines 
the ITPSL file and directory statements. In most operating systems, directories are implemented as 
special file structures [42] [43]. Nevertheless, separate directory statements exist in the language be-
cause the context of expressing insider misuse actions differs between files and containers of files 
(directories).  The file and directory statements provide the important mechanism of specifying file 
related activities. Previous chapters indicated that many misuse activities have file related system 
consequences. Thus, a misuse language must be able to express misuse scenarios by means of look-
ing at filesystem related information. There are three broad categories of file statements:
 File presence detection statements (fileexists, direxists): These statements help the lan-
guage user to relate the presence of certain files and directories to misuse scenarios. They 
also represent the workhorse of the ITPSL file statements as they are re-used (implicitly or 
explicitly) by other types of statements (for example, a file access specification statement re-
quires that we check for the file presence). 
 File access ability statements (usercanaccessfile, usercanaccessdir, groupcanaccessfile, 
groupcanaccessdir): These represent a mechanism that relates the ability of certain individ-
uals to access file data to misuse threat scenarios. This is important for an insider misuse 
specification language because it allows decision theoretic information to be expressed in a 
misuse signature. The fact that certain file data can be accessed does not necessarily repre-
sent misuse, but it could indicate the possibility for certain types of misuse (information 
theft, etc). All well known operating systems place great emphasis on file access control op-
erations by employing various forms of Access Control Lists (ACLs) [1]. There are discre-
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tionary, mandatory and role-based ACLs that constitute different approaches on controlling 
file access amongst operating systems. However, the important thing in the process of speci-
fying a threat scenario is to focus on what can be accessed and by whom and express this  
info using standardized semantics. The ITPSL engine should be aware of the differences of 
the various ACL mechanisms and hence it should be able to examine whether the conditions 
the language semantics specify are true or false.  
 File access statements (fileaccess, diraccess): A file access statement helps the language 
user to specify relevant file activities that should be considered as part of a misuse signature. 
In contrast to the two previous types of file statements that examine file presence or access 
capability, this type of statement refers to the actual act of file-system access.  In addition, 
whilst file presence and access ability statements express facts without a specified time peri-
od, a file access statement specifies either current (at the time of the misuse signature check) 
or other time-specific access activities, enhancing the ability of the language to relate tempo-
ral information to threat scenarios.      
6.5.1 File and directory detection statements 
The 'fileexists' detection statement makes sure that the signature author can locate one or more files 
(see <singlefile></singlefile> tags) that meet specific conditions. It is the workhorse of the file op-
eration statements and thus it needs to balance specificity and flexibility of expression to accommo-
date a wide range of scenarios. Figure 6.13 shows the basic syntax of the statement.
The filename tag tries to locate files with specific names. The specified name must include the file 
extension. If that fails or a specific name is not entered, the entered name becomes part of a regular 
expression that the ITPSL engine will produce in an attempt to locate the file(s) in question. If the 
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entered name fails to intercept a file as a regular expression (many malicious acts tend to alter the 
name of files to hide them or trick users, including the file extension), then the rest of the criteria 
are employed to detect a file. The AND, OR, XOR and NOT logical operators may be used to spec-
ify many combinations of matching file names.  
<fileexists>
<filename>  AND|OR|XOR|NOT (name1, name2, name3…) </filename>
<type> AND|OR|XOR|NOT (executable | image | sound | video | textdata | special | any) 
</type>
<location> path | AND|OR|XOR|NOT (path1, path2) | #userhome# | any   </location>
<singlefile> yes | no </singlefile>
[
<quantity> (over|less|equal)  number </quantity>
<filesize> (over|less|equal) number (b/k/m/g) </filesize>
<withcontents> 
<AND|OR|XOR|NOT>
<stringsearch> “string”</stringsearch> | <hexsearch> “hexstr” 
</hexsearch> |
<stringsearch> AND/OR/XOR/NOT (“string1”,”string2”…) 
</stringsearch> |
<hexsearch>  AND/OR/XOR/NOT (“hexstr1”,”hexstr2”…)</hexsearch>
</AND/OR/XOR/NOT>
</withcontents> 
<withchecksum> “md5checksum” </withchecksum>
<ownedbyuser>username</ownedbyuser>
<ownedbygroup>groupname</ownedbygroup>
<ownerperm> (read,write,execute) </ownerperm>
<groupperm> (read,write,execute) </groupperm>
<otherperm> (read,write,execute) </otherperm>
<specialperm> setuserid,setgroupid </specialperm>
]
</fileexists>
Figure 6.13: The 'fileexists' ITPSL statement 
The <type> tag is employed to examine whether the file(s) in question are executable, text data or 
other special file (such as device driver or other inter-process communication files).  
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The <location> tag tells the ITPSL engine where to start looking for the file(s). A specific path or 
combinations of possible paths where the files in question reside might be entered. However, in ev-
ery case, the specified path acts as a starting point for the file search, and the ITPSL engine will at-
tempt to search in all possible subdirectories. This can affect the time it takes to execute the search 
operation. Large filesystems might contain millions of files under various subdirectories and can 
prolong the time and computational resources required for their execution. The author can choose 
the “any” value to instruct the engine to start searching from the top of the filesystem tree, specify 
certain filesystem paths or choose the ‘userhome’ value. This latter value will start the file search 
from the user’s home area. The signature’s header will target a particular user category (i.e. ordi-
nary users) and thus every user’s home directory will be examined with the conditions specified in 
the statement.
The use of the <location> tag is obligatory in a standalone ‘fileexists’ statement. However, it can be 
omitted whenever a fileexists statement is embedded inside a direxists statement (see ‘direxists’ 
statement). This feature is necessary, in order to link the context of the embodied fileexists to that of 
the direxists statement and thus the path of the specified file is automatically resolved by the rele-
vant tag values of the direxists statement. Nesting statements of the same category under certain 
rules, in order to increase the specificity of an expression is a language feature and subsequent 
paragraphs will explain the concept in more detail.   
The  <withcontents>  optional  statement  allows  one  to  specify  files  that  have  certain  contents 
searcheable by general alphanumeric string or hexadecimal patterns. In case the search concerns a 
single file (<singlefile> yes </singlefile>), an md5sum checksum could be entered, so that the au-
thor is certain to intercept the presence of a specific file. On the other hand, if we are looking for 
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many files, it might be useful to provide a threshold value for the number of the detected objects. 
This is the role of the <quantity> optional tag. It gives the signature author the ability to set a  
threshold number of detected files and connect it to the target scenario in the header of the signa-
ture.  
As an example, the following statement detects a specific image file with name ‘supernova1.jpg’ 
under the directory /storage/images (Figure 6.14).
<fileexists>
<filename>  supernova1.jpg </filename>
<type> image </type>
<location> /storage/images </location>
<singlefile> yes  </singlefile>
<withchecksum> ca12b5405dfb739e197c803ed790bc01</checksum>
</fileexists> 
Figure 6.14: Example of detecting the presence of a specific image file 
This file existence statement of Figure 6.15 demonstrates a search for multiple mp3 files under the 
user’s home directory, setting a threshold of over 100 files. This could be part of a multi-level sig-
nature trying to detect the possibility of illegal peer-to-peer software activity.
<fileexists>
<filename> *.mp3 </filename>
<type> audio </type>
<location> userhome </location>
<singlefile> no </singlefile>
<quantity> over  100 </quantity>
</fileexists>
Figure 6.15: Example of detecting the presence of a number of music files
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Despite the existence of optional statements parts, increasing the specificity of the criteria employed 
in the file existence statement will improve its effectiveness.
In most known operating systems, directories are containers of files, so from a file operations point 
of view it is important to have the ability to relate actions and events to directories. The ‘direxists’  
file statement facilitates directory searching and like ‘fileexists’ contains tags that set the conditions 
for choosing the directories.
<direxists>
<dirname>  AND/OR/XOR/NOT (name1, name2, name3…) </dirname>
<location> AND/OR/XOR/NOT (name1, name2, name3…) | userhome | any 
</location>
<singledir> yes | no </singledir>
             [
<quantity> (over|less|equal)  number </quantity>
<dirsize> (over|less|equal) number (b/k/m/g) </dirsize>
<withfiles>
<AND|OR|XOR>
<fileexists>….</fileexists> 
<fileexists>….</fileexists>…
</AND|OR|XOR>
</withfiles>
<ownedbyuser>username</ownedbyuser>
<ownedbygroup>groupname</ownedbygroup>
<ownerperm> (read,write,execute) </ownerperm>
<groupperm> (read,write,execute) </groupperm>
<otherperm> (read,write,execute) </otherperm>
<specialperm> setuserid,setgroupid </specialperm>
]
</direxists>
Figure 6.16: The ITPSL 'direxists' statement
Similar to a ‘fileexists’ statement, ‘direxists’ checks for the presence of directories. Most of the tags 
should be self explanatory as they define properties similar to those of the ‘fileexists’ statement. 
However, entire ‘fileexists’ statements can be included inside an optional <withfiles></withfiles> 
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block, in order to increase the specificity of a directory search operation. Within the <withfiles> tag, 
the signature author can place any relevant file statement(s) and expect the encapsulated ‘fileexists’ 
statement(s) to act as selection condition(s) of the ‘direxist’ statement. Statement nesting can be 
performed under certain conditions only for statements of the same type. For instance, if we have a 
file statement such as ‘direxists’ and its syntax dictates that between the ‘withfiles’ tags other file 
statements may be placed, this will be true within the domain of file statements. For example, one 
cannot nest a net statement or exec statement inside a file statement.
<direxists> 
<dirname>  Filme </dirname>
<location> userhome </location>
<singledir> yes </singledir>
<dirsize> over 2 g </dirsize>
<withfiles>
<AND>
<fileexists>
<filename> *.torrent </filename>
<type>  textdata </type>
<singlefile> no </singlefile>
<quantity> over 20 </quantity>
</fileexists> 
<fileexists>
<filename> OR (*.avi, *.wmv, *.mpg)  </filename>
<type> video </type>
<singlefile> no </singlefile>
<quantity> over 20 </quantity>
</filexists>
</AND>
</withfiles>
</direxists>
Figure 6.17: Example of detecting the presence of a specific directory
As an example of a ‘direxists’ statement, one can consider a scenario that requires the detection of a 
directory under the user’s home area that is called ‘Filme’. That directory should be more than 2 Gi-
gabytes in size and contain more than 20 torrent files, as well as 20 or more video files of either avi, 
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wmv or mpg type. This directory detection scenario can be expressed with the statement shown in 
Figure 6.17.
Notable is the absence of the <location> tag in the embedded ‘fileexists’ statements. In this case, the 
nested 'filexists' tags embed statements that increase the specificity of the directory we are trying to 
detect. The ITPSL engine will automatically construct the <location> tag of each embedded fileex-
ists statement by merging the <location> and <dirname> tags values in order to form a suitable file 
path.  Thus, in this case, all file searches will be performed under the 'Filme' directory of the user’s 
home area. 
6.5.2 File access ability statements
An insider threat prediction specification language must be able to provide the ability to express po-
tential file access scenarios, in order to support decision theoretic information.  Even if the user is 
not accessing the file(s) in question, knowing whether a file is accessible by a user, as well as what 
the user can do with this file can form the basis of assessing various threat scenarios.  
The ‘usercanaccessfile’ statement provides this capability (Figure 6.18). It ties the existence of a file 
to the ability of a user to read, write and/or execute the file. The similarity of its parameter tags to  
the ones of the ‘fileexists’ statements implies that the ITPSL engine will check that the files exist 
prior performing the access checks. 
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<usercanaccessfile>
<userid>username</userid>
<filename> AND/OR/XOR/NOT (name1, name2, name3…)  </filename>
<accessrights> read| read-write| read-execute |all </accessrights>
<type> AND/OR/XOR/NOT (executable | image | sound | video | textdata | special | 
any) </type>
<location> path | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (path1, path2) | userhome | any  </location>
<singlefile> <yes | no> </singlefile>
[
<quantity> (over|less|equal)  number </quantity>
<filesize> (over|less|equal) number (b/k/m/g) </filesize>
<withcontents> 
<AND|OR|XOR|NOT>
<stringsearch> “string”</stringsearch> | <hexsearch> “hexstr” 
</hexsearch> |
<stringsearch> AND/OR/XOR/NOT (“string1”,”string2”…) 
</stringsearch> |
<hexsearch>  AND/OR/XOR/NOT (“hexstr1”,”hexstr2”…)</hexsearch>
</AND/OR/XOR/NOT>
</withcontents>  
<withchecksum> “md5checksum” </withchecksum>
<ownedbyuser>username</ownedbyuser>
<ownedbygroup>groupname</ownedbygroup>
]
</usercanaccessfile>
Figure 6.18: The 'usercanaccessfile' ITPSL statement 
The ‘groupcanaccessfile’ statement functions in a similar way to the ‘usercanaccessfile’ statement, 
however the checks are performed against a group of users.  The word ‘group’ might refer to the 
notion of a file group, as implemented by the host operating system. For example, if the host operat-
ing system is UNIX, net groups are not taken into consideration. Whilst the exact mechanism of file 
groups is operating system dependent, all popular operating systems support the idea of file groups. 
The alternative is to specify a list of usernames against which the checks will be performed. In that  
case, the username list does not constitute an operating system group, but a logical group for the 
purposes of the language being able to check a set of criteria against users that might not belong to  
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the same operating system group. In addition, this feature enables the language to specify logical 
groups in an operating system independent way. 
<groupcanaccessfile>
<groupid>groupname | (username1,username2…)</groupid>
<filename>  AND/OR/XOR/NOT (name1, name2, name3…)  </filename>
<accessrights>”read” “read,write” “read, execute” “all”</accessrights>
<type> AND/OR/XOR/NOT (executable  |  image |  sound |  video |  textdata  |  special  |  any) 
</type>
<location> path | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (path1, path2) | userhome | any   </location>
<singlefile> <yes | no> </singlefile>
[
<quantity> <over|less|equal> “ number“ </quantity>
<filesize> <over|less|equal> <number b/k/m/g> </filesize>
<withcontents> 
<stringsearch> “string1” AND/OR/XOR “string2”… </stringsearch>
AND/OR
<hexsearch> “hexpattern1” AND/OR/XOR “hexpattern2”…</hexsearch>
</withcontents> 
<withchecksum> “md5checksum” </withchecksum>
<ownedbyuser>username</ownedbyuser>
<ownedbygroup>groupname</ownedbygroup>
]
</groupcanaccessfile>
Figure 6.19: The 'groupcanaccessfile' ITPSL statement
For instance, if we wish to see whether a user has write access to the /etc/passwd file of a unix host,  
we could achieve that by placing the following file statement in the body of the ITPSL signature.
<usercanaccessfile>
<filename>passwd</filename>
<accessrights>read,write</accessrights>
<type> textdata </type>
<location> /etc </location>
<singlefile> yes </singlefile>
</usercanaccessfile>
Figure 6.20: A simple 'usercanaccessfile' usage example
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Figure 6.20 displays a more specific scenario, where we wish to see if the users of the ‘accounting’  
file group have read access to a commercially sensitive image file called “prototype1.jpg”, instances 
of which could be placed under the /drawings or under the /data/machinedesigns directories,  is 
owned by username ‘jdavies’ and has an md5 checksum of cf7af1a746f000a0e02cf8b4d1b71ba9 
(so we can be sure we will be looking for the right file).
The ‘<singlefile>no</singlefile>’ statement implies that the engine can check for more than one in-
stance of the file. If the file exists only in one of the specified locations, the check will be performed 
only in one instance. This could satisfy a scenario where the file in question is placed in different 
folders with the same or different permissions.
<groupcanaccessfile>
<groupid> accounting </groupid>
<filename>prototype1.jpg</filename>
<accessrights>read</accessrights>
<type>image</type>
<location>/drawings OR /data/machinedesigns</location>
<singlefile>no</singlefile>
<withchecksum> cf7af1a746f000a0e02cf8b4d1b71ba9 </withchecksum>
<ownedbyuser>jdavies</ownedbyuser>
</groupcanaccessfile>
Figure 6.21: A 'groupcanaccessfile' scenario
The directory related capability access statements work in a similar manner. Figure 6.21 displays 
the way of specifying the ability of a user to access a directory by using the ‘usercanaccessdir’ 
statement. The analyst needs to specify the id of the user, the name and location(s) of one or more 
directories, as well as the access ability to either read access the contents of the directory or whether 
the specified user has full control of the directory and its contents. In the latter case, this means that 
the user could create and delete files in the directory, as well as create files or subdirectories under 
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it, with all the security implications this might entail. The remaining optional tags are similar to the 
‘direxists’ statement and can be used to increase the specificity of the directory selection.
<usercanaccessdir>
<userid>username</userid>
<dirname>  AND/OR/XOR/NOT (name1, name2, name3…) </dirname>
<location>  AND/OR/XOR/NOT  (name1,  name2,  name3…)  |  userhome  |  any  
</location>
<singledir> yes </singledir>
<ability> just-read | full </ability>
[
<quantity> (over|less|equal)  number </quantity>
<dirsize> (over|less|equal) number (b/k/m/g) </dirsize>
<withfiles>
<AND|OR|XOR>
<fileexists>….</fileexists> 
</AND|OR|XOR>
</withfiles>
<ownedbyuser>username</ownedbyuser>
<ownedbygroup>groupname</ownedbygroup>
]
</usercanaccessdir>
Figure 6.22: The 'usercanaccessdir' ITPSL statement  
<groupcanaccessdir>
<groupid>groupname</groupid>
<dirname> AND/OR/XOR/NOT (name1, name2, name3…) </dirname>
<location> AND/OR/XOR/NOT (name1, name2, name3…) | userhome | any 
</location>
<singledir> <yes | no> </singledir>
<ability> just-read | full </ability>
[
<quantity> (over|less|equal)  number </quantity>
<dirsize> (over|less|equal) number (b/k/m/g) </dirsize>
<withfiles>
<AND|OR|XOR>
<fileexists>….</fileexists> 
</AND|OR|XOR>
</withfiles>
<ownedbyuser>username</ownedbyuser>
<ownedbygroup>groupname</ownedbygroup>
]
</groupcanaccessdir>
Figure 6.23: The 'groupcanaccessdir' ITPSL statement 
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The ‘groupcanaccessdir’ statement (Figure 6.23) is also similar to ‘usercanaccessdir’ but it exam-
ines the ability of a group of users to access in common one or more directories. As with the ‘group-
canaccessfile’ statement, the groupid tag specifies an operating system file group or a list of user-
names. The function of the rest of the statement tags is identical to the ‘usercanaccessdir’ statement.
A common scenario in many popular operating systems is that certain server processes (called ‘ser-
vices’ in Windows-based operating systems or ‘daemons’ in the Unix/Linux/Mac OS X world) are 
run with user specific credentials to ensure access compartmentalization. Good system administra-
tion practice dictates to check that these user credentials cannot access files on areas beyond their 
operational control, as part of accidental information theft measures. For instance, MySQL data-
bases run usually with a default specific user-id of ‘mysql’. Thus, as an example of a ‘usercanac-
cessdir’ statement, a scenario that checks whether user ‘mysql’ has read access to a number of sen-
sitive directories (/shared/data2, /shared/data3) could be expressed as shown in Figure 6.24.
<usercanaccessdir>
<userid>mysql</userid>
<dirname>  OR (data2, data3) </dirname>
<location> /shared </location>
<singledir> yes </singledir>
<ability> just-read </ability>
</usercanaccessdir>
Figure 6.24: An example of the 'usercanaccessdir' statement 
A more complex example (Figure 6.25) would check that a group of users should not be able to cre-
ate or alter files on directories that certain files are present. The example below checks whether all 
usernames ‘nickb’, ‘johnb’, ‘katea’ can read, alter, create and erase files under two directory names 
that can be under the directory with names “plans” or “schemas”. The directory could be either un-
der in two potential locations. Hence, the ITPSL engine will check for four possible directories: 
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(/data/plans, /repos/plans, /data/schemas and /repos/schemas). For each of the existing directories, it 
will attempt to see whether they have a specific jpg file and a number of documents, before they 
qualify. It will then perform the directory access checks against each of the listed usernames. 
<groupcanaccessdir>
<groupid>(nickb, johnb,katea)</groupid>
<dirname> OR (plans, schemas) </dirname>
<location> XOR (/data, /repos) </location>
<singledir> yes </singledir>
<ability> full </ability>
<withfiles>
<AND>
<fileexists>
<filename> rs3000schematic.jpg </filename>
<type>  image </type>
<singlefile> yes </singlefile>
<withchecksum> b87af1a746f345a0e02cb8b4d1b71b14       
</withchecksum>
</fileexists> 
<fileexists>
<filename> OR (*.doc, *.docx, *.pdf)  </filename>
<type> textdata</type>
<singlefile> no </singlefile>
</filexists>
</AND>
</withfiles>
</groupcanaccessdir>
Figure 6.25: Checking for directory access rights with 'groupcanaccessdir'
6.5.3 File and directory access statements 
The actual act of accessing a file (as opposed to the existence or the ability to access it) is expressed 
by a ‘fileaccess’ statement. The signature author can relate access to one or more files to a certain 
user or groups of users by means of employing the <byuser> or <bygroup> tags. It is possible that 
file  access  can  be  checked  not  against  a  specific  user  or  group  of  users  (‘anyone’,’anygroup’ 
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values).  The possible locations and file names are specified in the same way as the previous file 
statements. However, in addition to the two previous file statement categories, file access state-
ments provide the capability of specifying patterns of file access.  In particular, ‘fileaccess’ makes 
use of the <pattern> tag, in order to specify:
 File access on a temporal basis: When it is important to specify whether access is current 
(time of the signature check) or when access takes place between certain time periods of the 
present day, the day before, the present week or the present month.
 File access on a temporal frequency basis: When it is important to specify how often ac-
cess takes place within a specified period of time.
Enabling ITPSL to express temporal file access patterns is important. The additional specificity 
added by employing mechanisms to specify temporal frequencies can enhance the applicability of 
decision theoretic information in the process of identifying a specific threat (requirements FR3, 
FR4, FR5, section 4.3). A file access event intercepted under certain conditions might be important.  
The recurrence of the same file event under the same conditions is more important because it can 
increase the confidence of a threat indication. Thus, any language assigned to the task of expressing 
threat indicators should be able to express temporal frequencies.
Figure 6.26 below displays the structure of the ITPSL 'fileaccess' statement. The <byuser> and <by-
group> tags associate the file access activity to certain user and user group entities, a vital issue that 
provides file operation accountability. It is also possible to distinguish between file read and write 
operations (<accessmode> tag). The rest of the fields should be self-explanatory and similar to tags 
used in previous file and directory ITPSL statements.
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<fileaccess>
<byuser>username | anyone </byuser> | <bygroup>groupname | anygroup</bygroup>
<accessmode>read | write </accessmode> 
<filename>  AND/OR/XOR/NOT (name1, name2, name3…) </filename>
<type> AND/OR/XOR/NOT (executable | image | sound | video | textdata | special | 
any) </type>
<location> AND/OR/XOR/NOT (name1, name2, name3…) | userhome | any 
</location>
<singlefile> <yes | no> </singlefile>
<pattern> AND/OR/XOR/NOT ( now| hh-hh today | hh-hh (x | (0-30) ) days ago 
[(more-than|less-than) x times | every (minute | hour | (Sunday-Saturday))  ) </pattern> 
[
<quantity> (over|less|equal)  number </quantity>
<filesize> (over|less|equal) number (b/k/m/g) </filesize>
<withcontents> 
<stringsearch> “string1” AND/OR/XOR “string2”… </stringsearch>
AND/OR
<hexsearch> “hexpattern1” AND/OR/XOR “hexpattern2”…</hexsearch>
</withcontents> 
<withchecksum> “md5checksum” </withchecksum>
<ownedbyuser>username</ownedbyuser>
<ownedbygroup>groupname</ownedbygroup>
<ownerperm> (read,write,execute) </ownerperm>
<groupperm> (read,write,execute) </groupperm>
<otherperm> (read,write,execute) </otherperm>
<specialperm> setuserid,setgroupid </specialperm>
]
</fileaccess>
Figure 6.26: The 'fileaccess' ITPSL statement 
As an example of a  'fileaccess'  statement,  Figure 6.27 provides an example that  checks to  see 
whether each of the users ‘ianb’ and ‘georgen’ read more than twice the file ‘/engineering/field-
repos/fielddata.mdb’ between the hours of 20 and 24 in the evening yesterday.
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<fileaccess>
<bygroup>ianb,georgen</bygroup>
<accessmode> read </accessmode>
<filename>  fielddata.mdb </filename>
<type>  textdata  </type>
<location> /engineering/fieldrepos </location>
<singlefile> yes </singlefile>
<pattern> AND (  20-24 1 days ago, more-than 2 times) </pattern>
</fileaccess>
Figure 6.27: ITPSL 'fileaccess' example
We provide some further examples to clarify the expression of access patterns. If one wishes to 
check whether the same file was checked exactly 5 times throughout the whole day a week ago, the  
following <pattern> tag should be written:
<pattern> AND (  00-24 7 days ago, 5 times) </pattern>
Verifying that the file in question was accessed any number of times between 23:00 and 24:00 
hours for the last 30 days (including the present day) could be expressed as:
<pattern> 23-24 0-30 days ago </pattern>
Finally, a periodic access of more than 5 times between the hours of 23 and 24 every Saturday with-
in the last 3 weeks could be expressed as:
<pattern> AND ( 23-24 0-21 days ago, 5 times every Saturday) </pattern>
These are some of the examples of file access pattern specification granularity that the language 
provides.
The ‘diraccess’ performs the same role for directory access (Figure 6.28). Most of the statement 
tags are similar to those of the ‘fileaccess statement’ including the way to specify access patterns, 
however the <accessmode> tag can now take the potential values of ‘just-read’ and ‘full’, reflecting 
the abilities to just read the directory contents or have complete directory access, which means the 
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ability to modify, create and erase files respectively. The latter mode is detected by the ITPSL en-
gine when files are opened in write mode by the specified user and group or when files are detected 
in write mode in general ( ‘anyone’ , ‘anygroup’ values for the <byuser> and <bygroup> tags). 
<diraccess>
<byuser>username | anyone </byuser> | <bygroup>groupname | anygroup</bygroup>
<accessmode> just-read | full </accessmode>
<dirname> AND/OR/XOR/NOT (name1, name2, name3…) </dirname>
<location> AND/OR/XOR/NOT (name1, name2, name3…) | userhome | any 
</location>
<singledir> <yes | no> </singledir>
<pattern> AND/OR/XOR/NOT ( now| hh-hh today | hh-hh (x | (0-30) ) days ago 
[(more-than|less-than) x times | every (minute | hour | (Sunday-Saturday))  ) </pattern>
[
<quantity> (over|less|equal)  number </quantity>
<dirsize> (over|less|equal) number (b/k/m/g) </dirsize>
<withfiles>
<AND|OR|XOR>
<fileexists>….</fileexists> 
<fileexists>….</fileexists>…
</AND|OR|XOR>
</withfiles>
<ownedbyuser>username</ownedbyuser>
<ownedbygroup>groupname</ownedbygroup>
<ownerperm> (read,write,execute) </ownerperm>
<groupperm> (read,write,execute) </groupperm>
<otherperm> (read,write,execute) </otherperm>
<specialperm> setuserid,setgroupid </specialperm>
]
</diraccess>
Figure 6.28: The 'diraccess' ITPSL statement 
As an example of 'diraccess'  usage, consider a scenario that requires the check of whether user 
‘michaels’  has  accessed  in  full,  during  the  previous  day,  a  directory  with  name 
‘/home/users/lars/data1’, as shown in Figure 6.29 below.
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<diraccess>
<byuser> michaels </byuser>
<accessmode> full </accessmode>
<dirname> data1 </dirname>
<location> /home/users/lars </location>
<singledir> yes </singledir>
<pattern> 00-24 1 days ago </pattern>
<ownedbyuser>lars</ownedbyuser>
</diraccess> 
Figure 6.29: An example of 'diraccess' usage
The <pattern> tag expresses access patterns, as described in the 'fileaccess' ITPSL statement. In 
fact, the pattern expression syntax remains relatively consistent throughout the entire range of ITP-
SL statements, in order to keep the language consistent.  Minor variations do exist, as the ITPSL 
context of the statement type might have specific requirements. These variations will be highlighted 
in the following sections of the chapter.
This concludes the presentation of the ITPSL file and directory statements. The next section will fo-
cus on defining misuse activities at the network level.
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6.6 ITPSL network statements
The network statements express misuse scenarios in terms of network activity detected at host level. 
A large number of user activities relate to network enabled applications. Thus, the ability to de-
scribe aspects of network related user activities is important to a threat specification language.
There are two important design philosophies that dictated the construction of the ITPSL network 
statements. The first is concerned with balancing expressiveness and computational overhead and 
the second is trying to keep the underlying ITPSL engine simple. 
Balancing expressive power and its  associated  computational  overhead means that  the  network 
statements are host-level level oriented. The host-level network detection orientation means that the 
network  statement  expression  criteria  focus  more  on  network  endpoint  classification  detection 
rather than the actual payload of network activity and tap into the transported data (In ITPSL con-
text, the term endpoint refers to the entity on one end of a TCP/IP transport layer connection).  This  
was a conscious decision for two reasons: 
1. A variety of network protocols that encrypt their payload [100] make the task of extracting 
and analyzing network data a difficult or impossible process. 
2. Even if the underlying protocols that shift data between network endpoints are unencrypted, 
the increasing speeds of the data networks challenge network intrusion detection and pre-
vention systems by creating a substantial computational overhead.
If ITPSL can provide mechanisms to relate endpoint activity to user, application and file data, this 
could compensate for any threat context lost by the ability to tap into the payload of a network con-
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nection. For example, if a substantial element of a threat could be identified only by the contents of 
a file downloaded as a result of a network connection (the network connection identifiers might not 
provide a clue), it is more efficient (or viable) to try and identify the file once it has reached the 
hard disk rather than trying to tap to a secure FTP connection and identify parts of this file in net-
work packets. As long as one is able to say “This file is downloaded as a result of user x accessing  
endpoints a and b”, one can identify the payload in question in a viable and efficient way. Subse-
quent  paragraphs describing network statements will illustrate how one can make the relation and 
identify events of interest, as a result of network activity.
The second aspect of the ITPSL network statement design is that they focus on the TCP/IP protocol 
suite. The world of data network communication protocols has a much wider scope than TCP/IP 
and other communication protocol architectures such as SNA, OSI and a variety of other propri-
etary protocols constitute a more complex picture. However, it is fair to say that TCP/IP has grown 
to be the dominant architecture of network communication for several decades now. Consequently, 
ITPSL is concerned only with TCP/IP to keep the implementation complexity of the ITPSL engine 
low. 
The categories of network statements reflect to a certain extent those of the file statements in that 
they can be divided into 3 broad categories:
1. Network element detection statements (netinterfaceexists, routeexists): These statements 
describe the presence of certain network interfaces or routes and they can be embedded in 
other types of net statements to increase the specificity of network expressions.
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2. Network  access  ability  statements  (usercanaccessnet,  groupcanaccessnet):  They  de-
scribe the ability to access network resources as file access ability statements do for files. 
However, while a file access ability statement checks the permission of files by looking into 
persistent filesystem data, a network access ability statement will need to actively check 
whether a user can reach a specified network resource. Widely employed operating systems 
do not place this kind of information into persistent data structures. Hence, the ITPSL en-
gine must be actively involved and launch a process that checks the specified network ac-
cess resource criteria using the user or group credentials. Later paragraphs will outline the 
consequences of this feature. 
3. Network access statement (netaccess): This statement enables the language user to specify 
relevant  network  activities  as  part  of  a  misuse  signature  (the  equivalent  of 
‘fileaccess’/’diraccess’ for network operations). Pretty much like ‘fileaccess’, a ‘netaccess’ 
statement refers to the actual act of network access and it may also specify either current (at 
the time of the misuse signature check) or other time-specific endpoint access activities.  
6.6.1 Network element detection statements 
In ITPSL, a ‘netinterface’ is the logical entity associated with a single IP address that facilitates ac-
cess to a network. Thus, a netinterface is not necessarily related to a single hardware network card.  
As popular operating systems employ virtual network interfaces for a number of different reasons 
such as OS virtualization and IP aliasing capabilities (the ability of a single hardware network inter-
face to associate to more than 1 IP address), ITPSL follows the same approach. Consequently, one 
‘netinterfaceexists’ statement should be issued for each IP address the system associates to.   
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<netinterfaceexists>
<ipversion> 4 | 6 </ipversion>
<intip> ip | (ip(range))  | AND/OR/XOR (ip1, ip2,…) | AND/OR/XOR (ip(range1), 
iprange2…) </intip>
<netmask> netmask | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (netmask1, netmask2)</netmask>
<intmac> ‘any’ | macaddr | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (macaddr1, macaddr2) </intmac>
</netinterfaceexists>
Figure 6.30: The 'netinterfaceexists' ITPSL statement
Each of the specified IP addresses can be given in a number of different forms including single IPs 
or a range of IPs.  As an example, let’s specify a network interface that listens on IPv4 address 
192.168.14.135  with  a  standard  24  bit  (Class  C)  subnet  mask  and  MAC  address  of 
00:1A:A0:15:A8:7B, as shown in Figure 6.31 below.
<netinterfaceexists>
<ipversion> 4 </ipversion>
<intip> 192.168.14.135 </intip>
<netmask> 255.255.255.0 </intip>
<intmac> 00:1A:A0:15:A8:7B </intip>
</netinterfaceexists>
Figure 6.31: Expressing the existence of a network interface  
On the other hand, if we do not know the exact IP address that the interface will have at runtime, we 
could specify a range of IP addresses by using the OR operator.  
<netinterfaceexists>
<ipversion> 4 </ipversion>
<intip>OR(192.168.14(3-250),192.168.12(3-250)</intip>
<netmask> OR(255.255.255.0 , 255.255.0.0) </intip>
<intmac> any </intmac>
</netinterfaceexists> 
Figure 6.32: Existence of a network interface with alternative IP addresses
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ITPSL also needs a way to encode the state of a computer system routing table. The fact that the 
system is attached directly to networks of interest should be flagged and this is when we can use the 
‘routeexists’  statement.  A  possible  scenario  where  'routeexists'  would  be  useful  is  to  examine 
whether a laptop has been used on non-corporate networks that are suspicious or insecure. This in-
formation could then be correlated with other activities (transmission or reception of sensitive files). 
In simple words, 'routexists' can act as a map of hinting where the device was located. Figure 6.33 
displays the syntax of 'routeexists'.
<routeexists>
<ipversion> 4 | 6 </ipversion>
<netip> netip | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (netip1, netip2,...) </netip>
<netmask> netmask | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (netmask1, netmask2)</netmask>
<viainterface>
<netinterfaceexists>…</netinterfaceexists> 
</viainterface>
[
<gateway>gwip | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (gwip1,gwip2)</gateway>
]
</routeexists> 
Figure 6.33: The 'routeexists' ITPSL statement
As  an  example  of  using  'routeexists',  Figure  6.34  displays  the  routing  table  and  the  network 
interface of a real Linux workstation. 
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Destination     Gateway         Genmask         Flags   MSS Window irtt Iface
129.240.235.0   0.0.0.0         255.255.255.0   U         0  0          0 eth0
192.168.122.0   0.0.0.0         255.255.255.0   U         0  0          0 virbr0
0.0.0.0         129.240.235.1   0.0.0.0        UG        0              0          0 eth0
eth0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:1A:A0:15:A3:7C
          inet addr:129.240.235.130  Bcast:129.240.235.255  Mask:255.255.255.0
virbr0    Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:00:00:00:00:00
          inet addr:192.168.122.1  Bcast:192.168.122.255  Mask:255.255.255.0   
Figure 6.34: Routing information from a Linux workstation
<subblock>
<subop> AND </subop>
<routeexists>
<ipversion> 4 </ipversion>
<netip> 129.240.235.0 </netip>
<netmask> 255.255.255.0 </netmask>
<viainterface>
<netinterfaceexists>
<ip> 129.240.235.130 </ip>
</netinterfaceexists>
</viainterface>
<gateway> 129.240.235.1 </gateway>
</routeexists>
<routeexists>
<ipversion> 4 </ipversion>
<netip> 192.168.122.0 </netip>
<netmask> 255.255.255.0 </netmask>
<viainterface>
<netinterfaceexists>
<ip> 192.168.122.1 </ip>
</netinterfaceexists>
<gateway> 129.240.235.1 </gateway>
</routeexists>
</subblock>
Figure 6.35: An example of specifying routing configuration in ITPSL
Figure 6.35 displays part of the ITPSL markup that specifies the above networking configuration 
using one signature subblock with two 'routeexists' statements. The subop AND operator ensures 
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that both routeexists statements must be true, in order to validate the contents of the subblock. Note 
how ‘netinterfaceexists’ statements are encapsulated inside a ‘routeexists’  statement, in order to 
bind the route to its native interface. This nesting mechanism is similar to the encapsulation of 
‘filexists’ statement inside a ‘direxists’ one, as discussed in earlier sections. This is the reason the 
encapsulated  ‘netinterfacexists’  statements  lack  the  rest  of  the  required  tags 
(<ipversion>,<netmask>, etc) as these are taken in context from the relevant ‘routeexists’ tags.     
6.6.2 Network access ability statements
<usercanaccessnet>
<username> username </username>
<ipversion> 4 | 6 </ipversion>
<source> external | allnets | local | ip | FQDN | net[/subnet] | AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1, 
ip2, …) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT(FQDN1, FQDN2,…) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1,FQDN1,ip2,
…) | AND/OR/XOR (net1[/subnet1],net2[/subnet2])</source>
<destination> external | allnets | local  | ip | FQDN | net[/subnet] | 
AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1, ip2,…) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT(FQDN1, FQDN2,…) | 
AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1,FQDN1,ip2,…) | AND/OR/XOR 
(net1[/subnet1],net2[/subnet2]) </destination>
<singlenet> yes | no </singlenet>
[
<viasourceinterface> 
<netinterfaceexists>…</netinterfaceexists>
</viasourceinterface>
<viadestinationinterface>
<netinterfaceexists>…</netinterfaceexists>
</viadestinationinterface>
<quantity> (over|less|equal) number </quantity>
<sport> any | port |  (port1-portn) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (port1, port2,…) </sport>
<dport> any | port |  (port1-portn) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (port1, port2,…) </dport>
<transport> udp | tcp </transport>
<URI> URI | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (URI1, URI2…)</URI>
<viaroutepath> ip | FQDN | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (ip1,ip2,...) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT 
(FQDN1, FQDN2,…) |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1,FQDN1,ip2,…) 
</viaroutepath>
<receives> string | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (string1, string2, string3) </receives>
]
</usercanaccessnet> 
Figure 6.36: The 'usercanaccessnet' ITPSL statement 
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As part of ITPSL’s ability to express potential network access scenarios, ‘usercanaccessnet’ exam-
ines whether a network resource is reachable by a certain user specified by the <username> tag 
(Figure 6.36). The network resource is expressed by a number of mandatory and optional criteria. 
The source and destination IP addresses constitute the mandatory part, whereas source and destina-
tion ports could be optionally specified. The combination of IP addresses and ports for the source 
and destination addresses define the endpoints of interest. In ITPSL, an endpoint is the entity on one 
end of a transport layer connection (<transport> tag). As previous paragraphs discussed, the net-
work statements are heavily based on the TCP/IP suite. 
With the source and destination endpoints defined, the IP and transport layer details are taken care 
of. However, the language user can also specify additional criteria that might concern the applica-
tion layer of the TCP/IP protocol. The <URI> tag enables one to express a network resource by us-
ing the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) format, as described in RFC 3986 [138].  URI’s are used 
to specify all sorts of resources not only network ones. However, their widespread use in network 
enabled protocols makes them a quite handy mechanism to specify additional details about network 
access issues.
The URI inside the tag follows the syntax of the URI scheme as defined in RFC 3986 [138]:
<scheme name> : <hierarchical part> [ ? <query> ] [ # <fragment> ]
The ‘scheme name’ hints as to which application layer protocol is in use, the hierarchical part re-
veals details that should be consistent with other specified criteria such as the specified source and 
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destination endpoints and then the rest of the parts give further information about the resource to ac-
cess.   For example, if one specifies the following URI as part of a ‘usercanaccessnet’ statement:
http://cnkeeper.uio.no:8080/mrs-web/status.do?method=databanks
the scheme name (http) informs that the transport connection carries info to the Hyper Text Trans-
port Protocol, the 'cnkeeper.uio.no:8080’ scheme should be the same as the destination IP and port  
criteria and finally the ‘/mrs-web/status.do?method=databanks’ part submits a query of “databanks” 
in the 'status.do' method.
The  <viasourceinterface>  and  <viadestinationinterface>  tags  allow  the  signature  author  to 
optionally choose specific network interfaces for outbound and inbound endpoint traffic in systems 
that have more than one network interface. They both embed ‘netinterfaceexists’ statements and the 
following  paragraphs will discuss scenarios where they can be used.    
The  <viaroutepath> tag  is  another  interesting  optional  criterion  that  checks  to  see  whether  the 
specified network resource is accessed via a certain route or routes. For example, a security analyst  
might like to check whether access to a certain network resource can be achieved via a certain 
network path as part of a penetration testing procedure. In that case, a list of the IP or FQDN 
addresses of some (or all) the intermediate routers could be entered.
The <singlenet> and <quantity> tags perform quantitative checks on whether we are specifying one 
or more networks and on the number of endpoints we can access respectively,  as we did with 
various file statements. 
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Finally, the <receives> tag is an optional mechanism that enables the ‘usercanaccessnet’ statement 
to check more information about the destination endpoint. For example, when we connect to an FTP 
server, the process of initiating the connection includes the FTP server sending some info about the 
server, by means of the 220 FTP code [139] or by other codes. This is similar to other network 
servers and thus the feature could be used to identify a specific service, so that one can be more 
confident about connecting to the right endpoint.
The  <receives>  tag  implies  that  the  ‘usercanaccessnet’  statement  will  make  the  ITPSL engine 
launch a process that initiates the connection as specified by the endpoint criteria. This process will 
be  launched  with  the  credentials  of  the  user,  in  order  to  replicate  as  closely  as  possible  the 
conditions of the net access check. In addition, the ITPSL engine will look at the port number to 
infer what kind of service is being checked. Thus, the string specified by using the <receives> tag is  
taken in the context of the service being specified by the port number(s). 
The  fact  that  the  signature  author  has  a  feature  to  check  network  accessibility  by  launching 
processes has a certain computational overhead for the system the check is performed, as well as for 
the destination system that offers the network service. Whilst the ITPSL engine will attempt to  
optimize the execution rate of this check, caution should be exercised by the signature author to 
specify checks in an efficient and proper manner, particularly when probing systems on the Internet. 
In order to clarify the usage ‘usercanaccessnet’ statements, let’s examine a range of scenarios. If we 
wish to check whether user ‘johnc’ can access an ftp server that might be listening on a range of po-
tential IP addresses by means of a single FTP connection and use the <receive> tag mechanism to  
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check that we are talking to a specific FTP server. We could then write the ITPSL markup of Figure 
6.37 below.
<usercanaccessnet>
<username> johnc </username>
<ipversion> 4 </ipversion>
<source>testsystem.exampledomain.org</source>
<destination>OR (129.240.235.45, 129.240.235.56)</destination>
<singlenet> yes </singlenet>
<dport> 21 </dport>
<transport>tcp</transport>
<receives> “DMVS FTP server” </receives>
</usercanaccessnet>
Figure 6.37: An example of 'usercanaccessnet' usage
'testsystem.exampledomain.org’ is the source IP. Specifying the source IP of the single local inter-
face is sufficient, if the system has only one network interface. In the above example, we could have 
also specified the source IP as:
<source>local</source>
The word local could automatically be resolved to the IP of the local network interface automatical-
ly, provided that the system had only one network interface. However, if the origin system had 
more than one network interface (multi-homed), we could also be more specific and specify the 
source network interface by embedding a ‘netinterfaceexists’ statement. We demonstrate below this 
case and we now try to check whether the user can access simultaneously more than 3 FTP connec-
tions (Figure 6.38).
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<usercanaccessnet>
<username> johnc </username>
<ipversion> 4 </ipversion>
<source> local </source>
<viasourceinterface> 
<netinterfaceexists>
<ipversion> 4 </ipversion>
<intip> 192.168.14.135 </intip>
<netmask> 255.255.255.0 </intip>
<intmac> 00:1A:A0:15:A8:7B </intip>
</netinterfaceexists>
</viasourceinterface>
<destination> OR (129.240.235.45, 129.240.235.56)</destination>
<singlenet> no </singlenet>
<dport> 21 </dport>
<transport>tcp</transport>
<quantity>over 3 </quantity>
<receives> “DMVS FTP server” </receives>
</usercanaccessnet>
Figure 6.38: Checking for the ability to initiate a number of FTP sessions
The above code instructs the ITPSL engine to launch 3 simultaneous sessions to the specified FTP 
server starting from a specific interface, specified as local and accompanied by a <viasourceinter-
face> tag. 
The previous example and its variations examined outbound network access. ‘usercanaccessnet’ can 
also accommodate scenarios for inbound connections. A user can also access network resources 
when the user account receives traffic from remote endpoints. Thus, it should be possible to check 
for the ability to connect to a certain range of ports (in TCP/IP lingo we say we ‘bind’ a process to 
an endpoint) and prove that a particular user account could potentially receive traffic from a remote 
endpoint. The word “potentially” in the previous sentence is important. The ITPSL engine will not 
go ahead and launch a test connection from any remote endpoint. We have means to launch out-
bound network access checks to any reachable remote endpoint. On the other hand, initiating in-
bound network access from any reachable remote endpoint is not always possible. As a result, when 
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specifying inbound net access checks, valid remote endpoints are considered only the endpoints of 
computer systems that are under the control of the ITPSL engine. The engine will first check on the 
local system to see if the user can bind to the specified local endpoints. After that, it will attempt to  
connect to that local endpoint from a valid remote endpoint. This consequence limits the scope of 
the network checks, however it is still important for two reasons:
 It  provides useful host-level criteria for network processes (whether  a user  can bound a 
process to a network port is an important step for network access).
 Secondly, it provides a perspective of host inbound network connectivity from certain inter-
nal or external networks. This could be of importance to verify open gaps in network securi-
ty and hence express network related threats.    
Let’s assume that we need to test whether ‘johnc’ is able to bind a server daemon to port 8080 and 
accept a connection from a range of internal networks. We assume that the host has a single net-
work interface, so we write the ITPSL markup of Figure 6.39.
<usercanaccessnet>
<username>johnc</username>
<ipversion> 4 </ipversion>
<source>AND(192.168.14.0, 192.168.45.0)</source>
<destination>local</destination>
<dport>8080</dport>
<transport>tcp</transport>
<singlenet>yes</singlenet>
</usercanaccessnet>
Figure 6.39: Checking port binding and connection acceptance ability
If the test should include external (beyond the organizational boundaries) endpoints as well as inter-
nal ones, we could re-write the source tag:
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<source>AND(192.168.14.0, 192.168.45.0, external)</source>
If we wanted to test inbound connectivity from every possible remote network, we could use the 
‘allnets’ keyword in the <source> tag:
<source>allnets</source>
This means that the ITPSL engine would initiate a single test connection from every possible inter-
nal and external network it controls, in an attempt to verify global connectivity.
If the host has more than one network interface, we need to express the interface to bind the process  
that will be the receiving end. Hence, we use the <viadestinationinterface> tag to encapsulate infor-
mation about the destination interface (in contrast to outbound traffic checks, where we used the 
<viasourceinterface> tag). Figure 6.40 provides a suitable example.
<usercanaccessnet>
<username> johnc </username>
<ipversion> 4 </ipversion>
<source>AND(192.168.14.0, 192.168.45.0)</source>
<viadestinationinterface>
<netinterfaceexists>
<ipversion> 4 </ipversion>
<intip> 192.168.14.135 </intip>
<netmask> 255.255.255.0 </intip>
<intmac> 00:1A:A0:15:A8:7B </intip>
</netinterfaceexists>
</viadestinationinterface>
<dport>8080</dport>
<transport>tcp</transport>
<singlenet>yes</singlenet>
</usercanaccessnet>
Figure 6.40: Port binding and network connectivity test on a multi-home host 
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The ‘groupcanaccessnet’ functions similarly to a ‘usercanaccessnet’ statement, apart from the fact 
that the checks are performed against a number of users, in order to make easier to perform a specif-
ic check against many users.  Figure 6.41 shows the syntax os the 'groupcanaccessnet' ITPSL state-
ment. 
<groupcanaccessnet>
<groupid>groupname | (username1, username2)</groupid>
<ipversion> 4 | 6 </ipversion>
<source> external | allnets | local | ip | FQDN | net[/subnet] | AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1, 
ip2, …) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT(FQDN1, FQDN2,…) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1,FQDN1,ip2,
…) | AND/OR/XOR (net1[/subnet1],net2[/subnet2])</source>
<destination>  external  |  allnets  |  local   |  ip  |  FQDN  |  net[/subnet]  | 
AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1, ip2,…)  |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT(FQDN1,  FQDN2,…)  | 
AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1,FQDN1,ip2, …)  |  AND/OR/XOR 
(net1[/subnet1],net2[/subnet2]) </destination>
<singlenet> yes | no </singlenet>
[
<quantity> (over|less|equal) number </quantity>
<viasourceinterface> 
<netinterfaceexists>…</netinterfaceexists>
</viasourceinterface>
<viadestinationinterface>
<netinterfaceexists>…</netinterfaceexists>
</viadestinationinterface>
<sport> any | port |  (port1-portn) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (port1, port2,…) </sport>
<dport> any | port |  (port1-portn) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (port1, port2,…) </dport>
<transport> udp | tcp </transport>
<URI> URI-name </URI>
<viaroutepath>  ip  |  FQDN |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT (ip1,ip2,...)  |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT 
(FQD N1, FQDN2,…) |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1,FQDN1,ip2,…) </viaroutepath>
<receives> string | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (string1, string2, string3) </receives>
]
</groupcanaccessnet>
Figure 6.41: The ITPSL 'groupcanaccessnet' statement 
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<groupcanaccessnet>
<groupid>accounting</groupid>
<ipversion> 4 </ipversion>
<source>local</local>
<destination> internalweb.chicago.pcl.com</destination
<dport> 80 </dport>
<transport> tcp </transport>
<URI> http://internalweb.chicago.pcl.com/reports/authentication.html </URI>
<viaroutepath> NOT (129.240.250.10) </viaroutepath>
<receives> ”Please enter your password:” </receives>
</groupcanaccessnet>
Figure 6.42: Testing an unsafe network access scenario for a user group 
As with the relevant file group statements, the <groupid> tag specifies either an OS file group or a  
list of usernames against which the checks will be performed. 
For example, we can express an outbound network access check for the ‘accounting’ group users, in 
order to examine whether each of the users can connect to a particular web page as shown in Figure 
6.42. 
The example of Figure 6.42 includes the use of the <viaroutepath> tag. In this case, the tag makes 
the entire statement valid when the route path from the system the check is performed to the web 
server does not include the network 129.240.235.10. This could be of importance in a scenario 
where the signature author wishes to check whether access to the web page is facilitated in a secure 
way, as part of a threat assessment scenario. If the specified web page is an important authentication 
gateway, information is transmitted unencrypted (the URI specifies http and not https) and informa-
tion flows to the web server not via a specified VPN route, one could assume that this is an unsafe 
scenario and thus could use this statement as part of expressing an unsafe net access scenario.      
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6.6.3 Network access statements
We have seen so far ITPSL network statements that express the existence of routes and interfaces, 
statements that help the signature author express network access checks against one or more users. 
‘netaccess’ expresses signs of current and past network activity by one or more users, as part of  
misuse threat expression scenarios, as fileaccess and diraccess do for file operations. Resembling 
the philosophy of the similarly relevant file access statements, ‘netaccess’ uses the <pattern> tag to 
express relevant network activity by using two types of access patterns:
 Net access on a temporal basis: Specifies whether network access activity is current (time of 
the signature check) or when access takes place between certain time periods of the present 
day, the day before, the present week or the present month.
 Net access on a temporal frequency basis: When it is important to specify how often net-
work access activity takes place within a specified period of time.
The other important aspect of ‘netaccess’ is that it provides a mechanism that relates network activi-
ty to user(s) (<byuser> and <bygroup> tags). ‘usercanaccessnet’ and ‘groupcanaccessnet’ launch 
sessions to test network accessibility by using the user/group credentials under controlled circum-
stances. ‘netaccess’ will have to link existing or past activity to users. This is an important feature in 
the process of estimating threats, as suspicious network activity must be accounted to users. Figure 
6.43 displays the syntax of the 'netaccess' statement.
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<netaccess>
<ipversion> 4 | 6 </ipversion>
<source> local  |  any |  ip|  FQDN |  net[/subnet]  |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1,  ip2,…) |  
AND/OR/XOR/NOT(FQDN1, FQDN2,…) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1,FQDN1,ip2,…) |  
AND/OR/XOR (net1[/subnet1],net2[/subnet2]) </source>
<destination> local | any | ip | FQDN | net[/subnet] | AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1, ip2,…) | 
AND/OR/XOR/NOT(FQDN1, FQDN2,…) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1,FQDN1,ip2,…) |  
AND/OR/XOR (net1[/subnet1],net2[/subnet2]) </destination>
<singlenet> yes | no </singlenet>
[
<quantity> (over|less|equal) number </quantity>
<viasourceinterface> 
<netinterfaceexists>…</netinterfaceexists>
</viasourceinterface>
<viadestinationinterface>
<netinterfaceexists>…</netinterfaceexists>
</viadestinationinterface>
<sport> any | port |  (port1-portn) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (port1, port2,…) </sport>
<dport> any | port |  (port1-portn) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (port1, port2,…) </dport>
<transport> udp | tcp </transport>
<URI> URI-name </URI>
<pattern>  AND/OR/XOR/NOT  (  now|  hh-hh  today  |  hh-hh  (x  |  (0-30)  )  days  ago 
[(more- than|less-than) x times | every (minute | hour | (Sunday-Saturday))  ) </pattern>
<viaroutepath>  ip  |  FQDN |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT (ip1,ip2,...)  |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT 
(FQD N1, FQDN2,…) |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT(ip1,FQDN1,ip2,…) </viaroutepath>
<byapplication> program-name | path | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (path1,path2) </viaappli-
cation>
<byuser> username </username>
<bygroup> groupname | (username1,username2)</bygroup>
]
</netaccess>
Figure 6.43: The ITPSL 'netaccess' statement 
Most operating systems provide utilities that monitor network activity at various levels. However, 
this kind of monitoring does not usually include tools that link network access to users. A good ex-
ample of such a utility is netstat [140] found on both Windows and Unix/Linux operating systems. 
‘netstat’ lists remote and local connection endpoints, the state of the connection and other useful in-
formation but it does not associate  connection endpoints to users. Other utilities such as ‘lsof’ [94] 
found in the Unix/Linux family of operating systems can associate connections to users.           
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It is also possible to be more precise and associate endpoint, user and application information. The 
<viaapplication> tag complements the association criteria, so that one can express “this network 
endpoint accessed by this user via that application” in a netaccess statement.
<netaccess>
<ipversion> 4 | 6 </ipversion>
<source> local </local>
<destination> www.helpfulltorrents.com </destination>
<singlenet> yes </singlenet>
<transport> tcp </transport>
<URI> http://www.helpfulltorrents.com/torrentsearch </URI>
<pattern> AND (  20-24 1 days ago, more-than 2 times ) </pattern>
<viaapplication> OR (/usr/bin/firefox,  /usr/local/bin/azureus,  firefox,  azureus) </viaapplica-
tion> 
<byuser> johna </username>
</netaccess>
Figure 6.44: A 'netaccess' usage example 
The rest of the netaccess statement tags are identical to the statements of the previous section and 
thus, we begin describing potential usage examples in the following paragraphs.   If we wish to ex-
amine  whether  the  web  page  ‘http://www.helpfulltorrents.com/torrentsearch’  has  been  accessed 
more than two times, between 20 and 24 hours yesterday by user johna, and by using either the 
‘firefox’ or the ‘azureus’ applications, we could express that with the ITPSL markup of Figure 6.44.
The <byuser> tag relates the intercepted endpoint activity to a specific user. In addition, the <viaap-
plication> tag will extend the relation to an executed application by the user. Thus, the above state-
ment relates the endpoint access to the user as well as to the application the user executes to create 
the described endpoint.
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<netaccess>
<ipversion> 4 </ipversion>
<source> NOT (130.135.201/24) </source>
<destination> corp.smtp.abc.com </destination>
<singlenet> yes </singlenet>
<transport> tcp </transport>
<dport> 25 </transport>
<pattern> 9-18 (0-30) days ago </pattern>
<viaroutepath> NOT scarlet.vpnaccess.abc.com </viaroutepath>
</netaccess>
Figure 6.45: Checking whether a user utilized a non trusted network  
Another example checks whether a group of users has been accessing a corporate SMTP server via 
a routepath that does not involve the corporate VPN during working hours within the last month. In 
a threat scenario, routing data via a non-trusted network could indicate an important data compro-
mise activity. Figure 6.45 displays the markup that expresses this condition. 
6.7 ITPSL process execution statements 
Users interact with the computer system by means of executing programs. A process is “an instance 
of a program in execution” [42], which of course induces file and network level activity that the two 
previous types of ITPSL statements are able to express. However, in order to be able to fully ex-
press misuse scenarios, one needs to focus also on how programs are executed, not only on the ef-
fects of programs at file and network level. The process execution statements give the signature au-
thor means to express aspects of misuse threats that relate to process execution events.  
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There are 4 types of process execution statements:
 General  process  execution  description  (procexec):  A  single  statement  ‘procexec’  de-
scribes the execution of a process and does not relate the process to a user. Sometimes it 
might be worth describing a process regardless of its user credentials and later paragraphs 
will discuss such cases.   A ‘procexec’ can be embedded in other types of process descrip-
tion statements.
 User related process execution (userexec, groupexec): The same as ‘procexec’ but they asso-
ciate the described process with a certain user (userexec) or user group (groupexec).
 In  sequence  user  related  process  execution  (userexecsequence,  groupexecsequence): 
Earlier paragraphs discussed the ability to express temporal information in relation to file 
and network statements. Every threat materializes as a sequence of related steps. Whilst it is 
possible to use other language features (the ‘AND’ logical operator, the  ‘as_a_result_of’ ) 
to express a sequence of events, process execution is a good target for providing a mecha-
nism to explicitly describe an ordered sequence of actions relevant to a misuse threat sce-
nario. This is not only because processes are the focal high-level point that orchestrates file 
and network level events. A range of research techniques have focused on command execu-
tion [141] thus making the ability to encode a process execution sequence in ITPSL useful. 
As a result, ‘userexecsequence’ relates a process execution to a user, whereas ‘groupexecse-
quence’ performs the same for groups.
 Hardware operation statements (hardwareop): Certain misuse threats might be associat-
ed with specific hardware level changes. A good example is information theft by means of 
mobile media. Hence, the ITPSL vocabulary should include statements that are able to de-
tect the removal or addition of certain devices. As this sort of operation is process based (a 
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program performs the hardware changes), the most reasonable approach involves placing 
‘hardwareop’ under the process execution statements. 
All types of execution statements provide the ability to describe the temporal basis of process exe-
cution events. In contrast to the file and network ITPSL statements where the signature author had 
the ability to check file and network access scenarios, execution statements do not provide a mecha-
nism to test whether a user/group can execute certain processes for two reasons. Firstly, executing a 
program of unknown origin might make the system vulnerable to malicious code. Secondly, safer 
mechanisms that can facilitate whether a user/group can execute a program exist. The ‘usercanac-
cessfile’ and ‘groupcanaccessfile’ statements can check by means of the <accessrights> tag for exe-
cution rights and thus deduce whether a user could potentially execute a program without actually 
running it.
6.7.1 The general process execution statement
The ‘procexec’ statement (Figure 6.46) is the workhorse of process execution statements and allows 
us to describe the fact that one or more instances of a program (<singleprocess> and <quantity> 
tags) are being executed or have been executed in the past as described by the <pattern> tag. The 
<name> and <path> tags describe the exact location (or a combination of names and locations), 
whereas the <argumentlist> tag specifies also any arguments or options passed to the program.      
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<procexec>
<name> process-name | AND/OR/XOR/NOT (process-name1, process-name2)</name>
<path> any | path | OR/XOR/NOT(path1, path2) </path>
<singleprocess> yes | no </singleprocess>get
<quantity> (over|less|equal) number </quantity>
<argumentlist>(argument-list)  |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT(  (argument-list1),  (argu-
ment-list2) …) </argumentlist>
<pattern> AND/OR/XOR/NOT ( fromnow| hh-hh today | hh-hh (x | (0-30) ) days ago 
[(more- than|less-than) x times | every (minute | hour | (Sunday-Saturday))  ) </pattern>
]
</procexec>
Figure 6.46: The 'procexec' ITPSL statement 
For instance, if one wishes to specify that a MySQL server process was running between 7 and 23 
hours of the previous day, we could write the following ‘procexec’ statement, as shown in Figure 
6.47.
<procexec>
<name> mysqld </name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
<argumentlist> (/etc/my.cnf, 3306) </argumentlist>
<pattern> 07-23 1 days ago </pattern>
</procexec>
Figure 6.47: Specifying the execution of a process with 'procexec'
The <path> tag dictates the two possible locations 'mysqld' might be running from (the first one that 
matches will be considered as a hit for the signature). In addition, the argument list focuses on de-
sired operational parameters for the MySQL server that concern the location of its main configura-
tion file and the port it is listening on. The argument list of the above example is generic and it in -
volves only the actual arguments. These arguments may be expressed in a more specific way and 
include, for example, the actual command-line switches, as shown below:     
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<argumentlist> (--defaults-file=/etc/my.cnf, --port=3306 ) </argumentlist>
The generic argument list form acts as a regular expression matching only the relevant parts of the 
arguments and could be used when command-line argument switches are likely to change, whereas 
the second specific form could be used to perhaps match the operation against a certain MySQL 
version, for which the signature author knows the exact form of the command-line switches.
A ‘procexec’ statement does not relate the process execution to a user but it  just  describes the 
process execution itself. This is true for a standalone ‘procexec’ statement. However, when ‘procex-
ec’ is encapsulated inside another execution statement, a user relation exists taken by context. The 
following section  will discuss this issue. 
6.7.2 User related process execution statements
When the execution should be connected to a user entity, a ‘userexec’ statement should be used in-
stead (Figure 6.48).  ‘userexec’ has the same tags as a ‘procexec’ statetement, with the exception of 
<username> in order to identify the user in question.   
The reason for having two separate types of statements (general and user related process execution) 
is to be able to combine the ability to express conditions that are relevant to a user and non user re-
lated process events with semantic clarity. This could also add accuracy to the description of a 
process execution event. For instance, in the previous example where we described the execution of 
a MySQL server process, we could also include the execution of a MySQL client process by a user 
as shown in the ITPSL subblock of Figure 6.49.
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<userexec>
<username> username </username>
<name>  process-name  |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT  (process-name1,  process-name2) 
</name>
<path> any | path | OR/XOR/NOT(path1, path2) </path>
<singleprocess> yes | no </singleprocess>
[
<quantity> (over|less|equal) number </quantity>
<argumentlist>(argument-list) | AND/OR/XOR/NOT( (argument-list1), (argumen
t-list2)…) </argumentlist>
<pattern> AND/OR/XOR/NOT ( fromnow| any |  hh-hh today | hh-hh (x | (0-30) ) days 
ago [(more-than|less-than) x times | every (minute | hour | (Sunday-Saturday))  ) </pat-
tern>
]
</userexec>
Figure 6.48: The 'userexec' ITPSL statement 
<subblock>
<subop> AND </subop>
<procexec>
<name> mysqld </name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
<argumentlist> (/etc/my.cnf, 3306) </argumentlist>
<pattern> 07-23 1 days ago </pattern>
</procexec>
<userexec>
<username>johna</username>
<name> mysql </name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
<argumentlist> OR((-ujohna, -hlocalhost), (johna, localhost)</argumentlist>
<pattern>07-23 1 days ago </pattern>
</userexec>
</subblock>
Figure 6.49: User attributable process execution versus non user attributable process execution
By combining the two statements with an AND subop operator as shown above, we describe the 
process environment in a more specific way. The ITPSL engine will check for the existence of a  
MySQL client process ran by user ‘johna’ that connects to a local MySQL server process. The exe-
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cution of a local MySQL server is described by the accompanying ‘procexec’ and could ran with 
the credentials of any user. A secure MySQL server configuration dictates that the MySQL server 
process does not map to a specific user entity. This means that the userid of the server process 
might not be usable by actual users.  Thus,  if the user had tried to run the client connecting to a lo-
cal MySQL server without the MySQL server process running on the machine and a ‘procexec’ had 
not been specified, the signature would match the fact that a MySQL client had run. However, if the 
intention was to describe a complete database access scenario in this case, matching the client only 
without checking for a MySQL server process would be pointless and inaccurate.
A ‘groupexec’ statement functions similarly to a ‘userexec’ statement but it checks the process exe-
cution specification criteria against a group of users. Similarly to the file and network ITPSL state-
ments, the word group refers to an OS file group or a list of usernames that form a logical group.  
Figure 6.50 shows the syntax of the 'groupexec' statement.
<groupexec>
<groupname> groupname | AND/OR/XOR/NOT(username1, username2) </username>
<name>  process-name  |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT  (process-name1,  process-name2) 
</name>
<path> any | path | OR/XOR/NOT(path1, path2) </path>
<singleprocess> yes | no </singleprocess>
[
<quantity> (over|less|equal) number </quantity>
<argumentlist>(argument-list)  |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT(  (argument-list1),  (argu-
ment-list2) …) </argumentlist>
<pattern>  AND/OR/XOR/NOT  (  now|  hh-hh  today  |  hh-hh  (x  |  (0-30)  )  days  ago 
[(more- than|less-than) x times | every (minute | hour | (Sunday-Saturday))  ) </pattern>
]
</groupexec>
Figure 6.50: The 'groupexec' ITPSL statement
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<groupexec>
<groupname> engineering </groupname>
<name> thunderbird-bin </name>
<path> /usr/bin </path>
<singleprocess> no </singleprocess>
<quantity> over 3 </quantity>
<pattern> now </pattern>
</groupexec>
Figure 6.51: A 'groupexec' usage example 
For example, if one wants to check whether the ‘engineering’ file group is presently executing three 
or more thunderbird mail browsers, this could be expressed by a ‘groupexec’ statement as shown in 
Figure 6.51.
6.7.3 In sequence user related process execution statements
At other times, it might be necessary to express a sequence of process execution events related to a 
user as a pre-condition of a misuse threat scenario. This is a job for the ‘userexecsequence’ state-
ment. Its syntax is displayed in Figure 6.52. Between the <procsequence> tags we can encapsulate a 
series of ‘procexec’ statements to encode an ordered collection of processes. This means that the 
ITPSL engine will try to match the process execution events in the order they are listed. It also 
means that the ‘procexec’ statements are implicitly related to the user defined by the <username> 
tag. This last bit is confusing, but as earlier paragraphs warned, when a ‘procexec’ statement is en-
capsulated inside another execution statement, a user relation is implied in context to the encapsu-
lating statement. 
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<userexecsequence>
<username> username | OR/XOR/NOT (username1,username2) </username>
<timewindow> from-now | within x minute/hour/days | hh-hh today | hh-hh x days ago 
</timewindow>
<procsequence>
<procexec>…</procexec>
<procexec>…</procexec>
[
<oneof>
(<procexec>…</procexec>)
(<procexec1>…</procexec1> <procexec2>…</procexec2>)
</oneof>
]
…
</procsequence>
[
<validmatch>  x out-of t processes | threshold(w)=(scorea,scoreb,scorec…scoret)  
</validmatch> 
]
</userexecsequence>
Figure 6.52: The 'userexecsequence' ITPSL statement 
The optional <oneof> block inside the <procsequence> tag provides a way to make the process se-
quence polymorphic. If a particular step consists of many possible command combinations, they 
can all be specified inside the <one of> block and the one the first one that matches will be picked 
up by the ITPSL engine. 
Another important issue with ‘userexecsequence’ is that of specifying the time window to try and 
match the encoded process execution sequence.  The various steps of the specified program execu-
tion sequence might be separated by seconds, minutes, hours or even days. As a result, the signature 
author must instruct the ITPSL engine how far back it should go to look for the first command 
and/or when to end the search. Previous execution statements used the <pattern> tag in order to 
specify single execution events. However, specifying temporal information in relation to a sequence 
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of events requires different semantics. The <timewindow> tag provides these semantics and later 
paragraphs will explain the concept in more detail.  
Finally, the optional <validmatch> tag provides an additional refinement mechanism when it comes 
to the validity of the specified execution sequence. Ideally, all of the specified processes should 
match in order for the ‘userexecsequence’ statement to be valid. This is the default behavior of the 
ITPSL engine, when a <validmatch> tag is not specified.  Caution should be exercised by the signa-
ture author, in order not to include processes that are irrelevant to the threat specification or miss 
execution events that could be important. In other words, a process execution sequence when ex-
pressed as a threat pre-condition, is as good as the ability of the signature author to isolate and ex-
press the relevant events. This of course stands true for every part of the ITPSL signature. 
However, to accommodate for uncertainty created by the variety of commands that could be em-
ployed in sequence to create a threat, <validmatch> allows the signature author to specify a validity 
threshold in two possible ways:  
 As a match score (x out of t processes, with t being the total number of specified processes  
in the statement) OR 
 As a total threshold score (w) accompanied by a scored process weight list, so that some of 
the processes are considered more representative as threat indicators than others. Note that w 
is always smaller that the total score from the weight list on the right hand side (if w was 
equal to the total score of the weighted list, then all processes should be taken into consider-
ation and then we would have the default case and no need to specify a <validmatch> tag).
threshold(w)=(scorea,scoreb,scorec…scoret)
where w<(scorea,scoreb,scorec…scoret)
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Signature authors can think of <validmatch> as a kind of internal Weight Matrix that applies to 
process execution sequences. This last mechanism together with the <oneof> tag block gives more 
flexibility to the author to increase the specificity of a description by means of including more state-
ments with varied degrees of relevance. It could also be used as a nice way to refine older signa-
tures (keep the same process statements but change their weight and hence the scope of a threat 
specification).       
In order to illustrate all these concepts, let’s assume that we are constructing a misuse signature 
oriented  towards  detecting  the  installation  of  P2P  software.  Hence,  we  wish  to  describe  an 
execution  sequence  that  includes  the  launching  of  a  web  browser,  the  decompression  of  a 
compressed archive and finally the running of the uncompressed executable by user ‘chrisc’ within 
the last 24 hours from the point the signature is checked. Figure 6.53 displays displays a suitably 
crafted 'userexecsequence' statement that encodes these conditions.
Note how the <pattern> tag is omitted from the encapsulated ‘procexec’ statements, as <timewin-
dow> provides a time reference for the execution sequence search. However, the scope of the above 
process sequence example is not wide enough to accommodate a range of variations in the user ac-
tions. For example, what if the user had employed a different tool to decompress the downloaded 
executable and/or a different application to acquire it? We can widen the scope of the specification 
and re-write the relevant ‘procexec’ statements using logical operators as shown below by Figure 
6.54. The XOR operator inside the relevant statement tags (<name>,<path> and <argumentlist>) in-
cludes more options for specifying user related processes. 
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<userexecsequence>
<username> chrisc </username>
<timewindow> within 1  days </timewindow>
<procsequence>
<procexec>
<name> firefox </name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
</procexec>
<procexec>
<name> tar</name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
<argumentlist> (xvfz, azureus*.tar.gz) </argumentlist>
</procexec>
<procexec>
<name> OR(azureus, azureus-bin) </name>
<path> any </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
</procexec>
</procsequence>
</userexecsequence>
Figure 6.53: P2P software installation detection by using userexecsequence
…
  <procexec>
<name> XOR (mozilla, mozilla-bin, firefox, firefox-bin,ftp) </name>
<path> XOR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
</procexec>
<procexec>
<name> XOR(tar, gzip)</name>
<path> XOR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
<argumentlist> XOR ((xvfz, azureus*.tar.gz), (-d, azureus*.tar.gz)) 
</argumentlist>
</procexec>
…
Figure 6.54: Making the procexec statements polymorphic
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At this point, we could also make use of the <validmatch> tag to weight the significance of the pre -
viously described processes. As a result, the entire statement could be re-written, as shown in Figure 
6.55. 
<userexecsequence>
<username> chrisc </username>
<timewindow> within 1  days </timewindow>
<procsequence>
<procexec>
<name> XOR (mozilla, mozilla-bin, firefox, firefox-bin,ftp) </name>
<path> XOR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
</procexec>
<procexec>
<name> XOR(tar, gzip)</name>
<path> XOR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
<argumentlist> XOR ((xvfz, azureus*.tar.gz), (-d, azureus*.tar.gz)) 
</argumentlist>
</procexec>
<procexec>
<name> OR(azureus, azureus-bin) </name>
<path> any </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
</procexec>
</procsequence>
<validmatch> threshold(60)=(10,30,50)</validmatch>
</userexecsequence>
Figure 6.55: Using the 'validmatch' tag to refine a procexec statement 
We use the <validmatch> tag to specify that the most important process execution event is the last 
one. It is normal to assign greater weighting to commands towards the end of the sequence. If a  
threat can be realized as a sequence of steps, then the further we get in the sequence, the closer we 
get towards the threat misuse scenario. The above example process sequence contains three process 
execution events. By assigning a threshold score of 60, and allocating the scores for the 3 com-
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mands as shown below, we essentially exclude the validation of the entire process sequence if the 
last step is not executed. This makes sense as the first process description (the launch of a browser) 
has no arguments and hence it carries little information (the user might have launched a browser to 
do something else) as no arguments were encoded. The second step is more relevant as now a cer-
tain file is being decompressed as dictated by the argument list. Finally, the last step is the conclud-
ing one that adds the most certainty and thus it gets the most points.  
Still, the above re-write is far from perfect, as the above sequence of actions is incomplete. If the 
downloaded azureus executable is a tarball and the user employs the gzip utility as described, the 
file will still have to be ‘untared’. Thus, the sequence firefox->gzip->azureus is not right and we 
need a better way to express such a scenario. Figure 6.56 shows the way to do this by re-writing the 
<procsequence> block to include a <oneof> tag, in order to complete the sequence of commands by 
adding a little bit of polymorphism in the execution sequence. 
The role of the <oneof> tag is to split the described sequence flow in two possible paths illustrating  
how execution sequence polymorphism could be achieved. One path encodes the user employing 
the tar command to decompress and untar the downloaded file in one step. The second alternative 
specifies two separate commands (gzip and tar) to perform the same task. Each of the possible can-
didates for what is essentially the second step of the process sequence is contained in a pair of  
parentheses inside the <oneof> block. 
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<userexecsequence>
<username> chrisc </username>
<timewindow> within 1  days </timewindow>
 <procsequence>
<procexec>
<name> XOR (mozilla, mozilla-bin, firefox, firefox-bin,ftp) </name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
</procexec>
<oneof>
<procexec>
<name> tar</name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
<argumentlist> (xvfz, azureus*.tar.gz) </argumentlist>
</procexec>
<procexec>
<name>OR (gzip, gunzip)</name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess>yes</singleprocess>
<argumentlist> (-d, azureus*.tar.gz) </argumentlist>
</procexec>
<procexec>
<name> tar </name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess>yes</singleprocess>
<argumentlist> (xvf, azureus*.tar.gz) </argumentlist>
</procexec>
</oneof>
<procexec>
<name> OR(azureus, azureus-bin) </name>
<path> any </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
</procexec>
<validmatch> threshold(60)=(10,30,50)</validmatch>
</procsequence>
</userexecsequence>
Figure 6.56: The use of the 'oneof' tag in a 'userexecsequence' statement 
An important detail relating to the threshold score when process description polymorphism is em-
ployed is that the <validmatch> tag evaluates only the successful match of a <oneof> tag as a single 
step. In the above example, the <validmatch> tag contained:
<validmatch> threshold(60)=(10,30,50)</validmatch>
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Thus, if the signature matches a user executing either a tar or a combination of gzip and tar, only 
one step will be scored, even if the second <oneof> option contains two commands (gzip and tar). 
This is necessary to maintain the scoring consistency and also logically group alternative process 
execution steps (the important thing here is to encode the decompression and untar process of a file, 
not only to describe the actual commands).    
All of the previous examples were based on a time window sequence search of 1 day:
<timewindow> within 1  days </timewindow>
Other combinations are of course possible as described by the statement syntax. One of them is pe-
culiar. If one chooses the value ‘from-now’:
<timewindow> from-now </timewindow>
it will set the execution sequence search start reference point at the time of the signature check. The 
ITPSL engine will then try and collect the information, as the relevant commands gradually reach 
the logs. This can impact the signature execution time. If the <timewindow> tag specifies a period 
of search in the past, the data are already in the ITPSL engine log repository and hence the check 
will yield a result quickly. However, if the start search reference is set at the time of the signature  
check, the ‘userexecsequence’ statement will complete either by the time a matching sequence is 
found or after 30 days from the moment the search has started. The signature author should be 
aware of this detail for two reasons:
 From the perspective of execution timing,  if ‘from-now’ is used as a <timewindow> value 
and the ITPSL engine waits for the detection of a matching process execution sequence, the 
time delay in the signature check will affect the entire signature (including the accompany-
ing network and file statements), not only the execution part.   
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 In addition, the widespread use of ‘from-now’ will tie up computational cycles in the ITPSL 
engine (the engine has an active signature check for potentially long periods of time).
For these two reasons, a ‘from-now’ value should be used with caution only when it is necessary,  
for instance, in cases when it is known that a certain sequence might not have appeared in the past 
and is likely to appear in the future.
<groupexecsequence>
<groupname> groupname | OR/XOR/NOT (username1,username2) </groupname>
<timewindow> from-now | within x minute/hour/days | hh-hh today | hh-hh x days ago 
</timewindow>
<procsequence>
<procexec>…</procexec>
<procexec>…</procexec>
[
<oneof>
(<procexec>…</procexec>)
(<procexec1>…</procexec1> <procexec2>…</procexec2>)
</oneof>
]
…
</procsequence>
[
<validmatch>  x out-of t processes | threshold(w)=(scorea,scoreb,scorec…scoret)  
</validmatch> 
]
</groupexecsequence>
Figure 6.57: The 'groupexecsequence' ITPSL statement 
The ‘groupexecsequence’ statement functions in the same way as the ‘userexecsequence’ does, but 
it relates a process sequence to a group of users.   For the purposes of clarity, Figure 6.58 displays a  
complete ‘groupexecsequence’ statement tailored to the previous scenario (P2P client installation) 
concerning the user group ‘sales’.
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<groupexecsequence>
<groupname> sales </groupname>
<timewindow> within 1  days </timewindow>
<procexec>
<name> XOR (mozilla, mozilla-bin, firefox, firefox-bin,ftp) </name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
</procexec>
<oneof>
<procexec>
<name> tar</name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
<argumentlist> (xvfz, azureus*.tar.gz) </argumentlist>
</procexec>
<procexec>
<name>OR (gzip, gunzip)</name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess>yes</singleprocess>
<argumentlist> (-d, azureus*.tar.gz) </argumentlist>
</procexec>
<procexec>
<name> tar </name>
<path> OR(/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin) </path>
<singleprocess>yes</singleprocess>
            <argumentlist> (xvf, azureus*.tar.gz) </argumentlist>
</procexec>
</oneof>
<procexec>
<name> OR(azureus, azureus-bin) </name>
<path> any </path>
<singleprocess> yes </singleprocess>
            </procexec>
    </procsequence>
<validmatch> threshold(60)=(10,30,50) </validmatch>
</groupexecsequence>
Figure 6.58: A 'groupexecsequence' usage example
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6.7.4 The hardware operation process statement 
A ‘hardwareop’ statement describes the removal or addition of hardware components in a computer 
system (Figure 6.59). This could be useful when describing certain types of threats such as informa-
tion theft scenarios where some sort of mobile medium is involved. The <devicetype> tag provides 
some way to abstract the type of device that was added or removed (<operation> tag). A ‘mo-
bilestorage’ <devicetype> value is normally associated with USB/Firewire based media, whereas 
‘storage’ refers to onboard devices. The device in question could also be optionally identified by a 
<deviceidstring> tag.  The optional <storagepath> tag describes one or more potential mount points 
(or logical drive letters) where the device is expected to be attached.
<hardwareop>
<operation>device-addition | device-removal </operation>
<bus> usb | pci | any </bus>
[
<deviceidstring> 'device id string' | AND/OR/XOR/NOT ('devicestring1', 
'devicestring2',..</deviceidstring>
<pattern> from-now | hh-hh today | hh-hh (x | (0-999) ) days ago </pattern>
<userwasloggedon> username </userwasloggedon>
<groupwasloggedon>groupname  |  AND/OR/XOR/NOT(username1,username2…)
</groupwasloggedon>
]
</hardwareop>
Figure 6.59: The 'hardwareop' ITPSL statement  
The <userwaslogged> and <groupwaslogged> tags help the signature author to maintain account-
ability by relating the hardware operation to a user or group of users respectively. The problem with 
most widely employed Operating Systems is that although they log device addition/removal events, 
they  do  not  explicitly  connect  this  kind  of  hardware  operations  to  users.  Hence,  the  user  (or 
users)that was logged on at the time the hardware event took place is a good indication to include in 
a ‘hardwareop’ statement.        
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As an example of a ‘hardwareop’ statement consider the markup of Figure 6.60. We try to detect 
the hardware addition of a USB based mobile media device of a known model within the last 5 days 
between working hours and relate that event to user ‘chrisc’. Obviously the fact that user ‘chrisc’ 
was logged on might not be conclusive in terms of whether he has inserted the device (other users  
might also be logged in and the statement does not account for them). However, this statement 
should form part of a signature. Other parts of the signature can combine other checks (file activity 
on the specified mount point that would help determine whether ‘chrisc’ has inserted the device and 
is on a path towards an insider threat.
<hardwareop> 
<operation>device-addition</operation> 
<bus>usb</bus> 
<deviceidstring> OR ('MuVo-X', 'MuVo NX', ) </deviceidstring> 
<pattern> 08-17 6 days ago </pattern> 
<userwasloggedon> chrisc </userwasloggedon> 
</hardwareop> 
Figure 6.60: A 'hardwareop' statement example 
6.8 Conclusions
This Chapter presented the ITPSL semantics and examples of their usage in simple scenarios. ITP-
SL should be implemented as an external DSL, in order to gain the flexibility of designing a lan-
guage from scratch, without the dependencies of generic host languages (internal DSL approach). 
The translational semantic approach was used to create a framework where statements can cross-
reference LUARM audit data (Figure 6.4). This framework is based on XML, a universal mecha-
nism to describe data. XML's declarative syntax and statement hierarchy, as well as its standard 
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mechanisms to transform (XSLT) and validate (XML schema) the structure of semantics provide a 
solid ground to build an insider threat specification language.
The ITPSL header (Figure 6.9) facilitates threat signature repository creation and maintenance with 
its ontology section. Furthermore, the Weight Matrix concept (Figure 6.8) provides a mechanism 
for the language to express decision theoretic information by means of associating certain state-
ments (ITPSL sub-blocks) with a confidence weight. Hence, the signature author can craft threat 
prediction signatures based on his knowledge of a particular  type of threat  and classify certain 
events that are clear markers of forthcoming misuse incidents. 
The main ITPSL body (Figure 6.10) contains file, network, process and hardware operation state-
ments that describe the misuse act in threat detection or prediction context. The four different types 
of statements reflect the four different types of events monitored by the LUARM audit records.
The next Chapter discusses the implementation of the ITPSL compiler and evaluates the produced 
semantics in a series of scenarios. 
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Chapter 7 Realizing and evaluating the ITPSL
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The previous chapter presented the ITPSL semantics, discussing the language directives and provid-
ing simple examples of their usage context. This chapter puts ITPSL and LUARM in action by 
evaluating the capabilities of the language against a range of carefully crafted IT misuse scenarios. 
The process of evaluating the capabilities of a Domain Specific Language (DSL) is easier than that 
of a generic programming language. Section 6.1 explained that a DSL is tailored to a specific do-
main rather than the generic range of tasks of a high level programming language [105]. However, 
benchmarking a DSL is still a  process that requires a certain methodology and thus, the chapter 
starts by exploring this particular topic. 
The discussion then moves on to present the ITPSL compiler prototype, the tool that converts ITP-
SL signatures to system level audit checks, in order to detect or predict the specified IT misuse sce-
narios. Finally, the chapter discusses the results of benchmarking ITPSL.
7.1 Evaluating the ITPSL effectiveness
Section 1.1 stated that the fifth and final objective of the thesis was to: “Make a prototype system 
and evaluate the proposed language against a range of hypothetical and real insider IT misuse sce-
narios.”. The prototype system is the subject of the next section. This section raises the question of 
what is a meaningful evaluation for a threat specification language. 
ITPSL is a Domain Specific Language (DSL) and thus its limited context (insider threat prediction 
and specification) should make it easy to produce a range of checks that benchmark the effective-
ness of the language semantics. However,  DSL construction is a peculiar process [142] as it re-
quires both language and domain-specific expert knowledge, a combination which is hard to find. 
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The diversity of the insider IT misuse scenarios discussed in the third chapter combined with the 
number of functional requirements of section 4.3 indicate that the process of evaluating the effec-
tiveness of ITPSL can be a non-trivial task. 
At the beginning, DSLs like general purpose programming languages used to be evaluated empiri-
cally. They would be released to a user audience and evaluation would be performed by means of a 
long term process  loop consisting  of  user  feedback and subsequent  language refinement  steps. 
While this empirical process is still valuable, today the tasks of building and evaluating DSLs have 
become part of the Software Language Engineering (SLE) discipline [143] [144].  The SLE process 
improves dramatically the DSL creation task, as it provides a range of tools and structured method-
ologies [37] to help the language designer and domain expert converge their knowledge into seman-
tics. 
However, the SLE discipline still leaves important gaps for the DSL evaluation step, as mentioned 
by Gabriel et al [145]. Their review of a number of DSL implementations indicates a clear lack of 
focus on the task of systematically evaluating various verification parameters of a DSL approach 
such as:
 Expressiveness: Are the language semantics good enough to express clearly the domain?
 Usability: Are the tools associated to the language easy to use?
 Effectiveness: Can the language perform its task(s) on the domain of use for both the user 
and the domain expert? 
 Maintainability:  Can the language evolve and be corrected easily?
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Some of these criteria can be subjective and require empirical evidence from long term use of the 
tools by a community of domain experts and IT professionals. The usability criterion is one of them. 
Others can be measured more objectively. For instance, the expressiveness and effectiveness criteria 
are largely correlated to the ITPSL functional requirements of section 4.3 . 
An additional point to emphasize is that due to the close relation between the language semantics 
and the audit record (section 5.1), a complete benchmark of the language should measure the ex-
pressiveness and effectiveness of both the audit record and the language semantics. ITPSL can de-
tect or predict only what LUARM can capture. Hence, one of the important questions to answer is 
whether the devised audit record format is expressive and effective enough to capture data for a 
range of IT misuse scenarios.  Consequently, this means that the project needs data from real IT 
misuse incidents.  
In order to address the data generation issue, the project made the source code of LUARM publicly 
available [82] in May 2010, hoping that early user adopters can provide data.   Finding a suitable 
user audience willing to test the LUARM/ITPSL tools and provide real data proved to be difficult 
for a number of reasons. The first of these reasons relates to the level of information sensitivity of 
an insider misuse incident for the organization. Various information security surveys [6] [7] indicate 
a clear reluctance of the respondents to admit the occurrence of insider IT misuse incidents, fearing 
reputational damage.  Apart from the lack of suitable IT misuse expression standards that this re-
search project is trying to address, this reluctance is another important reason that contributes to the 
lack of data repositories for insider IT misuse mentioned in [57]. 
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A secondary difficulty in collecting real IT misuse data relates to data compliance reasons. Even if  
we find organizations that are willing to use the audit engine and admit the occurrence of insider in-
cidents, LUARM stores a large number of organization sensitive data (IP addresses, usernames). 
Organizations are usually reluctant to entrust these sensitive data to a University research group.
Despite these difficulties, the research project managed to find two commercial companies and one 
educational institution that tested LUARM in order to monitor legitimate user actions. Permission to 
publish the data was not obtained. Thus, the project needed a way to make use of these data, in or-
der to make a reproducible data set that can be used to measure objectively the capabilities of the 
semantics and the audit record. One obvious approach would be to find a way to pseudonymize the 
data and thus hide all references to the companies and research institutions that allowed us to cap-
ture misuse data. Data pseudonymization [146] is a growing practice on a number of Intrusion De-
tection domains. However, the complexity of this approach and the reluctance of the organizations 
to let us publish those data in any form made the project follow a different approach.
The chosen approach involves a multiple step misuse detection game. The aim of this game is to 
produce a publicly available data set that will allow the replay of the real world misuse incidents in 
LUARM format for the purposes of evaluating LUARM/ITPSL. The publication of the data means 
that the results can be reproducible and act as a way for language users to verify and experiment 
with the language in similar scenarios. The game steps are outlined below:
 Step 1: The making of text based scenarios: A text-based scenario is made for all the 
recorded real misuse incidents. The scenario uses fictitious names for the description of the 
entities and roles such as company and user names. It only mentions relevant background 
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details of each misuse case.  This step ensures that we have no references to the original  
source of the recorded data and hence ensure third party confidentiality. 
 Step 2:  The game briefing:  The scenarios are discussed amongst an analyst and a user 
team. The analyst is the person that re-enacts the security officer's role by using LUARM 
and ITPSL to monitor the actions of the user team with the aim to detect/predict the IT mis -
use acts described in the scenarios. The user team consists of a number of persons that will 
re-enact the scenarios by playing the role of the insider on a live IT infrastructure. The ana-
lyst briefs the users about the scope of the game and the misuse scenarios. He asks the user 
team not to disclose the person-role allocation nor the physical hosts where the misuse sce-
narios will take place. This last issue is vital for the credibility of the LUARM/ITPSL evalu-
ation, by making misuse detection and prediction easier for the analyst.
 Step 3: The setup of the live IT infrastructure: The analyst sets up all the necessary de-
tails (LUARM client-server, making of the fictitious user accounts, verification of the net-
work connections and all relevant scenario details) for the game to commence. The live IT 
infrastructure is a game requirement because it introduces a number of realism elements. 
The most important for them is the 'noise' (non relevant user activity data) the live infra-
structure contributes to the game detection and prediction process.  This can prove the stor-
age efficiency of the LUARM engine, as well as the filtering capabilities of ITPSL/LUARM 
to mine relevant user actions from a large collection of data. 
 Step 4: The game play: The LUARM recording starts and the user team is informed to go 
ahead and perform the scenarios at their convenience within a previously agreed date, in or-
der to keep the logs at a reasonable size for publication.  
 Step 5: The analysis of data: The LUARM monitoring stops and the analyst starts making 
misuse signatures to detect the misuse scenarios using the ITPSL compiler and the LUARM 
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logs. This is the step where we evaluate LUARM/ITPSL by answering the following ques-
tions:
 Were the language semantics good enough to express all aspects of the scenarios 
(expressiveness)?
 In the process of expressing the scenarios, did the language meet the ITPSL func-
tional requirements of section 4.3?
 Did the language and the audit record allow detection and prediction of all the sce-
narios in question? 
 Step 6: Post curation of data: Due to the fact that the game was recorded on a live IT infra-
structure, all non fictitious user ids and other types of data (sensitive command line argu-
ments) are pseudonymized, prior releasing the data set to the public.
Section 7.3 presents the actual scenarios and the results of the game. The next section then presents 
the final piece of the puzzle, the ITPSL compiler.
7.2 The ITPSL compiler
Figure 6.6 of Section 6.3 presented the ITPSL XML components. All of the these modules together 
with some additional logic are called collectively as 'the ITPSL compiler'.  Figure 7.1 provides a 
different view of these components and illustrate the modules of the ITPSL compiler prototype sys-
tem.
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Figure 7.1: The ITPSL compiler
The prototype system consists of a number of relational tables and Perl scripts, as well as an XML 
Schema [133] file (validate.xsd). This file describes the syntax of the ITPSL signature and helps the 
various tools ensure that the processed signature is consistent with the syntax and format of the lan-
guage, as described in Chapter 6. On the left hand side of Figure 7.1, the 'submitsig.pl' script helps 
the  user  submit  a  syntactically  correct  signature  to  the  ITPSL  signature  repository 
('signatures_repository.sql'). This repository implements the ITPSL signature ontology (ITPSL sig-
nature header).  In contrast, the 'searchsig.pl' and 'getsig.pl' are  used to search and retrieve one or 
more signatures from the ITPSL signature repository. 
The fetched signatures are then fed to the main ITPSL compiler module ('itpslc.pl'). This module 
has the vital job of interpreting LUARM data by turning the ITPSL signature semantics into misuse 
detection and prediction output, informing the analyst on whether something is happening  (misuse 
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detection) or is about to happen (threat prediction).  Thus, the output of the compiler may have two 
forms:
 one or more detection results of the form: (user_name, 0/1): expressing false or true 
outcome for detecting a misuse scenario for one or more user accounts in one or more 
hosts.
 one or more predictive results of the form: (user_name, EPMO): as described in sec-
tion 6.4  (Figure 6.8), an EPMO expresses a likelihood of a misuse occurrence associat-
ed to a user name.
At functional level, the ITPSL compiler issues two types of queries:
 LUARM-SQL queries: This query type mines information about a range of archived events 
(file, network endpoint, process execution) from each of the LUARM client information 
repositories. 
 Live client queries: These queries concern information that needs to be captured from at the 
present point of time. This is the job of the Live Client Query Forwarder functions imple-
mented inside the main compiler module ('itpslc.pl') that talk directly to the LUARM clients.
 
The type of ITPSL directives employed to describe a scenario dictate which of the two query types 
is going to be issued. For example, most of the user/group ability access statements ('usercaneccess-
dir', 'usercanaccessnet') as well as statements like 'fileexists', 'direxists' and 'netexists' could generate 
live client queries, whereas ITPSL statements such as 'fileaccess' and 'netaccess' generate LUARM-
SQL queries. A combination of these two different types of statements inside an ITPSL signature 
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sub-block (Figure 6.11, Section 6.4) can be used to check whether something that happens now 
(live client query) can be correlated to an event that happened previously for which evidence is no 
longer present in the system (LUARM-SQL query).
Figure 7.2: ITPSL repository signature submission 
In order to better understand the function of the prototype system, it is useful to illustrate the series  
of actions that occur amongst the various modules during certain system operations. Figure 7.2 dis-
plays the action series of a signature submission.  The 'submitsig.pl' accepts a single file as its input  
which contains the ITPSL signature markup (1). It then checks to see whether the submitted ITPSL 
markup follows certain syntactic rules, as specified in the XML Schema file 'validate.xsd' (2). If the 
submitted markup is syntactically valid, some additional logical validity checks are performed on 
the signature to ensure it is fit for submission. If anything fails at this stage, the script will halt the 
operation and inform the user about the syntax/logical error detected in the submitted signature. 
The final action (3) involves a check on whether the signature has been submitted before to the 
repository. If that is not the case, the signature is then entered successfully into the ITPSL reposito-
ry.
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Figure 7.3: Search, retrieve and process an ITPSL signature from the repository
Once a signature is successfully entered into the repository, it may be retrieved in order to be fed to  
the ITPSL compiler. Figure 7.3 displays the series of actions taking place to retrieve a signature and 
pass it to the 'itpslc.pl' module for processing. The first step (1) is to search for one or more signa-
tures using a range of search criteria (example: keywords, hostlist), as described by the signature 
ontology header (Figure 6.9, Section 6.4). These search criteria are fed to the 'searchsig.pl' module 
which performs a lookup on the signature repository (2). The module will return zero, one or more 
signature identifier  (sigid's) that match the search criteria (3). A 'sigid' is the unique identifier of a 
signature entry in the ITPSL repository and can be passed as an argument to the 'getsig.pl' module 
(4). After performing the lookup of the entered 'sigid' (5), the module will return a complete signa-
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ture (6). The user can then examine the signature and submit it to the main compiler (7) for process-
ing.
Figure 7.4: The ITPSL compiler in action  
Figure 7.4 shows the module interactions when a signature is submitted to the main ITPSL compiler 
(1). The ITPSL signature will run again a range of syntactic checks similar to the ones performed by 
the 'submitsig.pl' module (Figure 7.2). It will then search the signature repository to lookup the LU-
ARM database name for the hosts involved in the signature (2). Once the host names are located, 
steps 3 and 4 represent groups of LUARM-SQL and live client queries respectively, as dictated by 
the signature directives. The results are assembled together and the very final step is the compiler 
output (5). 
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These prototype modules represent a set of language tools with which one could interact with the 
ITPSL semantics. Appendix B contains more practical information about the implementation and 
use of the ITPSL compiler. The next sections demonstrate how these tools can be put into use 
against a range of insider misuse scenarios.
7.3 The Insider Misuse game
Section 7.1 described the methodology for assessing ITPSL as a DSL language and proposed a mul-
tiple step insider misuse detection game for that purpose. After presenting the language and the 
tools that implement it, this section discusses the insider misuse detection game in detail and ex-
plains its design rules.
The game is a controlled experiment on insider IT misuse detection and prediction and has three im-
portant entities:
 The users: The people that are associated to a particular scenario and have unique user-id 
and authentication credentials to individual workstations in the IT infrastructure. Some of 
these users are responsible for performing the misuse act.
 The analyst: The person who is responsible for examining the logs and using LUARM/ITP-
SL to detect/predict the threats and the associated users. In a real world scenario, this could 
be the security officer or a third party security auditor.
 The IT infrastructure: It consists of a number of hardware and software components that 
are setup to simulate insider threat scenarios:
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 Linux workstations that run the LUARM client processes. Users have access to these 
workstations at various levels (simple user, admin). 
 The data network that consists of Ethernet switches that interconnects all compo-
nents. 
 The LUARM audit engine server that contains the audit data and signature reposito-
ries the ITPSL tools to construct signatures for insider misuse detection/prediction.
Three important basic assumptions about the experiment should be stated: 
 Assumption 1: No users have access to the LUARM audit engine server or can corrupt/dis-
rupt the operation of the audit engine. The analyst is the only person that controls the LU-
ARM server. In a real world scenario, this assumption is unrealistic because logging systems 
are software systems. Thus, they exhibit a number of security vulnerabilities themselves. 
However, the goal of this research is to demonstrate the usefulness and weaknesses of the 
LUARM audit record and the ITPSL markup, in the process of specifying insider threats. 
Therefore, the prototype LUARM system was designed to do exactly that and nothing more.  
Chapter 8 will discuss ways to strengthen LUARM for real world deployment.
 
 Assumption 2: The scenarios were derived by real world LUARM captured data from a 
number of organizations that adopted the project's audit engine for testing purposes. Howev-
er, permission to reference the LUARM adopters and publish the original audit data was not 
obtained by the organizations in question. As a result, careful re-enactment of the real world 
incidents by a team of users under a controlled IT infrastructure is the only way to publish  
test results. Detecting and predicting insider IT misuse incidents in real world conditions is 
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certainly a more laborious and challenging task than re-enacting summaries of incidents in a 
computer lab. Nevertheless, a careful summary and replay of incidents can highlight the 
pros and cons of the LUARM/ITPSL design. 
 Assumption 3:  In order to increase the realism of the game to a maximum possible extent,  
the users do not communicate their actions to the analyst during the game. In addition, the 
experiment introduces a number of hosts and possible user accounts for each scenario, so 
that the possibilities of performing a misuse act increase. This means that it becomes more 
difficult for the analyst to predict/detect where (physical workstation), when (the time of de-
tection) and who (the name of the simulated user) performed the misuse act.  
The following paragraphs provide the scenario descriptions. Each description provides a set of user 
names associated to the user scenario. The scenario usernames act as account decoys, as previously 
stated in Assumption number 3.  
 Scenario 1:'Autobrake' Corp is a company designing car braking systems. Their engineering 
department is the most information sensitive work area. The braking system design process 
takes place, in high performance Linux workstations, one for each design engineer. The en-
gineers have normal user rights to the workstations. Superuser rights (root) is given only to 
the IT admin. The designs reside on the local hard drives of the workstations and the com-
pany's IT policy forbids any transfer of sensitive data to portable media. Autobrake's system 
administrator has requested a salary raise various times. This has been denied by manage-
ment, as the company faces a declining car manufacturing market. The system administrator 
is lured by a competing company that asked him to deliver schematics of the new and revo-
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lutionary Autobrake's RGX9 SUV braking system in return for a large amount of money. 
Enjoying the trust of everyone and having full control of the engineering CAD workstations, 
the system administrator decides to take the offer of the competing company. He performs 
the intellectual property theft by following a well designed approach which is summarized 
below: 
 He carefully chooses the user account of a mechanical engineer (username 'engi-
neer3') that had some disputes over work issues with management. He aims to avoid 
detection by means of masquerading as the engineer in question.
 After successfully masquerading as the engineer in the IT system he uses a portable 
USB key to obtain the commercially sensitive RGX9 schematic, leaving only the 
traces of the user engineer “actions”.
           (scenario user accounts: root, engineer1, engineer2, engineer3).
 Scenario 2: 'Agrico' is a small company (20 people) located in the countryside. It works as a 
price broker for various farming fertilizers.  The company employees need access to the 
World Wide Web in order to search for on-line prices on various vendor web sites. They use 
the online web data to make an up-to-date 'best price' database that they sell to their cus-
tomers. Agrico's IT manager  has a low budget to cater for the internet connection. Their 
only Internet access option (due to the rural location) is a 2 Mbps ADSL line. The ADSL 
connection has recently become slow and various brokers complain to the IT manager about 
slow access speeds. After some investigation, a fault with the ADSL line is ruled out and a 
cheap proxy cache server is installed, in an attempt to reduce the bandwidth requirements. 
The proxy logs indicate to the IT manager that various pornographic websites are being vis-
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ited and they find in the proxy server file space various high definition pornographic videos 
and photos, making clear that they are the reason the ADSL connection is saturated.  The 
proxy cache logs are in the following form:
Date/Time reference Workstation IP URL
18/12/2010-14:13:23 192.168.0.107 http://mybadsite.com
As a result, the CEO issues an email to all employees explicitly forbidding access to such 
sites.  In an attempt to mitigate the situation, the IT manager tries to block the URLs of these 
sites at the proxy server. However, he discovers that over time, new web sites are being vis-
ited.  As all employees have been warned that their online actions are being monitored, the 
CEO orders the IT manager to locate the offenders and provide evidence of their actions. 
The first action of the IT manager is to try and correlate the data from the proxy logs to the 
login activity of the workstation. This gave him a username, however, web browser history 
and cache provided no hits. As each of the workstations might be used by different users, 
this breaks the chain of evidence. We see how ITPSL and LUARM can help. (Scenario user 
accounts: agrico1,agrico2,agrico3).
 Scenario 3: John (username:johnc) is a talented software developer in the central IT ser-
vices of a known University. However, he has strong problems with authority and his liberal 
personality has caused some problems with the IT services manager and various people at 
his workplace. John has frequently argued that he should be allowed to use a Bit Torrent 
protocol in his development workstation, even if the the IT regulations explicitly forbid the 
installation of Bit Torrent software in University computing devices. Apart from the use of 
Bit Torrent software that is tolerated by the network administrators, John has recently got in 
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trouble by installing the LOIC (Low Orbit Ion Cannon) DoS client. While the intentions of 
John were unknown, the network manager believes that he intended to DoS various Amazon 
and Paypal servers, in response to the Wikileaks controversy. This shows how LUARM and 
ITPSL can help to mitigate these situations.
 Scenario 4: Detection of unintentional misuse: The Human Resources department of Auto-
corp has a file share called 'Payroll'. The share contains sensitive information and has the 
following folder structure:
Figure 7.5: Directory structure for Scenario 4 
The folder is owned by members of the user group 'hrpersons'. The 'Appraisals' subfolder is 
open to the entire company, so that staff can see appraisals. The 'Overtime' subfolder is ac-
cessible by all members of the 'accounts' group and 'hrpersons'. The 'Salary' and 'Contracts' 
are only accessible  by select  few people of the 'hrpersons'  user group (usernames:  ridh, 
mikes). Here, we show how ITPSL can help detect permission leakage problems that often 
happen by accidentally configuring permissions for contracts and salary folders being acces-
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sible by users other than ridh and mikes. Other users (not from the 'hrpersons' or 'accounts' 
user groups) having access to Overtime folder.
These scenarios represent a range of IT misuse incidents. Scenario 1 is a typical Intellectual Proper-
ty theft scenario with the added complexity of a masquerade attack (an attack which involves an in-
sider pretending to be another user, to perform the misuse act AND incriminate somebody else). It 
is designed to demonstrate how LUARM can provide a strong chain of evidence for detecting the 
occurrence of a past incident.  The same can be said for Scenario 2 which  re-enacts the detection of 
accessing pornographic material, a common incident according to information security surveys. 
Scenario 3 is an example of an insider IT misuse prediction task. In essence, it aims to demonstrate 
the decision theoretic information features of ITPSL and help the analyst predict the installation of a 
dangerous DoS attack tool by an ordinary user. The fourth and last scenario of the game is also 
demonstrating a predictive operation of file access control settings that could produce accidental 
(non intentional) information leak.
The scenarios were discussed during an initial briefing amongst the analyst and three IT specialists 
that would re-enact these incidents by playing the role of the misuser for each scenario. After the 
initial briefing, the users met amongst them to discuss a role allocation for each scenario without the 
knowledge of the analyst. At that point, LUARM was activated and logging commenced for a peri-
od of 4 weeks. After the four week audit period, results were collected and verified with the users 
by the analyst.
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After explaining the basic assumptions and role of the game, the next section demonstrates the use 
of LUARM/ITPSL in the first game scenario.
7.4 Detecting intellectual property theft
This section discusses how LUARM was used to provide accountability and locate the misuser for 
the intellectual property theft scenario (Scenario 1, Section 7.3). Scenario 1 is a complex scenario 
that requires strong chain of evidence to incriminate the offender. A post-mortem forensic examina-
tion style of an incident is provided, in order to demonstrate the correlation power of the LUARM 
audit record structure. 
The investigation begins at the MySQL LUARM server side, where the detection of relevant file ac-
tivity took place. In particular, instead of shifting manually through text log files and use informa-
tion filter tools such as grep, awk and sed [147] to locate activity relevant to the prototype file 
'RGX9', a series of LUARM-SQL statements is issued. From the audit records of various worksta-
tions, LUARM indicates that the workstation with name 'proteas' contains many hits for the file 
RGX9:
mysql>  select  COUNT(*)  from  panoitpsl.fileinfo  where  filename  RLIKE  'RGX9'  OR  location  RLIKE 
'RGX9'  \G
*************************** 1. row ***************************
COUNT(*): 0
1 row in set (0.05 sec)
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mysql> select COUNT(*) from dionitpsl.fileinfo where filename RLIKE 'RGX9' OR location RLIKE 'RGX9'  \G
*************************** 1. row ***************************
COUNT(*): 0
1 row in set (0.05 sec)
...
mysql>  select  COUNT(*)  from  protitpsl.fileinfo  where  filename  RLIKE  'RGX9'  OR  location  RLIKE 
'RGX9'  \G
*************************** 1. row ***************************
COUNT(*): 145
1 row in set (0.05 sec)
Thus, by loading the 'proteas' workstation LUARM database, the detected 145 hits can be further 
examined :
mysql> use protitpsl;
Database changed
mysql> select username,pid,cday,chour,cmin,location,filename from fileinfo where filename RLIKE 'RGX9' OR 
location RLIKE 'RGX9' \G
From the many resulting hits, the following ones stand out:
*************************** 111. row *************************** 
username: engineer3
pid : 8301
cday: 4 
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chour: 15 
cmin: 30
location: /storage/users/engineer3/work/designs
filename:RGX9.jpg 
...
*************************** 118. row *************************** 
username: engineer3
pid: 28538
cday: 4 
chour: 15 
cmin: 32
location: /media/U3SAN03-12
filename: RGX9.jpg
The reason these file access patterns looked suspicious is that they were different to the normal pat-
tern of accessing the file by the staff engineer. Normally, user 'engineer3' would access the file by 
means of certain design and image editing applications, under its usual directory (/storage/users/en-
gineer3/work/designs). This time, however, things look a bit different, if one follows the association 
of file access to process execution, in order to confirm which programs performed the recorded file 
transactions.
mysql>select  username,pid,command,arguments,cyear,cday,chour,cmin  from  psinfo  where  username='engi-
neer3' AND pid='8031' AND cyear='2011' AND cday='4' AND chour='15' AND cmin='30'; 
*************************** 1. row *************************** 
username: engineer3
pid: 8031
command: /bin/cp
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arguments: work/designs/RGX9.jpg /tmp/
cyear: 2011
cday: 4
chour: 15 
cmin: 30
mysql>select  username,pid,command,arguments,cyear,cday,chour,cmin  from  psinfo  where  username='engi-
neer3' AND pid='8031' AND cyear='2011' AND cday='4' AND chour='15' AND cmin='30; 
*************************** 1. row *************************** 
username: root 
pid: 28538
command: mv 
arguments: RGX9.jpg /media/U3SAN03-12
cyear: 2011 
cday: 4
chour: 15 
cmin: 32
Essentially, the previous results verify that the file was first copied from the normal directory to 
/tmp and then was moved to the /mnt/usb. At this point, a little bit of system specific knowledge 
comes into light, as /mnt/usb is the usual mount point where Linux links portable storage media to 
the filesystem. Hence, the question to raise is whether a portal storage medium was connected to the 
workstation, prior to the 'mv' file transaction. The query result yields a positive answer:
mysql> select * from hwinfo where cyear='2011' AND cmonth='01' AND cday='04' AND chour='15'\G 
*************************** 1. row *************************** 
hwdevid: 71 
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md5sum: a16e7386f14de769a7a9491da2071f5b 
cyear: 2010 
cmonth: 12
cday: 4
chour: 15 
cmin: 30
csec: 28
devbus: USB 
devstring: Cruzer Micro U3   
devvendor: SanDisk Corp.    
userslogged: engineer3,root 
dyear: 2010
dmonth: 1
dday: 4
dhour: 15 
dmin: 33 
dsec: 38
This database hit seems to be in line with the actions of engineer3, as it indicates a device connec-
tion before the execution of the 'mv' command and a disconnection well after the mv command. 
Thus, everything seems to point out that 'engineer3' violated the company policy and transferred a 
sensitive file to a USB medium, against the company IT regulations. However, this had been cate-
gorically denied by the actual person in the real world case. Moreover, a good but non IT based ali-
bi for the staff engineer (again from the real world case) was that he exited the building with his se -
curity card token around 14:50, returning back to his desk at 15:50, a wide gap for him. Clearly,  
something else was going on and the clue was the 'userslogged' field of the last LUARM result. 
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This 'hwinfo' LUARM table field contains the usernames for accounts that are logged into the work-
station at the time of the device connection. Apart from 'engineer3' we note the root account being 
active, which is clearly the only other choice that, under the circumstances, could have performed 
the mount procedure.     
Based on the time stamp of the mv operation, a careful investigation of the root account actions re-
veals a key command execution, derived from the 'psinfo' table:
mysql>  select  *  from  psinfo  where  pid='27865'  AND  cyear='2011'  AND  cday='4'  AND  cmonth='1'  AND 
chour='15' AND cmin >= '20' AND cmin <='33' \G 
*************************** 1. row *************************** 
psentity: 97654 
md5sum: 7067284f2e1aefc430339ef091b4e41b 
username: root 
pid: 27865 
ppid: 26407 
pcpu: 0.0 
pmem: 0.0 
command: su 
arguments: - engineer3 
cyear: 2011 
cmonth: 1 
cday: 4 
cmin: 28 
chour: 15 
csec: 36 
dyear: 2011 
dmonth: 1 
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dday: 4 
dhour: 15 
dmin: 28 
dsec: 39 
The 'su' command is used routinely by administrators to switch user credentials, in order to test en-
vironment settings and perform system tasks [14]. However, it can be easily used as a masquerading 
tool to covertly perform actions using the credentials of somebody else.
A further  investigation  also  found the  USB key on the  desk  of  the  IT  administrator  with  the 
RGX9.jpg file.  The hwinfo  table  device  identifier  data  ('devstring',  'devvendor')  as  well  as  the 
mount  point  identifier  (/media/U3SAN03-12)  from  the  psinfo  commands  contributed  towards 
strengthening the final piece of the puzzle.
This case shows the versatility of the relational structure of the LUARM record that paved the way 
from simple file operation to related program execution and other events that can provide strong ev-
idence and lead to the misuser.
7.5  Detecting pornography browsing during working hours 
Scenario 2 simulates a real world IT misuse incident which involved the detection of a person that 
-contrary to the company IT usage policy- used the Internet connection to access pornographic con-
tent during working hours. The abundance of pornography on the Internet makes this type of IT 
misuse a quite common problem with profound economic and productivity implications for the af-
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fected organizations [148]. Hence, it is useful to see how LUARM and ITPSL can tackle the detec-
tion of this problem and provide evidence of the offender.
The investigation starts by looking into the proxy server logs.  As previously mentioned by the sce-
nario description, the proxy server logs indicate more than a hundred hits on URL's that were clear-
ly referring to web sites were visited by the workstation with IP 192.168.0.107 (slart) almost on a 
daily basis. The proxy log for the 18th of December 2010 (one of the days the particular IT misuse 
incident took place is included below: 
Date/Time reference Workstation IP URL
18/12/2010-14:13:23 192.168.0.107 http://mybadsite1.com
18/12/2010-14:14:37 192.168.0.107 http://mybadsite1.com
...
18/12/2010-14:21:32 192.168.0.107 http://mybadsite2.com
...
18/12/2010-17:37:28 192.168.0.107 http://mybadsite2.com
18/12/2010-17:44:48 192.168.0.107 http://mybadsite1.com
However, as this workstation is used by many users throughout the day simultaneously, it is not 
clear who accessed the pornographic sites.  The proxy logs are an indication of the problem's pres-
ence, however they do not constitute concrete evidence of a user accessing the sites. One needs to 
query the LUARM records for host 'slart', in order to obtain definite evidence of user activities. This 
is when the first problem with the LUARM audit record structure is encountered:
mysql> use slartitpsl;
Database changed
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mysql> select COUNT(*) from netinfo where application RLIKE 'firefox' AND cyear='2010' AND cday='18' 
AND cmonth='12' AND  destport='80' AND destfqdn RLIKE 'mybadsite1.com'  LIMIT 100 \G
*************************** 1. row ***************************
COUNT(*): 0
1 row in set (0.01 sec)
mysql> select COUNT(*) from netinfo where application RLIKE 'firefox' AND cyear='2010' AND cday='18' 
AND cmonth='12' destport='80' AND destfqdn RLIKE 'mybadsite2.com'  LIMIT 100 \G
*************************** 1. row ***************************
COUNT(*): 0
1 row in set (0.00 sec)
In this case, LUARM was queried to return any detected hits on the host 'slart' as a result of the fire-
fox web browser application accessing port 80 (http) of 'mybadsite1.com' and 'mybadsite2.com'. It 
returned zero results. The query was repeated for other browsers (konqueror, chrome) but still no 
results were returned, something which appeared to be alarming at first sight. 
A more careful examination revealed the culprit. LUARM records only the IP addresses of the end-
points. Chapter 5 discussed the reasons behind this design choice. As many adult websites do not 
provide reverse DNS name resolution [98] creates a situation where the audit record cannot resolve 
the recorded IP to a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). Malicious spammers and phishers use 
a similar technique to avoid detection [149]. Whether adult website owners intentionally or acciden-
tally do not configure reverse DNS is unclear. However, the end result is that this incapacitates LU-
ARM to tag the recorded IP with the URL that hints a pornographic sight. 
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This is a serious problem that hinders the detection process. It can be circumvented by knowing al-
ternative places to look for, in order to find signs of the web proxy recorded URLs. In this case, it is 
known that the Firefox web browser keeps a record of visited pages inside the file places.sqlite  
[150],  located under the home profile of the user.  Other web browsers have similar settings to 
record the web pages visited by the user. 
Figure 7.6: ITPSL signature to detect IT misuse for Scenario 2 
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Locating the files that contain these criteria is a task that is best left to the ITPSL compiler. Rather  
than trying to manually search all the user browser history files for the URL of the offensive web-
sites, one can make a signature and use it to shift through the information collected LUARM using 
ITPSL semantics. Figure 7.6 shows the complete ITPSL markup to perform this action. The ITPSL 
directives are highlighted.
In the signature header, a single value of zero on the weightmatrix directive will force the compiler 
to switch in misuse detection mode. In the hostlist header directive, the value of 'cn1' represents the 
server which contains the user home directories (in corporate environments, it is common that user 
home directories are centrally located on file servers and then made available to user workstations 
by means of distributed file systems such as NFS [151], CIFS [152] or other protocols). The ITPSL 
body consists of a single statement which searches for the URL strings using an inclusive OR bina-
ry operator (in case only one of them is recorded). 
The signature is submitted to the ITPSL repository for subsequent reuse, as described in Figure 7.2. 
Pending a successful validation, it is then fed to the ITPSL compiler in order to detect the offender.  
These steps take place on the LUARM server side, as shown below:
[root@cn1 itpslcomp]# ./submitsig.pl scenario2.xml
SUCCESS: Inserted signature with MD5 hash 378389f2469486438d0c04f6b28c8c0a into the ITPSL repository. 
[root@cn1 itpslcomp]# ./itpslc.pl scenario2.xml
...
(agrico1, 1)
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The compiler takes some seconds to issue live client queries to the home directories of users on the 
cn1 server and the result is the detection list  (agrico1, 1). This means that the ITPSL compiler 
claims that the user 'agrico1' is the offender. The verification by manually looking into the file con-
firms what the ITPSL compiler detected:
[root@cn1 luarm]# strings /home/agrico1/.mozilla/firefox/c9hkxp7d.default/places.sqlite | grep -i mybadsite 
http://www.mybadsite1.com/videos/straight/redhead-recent.htmlSEX Free Sex Movie Galleries, Good Porn
http://www.mybadsite1.com/videos/straight/amateur-rate.htmlSEX  Free Sex Movie Galleries, Good Porn
http://www.mybadsite2.com/Asian/index.html
http://www.mybadsite2.com/blog/
At this point, the major question to ask is whether evidence in the browser history file is enough to 
incriminate a user for pornographic access IT misuse. Due to the abundance of pornography [148] 
on the Internet, there are good chances that someone may accidentally access pornographic material 
[153]. Many spam messages or misspelled domain names of widely known web sites can acciden-
tally direct a web browser to a pornographic website. Hence, what is important to examine in cases 
like this is whether the access pattern from the user is persistent.
The ITPSL signature compilation gave an additional crucial link: A username associated with ac-
cess to these offensive websites. One can now investigate further actions related to the username 
'agrico1' by going back to the LUARM SQL interface. As stated in previous paragraphs of this sec-
tion, LUARM did not manage to resolve the collected destination endpoint IPs due to lack of re-
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verse DNS data. However, now that a username is known, a DNS forward lookup (host->IP) can 
provide an IP address:
[root@cn1 itpslcomp]# host www.mybadsite1.com 
www.mybadsite.com is an alias for mybadsite.com.
mybadsite.com has address 216.18.190.104
[root@cn1 itpslcomp]# host www.mybadsite2.com
www.mybadsite2.com is an alias for mybadsite2.com.
mybadsite2.com has address 76.9.26.162
mybadsite2.com mail is handled by 10 twin3.isprime.com.
As a result, LUARM can be used to intercept the access pattern of these websites by the username 
'agrico1'. The results indicate many hits:
mysql> use slartitpsl;
Database changed
mysql>  select  COUNT(*)  from  netinfo  where  username='agrico1'  AND  application  RLIKE  'firefox'  AND 
cyear='2010' AND cday='18'  AND cmonth='12' AND destport='80' AND destip='216.18.190.104'  LIMIT 100 \G
*************************** 1. row ***************************
COUNT(*): 86
1 row in set (0.00 sec)
mysql>  select  COUNT(*)  from  netinfo  where  username='agrico1'  AND  application  RLIKE  'firefox'  AND 
cyear='2010' AND cday='18' AND cmonth='12' AND destport='80' AND destip='76.9.26.162'  LIMIT 100 \G
*************************** 1. row ***************************
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COUNT(*): 9
1 row in set (0.00 sec)
These hits can be further expanded to reveal a repeated and persistent access pattern (some of the 
results are omitted to save page space):
mysql> select chour,cmin,pid from netinfo where username='agrico1' AND application RLIKE 'firefox' AND 
cyear='2010' AND cday='18' AND cmonth='12' AND destport='80' AND destip='216.18.190.104'  LIMIT 100;
+-------+------+-------+
| chour | cmin | pid   |
+-------+------+-------+
|    14 |   12 | 27605 |
|    14 |   13 | 27605 |
|    14 |   17 | 27605 |
|    14 |   18 | 27605 |
|    17 |   20 | 12665 |
|    17 |   22 | 12665 |
|    17 |   36 | 25415 |
|    17 |   37 | 25415 |
...
|    17 |   41 | 30954 |
+-------+------+-------+
86 rows in set (0.00 sec)
The persistent access pattern of the offensive websites indicates that this is unlikely to be an acci-
dental access issue. This can be substantiated further by looking back at the web browser history of 
the file:
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http://www.google.com/search?q=sexy+asian+women&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-
US:official&client=firefox-a#sclient=psy&hl=en&safe=off&client=firefox-a&hs=iUa&rls=org.mozilla:en-US
%3Aofficial&source=hp&q=sexy+asian+women+porn&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw
.&fp=ff3e2739446bc197
http://www.google.com/search?q=sex&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a
http://www.google.com/search?q=sexy+asian+women&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-
US:official&client=firefox-a
http://www.google.com/search?q=sexoasis&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-
US:official&client=firefox-a
http://www.google.com/search?ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-
8&sourceid=navclient&gfns=1&q=tube#sclient=psy&hl=en&safe=off&q=tube+sex&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&pb
x=1&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.&fp=ff3e2739446bc197
This indicates that many searches were performed using a search engine, in an effort to obtain the 
material. The same pattern repeated for other days and at that point, one can be sure that the user -
name 'agrico1' is responsible for intentional pornographic material access.
If the user had deleted the contents of the history file, a common move by privacy conscious users  
and an option with many web browsers, the previously described information path could be necessi-
tated by performing the forward DNS lookup operation straight from the web proxy data.  The 
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querying of the LUARM SQL data against the obtained IP addresses would reach the same conclu-
sion. 
However, the fact that LUARM could not resolve the collected endpoint IPs creates a difficulty that  
forces the investigator to rely on external reference sources (web proxy logs). If these external refer-
ences are unavailable, the only way to locate misuse is to manually go through all the non resolved 
endpoint IPs from LUARM records and verify that they point to offensive websites. This might be 
incredibly laborious and is not acceptable as a solution to the problem. Thus, this case has revealed 
an important issue with the design of the LUARM audit record: Although it may be good enough to  
hold the evidence (unresolved endpoint IPs of the audit record), this evidence becomes difficult to 
find. This issue needs to be addressed more thoroughly and Chapter 8 will discuss this issue.
In summary, this case has demonstrated how LUARM and ITPSL can be used in harmony to detect  
a common type of Insider IT misuse. The ITPSL was used to shift through the volume of LUARM 
data, locate crucial evidence in relation to a user name and then LUARM was used to re-enforce the 
evidence of IT misuse. The LUARM data from this scenario have been placed on-line for reference 
[82].
   
7.6 Predicting the installation of unauthorized software
Whilst the previous scenarios were all about threat detection, the third scenario demonstrates the 
threat prediction capabilities of LUARM and ITPSL. Unauthorized software installation is an im-
portant threat for IT infrastructures [154] and commonly deployed operating systems have specific 
policy enforcement mechanisms to prevent it [155]. Beyond any prevention measures at operating 
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system level, it is important to provide evidence of the misuse act taking place by associating the 
activities of the user(s) to relevant events and examine a mechanism that predicts the occurrence of 
the misuse act in an automated way.
This particular scenario demonstrates an insider that willingly participates into a Distributed Denial 
of Service Attack (DDoS) [156]. On December 8 2010, the "Anonymous" group launched DDoS at-
tacks on organisations such as Mastercard.com, PayPal, Visa.com and PostFinance as part of the 
"Operation Payback" campaign [157]. This particular campaign was seeking volunteers to willingly 
install the Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) DDoS tool [158] and attack various websites that broke 
ties to the WikiLeaks organization. The scenario user 'johnc' is a potential volunteer and thus the 
task is to predict the installation of the software and provide enough evidence of his actions.
Figure 7.7: The header of the ITPSL signature for Scenario 3  
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Figure 7.8: The body of the ITPSL Scenario 3 signature
Figure 7.7 displays the header of the ITPSL signature for the demonstration scenario. We will use 
multiple criteria to predict the running of the LOIC DDoS tool (<detectby>multi</detectby>).  A 
combination of <multihost>no</multihost> and a system hostlist forces the compiler to examine the 
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ITPSL body specified conditions in each of the host separately. The Weight Matrix consists of the 3 
elements with relative weights of 10, 20 and 70 respectively. Later paragraphs discuss the choice of 
those weights, however, the fact that the weightmatrix tag consists of a non-zero value suggests that 
the ITPSL compiler will interpret the signature in threat prediction context. 
Figure 7.8 displays the body of the same signature. There are three sub-blocks inside the main-
block that define three separate prediction event criteria. The main-block 'as_a_result_of' operator 
suggests that these events should form a sequence of three successive steps. The very top one is the 
final step (Figure 6.11). The defined predictive event sequence reflects three steps that a user should 
take prior executing the LOIC DDoS tool:
1. Search for the tool in the Internet and visit the tools web page: As this tool is not part of a 
standard Linux Operating System utility toolkit, the most probable source for getting access 
to the tool is to download it from the Internet. Hence, an interaction of the web browser with 
LOIC tool website should be one of the early steps that one should look for. 
2. The decompression of the program utility archive file, as it is offered from the LOIC web 
site: This is the second logical step that a user should execute before he runs the utility. Most 
websites offer a program in  the form of a compressed archive.  This is the case with the  
LOIC tool [158].
3. If the decompression is successful, the very final step should verify the presence of certain 
files that are part of the contents of the compressed archive. The uncompressed files should 
mean that the user is ready to execute them and this is the limit between threat prediction 
(inferring the running of the utility as the next step) and threat detection (seeing the execu-
tion of the utility against the target websites).
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Starting with the final step/event (the first subblock in Figure 7.8), a 'fileexists'  ITPSL directive 
specifies three files that should be part of the DDoS installation archive: loiq, loic.pro and loic.qrc. 
These three files  exist in many versions of the LOIC DDoS archive (loicVERSION.tar.bz2) con-
tents, so their presence constitutes a distinguishing characteristic.  The AND sub-block operator 
(<subop>AND</subop) makes sure that all three of them must exist. The OR operator adds poly-
morphic properties to the location of the specified files. It is not known in advance where the user 
will decompress the executable, so the search for the files will be performed in any path under the 
user home directory (#userhome#), the /site/ , /tmp and /temp locations, where it is known that the 
user may have write privileges.
The second sub-block defines the interim step of decompressing the LOIC DDoS tool archive. A 
'userexec' ITPSL directive examines whether user 'johnc' has executed a set of possible archive de-
compression  applications  (file-roller,  tar,bzip2)  from  different  potential  source  paths  (/usr/bin, 
/usr/local/bin).  The filename uses a wild card (loiq*.bz2) to make the signature applicable to differ-
ent  versions of the LOIC utility (loiq-0.3.tar.bz2, loiq-0.2.3-1.tar.bz2, etc).  Note that the temporal 
specification is defined as 'any' (<pattern>any</pattern>). This means that we do not bind this step 
to a particular time. However, as the event is part of a 'as_a_result_of' main-block operator set of 
ITPSL sub-blocks, it will have to occur before the final event and after the first specified event (if 
either of the final and inital steps take place). This example demonstrates nicely the ability of ITP-
SL to comply with the functional requirement FR4 (Section 4.3), as the language can clearly ex-
press a sequence of events (first, final and intermediate steps), in response to Meier's event descrip-
tion dimensions [36]. 
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The very first event of the threat prediction sequence is described by the third and last ITPSL signa-
ture sub-block. On the basis of knowing that the Opera and Mozilla Firefox browsers are used, a 
search string of the LOIC DDoS tool website URL is specified as part of a 'fileexists' ITPSL direc-
tive. The user might use either of the two web browsers and thus the file location could either be un-
der the user's .mozilla or .opera subdirectories, where the browsers are likely to store the web histo-
ry files. 
The previously mentioned three steps are not the only predictive path an insider could follow, in or-
der to execute the LOIC DDoS tool. One could envisage different paths. For example, the user 
could execute the LOIC executable by copying the uncompressed file from a USB key (no web 
searches and no decompression steps) to his home area.  Yet another alternative predictive path 
would be to execute steps  1, 2 and 3, but then immediately erase the web history of his web brows-
er. This would invalidate step 1. The alternative paths should not invalidate the entire signature. 
This is where the decision theoretic features of the language come into the game in order to handle 
the uncertainty.
Figure 3.2 explained the limits between threat prediction and threat detection. A major difference 
between a threat prediction and a threat detection ITPSL compiler context is that the step consump-
tion is inclusive in threat prediction. In other words, any of the steps could trigger/validate the sig-
nature. In contrast, threat detection has a more selective step consumption and will validate the sig-
nature only when all the steps occur in order ('as_a_result_of' operation).  
The more relevant events one adds prior to the final threat prediction step, the more likely to in-
crease the prediction capability of the produced signature. However, the ITPSL Weight Matrix con-
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cept (Figure 38, Section 6.4) should reward the final events with a greater weight than that of their  
predecessors.  This is useful in case the previous predictive steps become invalid (they will  not 
match). For this reason, the ITPSL header (Figure 7.7) had a Weight Matrix of 3,10,20,70. The final 
step score (70) indicates this strategy. There is no way that one can achieve the execution of a file  
by not placing it uncompressed and ready to run in places where file permissions allow him to. 
Thus, even if all the other steps are invalidated, at least the final one would give the largest possible 
event score. 
As with Section 7.5, the signature is submitted to the ITPSL signature repository for validation and 
re-use:
[root@cn1 itpslcomp]# ./submitsig.pl scenario3.xml
...
submitsig.pl SUCCESS: Inserted signature with MD5 hash e957b4fa3f6cbc90200c339b6435e2a5 into the ITPSL 
repository. 
and subsequently fed to the ITPSL compiler by means of the following script:
[root@cn1 itpslcomp]# while true; do date ; ./itpslparser.pl scenario3.xml; sleep 60; done
This  script  keeps submitting the predictive signature to  the ITPSL compiler every minute.  The 
script was started towards the beginning of the IT misuse game (18/12/2011 at 01:02:20 secs), and 
hence the first EPMO scores were zero for the various hosts and users:
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Tue Dec 18 01:02:20 CET 2010
proteas.uio.no:
(johnc,0)
(agrico1,0)
(agrico2,0)
(agrico3,0)
(engineer1,0)
(engineer2,0)
(engineer3,0)
dionisos.uio.no:
(johnc,0)
(agrico1,0)
(agrico2,0)
(agrico3,0)
(engineer1,0)
(engineer2,0)
(engineer3,0)
....
Tue Dec 18 01:03:20 CET 2010
proteas.uio.no:
(johnc,0)
(agrico1,0)
(agrico2,0)
(agrico3,0)
(engineer1,0)
(engineer2,0)
(engineer3,0)
...
However, 10 days later, the ITPSL compiler warns:
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Tue Dec 28 11:19:32 CET 2010
proteas.uio.no:
(johnc,10)
(agrico1,0)
(agrico2,0)
(agrico3,0)
(engineer1,0)
(engineer2,0)
(engineer3,0)
...
Tue Dec 28 11:24:32 CET 2010
proteas.uio.no:
(johnc,80)
(agrico1,0)
(agrico2,0)
(agrico3,0)
(engineer1,0)
(engineer2,0)
(engineer3,0)
A score of 80 indicates that the compiler fired on the very final step and first step (70+10). A look 
at the user's home directory verifies the existence of the files in question: 
-rw-r--r--.  1 johnc johnc  35147 Sep  8  2010 COPYING
drwxr-xr-x.  2 johnc johnc   4096 Dec 28 11:23 images
-rw-r--r--.  1 johnc johnc      1 Sep 19  2007 INSTALL
-rwxr-xr-x.  1 johnc johnc 175590 Dec 10 21:02 loiq
-rw-r--r--.  1 johnc johnc    752 Dec 10 03:28 loiq.pro
244
Chapter 7 Realizing and evaluating the ITPSL
-rw-r--r--.  1 johnc johnc    196 Oct 16 21:40 loiq.qrc
-rw-r--r--.  1 johnc johnc   9647 Dec 10 03:28 Makefile
-rw-r--r--.  1 johnc johnc   1443 Oct 14 18:17 README
drwxr-xr-x.  2 johnc johnc   4096 Dec 28 11:23 src
drwxr-xr-x.  2 johnc johnc   4096 Dec 28 11:23 translations
In addition, the following file validates the first part:
[root@cn1 .opera]# fgrep loiq *
Binary file download.dat matches
global_history.dat:loiq | Download loiq software for free at SourceForge.net
global_history.dat:http://sourceforge.net/projects/loiq/
global_history.dat:Download loiq from SourceForge.net
The date stamps of the files indicate that the directory has been created around 11:23 hours on Dec 
28th. At this point the compiler has sensed correctly the presence of the files, but found no interme-
diate step on decompressing the tarball. This can be attributed to the 100 ms sampling process exe-
cution sampling frequency (Section 5.3, Chapter 5). Inevitably, LUARM could miss some com-
mands and this is another disadvantage of the audit engine that needs to be addressed. 
Nevertheless, the system did manage to predict/warn the system administrator. After the alert, the 
system administrator could stop the user from using the program successfully. The entire MySQL 
data set for this scenario has been placed online for reference [82].
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7.7 Detecting and preventing accidental information leakage
Accidental and intentional information leakage attributed to insiders is a serious threat for IT sys-
tems and a number of efforts have been made to address this type of IT misuse [159] [160]. Detect -
ing and preventing this type of threat is important and demonstrated by the fourth IT misuse game 
scenario.
Prior getting into the details of the fourth scenario, it is worth providing a short discussion of how 
the case relates to common operating system information access control features. Today, most oper-
ating systems control access to information (file and process execution) by extending the concept of 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) mechanisms [161]. The Orange Book [69] defines DAC as “a 
means of restricting access to objects based on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they 
belong. The controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain access permission is 
capable of passing that permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject (unless restrained by 
mandatory access control)”. Assigning access permissions on a user and user group basis on com-
puter files is a good example of a DAC. 
In contrast, the same source [69] defines Mandatory Access Control (MAC) as “a means of restrict-
ing access to objects based on the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information con-
tained in the objects and the formal authorization (i.e., clearance) of subjects to access information 
of such sensitivity".
A MAC based security mechanism beyond the basic access controls is commonly employed in 
Unix/Linux and Microsoft based operating systems. Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [162] and 
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Mandatory Integrity Control [163] are two examples of MAC mechanisms for Linux and Windows 
operating systems respectively. 
Figure 7.9: Combination of MAC and DAC mechanisms for file access control
MAC and DAC mechanisms are always combined in a modern operating system with MAC checks 
preceding the DAC ones. Figure 7.9 displays an example of this combination.  On the left hand 
side, a user (or a program that runs with certain user id credentials) is requesting read and write ac-
cess on a target file (right hand side). Beyond the traditional file access permissions defined by the 
file system (read, write and execute), the subject and target have a context label. This context label 
enforces the MAC policy and is allocated using different criteria, in order to further compartmental-
ize subjects and targets within certain logical groups. In the example of Figure 7.9, access is denied 
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because the subject and target have different labels. Despite the DAC policy allowing access to ev-
eryone on the target, the MAC policy is executed first and hence access is denied.
Despite the presence of effective access control mechanisms, the detection and prevention of acci-
dental information leaks will always require a check on the subject side in relation to certain target 
resources. In other words,  irrespective of how many policies and mechanisms exist between the 
subject and target object, the most reliable way is to check what the subject can really access. This  
is the functional scope of ITPSL directives such as 'usercanaccessfile' and 'usercanaccessdir' (file 
access ability statements, Section 6.5.2).
Figure 7.10 displays the ITPSL signature that detects the information leak of scenario 4. This shows 
how access control policies could be verified by ITPSL semantics. The main-block consists of two 
sub-blocks. The first one contains a 'usercanaccessdir' directive as the access control policy of sce-
nario 4 mentions that only certain user names (mikes,ridh) should access the 'Salary' and 'Contracts' 
folders. The <userid>NOT (mikes,ridh)</userid> tag is expanded to all other userids of the host and 
the directory access check is performed for each one of them. In contrast, the second sub-block con-
tains a 'groupcanaccessdir' because the other part of the policy defines two distinct groups (hrper-
sons, accounts) that should have the only access to the 'Overtime' folder. Thus, the <groupid>NOT 
(hrpersons,accounts)</groupid> tag is expanded to all non system groups (root, wheel) and then to 
all resulting usernames that belong to these groups, in order for the check to be performed for each 
user account member.
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Figure 7.10: ITPSL signature for Scenario 4
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The signature was successfully submitted to the ITPSL repository and then the ITPSL compiler was 
invoked on 18/12/2010:
[root@cn1 itpslcomp]# while true; do date ; ./itpslparser.pl scenario3.xml; sleep 60; done
On the 29th of December 2010, the compiler successfully intercepted the condition which could en-
able an information leak:
Tue Dec 29 11:49:32 CET 2010
proteas.uio.no:
(johnc,1)
(agrico1,1)
(agrico2,1)
(agrico3,1)
(engineer1,1)
(engineer2,1)
(engineer3,1)
Each of the resulting lists above indicates that the compiler can successfully intercept a deviation 
from the specified access  policy.  This  deviation was simulated by one of  the game users who 
opened the filesystem privileges by accident to the public around 11:44 local time.  This was con-
firmed during the debriefing of the misuse game participants. 
7.8 Conclusions
This Chapter has presented the ITPSL compiler system and four indicative real world IT misuse 
scenarios for the purposes of evaluating the abilities of the language and its underlying audit log 
structure (LUARM). As the project did not obtain permission to publish the real world data from 
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LUARM adopters, an IT misuse game was set in order to replay the data and thus demonstrate the  
effectiveness of the language.  The game scenarios demonstrated how an IT specialist (system ad-
ministrator, data forensics officer) could combine the relational power of the LUARM audit record 
and the language semantics to prove beyond reasonable doubt the insider actions and even predict 
some insider threats.
The results indicated an overall satisfactory detection and prediction ability for the proposed lan-
guage and its associated audit record for all four of the simulated game scenarios. However, some 
serious deficiencies were also detected. The first one concerns a difficulty of LUARM to get net-
work endpoint DNS data, so that suspicious web pages and endpoints URLs can be reliably collect-
ed. This could potentially result in important evidence loss, especially in threat prediction context,  
as many threat indicators could relate to the DNS name of the user initiated endpoint.
An additional notable LUARM deficiency relates to its process execution sampling frequency. The 
data analysis and subsequent debriefing on scenario3 showed that a 100 ms sampling frequency is 
too slow to log accurately most of the user process execution steps  (the decompression command 
seems to have been lost). The weight matrix concept compensated in that case, as the LUARM en-
gine has intercepted the initial and final signatures threat prediction steps. However, loosing steps 
due to slow sampling frequency in an arbitrary manner introduces reliability problems with the col-
lected data and this issue needs to be addressed.
Chapter  8  addresses  the  previously  mentioned  issues  and  provides  an  overall  evaluation  of 
ITPSL/LUARM in a wider context using the criteria mentioned in Section 7.1 .
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The previous chapter presented LUARM and ITPSL in action. It also set the rules for an overall 
evaluation of the ITPSL/LUARM framework. This chapter concludes the thesis by providing an 
overview of addressing some of the major achievements and tool deficiencies that rose from the 
game scenario. The discussion starts by taking a look at the pros and cons of the devised audit 
record format. An evaluation what has been achieved in terms of the ITPSL functional requirements 
of Section 4.3 and the ITPSL language evaluation criteria of Section 7.1 follows. Finally, this chap-
ter concludes by considering future research directions in terms of improving ITPSL.  Special con-
sideration is given to the issue of user privacy as part of the LUARM audit record format.
8.1  LUARM achievements and deficiencies
LUARM's main achievement is the provision of an audit record format that is specifically tailored 
for insider misuse detection and prediction. Section 5.2 presented a sample of existing audit engines 
and their deficiencies in terms of misuse detection. LUARM addresses those deficiencies satisfacto-
rily by means of:
 Providing a unified and detailed level of system activity (file, network and process execu-
tion)  by  combining  both  static  and  dynamic/volatile  system  information  in  the  audit 
record.
 Giving emphasis to the provision of user accountability. The entire structure of the audit 
record is designed around the concept of recording user actions and linking them to the de-
tailed log of events.
 Taking care of various data reliability issues: The collected data do not reside on the client  
side where they can be vulnerable to malicious alteration. They are stored by default on a 
central server where timing and data storage availability issues are taken care of.
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After the conclusion of the game scenarios of Chapter 7, it is clear that the audit record structure is 
sufficient to express a range of common IT misuse scenarios. Searching through audit data in rela-
tional mode is not a novelty in itself. However, the overall combination of user accountability and 
system-level detail is a unique combination which provides a much better way to find evidence than 
shifting through dispersed text files. 
Nevertheless, the game scenarios revealed two major issues with the LUARM audit record format. 
Both of these issues are considered important as they affect the availability of important evidence.
The first issue relates to the sampling frequency of user processes execution. After the debriefing of  
the third misuse game scenario (Section 7.6), it became evident that LUARM was loosing process 
execution data. A fault was located at the process execution monitoring module 'psactivity.pl' [82]. 
Due to the way the sampling loop was written in that module, the effective sampling frequency 
could exceed by far the desired 100 millisecond sampling frequency. As a result, LUARM would 
miss processes that executed by various users in the system.
The module was re-written using an entirely different process execution sampling philosophy. A 
Linux kernel technique called 'execve wrapping' was employed by adopting the Snoopy logger open 
source software [164]. The 'execve' system call [85] is used to launch processes in the linux kernel. 
A modified 'execve wrapper' logger like [164]  provides a way to log the process execution and its 
arguments without relying on a sampling loop and is thus a more efficient interface to capture live 
process execution data. This solved the problem of loosing process execution data due to a slow 
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sampling rate and thus corrected an important deficiency of LUARM and ensures that process data 
collection is done in a reliable manner. 
The pornography detection scenario (Section 7.5) revealed another important deficiency of the LU-
ARM audit record: The inability to reverse DNS resolve certain IP addresses. This is a consequence 
of two important factors:
 The core design decision of LUARM to avoid DNS name resolution on the client for relia-
bility purposes, as described in Section 5.3.
 The fact that many adult websites do not have reverse DNS records configured properly. 
This is probably an unintentional administrative error or an intentional omission, as the In-
ternet hosting providers of these websites might also engage in activities such as email spam 
operations and even rogue websites for 'phising' attack [165] purposes.  As a result, the tech-
nical community has proposed the technique of Forward-Confirmed reverse DNS (FCrDNS) 
records  [98]  where  a  given  IP  address  has  forward  (name-to-address)  and  reverse  (ad-
dress-to-name) DNS entries that match each other consistently.
The end result is that LUARM might loose a valuable piece of evidence (the URL pointed by the 
browser). The situation was remedied by employing the 'urlsnarf' utility[166] which runs on the 
client side ('urlcollector.pl' module). The end result is that LUARM logs all the URLs that are visit-
ed by the client system and enters them in the LUARM 'urlinfo' database table (Figure 8.1).  The 
'url' column logs the actual URL visited by the client system. The collected URL information can 
then be easily cross-referenced to the information of the 'netinfo' table (Figure 5.10). A correlation 
of the 'destip', 'users' and timing information fields with the relevant fields of the 'netinfo' table can 
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link the logged URLs to specific user actions and applications. Hence, LUARM can now log a use-
ful piece of evidence. Even if the client DNS configuration is unreliable, this can be flagged by 
comparing the client resolved URL to the DNS resolution of the server side. If the two differ, then 
the client URL information can be discarded.  
Figure 8.1: The 'urlinfo' LUARM table
The resolution of these two issues makes LUARM a more reliable evidence collection engine. The 
next section presents a critique of the effectiveness of the language semantics.
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8.2 ITPSL achievements and deficiencies 
LUARM is the data repository for insider misuse detection and prediction. ITPSL is the mechanism 
which shifts through the data in search of misuse incidents or signs of them (misuse prediction).  
Section 4.3 provided a list of functional requirements (FRs) for the proposed language. A combina-
tion of these requirements and the results of the game scenarios reveals that ITPSL has already met 
most its functional objectives. In particular:
 Its underlying audit record architecture stores the data away from vulnerable client systems 
(FR1).
 The submitsig.pl (Figure 7.2) and searchsig.pl (Figure 7.3) ITPSL utilities can create insider 
misuse incident signature repositories, as dictated by requirement FR2. 
 In response to requirement FR3, ITPSL does combine the description of static and live 
forensic data under one common semantic framework.
 ITPSL is  the  first  misuse  detection  language  to  support  decision  theoretic  information 
(FR5) with its weight matrix concept (Figure 6.8). The association of weights and events fa-
cilitates insider threat prediction based on the analyst's view of how the threat precursors 
occur at file, network, process execution and hardware device level.
 The block-based declarative structure of events (Figure 6.11) provides a hierarchical way of 
describing events (FR6) which can specify a precise order of events (FR4). 
 Despite the fact that none of the replayed scenarios provided a true opportunity to test event 
correlation across multiple hosts, ITPSL is equipped with operators such as the <onhost> 
tag (Section 6.4), which could bind certain events to specific hosts and thus permit cross-
host event correlation.
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However, there are certain areas where ITPSL has weaknesses, despite the detection/prediction suc-
cess of the benchmark game scenarios. 
One important issue to consider is the expressive granularity of the events. ITPSL (and its underly-
ing audit record) capture file, network endpoint and process creation data. All applications generate 
these types of events in an operating system. However, not all of these events are meaningful to in-
sider misuse detection and prediction at that level. There is a category of applications whose file, 
network and process execution operations are not easy to interpret. A great example is that of data-
base applications  where the observation of file access patterns do not reveal any clues about what 
kind of information is accessed and in what manner. In order to address that problem, the IDS/IPS 
community suggests application-integrated monitoring [167], a technique where audit records are 
generated by monitoring routines internal to the application itself. These routines know which inter-
nal events are of interest and can export relevant activities in specific audit log formats.  
ITPSL (and its underlying logging mechanism) clearly needs certain semantic extensions to monitor 
applications such as databases, social networking sites and other applications that organize informa-
tion using internal mechanisms. Everything else can be described by the proposed file, network, 
process and hardware semantics.
A last but equally important issue to consider is that of the monitoring framework scalability. LU-
ARM is a research prototype effort. Hence, it's code is not optimized for real world large IT infra-
structure  deployment.  Code optimization  is  not  within  the  academic  discipline  of  this  research 
project. Nevertheless, the LUARM concept enforces a relational model [66] and the SQL interface 
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[84]. This was a core design choice aiming to enhance the correlation versatility of the audit log 
structure. This goal was achieved, however, it imposes certain scalability limitations. 
Relational databases have been at the forefront of massive data storage and organization for several 
decades. A number of different approaches enable Relational Databases to scale well, so that they 
can handle concurrently a large number of operations (often referred to as “Transactions Per Second 
– TPS benchmark”) [168]. One common technique is the partitioning of tables amongst various 
computational nodes, as well as database clustering, a technique where database operations are load 
balanced in dedicated RDBMS modes [169]. Both of these techniques have been employed success-
fully to handle millions of concurrent transactions per second in environments such as telecommu-
nication processing and High Performance Computing.  
Despite  the  success  of  employing  Relational  Database  scalability  measures,  every  practitioner 
agrees that the measures can become a cumbersome process and they have limits [169]. As the Re-
lational Database scales horizontally (spread in various nodes), the complexity of managing soft-
ware and hardware aspects in relation to interprocess communication increases. In addition, large 
data processing problems that require several hundred million transactions per second (examples are 
social networking site activities, large Petaflop scale simulations) cannot be accommodated by Re-
lational Databases.
The previous complexity and transaction volume requirements created a new generation of database 
products that are collectively referred to as 'NoSQL databases' [170]. The 'NoSQL' term emphasizes 
the departure of these products from the traditional relational model [66], in an attempt to balance 
the need to scale and the need to preserve some of the properties of relational consistency [66]. 
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These products deviate from traditional RDBMS requirements such as data normalization and cre-
ate simpler but faster key lookup mechanisms, in order to achieve massive concurrency and scala-
bility. The term 'eventually consistent' coined by Werner Vogels [171] embodies all these princi-
ples. 
LUARM's SQL table schema (Chapter 5) is simple and does not require data normalization or em-
body any relational key constraints amongst the various client tables (audit levels). Consequently, it 
should be possible to port the audit log structure into a 'NoSQL' product and take advantage of its  
speed and scalability features, should the size of the monitored infrastructure makes the employ-
ment of a Relational Database product prohibitive. 
   
8.3 Future directions of insider IT misuse detection and prediction
The basic goal of the research project was to produce a prototype system that can systematize the 
specification of insider threats and their precursors, as well as establishing signature repositories 
that can aid researchers build best recipes for detecting and predicting insider IT misuse. The goal 
was achieved to a large extent, but there are often huge gaps between the research laboratory and 
the production use of a concept. Beyond the deficiencies mentioned in the previous sections of the 
chapter, these gaps define the ways the research work will evolve from a concept idea to a usable 
system.
In the Information Security world, there is always a tension between monitoring and user privacy, 
as most systems need to retain and collect data about a user's on-line behavior. In direct contrast, 
privacy dictates the right of individuals to define whether somebody will collect data about their on-
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line actions and the extent or way the data can be used [172]. Insider IT misuse monitoring is no ex-
ception. The LUARM audit trails and the ITPSL signatures that shift through the collected audit 
data inevitably identify personal aspects of system users and breach certain aspects of user privacy. 
Addressing these privacy issues is a complex task, driven by legal compliance and an ethical basis.
In most European countries, personal data is protected by privacy law [173], which permits the indi-
vidual to determine himself issues related to the disclosure and use of his personal information. As 
it is impossible to participate in a society without disclosing some level of personal information, 
most privacy laws grant exceptions from that personal right. These exceptions provide the legal and 
ethical ground for audit systems to collect personal information. 
The same laws dictate that a control of the amount and type of logged data must be performed. This  
can be achieved by pseudo-anonymizing certain parts of the audit record, in order to protect certain 
aspects of the user privacy but still be able to infer IT misuse reliably.  The term 'Privacy-Respect-
ing Intrusion Detection' [146] encompasses all the efforts of achieving a good compromise between 
the need to monitor and the need to respect user privacy. In addition, a trust-authorization schema 
needs to be established between three entities (the term 'entity' might refer to a combination of hu-
man and software module elements of a procedure):
 the entity who will indicate a legitimate need to access the audit logs (access request) 
 the entity who will reverse the pseudo-anonymization of audit log data and recover the in-
formation (log reader) 
 the entity who will infer the IT misuse (analyst)  
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As an example, on the suspicion of an IT misuse incident in a firm, the access request entity might 
be the IT officer of the firm, the log reader entity may come from an externally assigned audit com-
pany, whereas the analyst might be a team of people from the original firm and the audit company. 
The independence of the discrete  entities (IT officer, external auditor) is proportional to the user 
privacy awareness of audit log processing. However, this distributed audit log access scheme re-
quires a framework of authorizations, in order to enable trusted mediation amongst the related enti-
ties. Research on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)  [174, 175] applied to the subject of secure media-
tion [176] indicate the magnitude and complexity of the problem.  As a result, certain parts of the  
LUARM audit record need to be re-designed so that they protect the  privacy of the monitored 
users, in order to prevent illegal and unauthorized correlation of personal information.
Another important research direction for misuse detection and prediction research is how  best to 
enablethe LUARM/ITPSL framework in virtual operating system environments [68]. In a world 
where operating systems are run in virtual mode for improving the efficiency of data centers and en-
abling Cloud Computing architectures [177], one of the main challenges is to improve the efficien-
cy and security of the data audit components. 
In their current form, LUARM and ITPSL rely on operating system components to derive the file,  
network endpoint, process execution and hardware device attachment information. This might be 
sufficient for the construction of a prototype system in the research laboratory, but it might cause a  
number of problems in a production system that runs hundreds or thousands of virtual operating in-
stances:
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 The cumulative CPU load of running the LUARM clients on each virtual operating sys-
tem might create resource contention issues.
 The operating system modules  might  be often compromised or vulnerable by various 
types of threats and thus provide incorrect information. The variability and size of the op-
erating system code base might make the fixing and detection of these threats difficult.
For these reasons, preliminary research [178] suggests the moving of the client audit components to 
the 'hypervisor', the software module that is responsible for coordinating the execution of all guest 
operating systems in a virtualized environment. The advantages of moving the audit sensors to the 
hypervisor address exactly the previous two production issues: It is more efficient to probe for the  
information inside the virtual machine management logic. Moreover, as the hypervisor's code base 
is substantially smaller than that of a full operating system, it is easier to manage security risks re-
lated to code flaws and produce reliable components that provide audit information.
The trend to reduce the size of the code base as a measure of reducing the exposure to malware at-
tacks is evident and in more recent research approaches. The Strongly Isolated Computing Environ-
ment (SICE) [179] employs aspects of hardware and software approaches and a code base size of 
just 300 lines of code, in order to assure the integrity of computational tasks in modern commodity 
multi-core processors. 
Adapting LUARM to utilize research approaches like the ones of [178] and [179] will defend it  
against hypervisor and guest operating system vulnerabilities and provide a reliable way of system 
activity introspection. 
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8.4 The contribution of this research project
This thesis has demonstrated the seriousness of the insider threat. It is a real problem that affects 
many organizations and is here to stay, as no current solution represents a panacea for tackling the 
problem and our dependency on computing infrastructures is increasing.   
A large part of the difficulty of tackling insider IT misuse comes from the fact that there are funda-
mental deficiencies in defining both what constitutes misuse is in an organizational context, as well 
as how  IT misuse manifests itself at system level. The proposed ITPSL framework (semantics plus 
logging) addresses exactly this lack of systemic definition. Providing a basis for insider threat speci-
fication is an important step in the fight of dealing with these types of threats. 
A second but equally important ability to address insider threats (and the deficiencies of previous 
intrusion specification languages) concerns the ability to predict threats. The ITPSL weight matrix 
concept provides a basic mechanism that associates a systemic description of the threat precursor to 
a numeric confidence indicator. This arms the IT security specialist with a simple tool to describe 
consistently what comes before the actual misuse act, a feature that does not exist in generic intru-
sion specification languages.
Insider threat specification is of course one component of the evolving and multi-factorial IT misuse 
world, but an important one.  Human management and legal issues relating to what constitutes IT 
misuse and how can IT misuse be monitored and proven in a court of law perplex the problem even 
further and require different (non technical) knowledge in order to be fully addressed. 
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However, all of these non technical issues relate to the way threats and misuse actions are expressed 
and defined. In a world of increasing and evolving user interactions and pervasive computing para-
digms insider threat specification is an important stone in the wall of combating harmful user ac-
tions. This project has provided such a stone by drawing a theoretical foundation for insider threat 
specification with prototype tools that monitor the IT infrastructure and aid the researcher/practi-
tioner to express and use observable events as threat indicators at the IT infrastructure level.  
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This appendix contains the PERL source code of the LUARM client monitoring modules for 
reference. The complete source code of the LUARM/ITPSL system can be found on-line at:
http://luarm.svn.sourceforge.net/viewvc/luarm/ 
and also in the accompanying thesis DVD. The reader should prefer the online reference, in 
order to obtain up-to-date code versions of the system. 
#!/usr/bin/perl
#fileactivity.pl - By George Magklaras - Center for Security, Communications and Networks Research - University of 
Plymouth, UK
#Synopsis: This program populates the ITPSL RDBMS with file access data.
use Time::HiRes qw(usleep clock_gettime gettimeofday clock_getres CLOCK_REALTIME ITIMER_REAL 
ITIMER_VIRTUAL ITIMER_PROF ITIMER_REALPROF);
use Digest::MD5 qw(md5 md5_hex md5_base64);
use DBI;
use strict;
my $VERSION="alpha1";
#Some essential sanity checks
my @whoami=getpwuid($<);
die "fileactivity.pl Error:You should execute this program ONLY with root privileges. You are not root.\n"
if ($whoami[2]!=0 && $whoami[3]!=0);
#System variables
#What's the sampling frequency in microseconds
my $sdelay=100000;
#Get the pid of this fileactivity.pl instance (startluarmclient.pl and stopluarmclient.pl scripts need this
my $fapid="$$";
system "echo $fapid > managescripts/.fapid";
#And now we fo into a sampling loop
while (1==1) {
        usleep($sdelay);
        my $loopout=`lsof -w -n -M -P | grep -v IPv4 | grep -v IPv6 | grep -v ^COMMAND | grep -v lsof | grep -v 
"can't" | grep -v "socket" | grep -v "/lib64/" | grep -v "/lib/" | grep -v "FIFO" | grep -v "root" | grep "REG" | grep -v 
"mem" | grep -v "rpcbind" | grep -v "dbus-daemon"`;
        my @looparray=split("\n",$loopout);
        dbfileupdate(\@looparray);
        chnonexisting();
}
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#Subroutine definitions here
#Essential for the way ITPSL specifies the file (filename and location)
#Takes as an argument a refence to a string and returns a list of two strings
#that represent the location (directory) and the filename. 
sub splitnameloc {
        my $reftostring=shift;
        my @locname=split("/", $$reftostring);
        #The filename has to be the last array element)
        my $filename=pop @locname;
        #Then what's 
        my $location=join("/",@locname);
        return ($filename,$location);
}
sub timestamp {
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
              ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);                                           }
        #Connect to the LUARM RDBMS server and get the timestamp from MySQL
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
        my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("select DATE_FORMAT(NOW(), '%Y-%m-%d-%k-%i-%s')");
        $SQLh->execute();
        my @timearray=$SQLh->fetchrow_array();
        my ($year,$month,$day,$hour,$min,$sec)=split("-",$timearray[0]);
        $SQLh->finish();
        return ($year,$month,$day,$hour,$min,$sec);
}
sub dbfileupdate  {
        my $reftoarray=shift;
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
                ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);
        }
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
        #Calculate the MD5 hex checksum of each record
        foreach my $record (@$reftoarray) {
                my $md5s=md5_hex($record);
                #Select only the records that are relevant (i.e. not closed)
                my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("SELECT md5sum FROM fileinfo WHERE 
md5sum='$md5s' AND dyear is NULL and dmonth is NULL");
                $SQLh->execute();
                my @md5hits=$SQLh->fetchrow_array();
                if ($md5hits[0] eq $md5s) { $SQLh->finish();
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        } elsif (!defined($md5hits[0])) {
                my($command,$pid,$user,$fd,$type,$devperlprogsice,$size,$node,$name)=split(" ", $record);
                my @nameloc;
                #This if statement addresses sourceforge bug 3024339. Because the lsof output can
                #omit the size-off output for certain types of files, we could have an empty $name
                #This could break the SQL INSERT statement (non NULL column). For that reason, we 
perform
                #the following changes. If size-off is empty and $name is not defined due to the way we parse
                #we exchange $node and name vars and we solve the problem.
                if ($name) {
                        @nameloc=splitnameloc(\$name); } else {
                        $name=$node;
                        $node=0;
                        @nameloc=splitnameloc(\$name);
                } 
                my ($cyear,$cmonth,$cday,$chour,$cmin,$csec)=timestamp();
                #Quote fields that might contain characters that need escaping, to address sourceforge bug 
3024339.
                $nameloc[0]=$itpslservh->quote($nameloc[0]);
                $nameloc[1]=$itpslservh->quote($nameloc[1]);
                my $rows=$itpslservh->do ("INSERT INTO fileinfo 
(md5sum,filename,location,username,application,fd,pid,size,cyear,cmonth,cday,chour,cmin,csec)"
                                   . "VALUES ('$md5s',$nameloc[1],
$nameloc[0],'$user','$command','$fd','$pid','$size',"
                                   . "'$cyear','$cmonth','$cday','$chour','$cmin','$csec')" );
                
                if (($rows==-1) || (!defined($rows))) {
                        print "fileactivity.pl Fatal Error: dbfileupdate : No records were altered. Record 
$record was not registered.\n";
                }       
                #Finally close the db handler
                $SQLh->finish();                
}
                
        }
}
sub chnonexisting {
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
                ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);
        }
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
        #Get all the MD5sums of the records in the database that are not closed
        my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("SELECT md5sum FROM fileinfo WHERE dyear is NULL AND 
dmonth is NULL");
        $SQLh->execute();
        my @md5hits;
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        while (my $row=$SQLh->fetchrow_array()) {
                push(@md5hits, $row);
        #With this method we retrieve multiple results
        }
        
        #Now sample the current file activity and generate the live md5sums for each file record
        my $loopout=`lsof -w -n -M -P | grep -v IPv4 | grep -v IPv6 | grep -v ^COMMAND | grep -v lsof | grep -v 
"can't" | grep -v "socket" | grep -v "/lib64/" | grep -v "/lib/"| grep -v "FIFO" | grep -v "root" | grep "REG" | grep -v 
"mem" | grep -v "rpcbind" | grep -v "dbus-daemon"`;
        my @looparray=split("\n",$loopout);
        my @livemd5;
        foreach my $liverecord (@looparray) {
                my $md5live=md5_hex($liverecord);
                push(@livemd5, $md5live);
        }
        #For each md5 record obtained from RDBMS, check if it exists in the live..
        #If it doesn't timestamp the closing time table columns for the record in the RDBMS.
        #To do that, first take the difference between the two arrays (the difference of the md5hits to the livemd5)
        my @arrunion=grep!${{map{$_,1}@livemd5}}{$_},@md5hits;  
        foreach my $tobeclosed (@arrunion) {
                my ($dyear,$dmonth,$dday,$dhour,$dmin,$dsec)=timestamp();
                my $rows=$itpslservh->do ("UPDATE fileinfo set 
dyear='$dyear',dmonth='$dmonth',dday='$dday',dhour='$dhour',dmin='$dmin',dsec='$dsec'"
                                   . " where md5sum='$tobeclosed'" );
        }#end of foreach $tobeclosed
        $SQLh->finish();
}#end of chknoexisting
sub getdbauth {
        unless(open DBAUTH, "</root/itpsl/.adb.dat") {
                        die "endpointresolver.pl Error:getdbauth: Could not open the .adb.dat file due to: 
$!";
                }
        my @localarray; 
        
        while (<DBAUTH>) {
                my $dbentry=$_;
                chomp($dbentry);
                push(@localarray, $dbentry);
        }
        return @localarray;     
        
} #end of getdbauth()
#!/usr/bin/perl
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#netactivity.pl - By George Magklaras - Center for Security, Communications and Networks Research - University of 
Plymouth, UK
#Synopsis: This program populates the ITPSL RDBMS with network endpoint data.
use Time::HiRes qw(usleep clock_gettime gettimeofday clock_getres CLOCK_REALTIME ITIMER_REAL 
ITIMER_VIRTUAL ITIMER_PROF ITIMER_REALPROF);
use Digest::MD5 qw(md5 md5_hex md5_base64);
use DBI;
use strict;
my $VERSION="alpha1";
#Some essential sanity checks
my @whoami=getpwuid($<);
die "netactivity.pl Error:You should execute this program ONLY with root privileges. You are not root.\n"
if ($whoami[2]!=0 && $whoami[3]!=0);
#The database authentication file contains the authentication info required to connect
#to each host database (one database per monitored host): username, database_name, database_password 
die "endpointresolver.pl Error:No database authentication file found. \n"
if (! (-e "/root/itpsl/.adb.dat"));
#Get the pid of this netactivity.pl instance (startluarmclient.pl and stopluarmclient.pl scripts need this
my $napid="$$";
system "echo $napid > managescripts/.napid";
#System variables
#What's the sampling frequency in microseconds
my $sdelay=100000;
my $filterstring="lsof -i -n -w -P | grep -v ^COMMAND";
#And now we fo into a sampling loop
while (1==1) {
        usleep($sdelay);
        my $loopout=`$filterstring`;
        my @looparray=split("\n",$loopout);
        dbfileupdate(\@looparray);
        chnonexisting();
}
#Subroutine definitions here
sub timestamp {
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
              ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);                                           }
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        #Connect to the LUARM RDBMS server and get the timestamp from MySQL
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
        my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("select DATE_FORMAT(NOW(), '%Y-%m-%d-%k-%i-%s')");
        $SQLh->execute();
        my @timearray=$SQLh->fetchrow_array();
        my ($year,$month,$day,$hour,$min,$sec)=split("-",$timearray[0]);
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        $SQLh->finish();
        return ($year,$month,$day,$hour,$min,$sec);
        
}
sub splitipdata {
        my $refipdata=shift;
        #Now we have to see what type of connection info we have (LISTEN, ESTABLISHED, IPv4/6)
        #as all these have a different type of structure
        if ($$refipdata =~/.+->.+/) {
                #We have an established TCPv4 connection
                my ($source,$destination)=split("->",$$refipdata);
                my ($sourceip,$sourceport)=split(":",$source);
                my ($destip,$destport)=split(":",$destination);
                return ($sourceip,$sourceport,$destip,$destport);
                } elsif ($$refipdata =~/.*:d+/) {
                #This must be a UDP or TCP LISTEN endpoint
                my ($sourceip, $sourceport)=split(":",$$refipdata);
                if ($sourceip eq "*") {
                        $sourceip="ALL";
                }
                my $destip="ALL";
                my $destport="ALL";
                return ($sourceip,$sourceport,$destip,$destport);
                }       
}
sub dbfileupdate  {
        my $reftoarray=shift;
        
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
                ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);
        }
        
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
        #my @arrayofchecksums;
        #Calculate the MD5 hex checksum of each record
        foreach my $record (@$reftoarray) {
                my ($application,$pid,$username,$fd,$ipversion,$device,$size,$transport,$name)=split(" ", 
$record);
        
                #now split the sourceip,destip,sourceport,destport from $name into separate variables
                my ($sourceip,$sourceport,$destip,$destport)=splitipdata(\$name);
                my $md5s=md5_hex(join("," , $sourceip,$sourceport,$destip,$destport,$application,$pid,
$username,$transport));
                #Does it exist and is it relevant? This query matches all fields and should return 1 only result if 
we get things right
                my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM netinfo WHERE 
md5sum='$md5s' ");
                $SQLh->execute();
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                my @md5hits=$SQLh->fetchrow_array();
                
                if ( $md5hits[0]=="1") { #The record exists
                                        $SQLh->finish();
        } elsif ($md5hits[0]=="0") {
                #New record, we have to insert it.
                
                #In order to avoid passing empty values for the source
                #IP and dest IP that would terminate prematurely a 
                #fetchrow_array OP in endpointresolver.pl we have to 
                #put NONE to both fields here.
                if ($sourceip eq "") {
                        $sourceip="NONE";
                }
                if ($destip eq "") {
                        $destip="NONE";
                }
                my ($cyear,$cmonth,$cday,$chour,$cmin,$csec)=timestamp();
                my $rows=$itpslservh->do ("INSERT INTO netinfo (md5sum, 
sourceip,sourceport,destip,destport,application,ipversion,pid,username,transport,cyear,cmonth,cday,chour,cmin,csec)"
                                   . "VALUES 
('$md5s','$sourceip','$sourceport','$destip','$destport','$application','$ipversion','$pid','$username','$transport',"
                                   . "'$cyear','$cmonth','$cday','$chour','$cmin','$csec')" );
                
                if (($rows==-1) || (!defined($rows))) {
                        print "netactivity.pl Fatal Error: dbfileupdate : No records were altered. Record 
$record was not registered.\n";
                }       
                #Finally close the db handler
                $SQLh->finish();                
}
                
        }
}
sub chnonexisting {
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
                ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);
        }
        
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
        #Get all the network endpoint records in the database that are not closed
        my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("SELECT md5sum FROM netinfo WHERE dyear is NULL AND dmonth 
is NULL AND dday is NULL");
        $SQLh->execute();
        my @md5hits;
        while (my $row=$SQLh->fetchrow_array()) {
                push(@md5hits, $row);
        #With this method we retrieve multiple results
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        }
        
        #Now sample the current endpoint activity.
        my $loopout=`$filterstring`;
        my @looparray=split("\n",$loopout);
        my @livemd5;
        
        foreach my $liverecord (@looparray) {
                my ($application,$pid,$username,$fd,$ipversion,$device,$size,$transport,$name)=split(" ", 
$liverecord);
                
                #now split the sourceip,destip,sourceport,destport from $name into separate variables
                my ($sourceip,$sourceport,$destip,$destport)=splitipdata(\$name);               
                my $md5s=md5_hex(join("," , $sourceip,$sourceport,$destip,$destport,$application,$pid,
$username,$transport));
                push(@livemd5, $md5s);
        }
                        
        #For each md5 record obtained from RDBMS, check if it exists in the live..
        #If it doesn't timestamp the closing time table columns for the record in the RDBMS.
        #To do that, first take the difference between the two arrays (the difference of the md5hits to the livemd5)
        my @arrunion=grep!${{map{$_,1}@livemd5}}{$_},@md5hits;  
        foreach my $tobeclosed (@arrunion) {
                my ($dyear,$dmonth,$dday,$dhour,$dmin,$dsec)=timestamp();
                my $rows=$itpslservh->do ("UPDATE netinfo set 
dyear='$dyear',dmonth='$dmonth',dday='$dday',dhour='$dhour',dmin='$dmin',dsec='$dsec'"
                                   . " where md5sum='$tobeclosed'" );
        }#end of foreach $tobeclosed
        $SQLh->finish();
}#end of chknoexisting
        
sub getdbauth {
        unless(open DBAUTH, "</root/itpsl/.adb.dat") {
                        die "endpointresolver.pl Error:getdbauth: Could not open the .adb.dat file due to: 
$!";
                }
        my @localarray; 
        
        while (<DBAUTH>) {
                my $dbentry=$_;
                chomp($dbentry);
                push(@localarray, $dbentry);
        }
        return @localarray;     
        
} #end of getdbauth()
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#!/usr/bin/perl
#psactivity.pl - By George Magklaras - Center for Security, Communications and Networks Research - University of 
Plymouth, UK
#Synopsis: This program populates the ITPSL RDBMS with process execution data and it effectively makes the need of 
deploying 
#execve wrappers obsolete.
use Time::HiRes qw(usleep clock_gettime gettimeofday clock_getres CLOCK_REALTIME ITIMER_REAL 
ITIMER_VIRTUAL ITIMER_PROF ITIMER_REALPROF);
use Digest::MD5 qw(md5 md5_hex md5_base64);
use DBI;
use strict;
use Fcntl qw(:DEFAULT :flock);
my $VERSION="alpha1";
#Some essential sanity checks
my @whoami=getpwuid($<);
die "psactivity.pl Error:You should execute this program ONLY with root privileges. You are not root.\n"
if ($whoami[2]!=0 && $whoami[3]!=0);
#Get the pid of this psactivity.pl instance (startluarmclient.pl and stopluarmclient.pl scripts need this
my $pspid="$$";
system "echo $pspid > managescripts/.pspid";
#System variables
#What's the sampling frequency in microseconds
my $sdelay=10;
#And now we fo into a sampling loop
while (1==1) {
        sysopen(FH, "/tmp/.psdata", O_RDWR ) or die "psactivity.pl Error:can't open the psdata file: $! \n";
        #Lock the file so that it does not get corrupted.
        #flock(FH, LOCK_EX) or die "psactivity.pl Error:can't lock the psdata file: $!\n";
        my $loopstring = <FH>;
        truncate(FH, 0) or die "psactivity.pl Error: can't empty psdata: $! \n";
        close(FH);
        my @looparray=split("\n",$loopstring);
        dbprocupdate(\@looparray);
        chnonexisting();
        usleep($sdelay);
}
#Subroutine definitions here
#Essential for the way ITPSL specifies the process (command and argument(s))
#Takes as an argument a refence to a string and returns a list of two strings
#that represent the process name and its respective arguments. 
sub splitcommandargs {
        my $reftostring=shift;
        my @proc=split(" ", $$reftostring);
        #The command name has to be the first array element
        my $commname=shift @proc;
        #Whatever is left are the arguments to the command.
        my $arguments=join(" ",@proc);
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        return ($commname,$arguments);
}
sub timestamp {
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
                ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);
        }
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
        #Get all the MD5sums of the records in the database that are not closed
        my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("select DATE_FORMAT(NOW(), '%Y-%m-%d-%k-%i-%s')");
        $SQLh->execute();
        my @timearray=$SQLh->fetchrow_array();
        my ($year,$month,$day,$hour,$min,$sec)=split("-",$timearray[0]);
        $SQLh->finish();
        return ($year,$month,$day,$hour,$min,$sec);
}
sub dbprocupdate  {
        my $reftoarray=shift;
        
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
                ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);
        }
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
        
        #Calculate the MD5 hex checksum of each record
        foreach my $record (@$reftoarray) {
                my ($pid,$ppid,$uid,$command,$comwargs)=split(",",$record);
                #Now split the process name (command) from its arguments
                my ($comm,$arguments)=splitcommandargs(\$comwargs);
                #And then produce the md5sum of the record ONLY FROM SOME FIELDS THAT REMAIN 
STATIC
                #In this case, the md5sum will be the pid, the ppid, the username, and the command 
                my $username=getpwuid($uid);
                my $md5s=md5_hex(join("," , $username,$pid,$ppid,$command));
                #Does this process exist in the DB and is it relevant? This should return 1 only result if we get 
things right.
                my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM psinfo WHERE 
md5sum='$md5s' AND dyear is NULL AND dmonth is NULL ");
                $SQLh->execute();
                my @md5hits=$SQLh->fetchrow_array();
                #Select only the records that are relevant (i.e. not closed)
                #Does the record exist?
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                if ($md5hits[0]=="1") {
                        #Record exists.
                         
                        #$SQLh->finish();
        } elsif ( $md5hits[0]=="0") {
                #The record does not exist. We need to SQL INSERT it.
                my ($cyear,$cmonth,$cday,$chour,$cmin,$csec)=timestamp();
                #Does the @arguments string contain a single quote character?
                #sourceforge Bug 3024339. If yes, we need to escape this properly
                #by using quote.
                $arguments=$itpslservh->quote($arguments);
                my $rows=$itpslservh->do ("INSERT INTO psinfo 
(md5sum,username,pid,ppid,command,arguments,cyear,cmonth,cday,chour,cmin,csec)"
                                   . "VALUES ('$md5s','$username','$pid','$ppid','$command',
$arguments,"
                                   . "'$cyear','$cmonth','$cday','$chour','$cmin','$csec')" );
                
                if (($rows==-1) || (!defined($rows))) {
                        print "fileactivity.pl Fatal Error: dbfileupdate : No records were altered. Record 
$record was not registered.\n";
                }       
                #Finally close the db handler
                $SQLh->finish();                
}
                
        }
}
sub chnonexisting {
        sysopen(FH, "/tmp/.psdata", O_RDONLY ) or die "psactivity.pl Error:can't open the psdata file: $! \n";
        #Lock the file so that it does not get corrupted.
        flock(FH, LOCK_EX) or die "psactivity.pl Error:can't lock the psdata file: $!\n";
        my $loopstring = <FH>;
        close(FH);
        my @looparray=split("\n",$loopstring);
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
                ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);
        }
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
        
        #Get all the MD5sums of the records in the database that are not closed
        my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("SELECT md5sum FROM psinfo WHERE dyear is NULL AND dmonth 
is NULL");
        $SQLh->execute();
        my @md5hits;
        while (my $row=$SQLh->fetchrow_array()) {
                push(@md5hits, $row);
        #With this method we retrieve multiple results
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        }
        
        #Now generate the live md5sums for each file record
        my @livemd5;
        foreach my $record (@looparray) {
                my ($pid,$ppid,$uid,$command,$comwargs)=split(",",$record);
                #Now split the process name (command) from its arguments
                my ($comm,$arguments)=splitcommandargs(\$comwargs);
                #And then produce the md5sum of the record ONLY FROM SOME FIELDS THAT REMAIN 
STATIC
                #In this case, the md5sum will be the pid, the ppid, the username, and the command 
                my $username=getpwuid($uid);
                push(@livemd5, md5_hex(join("," , $username,$pid,$ppid,$command)));
                
        }
        
        #For each md5 record obtained from RDBMS, check if it exists in the live..
        #If it doesn't timestamp the closing time table columns for the record in the RDBMS.
        #To do that, first take the difference between the two arrays (the difference of the md5hits to the livemd5)
        my @arrunion=grep!${{map{$_,1}@livemd5}}{$_},@md5hits;  
        foreach my $tobeclosed (@arrunion) {
                my ($dyear,$dmonth,$dday,$dhour,$dmin,$dsec)=timestamp();
                my $rows=$itpslservh->do ("UPDATE psinfo set 
dyear='$dyear',dmonth='$dmonth',dday='$dday',dhour='$dhour',dmin='$dmin',dsec='$dsec'"
                                   . " where md5sum='$tobeclosed'" );
        }#end of foreach $tobeclosed
                        
        $SQLh->finish();
}#end of chknoexisting
sub getdbauth {
        unless(open DBAUTH, "</root/itpsl/.adb.dat") {
                        die "endpointresolver.pl Error:getdbauth: Could not open the .adb.dat file due to: 
$!";
                }
        my @localarray; 
        
        while (<DBAUTH>) {
                my $dbentry=$_;
                chomp($dbentry);
                push(@localarray, $dbentry);
        }
        return @localarray;     
        
} #end of getdbauth()
        
#!/usr/bin/perl
#hwactivity.pl - By George Magklaras - Center for Security, Communications and Networks Research - University of 
Plymouth, UK
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#Synopsis: This program populates the ITPSL RDBMS with hardware device connection data. All hardware PCI and 
USB devices present
#to the system are logged in terms of their insertion and removal time. 
use Time::HiRes qw(usleep clock_gettime gettimeofday clock_getres CLOCK_REALTIME ITIMER_REAL 
ITIMER_VIRTUAL ITIMER_PROF ITIMER_REALPROF);
use Digest::MD5 qw(md5 md5_hex md5_base64);
use DBI;
use strict;
my $VERSION="alpha1";
#Some essential sanity checks
my @whoami=getpwuid($<);
die "hwactivity.pl Error:You should execute this program ONLY with root privileges. You are not root.\n"
if ($whoami[2]!=0 && $whoami[3]!=0);
#System variables
#What's the sampling frequency in microseconds
my $sdelay=4000000;
#Get the pid of this hwactivity.pl instance (startluarmclient.pl and stopluarmclient.pl scripts need this
my $hwpid="$$";
system "echo $hwpid > managescripts/.hwpid";
#We start with the PCI devices
#and use the -vm flag for backwards compatibility
#see lspci manual page. 
#The perl filter removes the lines that *BEGIN* with \n to parse the data properly.
my $hwfilterstring1="lspci -vm | grep -2 Class | perl -pi -w -e 's/^\n//g;' ";
#We also have to check the USB bus
my $hwfilterstring2="lsusb -v | grep -1 idVendor";
#And who was logged in at that time for accountability
my $userslogged="users";
#And now we go into a sampling loop
while (1==1) {
        usleep($sdelay);
        my $pcidata=`$hwfilterstring1`;
        my $usbdata=`$hwfilterstring2`;
        my $loggedusersdata=`$userslogged`;
        my @pciarray=split("--\n",$pcidata);
        my @usbarray=split("--\n",$usbdata);
        my @userarray=split(" ", $loggedusersdata);
        #Make sure that the userarray element has no duplicate user entries
        #(users might be logged in in multiple pts, ttys)
        my %seenuser=();
        my @uniquserarray=();
        foreach my $user (@userarray) {
          unless ($seenuser{$user}) {
              $seenuser{$user}=1;
              push(@uniquserarray, $user);
              }
        } #end of foreach
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        #Debug 
        #print "pciarray0 is $pciarray[0], pciarray[1] is $pciarray[1], usbarray[0] is $usbarray[0] and usbarray[1] is 
$usbarray[1] \n";
        dbprocupdatehw(\@pciarray,\@usbarray,\@uniquserarray);
        chnonexistinghw();
}
#Subroutine definitions here
sub timestamp {
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
              ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);                                           
                        }
        #Connect to the LUARM RDBMS server and get the timestamp from MySQL
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
        my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("select DATE_FORMAT(NOW(), '%Y-%m-%d-%k-%i-%s')");
        $SQLh->execute();
        my @timearray=$SQLh->fetchrow_array();
        my ($year,$month,$day,$hour,$min,$sec)=split("-",$timearray[0]);
        $SQLh->finish();
        return ($year,$month,$day,$hour,$min,$sec);
}
#Takes two array references as arguments
sub dbprocupdatehw {
        my $reftopciarray=shift;
        my $reftousbdarray=shift;
        my $reftouserarray=shift;
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
                ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);
        }
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
        
        #Dealing with the PCI bus first
        foreach my $pcirec (@$reftopciarray) {
                my ($dev1,$string1,$vendor,$string2)=split("\n",$pcirec);
                my @devvendor=split(":", $vendor);
                my @devstring1=split(":", $string1);
                my @devstring2=split(":", $string2);
                my $devstring=$devstring1[1].$devstring2[1];
                my $loggedusers=join(",", @$reftouserarray);
                my $devbus="PCI";
                #Calculate the md5sum for the PCI device record
                my $md5s=md5_hex(join("," , $devvendor[1],$devstring,$devbus));
                #Do we have already the device on the hwinfo table of the host?
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                my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM hwinfo WHERE 
md5sum='$md5s' AND dyear is NULL AND dmonth is NULL ");
                $SQLh->execute();
                my @md5hits=$SQLh->fetchrow_array();
                #Select only the records that are relevant (i.e. not closed)
                #Does the record exist?
                if ($md5hits[0]=="1") {
                        #Record exists. Close the DB handler.
                        $SQLh->finish();
        } elsif ( $md5hits[0]=="0") {
                #The record does not exist. We need to SQL INSERT it.
                my ($cyear,$cmonth,$cday,$chour,$cmin,$csec)=timestamp();
                #Quote the devicestring as it is likely to contain characters that can break the SQL INSERT 
statement
                $devstring=$itpslservh->quote($devstring);
                my $rows=$itpslservh->do ("INSERT INTO hwinfo 
(md5sum,cyear,cmonth,cday,chour,cmin,csec,devbus,devstring,devvendor,userslogged)"
                                   . "VALUES 
('$md5s','$cyear','$cmonth','$cday','$chour','$cmin','$csec','$devbus',$devstring,'$devvendor[1]','$loggedusers')" );
                if (($rows==-1) || (!defined($rows))) {
                        print "hwactivity.pl Fatal Error: dbfileupdate : No records were altered. Record 
$pcirec was not registered.\n";
                }       
                #Finally close the db handler
                $SQLh->finish();                
                
                        }#end of elsif
                } #end of foreachloop
        #Now we have to deal with the USB device data
        foreach my $usbrec (@$reftousbdarray) {
                my ($garbage,$vendor,$string)=split("\n",$usbrec);
                my ($v1,$v2,$v3,$v4,$v5,$v6,$v7,$v8)=split(" ",$vendor);
                my $devvendor="$v3 "."$v4 "."$v5 "."$v6 "."$v7 "."$v8";
                my ($s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8)=split(" ",$string);
                my $devstring="$s3 "."$s4 "."$s5 "."$s6 "."$s7 "."$s8";
                my $loggedusers=join(",", @$reftouserarray);
                my $devbus="USB";
                #Calculate the md5sum for the USB device record
                my $md5s=md5_hex(join("," ,$devvendor,$devstring,$devbus));
                                
                #Do we have already the device on the hwinfo table of the host?
                my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM hwinfo WHERE 
md5sum='$md5s' AND dyear is NULL AND dmonth is NULL ");
                $SQLh->execute();
                my @md5hits=$SQLh->fetchrow_array();
                if ($md5hits[0]=="1") {
                        #Record exists. Close the DB handler.
                        $SQLh->finish();
        } elsif ( $md5hits[0]=="0") {
                #The record does not exist. We need to SQL INSERT it.
                my ($cyear,$cmonth,$cday,$chour,$cmin,$csec)=timestamp();
                #Quote the devicestring as it is likely to contain characters that can break the SQL INSERT 
statement
                $devstring=$itpslservh->quote($devstring);
                my $rows=$itpslservh->do ("INSERT INTO hwinfo 
(md5sum,cyear,cmonth,cday,chour,cmin,csec,devbus,devstring,devvendor,userslogged)"
307
Appendix A : LUARM sample source code
                                   . "VALUES 
('$md5s','$cyear','$cmonth','$cday','$chour','$cmin','$csec','$devbus',$devstring,'$devvendor','$loggedusers')" );
                if (($rows==-1) || (!defined($rows))) {
                        print "hwactivity.pl Fatal Error: dbfileupdate : No records were altered. Record 
$usbrec was not registered.\n";
                }       
                #Finally close the db handler
                $SQLh->finish();                
                
                        }#end of elsif
                
                } #end of foreachloop 
}#end of dbprocupdatehw
sub chnonexistinghw {
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
                ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);
        }
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
        
        #Get all the MD5sums of the records in the database that are not closed
        my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("SELECT md5sum FROM hwinfo WHERE dyear is NULL AND dmonth 
is NULL");
        $SQLh->execute();
        my @md5hits;
        while (my $row=$SQLh->fetchrow_array()) {
                push(@md5hits, $row);
        #With this method we retrieve multiple results
        }
        
        #Now sample the current PCI activity and generate the live md5sums for each file record
        #First for PCI devices
        my $livepci=`$hwfilterstring1`;
        #And then for USB devices
        my $liveusb=`$hwfilterstring2`;
        my @livepcia=split("--\n",$livepci);
        my @liveusba=split("--\n",$liveusb);
        my @livemd5;
        
        foreach my $pcirec (@livepcia) {
                my ($dev1,$string1,$vendor,$string2)=split("\n",$pcirec);
                my @devvendor=split(":", $vendor);
                my @devstring1=split(":", $string1);
                my @devstring2=split(":", $string2);
                my $devstring=$devstring1[1].$devstring2[1];
                my $devbus="PCI";
                #Push the md5sum for the PCI device record in the livemd5 array
                push(@livemd5,md5_hex(join("," , $devvendor[1],$devstring,$devbus)));
        } #end of foreach loop
        
        foreach my $usbrec (@liveusba) {
                my ($garbage,$vendor,$string)=split("\n",$usbrec);
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                my ($v1,$v2,$v3,$v4,$v5,$v6,$v7,$v8)=split(" ",$vendor);
                my $devvendor="$v3 "."$v4 "."$v5 "."$v6 "."$v7 "."$v8";
                my ($s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7,$s8)=split(" ",$string);
                my $devstring="$s3 "."$s4 "."$s5 "."$s6 "."$s7 "."$s8";
                my $devbus="USB";
                #Push the md5sum for the USB device record in the livemd5 array
                push(@livemd5,md5_hex(join("," , $devvendor,$devstring,$devbus)));
        } #end of foreach loop
        
        #Contrary to the fact that we had to hit the database twice on dbupdate, when we check for existing records, 
we collected 
        #all the PCI and USB MD5 sums and we need to perform the check only once this time
        #For each md5 record obtained from RDBMS, check if it exists in the live..
        #If it doesn't timestamp the closing time table columns for the record in the RDBMS.
        #To do that, first take the difference between the two arrays (the difference of the md5hits to the livemd5)
        my @arrunion=grep!${{map{$_,1}@livemd5}}{$_},@md5hits;  
        foreach my $tobeclosed (@arrunion) {
                my ($dyear,$dmonth,$dday,$dhour,$dmin,$dsec)=timestamp();
                my $rows=$itpslservh->do ("UPDATE hwinfo set 
dyear='$dyear',dmonth='$dmonth',dday='$dday',dhour='$dhour',dmin='$dmin',dsec='$dsec'"
                                   . " where md5sum='$tobeclosed'" );
        }#end of foreach $tobeclosed
                        
        $SQLh->finish();
        
} #end of chnonexistinghw
sub getdbauth {
        unless(open DBAUTH, "</root/itpsl/.adb.dat") {
                        die "endpointresolver.pl Error:getdbauth: Could not open the .adb.dat file due to: 
$!";
                }
        my @localarray; 
        
        while (<DBAUTH>) {
                my $dbentry=$_;
                chomp($dbentry);
                push(@localarray, $dbentry);
        }
        return @localarray;     
        
} #end of getdbauth()
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#!/usr/bin/perl
#getsig.pl - Retrieves one or more signatures from the ITPSL signature repository.
#George Magklaras - Center for Security, Commununications and Networks Research
#University of Plymouth, UK - February 2011
#Takes as arguments a space delimited list of ITPSL signid's 
use DBI;
use strict;
my $VERSION="beta1";
#Some essential sanity checks
my @whoami=getpwuid($<);
die "getsig.pl Error:You should execute this program ONLY with root privileges. You are not root.\n"
if ($whoami[2]!=0 && $whoami[3]!=0);
my @arguments= @ARGV;
foreach (@arguments) {
        sigget($_);
}
sub sigget {
        #get the signid
        my $sigid=shift;
        #And here we connect to the database
        #get the db authentication info
        my @authinfo=getdbauth();
        my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
        foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
              ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);
        }
        #Connect to the database
        my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
        my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
      
        #Execute the statement and get the results by quoting the formed string
        #$sqlstring=$itpslservh->quote($sqlstring);
        my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("SELECT mainblock FROM repository WHERE signid='$sigid' ");
        $SQLh->execute();
        print "Retrieving signature with id: $sigid from the ITPSL repository: \n";
        my @sighits=$SQLh->fetchrow_array();
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        if (defined ($#sighits) && $#sighits=="0") {
                 open(my $fh, '>', "$sigid.xml") or die "getsig.pl Error:can't open the file to write signature 
$sigid due to: $! \n";
                 select $fh;
                 print "$sighits[0]";
                 close $fh;                              
                 } else {
                print "getsig.pl Error: No signature entry for signature id:$sigid was found. \n" 
        } #end of if 
} #end of sigget
sub getdbauth {
        unless(open DBAUTH, "</root/itpsl/.sig.dat") {
                        die "getsig.pl Error:getdbauth: Could not open the .sig.dat file due to: $!";
                }
        my @localarray; 
        
        while (<DBAUTH>) {
                my $dbentry=$_;
                chomp($dbentry);
                push(@localarray, $dbentry);
        }
        return @localarray;     
        
} #end of getdbauth()
#searchsig.pl - Searches the ITPSL signature repository for signatures
#George Magklaras - Center for Security, Commununications and Networks Research
#University of Plymouth, UK - February 2011
#Takes a range of arguments to specify different search criteria according to the ITPSL ontology.
#The following search criteria are supported in the form of command-line switches
# --reason      VALUES: intentional/accidental
# --multihost   VALUES: yes/no
# --forhosts    VALUES: comma separated list of hostnames                                       Example: host1,host2,host3 
# --synopsis    VALUES: relational operators lists in the form OP=term1,term2 or single term    Example: 
OR=development,production
# --keywords    VALUES: relational operators lists in the form OP=term1,term2 or single term    Example: 
AND=p2p,azureus   
# --context     VALUES: predictive/detection
# --fromdate    VALUES: dd/mm/yyyy                                                              Example: 24/05/2010
# --todate      VALUES: dd/mm/yyyy                                                              Example: 28/09/2010
use DBI;
use strict;
use Cwd;
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use Getopt::Long;
my $VERSION="beta1";
my $reason;
my $multihost;
my $forhosts;
my $synopsis;
my $keywords;
my $context;
my $fromdate;
my $todate;
my $helpvar;
my $sqlstring;
GetOptions("reason=s" => \$reason,
           "multihost=s" => \$multihost,
           "forhosts=s" => \$forhosts,
           "synopsis=s" => \$synopsis,
           "keywords=s" => \$keywords,
           "fromdate=s" => \$fromdate,
           "context=s" => \$context,
           "todate=s" => \$todate,
           "help" => \$helpvar );
if ($helpvar) {
        dispusage();
}
#Some essential sanity checks
my @whoami=getpwuid($<);
die "submitsig.pl Error:You should execute this program ONLY with root privileges. You are not root.\n"
if ($whoami[2]!=0 && $whoami[3]!=0);
#Input validation checks
#If nothing is defined display by default the usage of the program
if ((!defined($reason)) && (!defined($multihost)) && (!defined($forhosts)) && (!defined($synopsis)) && (!
defined($keywords)) && (!defined($context)) && (!defined($fromdate)) && (!defined($todate)) ) {
      print "searchsig.pl Error: You provided no arguments \n";
      dispusage();
}
#Valid date formats
die "searchsig.pl Error: $fromdate is an invalid date format for a --fromdate argument. Use --fromdate dd/mm/yyyy .\n"
if ( !($fromdate =~ m/\d{2}\/\d{2}\/\d{4}/) && (defined($fromdate)) );
die "searchsig.pl Error: $todate is an invalid date format for a --todate argument. Use --todate dd/mm/yyyy .\n"
if ( !($todate =~ m/\d{2}\/\d{2}\/\d{4}/) && (defined($fromdate)) );
#Valid reason strings
die "searchsig.pl Error: $reason is an invalid string for a --reason argument. Use --reason intentional OR --reason 
accidental .\n"
if ( defined($reason) && !($reason eq "intentional") && !($reason eq "accidental"));
#Valid multihost strings
die "searchsig.pl Error: $multihost is an invalid string for a --multihost argument. Use --multihost yes OR --multihost 
no. \n"
if ( defined($multihost) && !($multihost eq "yes") && !($multihost eq "no") );
#Valid context strings
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die "searchsig.pl Error: $context is an invalid string for a --context argument. Use --context predictive OR --context 
detection .\n"
if ( defined($context) && !($context eq "predictive") && !($context eq "detection") ); 
#If one defines the fromdate switch there must be a todate switch as well.
die "searchsig.pl Error: When you define a --fromdate argument, you must also define a --todate argument. \n" 
if ( defined($fromdate) && (!(defined($todate))));
#Equally for multihost 'yes' and --forhosts switch
die "searchsig.pl Error: When you define a --multihost yes argument, you also need to define a --forhosts argument. \n"
if ( defined($multihost) && $multihost eq "yes" && (!(defined($forhosts))) );
#For the synopsis switch
die "searchsig.pl Error: $synopsis is an invalid string for a --synopsis argument. Use something like --synopsis 
AND=term1,term2  or --synopsis term1 \n"
if ( (defined($synopsis)) && !($synopsis =~ m/AND=((\w){2,},){1,}/) && !($synopsis =~ m/OR=((\w){2,},){1,}/) 
      && !($synopsis =~ m/NOT=((\w){2,},){1,}/) && !($synopsis =~ m/(\w){2,}/) );
#For the keywords switch
die "searchsig.pl Error: $keywords is an invalid string for a --keywords argument. Use something like --keywords 
AND=term1,term2 or --keywords term1 \n"
if ( (defined($keywords)) && !($keywords =~ m/AND=((\w){2,},){1,}/) && !($keywords =~ m/OR=((\w){2,},){1,}/) 
      && !($keywords =~ m/NOT=((\w){2,},){1,}/) && !($keywords =~ m/(\w){2,}/) );
#We have done our basic checks so, we will start forming the SQL string
$sqlstring="SELECT signid from repository WHERE ";
#Here we transform the defined arguments into SQL statements.
#Their assembly to an SQL statements comes later on.
my $reasonsql;
if ( defined($reason)) {
      $reasonsql="reason='$reason'";
}
my $multihostsql;
if ( defined($multihost)) {
      $multihostsql="multihost='$multihost'";
}
my $forhostssql;
if ( defined($forhosts)) {
      if ($forhosts =~ m/((\w){1,},){1,}/) {
          my @hostarray=split("," , $forhosts);
          #Start the SQL string
          my $firstelement=shift @hostarray;
          $forhostssql="(hostlist RLIKE '$firstelement' "; 
          foreach (@hostarray) {
              $forhostssql=$forhostssql." OR hostlist RLIKE '$_' ";
          }
          #At the end, terminate the string
          $forhostssql=$forhostssql." )";
      } else { 
          $forhostssql="hostlist RLIKE '$forhosts'";
      } #end of if-else
} #end of if ( defined($forhosts))
my $synopsissql;
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if ( defined($synopsis)) {
      if ( $synopsis =~ m/AND=((\w){2,},){1,}/ || $synopsis =~ m/OR=((\w){2,},){1,}/) {
          #Get the operator and then the term list
          my ($synop,$therestof)=split("=", $synopsis);
          my @synarray=split(",", $therestof);
          my $firstelement=shift @synarray;
          $synopsissql="(synopsis RLIKE '$firstelement' ";
          foreach (@synarray) {
              $synopsissql=$synopsissql." AND $synop synopsis RLIKE '$_' ";
          }
          #At the end, terminate the string
          $synopsissql=$synopsissql." )";
      } elsif ($synopsis =~ m/NOT=((\w){2,},){1,}/) {
          my ($synop,$therestof)=split("=", $synopsis);
          my @synarray=split(",", $therestof);
          my $firstelement=shift @synarray;
          $synopsissql="(NOT synopsis RLIKE '$firstelement' ";
          foreach (@synarray) {
              $synopsissql=$synopsissql." AND $synop synopsis RLIKE '$_' ";
          }
          #At the end, terminate the string
          $synopsissql=$synopsissql." )";
      } else {
          $synopsissql="synopsis RLIKE '$synopsis'";
      } #end of if-else
} #end of if ( defined($synopsis))
my $keywordssql;
if ( defined($keywords)) {
      if ( $keywords =~ m/AND=((\w){2,},){1,}/ || $keywords =~ m/OR=((\w){2,},){1,}/) {
          #Get the operator and then the term list
          my ($keywop,$therestof)=split("=", $keywords);
          my @keywarray=split(",", $therestof);
          my $firstelement=shift @keywarray;
          $keywordssql="( keywords RLIKE '$firstelement' ";
          foreach (@keywarray) {
              $keywordssql=$keywordssql." $keywop keywords RLIKE '$_' ";
          }
          #At the end, terminate the string
          $keywordssql=$keywordssql." )";
      } elsif ($keywords =~ m/NOT=((\w){2,},){1,}/) {
          #Get the operator and then the term list
          my ($keywop,$therestof)=split("=", $keywords);
          my @keywarray=split(",", $therestof);
          my $firstelement=shift @keywarray;
          $keywordssql="( NOT keywords RLIKE '$firstelement' ";
          foreach (@keywarray) {
              $keywordssql=$keywordssql." AND $keywop keywords RLIKE '$_' ";
          }
          #At the end, terminate the string
          $keywordssql=$keywordssql." )";
      } else  {
          $keywordssql="keywords RLIKE '$keywords'";
      } #end of if-else
} #end of if ( defined($keywords))
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my $contextsql;
if ( defined($context)) {
      if ($context eq "predictive") {
          $contextsql=" NOT weightmatrix='0' "} else {
          $contextsql=" weightmatrix='0' ";
          }
}
my $fromdatesql;
if ( defined($fromdate) ) {
      my ($day,$month,$year)=split("/", $fromdate);
      $fromdatesql="year>='$year' AND month>='$month' AND day>='$day'";
}
my $todatesql;
if ( defined($todate) ) {
      my ($day,$month,$year)=split("/", $todate);
      $todatesql="year<='$year' AND month<='$month' AND day<='$day' ";
}      
#Eventually, to form the SQL query string and place the AND operator to combine the
#criteria, we do the following.
#Define an array with all the defined arguments
my @definedargs;
foreach ($reasonsql, $multihostsql,$forhostssql,$synopsissql,$keywordssql,$contextsql,$fromdatesql,$todatesql) {
        if (defined($_)) {
            push(@definedargs, $_);
        }
} #end of foreach
#Take the first argument statement that was defined           
my $first=shift @definedargs;
$sqlstring=$sqlstring." $first";
#Then append the rest by means of AND ops (all the search criteria need to be valid)
foreach (@definedargs) {
        $sqlstring=$sqlstring." AND $_ ";
}
#Debug
print "Executing the query: $sqlstring \n";
#And here we connect to the database
#get the db authentication info
my @authinfo=getdbauth();
my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
        ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);
}
#Connect to the database
my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
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#Execute the statement and get the results by quoting the formed string
#$sqlstring=$itpslservh->quote($sqlstring);
my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare($sqlstring);
$SQLh->execute();
my @searchhits=$SQLh->fetchrow_array();
print "The ITPSL signatures that match are: \n";
foreach (@searchhits) {
        print "$_ \n";
}
#Subroutine definitions here
sub dispusage {
        print "Usage  :./searchsig.pl --reason REASON --multihost MLTHOST --forhosts HOSTS --synopsis 
SEARCH_STRING --keywords KEYWRD_STRING --fromdate DATE --todate DATE [--help] \n";
        print "Example:./searchsig.pl --reason intentional --multihost yes --forhosts cn1,cn2 --synopsis 'p2p OR 
ktorrent' --keywords 'theft' --fromdate 28/05/2010 --todate 29/05/2010 \n";
        exit;
} #end of dispusage
sub firsttimesigsub {
    print "searchsig.pl: It looks as if you are running the program for the first time. I will need some info from you 
\n";
    print "searchsig.pl: Please enter the MySQL password for the root user and press Enter:";
    chomp (my $mysqlp=<STDIN>);
    print "searchsig.pl: Please verify the host name or IP of the LUARM RDBMS server:";
    chomp (my $luarms=<STDIN>);
    
    #Write the info into the config file
    open(my $fh, '>', "/root/itpsl/.sig.dat") or die $! or die "submitsig.pl Error:can't open the .sig.dat file: $! \n";
    select $fh;
    print "root,signatures,$mysqlp,$luarms";
    close($fh);
} #end of firsttimesigsub()
sub getdbauth {
        unless(open DBAUTH, "</root/itpsl/.sig.dat") {
                        die "submitsig.pl Error:getdbauth: Could not open the .adb.dat file due to: $!";
                }
        my @localarray; 
        
        while (<DBAUTH>) {
                my $dbentry=$_;
                chomp($dbentry);
                push(@localarray, $dbentry);
        }
        return @localarray;     
        
} #end of getdbauth()
#!/usr/bin/perl 
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#submitsig.pl - Submits an ITPSL signature to the ITPSL signature repository
#George Magklaras - Center for Security, Commununications and Networks Research
#University of Plymouth, UK - February 2011
#Takes one argument, the filename of the ITPSL signature. 
#It requires the presence of an XSD Schema file at the same directory.
#The program will validate the XML syntax of the submitted signature, check the consistency
#of various signature and if successful it will submit it to the ITPSL signature repository.
#Most of the error checking is done here. The itpslparser.pl handles only signatures that
#have successfully entered the database repository.
  
use XML::LibXML;
use XML::Twig::XPath;
use Class::Date;
use Digest::MD5 qw(md5 md5_hex md5_base64);
use Scalar::Util qw(looks_like_number);
use DBI;
use strict;
use Cwd;
my $VERSION="beta1";
####################################
#IMPORTANT SIGNATURE DATA VARIABLES#
####################################
#Signature date info and revision
my $cyear;
my $cmonth;
my $cday;
my $sigrev;
#The OS the signature is written for and its version
my $os;
my $osver;
#The user role the signature applies to
my $userrole;
#The detectby string (aka what do we use for detecting the threat)
my $detectm;
#The type of misuse (accidental or intentional)
my $reason;
#The host list that the signature is applicable to
my $hostlist;
#The Weight Matrix signature data  
my $weightmatrix;
my $events;
#Multihost signature?
my $ismultihost;
#The threat keywords
my $keywords;
#Synopsis description (optional)
my $synopsis;
#and finally the body of the statements
my $itpslsig;
#Some essential sanity checks
my @whoami=getpwuid($<);
die "submitsig.pl Error:You should execute this program ONLY with root privileges. You are not root.\n"
if ($whoami[2]!=0 && $whoami[3]!=0);
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my $filename=shift;
my $wdir=getcwd();
my $xmlschema = XML::LibXML::Schema->new( location => "$wdir/validate.xsd" );
#Does the signature file exist?
die "submitsig.pl Error: The signature file $filename does not exist. Are you sure you are referencing the file 
properly? \n"
if (! (-e $filename));
#If it does, make a new LibXML object to parse it.
my $doc = XML::LibXML->new->parse_file($filename);
#Now check that the signature file has a valid ITPSL syntax
eval { $xmlschema->validate( $doc ); };
die "submitsig.pl Error: Oops! It seems that the signature $filename is not a valid one. Here is the error: $@ " if $@;
#Now that we have a valid signature, let's attempt to connect to the LUARM RDBMS server
die "submitsig.pl Error: First time run? The /root/itpsl directory does not exist. Please create it first and then re-run the 
program.\n"
if (! (-e "/root/itpsl"));
#Do we reach the /root/itpsl/.sig.dat file?
if (! (-e "/root/itpsl/.sig.dat")) {
    firsttimesigsub();
}
#We start the parsing for checks here and we connect the different parts of the
#signature to the appropriate handling routines that will extract the value 
#from the ITPSL markup.
my $twig = new XML::Twig::XPath( TwigHandlers => {
        #ITPSL header parsing data
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/signdate/year" => \&getyear,
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/signdate/month" => \&getmonth,
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/signdate/day" => \&getday,
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/ontology/revision" => \&getrev,
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/ontology/weightmatrix" => \&getwm, 
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/ontology/detectby" => \&getdetectmethods,
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/ontology/os" => \&getos,
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/ontology/osver" => \&getosver,
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/ontology/user_role" => \&geturole,
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/ontology/reason" => \&getreason,
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/ontology/multihost" => \&getmhost,
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/ontology/hostlist" => \&gethlist,
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/ontology/keywords" => \&getkeywords,
        "/itpslsig/itpslheader/ontology/synopsis" => \&getsynopsis,
        
        
});
# Now we have XML Schema validated let's parse, checking the logical validity of the 
# parsed nodes on the way
$twig->parsefile( $filename );
$twig->flush;
#This is a new Twig object now to get the entire signature in $itpslsig
my $twig2=XML::Twig->new(pretty_print=> 'indented', 'xml:space'=>"preserve");
$twig2->parsefile( $filename );
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$itpslsig=$twig2->sprint;
#At that point, all data should be fine and we should hit the LUARM signature repository
#Calculate the MD5 hex checksum of the signature by simply joining all the signature strings together
my $sigmd5=md5_hex(join("," , $cyear,$cmonth,$cday,$os,$osver,$sigrev,$reason,$weightmatrix,$detectm,$userrole,
$ismultihost,$hostlist,$keywords,$synopsis,$itpslsig));
#get the db authentication info
my @authinfo=getdbauth();
my ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname);
foreach my $dbentry (@authinfo) {
        ($username,$dbname,$dbpass,$hostname)=split("," , $dbentry);
}
#Connect to the database
my $datasource="DBI:mysql:$dbname:$hostname:3306";
my $itpslservh=DBI->connect ($datasource, $username, $dbpass, {RaiseError => 1, PrintError => 1});
#Check to see if the signature we are trying to submit already exists.
my $SQLh=$itpslservh->prepare("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM repository WHERE signid='$sigmd5' ");
$SQLh->execute();
my @md5hits=$SQLh->fetchrow_array();
if ($md5hits[0]=="1") {
        $SQLh->finish();
        die "submitsig.pl Εrror: The signature you tried to submit (MD5 hash $sigmd5) already exists in the ITPSL 
signature repository. \n";
}
#If it doesn't exist INSERT the record
#by quoting parts that might contain characters that can force the execution of SQL statements to fail
#in the itpslsig, the keywords and synopsis fields
$itpslsig=$itpslservh->quote($itpslsig);
$synopsis=$itpslservh->quote($synopsis);
$keywords=$itpslservh->quote($keywords);
my $rows=$itpslservh->do ("INSERT INTO repository 
(signid,year,month,day,reason,revision,userrole,detectby,multihost,hostlist,os,osversion,"
                                   . "weightmatrix,keywords,synopsis,mainblock) "
                                   . "VALUES 
('$sigmd5','$cyear','$cmonth','$cday','$reason','$sigrev',"
                                   . 
"'$userrole','$detectm','$ismultihost','$hostlist','$os','$osver','$weightmatrix',$keywords,$synopsis,$itpslsig)" );
if (($rows==-1) || (!defined($rows))) {
                        print "submitsig.pl Error: Could not insert signature with MD5 hash $sigmd5 into 
the ITPSL repository. Something wrong occurred at the RDBMS level. \n";
                }       
#Finally close the db handler
$SQLh->finish();
                
print "submitsig.pl SUCCESS: Inserted signature with MD5 hash $sigmd5 into the ITPSL repository. \n";
#Subroutine definitions here
sub firsttimesigsub {
319
Appendix B : ITPSL sample source code
    print "submitsig.pl: It looks as if you are running the program for the first time. I will need some info from you 
\n";
    print "submitsig.pl: Please enter the MySQL password for the root user and press Enter:";
    chomp (my $mysqlp=<STDIN>);
    print "submitsig.pl: Please verify the host name or IP of the LUARM RDBMS server:";
    chomp (my $luarms=<STDIN>);
    
    #Write the info into the config file
    open(my $fh, '>', "/root/itpsl/.sig.dat") or die $! or die "submitsig.pl Error:can't open the .sig.dat file: $! \n";
    select $fh;
    print "root,signatures,$mysqlp,$luarms";
    close($fh);
} #end of firsttimesigsub()
sub getdbauth {
        unless(open DBAUTH, "</root/itpsl/.sig.dat") {
                        die "submitsig.pl Error:getdbauth: Could not open the .adb.dat file due to: $!";
                }
        my @localarray; 
        
        while (<DBAUTH>) {
                my $dbentry=$_;
                chomp($dbentry);
                push(@localarray, $dbentry);
        }
        return @localarray;     
        
} #end of getdbauth()
sub getyear {
        my( $tree, $elem ) = @_;
        $cyear=$elem->text;
        
} #end of sub getyear
sub getmonth {
        my( $tree, $elem ) = @_;
        $cmonth=$elem->text;
        
} #end of sub getmonth
sub getday {
        my( $tree, $elem ) = @_;
        $cday=$elem->text;
        
} #end of sub getday
#Obtains and checks the validity of weight matrix data 
sub getwm {
        my( $tree, $elem ) = @_;
        my $wm=$elem->text;
        #Filter out any white space data from the parsed signature wm string
        $wm=~ s/\s//g;
        my @wmvals;
        push (@wmvals, split(",", $wm));
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        #set the global values of interest
        my $fnev=$wmvals[0];
        if (looks_like_number($fnev)) {;
                #Check that the number of specified ITPSL event weights is consistent
                die "submitsig.pl signature logic Error: HEADER SCOPE: You specified 0 events and you have 
additional weights in the signature. Please correct the wm and try again. \n"
                if ( $fnev eq "0" && $#wmvals gt "0" );
                die "submitsig.pl signature logic Error: HEADER SCOPE: You specified $fnev events, but your 
signature contains $#wmvals+1. Please correct the wm and try again. \n"
                if ( $fnev!=$#wmvals);
                #If all is well, export the value of w:m string
                $weightmatrix=$wm;
                } else {
                die "submitsig.pl signature logic Error: HEADER SCOPE:Got $fnev from the Weight Matrix as 
the number of events. This does not look like a number to me.";
                }
} #end of sub getwm
sub getdetectmethods {
        my( $tree, $elem ) = @_;
        $detectm=$elem->text;
        
} #end of sub getdetectmethods
sub getos {
        my( $tree, $elem ) = @_;
        $os=$elem->text;
} #end of sub getos
sub getosver {
        my ( $tree, $elem ) = @_;
        $osver=$elem->text;
} #end of sub getosver
sub getrev {
        my ( $tree, $elem) = @_;
        $sigrev=$elem->text;
} #end of sub getrev
        
sub geturole {
        my ( $tree, $elem) = @_;
        $userrole=$elem->text;
} #end of sub geturole
sub getreason {
        my ( $tree, $elem) = @_;
        $reason=$elem->text;
} #end of sub getreason
sub getmhost {
        my ( $tree, $elem) = @_;
        $ismultihost=$elem->text;
} #end of sub getmhost
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sub gethlist {
        my ( $tree, $elem) = @_;
        $hostlist=$elem->text;
} #end of sub gethlist
sub getsynopsis {
        my( $tree, $elem ) = @_;
        $synopsis=$elem->text;
} #end of sub getsynopsis
sub getkeywords {
        my( $tree, $elem ) = @_;
        $keywords=$elem->text;
} #end of sub getkeywords
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Probst, Christian W.; Hunker, Jeffrey; Gollmann, Dieter (Eds.) 2010, XII, 244 p. 40 illus., 20 in col-
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LUARM – An audit engine for insider misuse detection
G.Magklaras, S.Furnell and M.Papadaki
Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK
cscan@plymouth.ac.uk
Abstract
'Logging User Actions in Relational Mode' (LUARM) is an open source audit engine for Linux. It provides a near real-time snapshot 
of a number of user action data such as file access, program execution and network endpoint user activities, all organized in easily 
searchable relational tables. LUARM attempts to solve two fundamental problems of the insider IT misuse domain. The first 
concerns the lack of insider misuse case data repositories that could be used by post-case forensic examiners to aid an incident 
investigation. The second problem relates to how information security researchers can enhance their ability to specify accurately 
insider threats at system level. This paper presents LUARM's design perspectives and a 'post mortem' case study of an insider IT 
misuse incident. The results show that the prototype audit engine has a good potential to provide a valuable insight into the way 
insider IT misuse incidents manifest on IT systems and can be a valuable complement to forensic investigators of IT misuse 
incidents.
Keywords
Insiders, misuse, detection, auditing, logging, forensics
1.  Introduction
The problem of insider IT misuse is a very real threat for the health of IT infrastructures encompassing both intentional 
activities (e.g. targeted information theft and accidental misuse (e.g. unintentional information leak). Numerous studies 
have tried to define an “insider” in the context of Information Security. A generic definition from Probst et al. (2009) is 
”a person that has been legitimately empowered with the right to access, represent, or decide about one or more assets 
of the organization's structure”.
The most widely known insider misuse cases are usually about intellectual property theft. The arrest of Lan Lee and 
Yuefei Ge by FBI agents (Cha, 2008) is a classic case. The arrested men were engineers of NetLogic Microsystems 
(NLM) until July 2003. During the time of their employment, they were downloading trade sensitive documents from 
the NLM headquarters into their home computers. These documents contained detailed descriptions of the NLM 
microprocessor product line. Eventually, their ties to the Chinese government and military were discovered by 
investigators.     However, both mass media case descriptions and relevant security surveys do not provide the tools or 
the methodology to systemically study and mitigate the problem. Insider IT misuse is a multi-faceted problem and one 
of the things insider misuse researchers really need is a repository of more detailed case descriptions with a focus on the 
impact insider misuse actions have at computer system level (NSTISSAM). This is the area of Insider Threat 
Specification, the core concept behind the proposed logging engine which is examined in the next section.
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2.  Insider Threat Specification and modelling
Figure 1: Information flow in a misuse detection system 
Threat specifications follow the principles of intrusion specification, a concept which is not new in the information 
security world. Techniques to describe threats exist for an entire range of information security products, from anti-virus 
software to several intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS) (Bace, 2000), where threats are specified by 
anomaly detection, pattern matching (also known as misuse detection) mechanisms or a heuristic-based combination of 
the two.  Insider Threat Specification is the process of using a standardized vocabulary to describe in an abstract way 
how the aspects and behaviour of an insider relate to a security policy defined misuse scenario. Figure 1 shows the 
information flow of a typical IT misuse detection system.  The security specialist translates the Security (and resulting 
monitoring policy) into a set of misuse scenario signatures, standard descriptions of IT misuse acts that describe the 
behaviour of a user at process execution, filesystem and network endpoint level (Magklaras et al, 2006). The misuse 
scenario signatures and collected audit data (Bace, 2000) from the IT infrastructure are fed into a misuse detection 
engine.
Vital to insider threat specification is the structure and content of the audit record, at the center of Figure 1. If the audit 
record is incomplete, in terms of the type of information we need to log or unavailable, because the data are vanished 
due to bad system design or intentional data corruption, the specification of insider threats is useless. This is one of the 
primary objectives that LUARM tries to address by providing an evidence rich and reliable audit record format.
3.  Insider misuse detection auditing requirements
Bace (Bace, 2000) discusses intrusion detection (and hence misuse detection) as an audit reduction problem. Audit 
reduction is the process of filtering the relevant information out of the audit records, in order to infer a partially or fully 
realized threat and excluding information that is irrelevant or redundant.   The structure of an audit record is important 
for a misuse detection system. A good structure has well defined fields that can be easily parsed. Moreover, the 
structure of the audit record should easily facilitate relational type queries. It is necessary for the information to be 
applied on the disjunction (OR), conjunction (AND), and negation (NOT) operators, in order to increase the query 
versatility and speed of response.
A desired aspect of a suitable crafted audit record format for insider misuse detection is clear user accountability. This 
means that the audit record should be able to reliably and easily associate user entities to recorded actions. The wealth 
and replication of vital information in various types of audit records is a requirement for proper event correlation and 
step instance selection (Meier, 2004).
Another important issue of audit record engines is that of referencing time. In large IT infrastructures that span several 
networks and time zones, audited systems might report in different time formats. They can also experience 'clock skew', 
a difference in time recorded amongst computer systems due to computer clock hardware inaccuracies, especially when 
an NTP (Mills et al, 2010) server is not available to provide a reliable time source.  
One of the most recent and commonly referenced  works that concern the format of audit records is the Common 
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (Common Criteria Portal, 2009) standards.  The Common 
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Criteria (CC) effort does not fully address the previously mentioned audit record requirement omissions of its 
predecessor, the Orange Book (DOD 5200.28-std, 1985). However, some of its high level functional audit requirements 
are interesting. In particular, CC requirement 88 of section 8.2  states that: “At FAU_GEN.2 User identity association, 
the TSF shall associate auditable events to individual user identities.” In CC terminology TSF stands for Target of 
evaluation Security Functionality, meaning essentially the software and hardware under evaluation. In addition, CC 
mentions a set of requirements that concern various aspects of the audit record storage.  Once again, the requirements 
are given in high-level terms, specifying that:
 unauthorized deletion and/or modification of audit records
 any other condition that could cause storage failure.
should be mitigated.
The next section discusses whether today's audit engines satisfy these requirements.
4.  Existing audit record engines
Audit record engines have existed since the very early days of operating systems. However, not all of them fit the 
requirements of misuse detection engines, as discussed in the previous section.
The most common variety of audit record engines uses information that comes directly from the Operating System. 
Characteristic examples of this category of engines are Oracle's Basic Security Module (BSM) auditing system (Oracle 
Corporation, 2010) and its open source implementation OpenBSM (Trusted BSD Project portal, 2009), the psacct audit 
package (psacct utilities, 2003), as well as the syslogd (Gerhards, 2009) and WinSyslogd (Monitorware, 2010) 
applications.
After examining these engines, serious deficiencies can be located in terms of use for insider threat prediction. Firstly, 
many engines consolidate information from various different devices and operating system vendors, but they are far 
from describing sufficiently issues in an operating system agnostic way. In addition, process accounting tools might not 
cover sufficiently the variety of different system level information (file, process execution and network level). In fact, 
some of them might miss data as described in (HP Portal, 2003). A logging engine that cannot facilitate the description 
of both static and live forensic insider misuse system data at the network, process and filesystem layer could hinder a 
forensic examination of an IT misuse incident. Static digital forensic analysis is employed by most forensic tools and 
cannot portray accurately the non-quiescent (dynamic) state of the system under investigation. Information such as 
active network endpoints, running processes, user interaction data (number of open applications per user, exact 
commands), as well as the content of memory resident processes may not be recorded accurately on non-volatile media. 
(Hay et al, 2009) discuss the shortcomings of static digital forensics analysis in detail. In order to overcome the barriers 
of static analysis, Adelstein et al. (2006) discuss the virtues of non-quiescent or live analysis, which essentially gathers 
data while the system under-investigation is operational.
Several audit record systems do not report consistently the timing of audit record generation. For instance, many 
implementations of the syslog audit standard and psacct tools generate the audit record by entering the time stamp of the 
client system. If the client system does not have a reliable time source, this generates inaccurate information and could 
seriously hinder event correlation.
Finally, one of the most serious drawbacks of existing audit approaches is the inability to store the audit information in 
a form that can utilize relational queries. Section 3 discussed the reasoning behind this requirement. In one sense, some 
people might argue that this is an audit management feature rather than an audit log design issue. However, as section 3 
discussed the advantages of using a relational schema to form audit queries in a structured log record, the author's view 
is that everything that increases the expressive power of an audit log query should be incorporated in the structure of the 
audit log, rather than being left as an 'add-on' feature.
5.  The LUARM audit engine
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Figure 2: The LUARM architecture 
LUARM is  a prototype Open Source audit  record engine (LUARM portal,  2010) that  uses  a  Relational  Database 
Management System (RDBMS) for the storage and organization of audit record data. The employment of an RDBMS is 
a core design choice for the LUARM engine. Beyond the relational type query support discussed in Section 3, an 
RDBMS offers  the  necessary data  availability,  integrity  and  scalability  features,  because  most  RDBMS tools  are 
explicitly designed to organize and store large amounts of data, as dictated by many CC requirements.  The Structured  
Query Language (SQL) facilitates instance selection and completion, as well as data correlation can be performed by 
using clauses such as 'FROM' and 'WHERE'.
Figure 3: LUARM relational table structure
Figure 2 depicts the module client-server architecture of the LUARM audit engine. On the left of the figure, we can see 
a set of audited computer clients. Every client is running a unique instance of a set of monitoring scripts. Each of the 
client scripts audits a particular system level aspect of the operating system: 'netactivity.pl'  audits the addition and 
creation of endpoints, 'fileactivity.pl' records various file operations, 'psactivity' provides process execution audit 
records and 'hwactivity.pl' keeps a log of hardware devices that are connected or disconnected from the system. The 
right hand side contains the centralized server part of the architecture where audit data are stored, maintained and 
queried in a MySQL (Oracle MySQL portal, 2010) based RDBMS (other RDBMS systems could be used as well). The 
Perl programming language is used to implement the modules and the communication between client and server is 
performed via a Perl DBI (CPAN-DBI, 2010) interface.
The client-server architecture avoids leaving the data in vulnerable clients. The central host MySQL server has its own 
authentication system responsible for controlling who has access to the audit data. By authenticating audit reviewers 
against the RDBMS authentication system, we de-couple the users being audited from the auditors, a desirable property 
that ensures that audited insiders cannot easily manipulate audit data. Furthermore, by assigning a separate database 
instance per audited client, we reduce the likelihood of compromising the data for all clients. If the database access 
credentials of one client are compromised, the damage is limited to the audit data for that client only.
Figure 3 displays the relational table format for the four main types of recorded audit data in LUARM: fileaccess, 
process execution, network endpoint and hardware device information.  Temporal information is provided by event 
creation time stamps (cyear, cmonth, cday,chour,cmin,csec) and respective event destruction time stamps 
(dyear,dmonth,dday,dhour,dmin,dsec). The combination of the two types of timestamps can pinpoint exact time 
intervals for events in a consistent format for all recorded event types. In contrast, most audit systems may provide only 
event creation time references without hinting for the duration of an event.
The sampling of events is done at 100ms intervals and is adjustable by means of modifying certain variables on each 
monitoring module. At first, this might seem problematic as many attack steps can occur much faster than that amount 
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of time. However, in an event sampling loop, one has to account for the time delay to update the database, which can 
vary from 10ms to 60-70 ms intervals on heavily loaded clients and servers. In addition, time resolution varies amongst 
operating systems. For these reasons, LUARM relies on the Perl Time::HiRes module (CPAN-HiRes, 2010) to bridge 
the gap between the different operating system timer implementations. A time granularity of 100 ms is also a good 
compromise between accuracy and scalability. The more granular the time resolution, the greater the computational 
load for both the client and the server LUARM parts.
Another important design decision that concerns the format of the audit table was to include common attributes amongst 
different event tables for the purposes of increasing the ability to correlate events and provide user entity accountability. 
For instance, fields such as 'username' (user entity), pid (numeric process ID of the program responsible for the event 
creation) and application (string that represents the name of the application that matches the pid) can be found in most 
of the event tables. This enables the audit reviewer to use SQL and relate events, so he can form queries of the type 
“Find the network endpoint created by program x of user y” in an easy manner.  
The 'fileinfo' table stores file access related events. The filename specification consists of two parts. The 'filename' field 
which holds the filename with the file extension (i.e. data.txt) and the 'location' field which contains the absolute path of 
the file. The fact that the two are divided in separate fields makes it easier to search by location or by field name only, 
increasing the versatility of mining file data. In order to populate the data on this table, LUARM relies on the 'lsof' 
utility (Pogue et al, 2008). The utility is versatile and can record a variety of events including file and network 
endpoints in real time. It exists for an entire range of UNIX/Linux and MACOSX operating systems, covering a large 
spectrum of computing devices.
The 'netinfo' table logs the creation and destruction of network endpoints. In the context of LUARM, the term 'network 
endpoint' refers to the operating system data structures employed to facilitate network connectivity via the TCP/IP 
protocol suite.  Network endpoint activity is considered as live forensic data.  A series of table fields are used to record 
endpoint details ('sourceip', 'destip', 'sourceport' , 'destport' and 'transport' record source and destination IP addresses, 
source and destination port and transport protocol respectively). The fields 'sourcefqdn' and 'destfqdn' hold the DNS 
(Mockapetris, 1987) resolved Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) for the source and destination hosts.
The 'sourcefqdn' and 'destfqdn' fields are not populated by the client LUARM routines. In contrast, they are populated 
on the LUARM server side. Due to the criticality of correct DNS data for the audit records, the frequent DNS 
configuration errors (Barr, 1996), aspects of DNS operational security (Bauer, 2003) and client performance, the 
endpoint name resolution is left on the server side. This provides a greater control on DNS derived data and does not 
rely on vulnerable clients (malicious insiders or software vulnerabilities) for auditing network connections.
Process execution activity is recorded in the 'psinfo' table (Figure 3). This table records 'live' forensic data. The table 
includes both the proces ID ('pid') and parent process id ('ppid'), so that process execution flow can be traced back to the 
original process. In order to speed up process execution searches, the LUARM engine also separates the executed 
command ('command') from its arguments ('arguments'). One might like to search them separately in the process of 
mining process execution data. The 'ps' UNIX/Linux utility (Pogue et al, 2008) is used to collect process information. 
For all active processes (whose d* temporal fields are NULL), LUARM updates in near real time these two fields.   
The 'hwinfo' table logs 'live' device connection and disconnection events. All events generated by devices that connect 
to the Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI and PCI-Express) and Universal Serial (USB) buses. These two buses 
are commonly found on a large array of computing devices. For instance, an audit reviewer or forensics analyst might 
correlate file activity to a portable storage medium connection, as part of an intellectual property theft scenario. In that 
case, the 'hwinfo' table logs information in various fields that help identify the attached device ('devstring', 'devvendor'), 
the bus the device was connected to ('bus') and correlate the device attachment event against a number of users that are 
logged into the system at the time of the device attachment ('userslogged').
6.  LUARM in action
Having a proposed structure and content for the various categories of audit events as described in the previous section, 
we can now issue sample SQL statements to illustrate how audit data mining is performed. Figure 4 displays sample 
queries that demonstrate the expressiveness of LUARM's audit record content and structure.   
There are a few important observations to make about the example LUARM SQL queries. The first one concerns the 
embedding of system specific knowledge inside the statement. In essence, the third example of Figure 4 defines a step 
of an insider trying to transfer a sensitive file to a portable medium. One has to know the name of the sensitive file 
'prototype.ppt' and also the fact that '/media' is used as a mount point for portable media for that host. Additional 
possible destination locations could be specified by means of OR operators.  The use of the 'RLIKE' operator (RLIKE 
RegExp, 2008), always in relation to the second and third examples of Figure 4. The operator implements a regular 
expression type of match. Apart from the conjunction operator (OR), regular expressions give the specification 
polymorphic properties (one specification string, many matching results), a desirable property for compact misuse 
detection language statements.
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Figure 4: Using SQL to mine data in LUARM
LUARM was tested on a variety of simulated insider misuse scenarios. The scenarios were derived by real world 
LUARM captured data. However, permission to publish the original audit data was not obtained by the organizations in 
question. Thus, we had to reconstruct the misuse incidents by means of writing down a text based description of each 
incident and ask a team of users to re-enact it under a controlled IT infrastructure. The following paragraphs will 
present one of these incidents and demonstrate how the correlation versatility of the LUARM relational audit log 
structure can shed forensic light into the actions of a malicious insider. The scenario is provided below:
'Autobrake' Corp is a company designing car braking systems. Their engineering department is the most information 
sensitive work area. The braking system design process takes place in high performance Linux workstations, one for 
each design engineer. The engineers have normal user rights to the workstations. Superuser rights (root) is given 
only to the IT admin. The designs reside on the local hard drives of the workstations and the company's IT policy 
forbids any transfer of sensitive data to portable media. Autobrake's system administrator has requested a salary 
raise various times. This has been denied by management. The system administrator is lured by a competing 
company that asked him to deliver schematics of the new and revolutionary Autobrake's RGX9 SUV braking system 
in return for a large amount of money. Enjoying the trust of everyone and having full control of the engineering 
CAD workstations, the system administrator decides to take the offer of the competing company. He performs the 
intellectual property theft by following a well designed approach which is summarized below:
 He carefully chooses the user account of a mechanical engineer (username 'engineer3') that had some disputes 
over work issues with management. He aims to avoid detection by means of masquerading as the engineer in 
question.
 After successfully masquerading as the engineer in the IT system he uses a portable USB key to obtain the 
commercially sensitive RGX9 schematic, leaving only the traces of the engineer “actions”.
Assuming that a third party auditor manages the audit process and monitors the logging (ensuring that the logging 
infrastructure works) and that all Engineering workstations are monitored by LUARM, we are now tasked to find the 
offender and clear the name of 'engineer3'. The reader should consult the LUARM relational table structure (Figure 3), 
in order to follow the SQL queries presented below.
The investigation begins from the most important file, that of RGX9, and the people that work on it. From the audit 
record of the workstations with name 'proteas', we utilize LUARM to find out who has been using the file:
mysql> select username,pid,cday,chour,cmin,location,filename from fileinfo where filename RLIKE 'RGX9' OR 
location RLIKE 'RGX9' \G
From the many hits we get from the data base, we focus our attention on the following ones:
*************************** 111. row ***************************
username: engineer3
pid : 8301
cday: 4
chour: 15
cmin: 30
location: /storage/users/engineer3/work/designs
filename:RGX9.jpg
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...
*************************** 118. row ***************************
username: engineer3
pid: 28538
cday: 4
chour: 15
cmin: 32
location: /media/U3SAN03-12
filename: RGX9.jpg
The reason these file access patterns looked suspicious is that they were different than the normal pattern of accessing 
the file by the staff engineer. Normally, user 'engineer3' would access the file by means of certain design and image 
editing applications, under its usual directory (/storage/users/engineer3/work/designs). This time, however, things look 
a bit different, if one follows the association of file access to process execution, in order to confirm which programs 
performed the file transaction. The following SQL queries achieve the desired association:
mysql>select username,pid,command,arguments,cyear,cday,chour,cmin from psinfo where 
username='engineer3' AND pid='8031' AND cyear='2011' AND cday='4' AND chour='15' AND cmin='30;
*************************** 1. row ***************************
username: engineer3
pid: 8031
command: /bin/cp
arguments: work/designs/RGX9.jpg /tmp/
cyear: 2011
cday: 4
chour: 15
cmin: 30
mysql>select username,pid,command,arguments,cyear,cday,chour,cmin from psinfo where 
username='engineer3' AND pid='8031' AND cyear='2011' AND cday='4' AND chour='15' AND cmin='30;
*************************** 1. row ***************************
username: root
pid: 28538
command: mv
arguments: RGX9.jpg /media/U3SAN03-12
cyear: 2011
cday: 4
chour: 15
cmin: 32
Essentially, the previous results verify that the file was first copied from the normal directory to /tmp and then was 
moved to the /mnt/usb. At this point, a little bit of system specific knowledge comes into light, as /mnt/usb is the usual 
mount point where Linux links portable storage media to the filesystem. Hence, the question to raise is whether a portal 
storage medium was connected to the workstation, prior to the 'mv' file transaction. The query result yields a positive 
answer:
mysql> select * from hwinfo where cyear='2011' AND cmonth='01' AND cday='04' AND chour='15'\G
*************************** 1. row ***************************
hwdevid: 71
md5sum: a16e7386f14de769a7a9491da2071f5b
cyear: 2010
cmonth: 12
cday: 4
chour: 15
cmin: 30
csec: 28
devbus: USB
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devstring: Cruzer Micro U3   
devvendor: SanDisk Corp.    
userslogged: engineer3,root
dyear: 2010
dmonth: 1
dday: 4
dhour: 15
dmin: 33
dsec: 38
This database hit seems to be in line with the actions of engineer3, as it indicates a device connection before the 
execution of the 'mv' command and a disconnection well after the mv command.  Thus, everything seems to point out 
that 'engineer3' violated the company policy and transferred a sensitive file to a USB medium, against the company IT 
regulations. However, this had been categorically denied by the actual person. A good but non IT based alibi for the 
staff engineer was that he exited the building with his security card token around 14:50, returning back to his desk at 
15:50, a wide gap for him. Clearly, something else was going on and the clue was the 'userslogged' field of the last 
LUARM result. This 'hwinfo' LUARM table field contains the usernames for accounts that are logged into the 
workstation at the time of the device connection. Apart from 'engineer3' we note the root account being active, which is 
clearly the only other choice that, under the circumstances, could have performed the mount procedure.     
Based on the time stamp of the mv operation, a careful investigation of the root account actions reveals a key command 
execution, derived from the 'psinfo' table:
mysql> select * from psinfo where pid='27865' AND cyear='2011' AND cday='4' AND cmonth='1' AND 
chour='15' AND cmin >= '20' AND cmin <='33' \G
*************************** 1. row ***************************
psentity: 97654
md5sum: 7067284f2e1aefc430339ef091b4e41b
username: root
pid: 27865
ppid: 26407
pcpu: 0.0
pmem: 0.0
command: su
arguments: - engineer3
cyear: 2011
cmonth: 1
cday: 4
cmin: 28
chour: 15
csec: 36
dyear: 2011
dmonth: 1
dday: 4
dhour: 15
dmin: 28
dsec: 39
The 'su' command is used routinely by administrators to switch user credentials, in order to test environment settings 
and perform system tasks (Garfinkel et al, 1996). However, it can be easily used as a masquerading tool to covertly 
perform actions using the credentials of somebody else.  A further investigation also found the USB key on the desk of 
the IT administrator with the RGX9.jpg file. The hwinfo table device identifier data ('devstring', 'devvendor') as well as 
the mount point identifier (/media/U3SAN03-12) from the psinfo commands contributed towards strengthening the final 
piece of the puzzle.
This case shows the versatility of the relational structure of the LUARM record that showed the way from simple file 
operation to related program execution and other events that can provide strong evidence and lead to the misuser. In 
addition, LUARM has also been used successfully to provide evidence about security incidents of external origin 
(Magklaras, 2011). Thus, it offers a valuable complement of existing logging mechanisms.
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7.  Conclusions
A very important tool to mitigate Insider IT misuse is an audit record which is specifically designed to address its 
various needs, as well as complement existing forensic tools when security specialists perform a post-mortem incident 
examination. LUARM is an audit engine that provides a detailed log of user actions at file, process execution and 
network endpoint level stored in a Relational Database Management System. Its file, process and network endpoint data 
provide a dynamic forensic view of the system, a useful complement to existing forensic tools that offer only static data 
in their majority. The relational storage layer increases the correlation versatility amongst the different types of audit 
data, as it is vital to be able to perform various associations during the investigation of an incident (process to file, 
process to network activity) and reliably relate actions to user entities.
The results are promising, showing a much better way to examine a system than looking at static text files which are 
difficult to parse and even more difficult to correlate. However, LUARM is a work in progress. It has its deficiencies 
and needs many improvements, in order to become a production real-world audit engine for insider misuse.  
The first issue that was identified relates to the sampling frequency of user processes execution. After examining 
carefully the consistency of audit logs, it became evident that LUARM was losing process execution data. A fault was 
located at the process execution monitoring module. Due to the way the sampling loop was written in that module, the 
effective sampling frequency could exceed by far the desired 100 millisecond sampling frequency. As a result, LUARM 
would miss processes that executed by various users in the system.  The module was re-written using an entirely 
different process execution sampling philosophy. A Linux kernel technique called 'execve wrapping' was employed by 
adopting the Snoopy logger open source software (Snoopylogger portal, 2000).  A modified 'execve wrapper' logger 
like 'Snoopy' logger  provides a way to log the process execution and its arguments without relying on a sampling loop 
and is thus a more efficient interface to capture live process execution data. This solved the problem of losing process 
execution data due to a slow sampling rate and thus corrected an important deficiency of LUARM.
Addressing the issue of user privacy is not so straightforward. There is always a tension between insider IT misuse 
monitoring and privacy. LUARM needs to retain and collect data about a user's behavior, in order to help the analyst 
infer IT misuse. In direct contrast, privacy dictates the right of individuals to define whether somebody will collect data 
about their online actions and the extent or way the data can be used.  The best compromise between these two 
opposing needs is to control the amount and type of logged data. This can be achieved by pseudo-anonymizing certain 
parts of the audit record, in order to protect certain aspects of the user privacy but still be able to infer IT misuse 
reliably.  The term 'Privacy-Respecting Intrusion Detection' (Flegel, 2007), encompasses all the efforts of achieving a 
good compromise between the need to monitor and the need to respect user privacy.
The achievement of the LUARM prototype has been to demonstrate that structured evidence based logging for IT 
misuse is feasible.  The authors welcome feedback and participation to the development of its code base. The prototype 
is not yet ready for production deployment, but it should be suitable for experimentation and has already proved its 
value on a number of insider IT misuse incidents.
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Insider Threat Specification as a threat mitigation technique 
Introduction:
This chapter describes the Insider Threat Prediction Specification Language (ITPSL), a research 
effort to address the description of threat factors as a mechanism to mitigate insider threats. 
Section  A  ‘The  insider  threat  problem’  provides  some  necessary  definitions  about  the  insider 
misuse problem.
Section B ‘ITPSL: Scope, development paradigms and design criteria’ starts with a discussion of 
two  intrusion  specification  language  paradigms  that  influenced  the  development  of  ITPSL 
(subsection  B1).  The second subsection B2 is  concerned with  taxonomic  and threat  modeling 
research and development efforts designed to address insider threats, with emphasis on abstracting 
the domain of insider misuse and shaping the threat metrics the language can express. Subsection 
B3 explains the problems ITPSL is trying to solve and its design criteria. Finally, subsection B4 
discusses the programming paradigm that could facilitate the ITPSL construction.  
A) The insider threat problem:  
The problem of insider  IT misuse (the term ‘misuse detection’  or  ‘misuse’  is  also used in  the  
literature) is a serious threat for the health of IT infrastructures. A threat in an IT infrastructure 
context is “a set of circumstances that has the potential to cause loss or harm” [1]. As a result, in 
legitimate user context, these circumstances might involve intentional IT misuse activities such as 
targeted information theft, introducing or accessing inappropriate material, and accidental misuse 
(e.g. unintentional information leak).  In addition, there is also potential for flaws in the design and 
implementation of the computer system, which could render it susceptible to insider misuse.
Numerous people have tried to define the term “insider” in the context of Information Security. This 
is because there are many possible sub-contexts that are applicable to shedding light on different 
aspects of what an insider is and what she can do.  For instance, an aspect of insiders relates to what 
they are allowed and not allowed to do in an organizational context. This is often dictated by the 
organization's IT usage policy, “a set of laws, rules, practices, norms and fashions that regulate how 
an organisation manages, protects, and distributes the sensitive information and that regulates how 
an organisation protects system services” [2] . Insiders that do not follow the rules of the IT policy 
are formally considered as misusers.
Other definitions focus more on the attributes of an insider, from an organizational trust point of  
view [3]:”An insider is a person that has been legitimately empowered with the right to access,  
represent, or decide about one or more assets of the organization's structure”. This definition has a 
wide perspective and emphasizes a key aspect of an insider: that of trust. Trust is a property that 
goes beyond an IT  system oriented view (system credentials, actions, indications). Whilst people 
who constitute direct threats might not have access to IT access credentials, they still can decide on 
policies,  equipment  procurement  and  other  issues  that  can  affect  the  well  being  of  an  IT 
infrastructure. A good example is an IT director that spends millions on a state of the art security 
system but does not bother to emphasize or make policies that dictate the flow of information inside 
the  organization  (employ  that  bypasses  the  system  with  a  simple  USB  key,  intentionally  or 
accidentally).    
However, trust has an impact on IT level credentials. A narrower but IT system specific definition 
can also be useful, in order to focus on insider actions that can be detected by system methods.  
Hence, an insider is a person that has been legitimately given the capability of accessing one or 
many components of an IT infrastructure (hardware, software and data) enjoying effortless login by 
interacting with one or more authentication mechanisms. The word 'legitimately' differentiates the 
user from an external cracker that masquerades as the user by means of bypassing the authentication 
mechanisms. The implication of 'effortless' is that  an insider does not need to consume time and 
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effort to gain access to a system resource. This also means that they enjoy trust, a vital property of 
all insiders. 
The reader can consult references [4] to [11] for a detailed qualitative and quantitative review of 
insider misuse cases.
B) ITPSL: Scope, development paradigms and design criteria
B1) An overview of two intrusion specification languages:
The main function of ITPSL concerns insider threat specification. Threat specification is not a new 
concept in the information security world. Techniques to describe threats exist for an entire range of 
information security products,  from anti-virus  software to  several  intrusion detection/prevention 
systems, where  specified rules are used to describe a particular range of threats. However, this  
subsection focuses on generic threat specification. Most products might focus on specific types of 
threats  (anti-virus  products  relate  to  malware  detection,  IDS products  might  focus  on  network 
threats, etc). 
When it comes to generic intrusion specification languages, we have two notable examples. The 
Common Intrusion Specification Language (CISL) [12] and Panoptis [13]. The next paragraphs are 
going to describe these two languages and discuss their significance for ITPSL. 
CISL consists of a semantic framework to unambiguously describe intrusive activities together with 
proposed  data  structures  that  store  the  event  information  and  can  form standardized  messages 
exchanged by various Intrusion Detection System (IDS) components. The semantic representation 
of intrusive activities is achieved by the formation of an S-Expression. This is a recursive grouping 
of tags and data, delimited by parentheses. The tags provide semantic clues to the interpretation of 
the S-Expression and the data might represent system entities or attributes. For this reason, the tags 
are also called Semantic Identifiers (SIDs). 
The best  of  way of  illustrating how CISL works  is  by considering an example.  The statement 
(Hostname ‘frigg.uio.no’)  is  a  simple  S-Expression.  It  groups  two terms,  without  semantically 
binding  them.  One  can  guess  that  it  refers  to  a  computer  system  with  the  FQDN  name 
‘frigg.uio.no’, but the true meaning of the statement is still vague. In fact, the full semantic meaning 
of S-Expressions becomes apparent when one forms more complex S-Expressions, by means of 
combining several SIDs into a sentence.
Figure 1 illustrates a suitably crafted CISL intrusion specification which could be translated in the 
following plain English translation:
“On the 24th of February 2005, three actions took place in sequence in the host ‘frigg.uio.no’.  
First, someone logged into the account named 'tom' (real name ‘Tom Attacker’) from a host with  
FQDN 'outside.firewall.com'.  Then, about a half-minute later,  this  same person deleted the file  
'/etc/passwd' of the host.  Finally, about four-and-a-half minutes later, a user attempted but failed  
to log in to the account 'ksimpson' at 'frigg.uio.no'.  The attempted login was initiated by a user at  
'hostb.uib.no'.”
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(And
        (OpenApplicationSession
            (When
                (Time 14:57:36 24 Feb 2005)
            )
            (Initiator
                (HostName 'outside.firewall.com')
            )
            (Account
                (UserName 'tom')
                (RealName 'Tom Attacker')
                (HostName 'frigg.uio.no')
                (ReferAs 0x12345678)
            )
            (Receiver
                (StandardTCPPort 22)
            )
        )
        (Delete
            (World Unix)
            (When
                (Time 14:58:12 24 Feb 2005)
            )
            (Initiator
                (ReferTo 0x12345678)
            )
            (FileSource
                (HostName 'frigg.uio.no')
                (FullFileName '/etc/passwd')
            )
        )
        (OpenApplicationSession
            (World Unix)
            (Outcome
                (CIDFReturnCode failed)
                (Comment '/etc/passwd missing')
            )
            (When
                (Time 15:02:48 24 Feb 2005)
            )
            (Initiator
                (HostName 'hostb.uib.no')
            )
            (Account
                (UserName 'ksimpson')
                (RealName 'Karen Simpson')
                (HostName 'frigg.uio.no')
            )
            (Receiver
                (StandardTCPPort 22)
            )
        )
    )
Figure 1: CISL sentence syntax example
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The particular CISL sentence describes a malicious attack that erases an important system file of a 
UNIX system and consists of three multi-SID S-Expressions. In general, a sentence can be formed 
by one or more S-Expressions nested at different levels.
Verb SID’s are joined together in a sentence by conjunction SIDs. In the previous example of 
Figure 1, ‘And’ is the conjunction SID that holds together the three SIDs that form the sentence. In 
addition, a CISL sentence might employ role, adverb, attribute, referent and atom SID types. Role 
SIDs indicate what part an entity plays in a sentence (such as ‘Initiator’). Adverb SIDs provide the 
space  and  time  context  of  a  verb  SID.  Attribute  SIDs  indicate  special  properties  or  relations 
amongst the sentence entities, whereas atom SIDs specialise in defining values that are bound to 
certain event instances (for instance ‘Username’).  Lastly, referent SIDs allow the linking of two or 
more  parts  of  a  sentence  (‘Refer  to’  and ‘Refer  as’).  There  are  additional  SID types,  but  the 
aforementioned ones are the most commonly employed.
One can clearly observe a structural hierarchy for forming complex sentences that also contributes 
to the semantic meaning. This semantic structure is inspired by the syntax of natural languages. A 
verb is always at the heart of every sentence and is followed by a sequence of one or more qualifiers 
that describe the various entities that play parts in the sentence, or qualify the verb itself.
CISL [12] is not only about semantic rules. Its authors were concerned with the encapsulation of the 
structured semantic  information into the ‘Generalised Intrusion Detection Object’  (GIDO), data 
structures that hold the encoded event information. The purpose of encoding the information in a 
standard  way  is  to  make  the  process  of  exchanging  the  information  amongst  various  IDS 
components easy. 
Unfortunately, despite the well-conceived interoperability target, the CISL GIDO encoding process 
introduced  many problems.  Doyle  [14]  has  criticized  many of  the  aspects  of  the  CISL GIDO 
structure. Although the purpose of the document was to evaluate the fitness of CISL for use in the 
DARPA Cyber Command and Control (CC2) initiative, the paper identifies serious inadequacies 
that  concern  the  CISL time resolution  data  representation facilities,  as  well  as  data  throughput 
limitations caused by the fixed size of the GIDO data structure. Finally, Doyle comments on the 
lack of support for the next generation Internet Protocol (Version 6). Whilst these points are fair,  
they could easily be corrected by making the necessary changes to the relevant data types and 
overcome the perceived obstacles. In fact, section 7 of the CISL standard [12] contains specific 
guidelines that explain how to add information to a GIDO, to clarify or correct its contents. This 
suggests that the encoding principles are certainly extensible.
A  more  serious  aspect  of  Doyle’s  critique  [14]  refers  to  the  semantic  structure  of  the  CISL 
language. In particular, his criticism that CISL has “no facilities for representing trends or other 
complex behavioral patterns; ill-specified, inexpressive, and essentially meaningless facilities for 
representing  decision-theoretic  information  about  probabilities  and  utilities”  indicates  that  the 
language would be a bad choice for describing threat prediction related information.  The basic 
reasoning behind this critique is that CISL is too report-orientated and threat mitigation requires a 
different level of information, not just mere report structures of what is happening on one or more 
systems. These indeed represent  more serious limitations that would require a more radical re-
design of the CISL. 
In addition to Doyle's  criticisms, from a threat specification perspective,  we note the following 
omissions/weaknesses in CISL:
 Inability  to  express  variability  in  intrusion  events:  For  example,  all  the  necessary  time 
patterns to specify recurring events of significance: The 'When', 'Time' and others SIDs can 
bind an event to an accurate time and date location. However, this is of little value to a threat 
specification as the accurate time of an intrusion event is rarely known. An SID operant such 
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as 'afternoon-hours', 'evening-hours' would be more functional. This is true for other type of 
SIDs such as 'FileSource',  network SIDs, etc. The expressions clearly lack the necessary 
polymorphism required to describe a range of possible events.
 The  nesting  of  S-Expressions  does  not  facilitate  logical  operands/operators,  in  order  to 
describe alternative events. This affects the overall polymorphic description at event level.   
 General lack of a mechanism to express confidence of a particular metric: Decision theoretic 
information is a desired feature of threat specification. The process of specifying a threat 
might include the description of various events. Not all  of them have the same level of 
reliability and as such, a language that omits a mechanism of expressing a confidence in a 
particular event is a serious issue.  This omission also hinters the ability to build up user  
profiling information.    
Nevertheless, Amoroso [15] characterizes CISL [12] and its associative CIDF framework [16] as a 
“good piece of computer science”, despite the fact that it has not managed to infiltrate the IDS/IPS 
vendor market as a product interoperability platform. CISL is significant for the development of 
ITPSL for the following reasons:
 It's  the  first  language  framework  for  generic  intrusion  specification  with  system 
interoperability as its design goal, attempting to bridge the gap between language semantics 
and  operating  system/IDS  product  implementation  details.  This  is  a  desirable  feature 
because a good threat specification mechanism should focus on the threat itself and less on 
platform specific issues.
 It  introduces  the  S-expression  as  a  way  to  group  the  SIDs  with  the  actual  data  in  a  
hierarchical semantic notation which can nest expressions. Despite the previously discussed 
weaknesses of its proposed semantic identifiers, the suggested combination increases the 
clarity of the expression and the S-expression nesting capability increases the specificity of 
the statement in a consistent manner (the more S-expressions nested together in a the more 
specific the conditions of the match).  
Panoptis [13] is another interesting and more recent intrusion specification language paradigm. The 
language sits on top of an anomaly detection system which parses standardized UNIX audit process 
logs. After establishing a user profile based on a number of different criteria, the audit logs are 
parsed and then checked against the profiling data. A sample of the entities and quantitative criteria 
that the panoptis system checks against is given below. These include: 
 Discrete entities are organized in database tables such as:
 tty UNIX terminals.
 uid Users.
 uidtty Users logged in on a specific terminal.
 comm Commands.
 uidcomm Users executing a specific command.
 Process accounting data such as:
 maxaxsig Signal exit status.
 maxhog Maximum CPU hog factor (CPU time over elapsed time).
 maxmem Maximum memory usage.
 maxavrw Maximum average disk block input/output.
 maxstime Maximum system time.
 minbmin Minimum daily start time (start time whithin the 24 hour interval).
 maxutime Maximum user time.
 maxbmin Maximum daily start time.
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 maxasu Superuser status.
 maxcount Maximum number of times a given record has appeared in the database.
 maxrw Maximum disk block input/output.
 maxacore Core dump flag.
 maxavio Maximum average character input/output.
 maxafork Fork status.
 maxetime Maximum clock time.
 maxavmem Maximum average memory usage.
 maxio Maximum character input/output.
In essence, panoptis is an anomaly detection system envisaged to detect a number of attacks such as 
data leakage, wiretapping and user masquerading amongst others. The semantics are restricted to 
configuration  file  options  such  as  the  one  illustrated  by  Figure  2.  Declarations  of  the  type 
variable=value and a keyword(entity, value(s)) combination make up the syntactical convention. 
HZ = 100                # "Floating point" value divisor
bigend = FALSE          
map = TRUE              
EPSILON = 150           # New maxima difference threshold (%)
report = TRUE         # Set to TRUE to report new/updated 
entries
unlink = FALSE          # Set to TRUE to start fresh
# Reporting procedure
output = ’| /usr/bin/tee /dev/console | /bin/mail root’
# Databases and parameters to check
dbcheck(tty, minbmin, maxbmin, maxio, maxcount)    # Terminals
dbcheck(comm, ALL) # Commands
dbcheck(uid, ALL) # Users
dbcheck(uidtty, maxcount) # Users on a terminal
dbcheck(uidcomm, minbmin, maxbmin, maxutime,maxstime, maxmem, 
maxrw, maxcount, maxasu)
# Map users and terminals into groups
usermap(caduser, john, marry, jill)
usermap(admin, root, bin, uucp, mail, news)
Figure 2: A configuration file sample showing the DSL syntax of 'panoptis'
For instance, the statement dbcheck(tty, minbmin, maxbmin, maxio, maxcount) will check the UNIX 
terminal entity activity against  the normal minimum and maximum startup time, as well as the 
maximum character input/output and the maximum number of times a given record has appeared in 
the database. If any of these figures exceeds the preset epsilon threshold normal value by 150% 
(EPSILON=150 declaration), the observation will be flagged as an intrusion. Note that these checks 
will  be  performed  against  the  records  of  certain  users  as  defined  by  the  usermap statements 
(caduser, john, marry, jill as user group 1 and admin, root, bin, uucp, mail, news as user group 2).
The simplistic semantics of panoptis suffer from many of the previously discussed drawbacks of 
CISL. Development on the 'panoptis' system has been discontinued and thus, it is not fair to really 
judge the effort on the basis of the presented system. The panoptis authors were more interested to 
present a paradigm whose scope was to parse system audit logs and not a full intrusion specification 
language.
However, the panoptis approach is an important paradigm for ITPSL for two reasons:
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 It is one of the first specification language approaches that target insider misuse incidents. 
The  authors  claim  that  under  certain  conditions,  panoptis  could  “detect  an  employee 
transferring inordinately large amounts of datato a computer outside the organisation even if 
that employee had proper system authorisations to perform.”[13]
 It is one of the first systems that employs a Domain Specific Language approach, in order to 
design the intrusion specification semantics and capture precisely the domain's semantics. 
Section B3 will examine the Domain Specific Language more closely.
 It makes use of simple data management techniques in terms of having access to structured 
data input (reading from UNIX process audit  logs) and arranging the anomaly detection 
threshold in a simple non-relational database. This indicates the need for properly storing 
and  readily  accessing  intrusion  information,  an  important  requirement  of  a  threat 
specification tool in itself.
For all these reasons, both CISL [12] and Panoptis [13] play an important role to the development 
of ITPSL. 
B2)Insider misuse taxonomies and threat models:
Apart from the process of designing the semantics of the specification language, there are other 
steps  that  concern  the  language  designer.  In  fact,  Magklaras  and  Furnell  [17]  propose  a 
methodology for deriving a Domain Specific Language for insider misuse detection and prediction 
that includes three important steps:
- the abstraction of the domain, which involves the removal of all the unnecessary details of 
the environment;
- the systematic categorisation of the necessary (abstracted) details into language semantics;
 the process of engineering the developed semantics into software.
The domain  abstraction is  a  critical  part  of  the  overall  language design process  and raises  the 
question of which entities and data are relevant to the insider threat domain. The CISL [12] and 
Panoptis  [13]  paradigms  proposed certain  types  of  data  to  monitor,  without  giving  a  concrete 
explanation on why these data were chosen and how they can aid the threat detection/prediction 
process. Section A presented notable insider misuse case studies and surveys and concluded that 
whilst generic trends can be spotted, this is not enough information to have a concrete picture of the 
problem. In order to select with confidence a range of insider misuse threat descriptors, a more 
systemic view of the problem is needed.
Information  security  taxonomies  and  threat  models  provide  the  answer  to  these  questions. 
Taxonomies  are  efforts  to  classify  information.  Threat  Modeling  attempts  to  make  use  of  the 
systemic knowledge of the taxonomies and estimate threat levels and/or simulate threat scenarios to 
help insider misuse researchers understand better important concepts and ultimately estimate threat 
levels.  A  model  is  an  “abstraction  of  the  system  being  studied  rather  than  an  alternative 
representation of that  system” [18].  This abstracted representation of the system should closely 
resemble its real-world behavior. The process of abstracting a real-world situation implies that not 
all  information about its attributes and functions is transferred into the model. Only those attributes 
and functions that are relevant for the study of certain aspects of the entities involved are included. 
Thus,  insider  threat model  designers need to consider carefully which attributes  and behavioral 
characteristics of a legitimate user are important to a threat estimation process. Latter paragraphs of 
this subsection will discuss these issues in more detail.
As with intrusion specification languages (subsection B1), intrusion specification taxonomies are 
not a new idea in the information security field. An overview of intrusion specification taxonomies 
is provided by Furnell et al [19]. Amongst these taxonomies, one that specifically addresses insider 
IT misuse incidents is given by Tuglular [20].  Tuglular’s paper is one of the first to suggest a 
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‘target-type of threat’ association as a way to prevent insider misuse. The target is an ‘asset’ and the 
rule is called a ‘strategy’ in the terminology he proposes. The suggestion  forms the basis for a 
methodology to predict insider misuse threats. If one can associate successfully certain actions to 
threats then it establishes the first step towards systematizing insider IT threat prediction. 
Most research efforts in the field of intrusion taxonomy classification are still at an early stage. The 
Tuglular taxonomy, and others mentioned in [19], are useful for the systematic study of intrusions, 
but they offer little help to a process designed to automatically detect intrusive activities. This is  
because the classification criteria employed by these taxonomies cannot be qualified or quantified 
very easily by an Intrusion Detection System with the level of information they exhibit. Moreover, 
none of these taxonomies is tailored for the process of estimating the likelihood of Insider Threat.
The best way of enhancing the expressiveness of an intrusion taxonomy scheme for insider misuse 
activities is to focus on the human actions and how their consequences impact the elements of the 
IT infrastructure that  are  being targeted.  The idea is  that it  is  easier to detect  which particular  
element is affected by a potentially intrusive action, rather than focusing on the task of sensing the 
motives for initializing an attack or focusing on other non-system detectable factors of the insider 
misuse domain.
The perplexing variable nature of insider IT misuse is a fact ([4] - [11]). What is considered as 
misuse  by a  well-defined  IT  usage  policy  is  not  the  same  across  different  organizations.  The 
freedom of the security architect to choose what can be considered as an Insider IT misuse threat 
indicator  and  even  decide  on  the  confidence  of  each  indicator  is  important.  Most  taxonomies 
enforce a rigid framework for classifying phenomena with clear borders of distinction that offer 
little space for subjective or varying interpretation of facts. This schema does not fit the case of 
Insider IT misuse prediction. 
Figure 3 below displays the top level of the taxonomy structure indicating the three primary, non-
mutually exclusive levels that address these consequences. 
Figure 3: Top hierarchy level of an insider misuse taxonomy
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Figure 4: File-system manipulation O/S consequences
The Operating System (O/S) based consequences are branched down to two sublevels of file-system 
and memory manipulation, illustrated by Figures 4 and 5 respectively. A justification for this is that 
a  large number of security faults  [21] involve filesystem and memory management issues,  and 
indeed  the  core  modules  of  UNIX  [22]  and  Windows-based  [23]  operating  systems  provide 
(amongst others) specific support for the related functions. Hence, it is safe to assume that these two 
kernel functional attributes can be used as a strong criterion for further classifying legitimate user 
activities.
At File/Directory level, a misuser may attempt to read or alter (write/create) certain files. These 
files  might  contain  sensitive  or  unauthorised  information  (information  theft  or  fraudulent 
modification of vital information). A knowledgeable insider might also attempt to read or modify 
file information that is not directly related to its content. Bach [22] and Richter [23] emphasize that 
most  Operating  Systems  allow  a  file  to  contain  additional  information  such  as 
access/creation/modification  times  as  well  as  information  that  relates  the  file  to  its  owner  and 
permits access to it under certain conditions. Although the mechanisms that implement these file 
attributes are different amongst Operating Systems, they are collectively known as file metadata and 
they are  vital  mechanisms to secure  the privacy,  availability and integrity of  the file  contents.  
Consequently,  they  are  good  candidates  for  exploitation  by a  legitimate  user  who  is  about  to 
perform a deliberate or accidental misuse act. 
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Figure 5: Memory Manipulation O/S Consequences
The points mentioned in the previous paragraph are also valid for ‘filesystem’ related data. Every 
Operating System organizes its files and directories by means of a specific set of rules that define 
how a file (contents and metadata) are about to be stored on the physical medium. The Operating 
System sub-modules that handle these issues are known as filesystems. Attempts to read or alter the  
physical medium’s Master Boot Record (MBR), intentional or accidental modification of partition 
table data are some of the most notable auditable actions that could point to legitimate user misuse 
acts. Robert Hanssen’s attempt to hide information in modified floppy disks, a case [4] discussed in 
section A, is a classic reminder of this kind of activity. 
In addition to filesystem content and metadata modification, a survey of insider misuse conducted 
by Magklaras and Furnell [11] showed that excessive disk space consumption is perceived as a 
problem for many of the respondents. Under certain conditions that depend on the configuration of 
the IT infrastructure, a legitimate user might produce a deliberate or accidental Denial of Service 
attack (DoS). 
Memory inspection is the best  way to see if a legitimate user attempts to run or even install a 
suspicious  program.   Indeed,  it  is  one  of  the  core  techniques  used  in  the  detection  of  overtly 
malicious code, such as viruses and Trojan horse programs.  The usage of unauthorised programs is 
a serious issue that can also create a way for accidental misuse by introducing a number of system 
vulnerabilities, as described by Papadaki et al [24].  The execution or installation of these programs 
could be intercepted by either recognising a program’s footprint in memory or by intercepting a 
well-known series of system calls produced by various suspicious programs. For example, the fact 
that a non-advanced user is trying to compile an advanced vulnerability scanning tool is an event 
that should be noticed and serve as a good indicator of potential misuse activities that are about to  
follow.
In addition, attempts to consume large memory portions of an operational system that are related to 
a legitimate user account can serve as good indicators of (intentional or accidental) insider misuse at 
Operating System level. One might argue that the ‘irregular memory usage’ sub-categories should 
really  belong  under  the  ‘Program execution’  hierarchy of  events.  However,  it  is  possible  that 
someone will produce a quick and easy Denial of Service attack on a running system by forcing the 
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host to commit large portions of system memory to a process, as demonstrated in various case 
studies described by Moore et al [25]. Moreover, a large category of security faults can be achieved 
by means of accessing normally restricted memory areas, creating what is commonly known as a 
“buffer overflow” attack [26]. As a result of these issues, it was felt that a separate sub-category 
hierarchy should exist to describe these events (Figure 5).
The filesystem and memory manipulation consequences conclude the O/S consequence category of 
the proposed taxonomy (Figure 3). The next category, “network consequences”, represents another 
distinct set of factors that could be taken into consideration in order to classify insider misuse threat 
indicators.  Figure  6  illustrates  the  network-related  consequences  of  acts  that  could  be  used  as 
legitimate user threat indicators. 
Figure 6: Network consequences of the insider IT misuse prediction taxonomy
Network packets that are associated with certain legitimate users and indicate the usage of a variety 
of network protocols and applications that might introduce certain vulnerabilities are also distinct 
ways of accidental or intentional IT misuse. For example, it could be said that a user that employs  
the TELNET [27]  protocol  to  login to  a  multi-user system is  more likely to have her  account 
compromised than a user who logins via the Secure Shell (SSH) application [28] due to the fact that 
the earlier application transmits the user password in clear-text form across the network, whereas 
the latter one encrypts it.
Someone might also like to differentiate between TCP and UDP based applications/protocols. From 
a potential threat point of view, UDP services are less secure than TCP based ones. For example, 
Ziegler [29] discusses in detail how UDP’s lack of flow control and state mechanisms can create 
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various data security problems. Consequently, the distinction between the usage of UDP and TCP 
services can serve as a potential insider misuse threat indicator, on the basis that UDP services are 
more likely to be accidentally (or intentionally) abused by a legitimate user.
Although the ‘Filesystem Manipulation’ subcategory of the taxonomy indicates ways with which 
disk storage capacity can be misused, the results of over-utilisation can also affect network capacity. 
For instance, a legitimate user could start downloading massive quantities of data, exceeding the 
network bandwidth cost budget of a business (Downloading over X Mbytes of data in a period Y). 
The X and Y number limits can be selected by the network administrator according to the company 
budget requirements.
In addition, a legitimate user might also cause network congestion by exceeding the data network’s 
‘burst’  or  throughput  capacity  or  exhausting  the  number  of  available  network  endpoints,  as 
described by Sharda [30]. Bandwidth hungry applications, such as video streaming players, and 
multiple data transfers can cause congestion that can severely impact the performance of a data 
network or affect the Quality of Service (QoS) of certain applications that require sustained data 
network throughput.
Finally, incoming or outgoing SMTP headers or attachments might indicate activity related to e-
mail misuse that can certainly be traced in network or host level. Outgoing e-mails that contain a set  
of particular files as attachments (e.g. password database files, other sensitive material) and have 
unusual destination addresses (e.g. unknown Hotmail accounts, a large number of recipients) should 
serve  not  necessarily  as  intrusion  indicators  but  as  insider  threat  estimators.  The  plethora  of 
malicious  code  efforts  and  phishing  techniques  may have  an  external  origin,  but  the  threat  is 
realized by the actions of unsuspecting legitimate users. In addition, proprietary information theft 
could also be realized by means of emailing sensitive material to non-authorized external entities. 
The  last  system  consequences  category  (“hardware”)  plays  an  important  role  in  preventing  a 
number of computer system threats. Insiders can often access the physical hardware of the machine 
very easily. Thus, removal or addition of hardware components, as well as modifications of their 
default configuration are some of the events that may act as important indicators of insider misuse 
prediction in a computer system.
However, in order to make use of these threat indicators, we need a way to quantify them. This  
paves the way for the discussion of  various Insider Threat Models  presented in  the following 
paragraphs.
The first important step of deriving an Insider Threat Prediction Model is to decide which attributes 
and  behavioural  (functional)  characteristics  of  a  legitimate  user  are  important  to  the  Threat 
Estimation Process. This will produce a set of Insider Threat Qualification Attributes (ITQAs).
The  next  step  in  the  process  of  establishing  the  model  is  to  describe  how the  ITQAs can  be 
quantified, in order to estimate the level of insider threat per individual user. This will involve the 
establishment of a suitable mathematical function, which will take as input a number of ITQAs and 
will associate them with a certain level of threat. We shall call this function the Estimated Potential 
Threat function, which quantifies the ITQAs. At this point, the overall target of our ideal model will 
be achieved: the establishment of a mechanism that will map ITQAs to certain threat levels. 
The development of insider threat models is a relatively new idea. Wood [31] provides an excellent 
basis for qualifying a set of metrics to mitigate insider threat. Most of these criteria are in line with 
the conclusions issues discussed as part of the insider misuse taxonomy discussed in the previous 
section.
In particular, Wood suggests that a malicious insider can be qualified in terms of distinct attributes:
 Access: The insider has unlimited access to some part or all parts of the IT infrastructure and 
the  ability  to  physically  access  the  equipment  hardware.  Consequently,  the  insider  can 
initiate an attack without triggering traditional system security defences.
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 Knowledge: The legitimate user is familiar with some or all the internal workings of the 
target systems or has the ability to obtain that knowledge without arousing suspicion.
 Privileges: The malicious insider should not have problems obtaining the privileges required 
to mount an infrastructure attack.
 Skills: The knowledgeable insider will always have the skills to mount an attack that is 
usually limited to systems that he/she is very familiar with. The model assumes that a given 
adversary is unlikely to attack unfamiliar targets.
 Tactics: This attribute refers to the methods used to launch the malicious attack. They are 
dependent on the goal of the attack and might include a variety of scenarios such as plant-
hit-and-run,  attack-and-eventually run,  attack-until-caught  as well  as  passive information 
extraction acts.
 Motivation: Insiders might launch the attack for profit or sabotaging the target organisation. 
Some of them might mount an attack for personal reasons such as taking revenge against the 
enterprise or even satisfy their plans to invoke some policy change inside an organisation.
 Process: The model assumes that a legitimate user follows a basic predictable process to 
mount an attack that consists of distinct stages. First the malicious adversary will become 
motivated to  mount  the attack.  The next  logical  stages  involve the identification  of  the 
target, the planning of the attack and finally the act of mounting the attack itself. 
All  of  the  previously  mentioned  attributes  emphasize  important  aspects  of  the  insider  misuse 
problem.  However,  Wood’s  criteria  do  not  necessarily  represent  a  clear  picture  for  the 
establishment of an insider threat prediction model. Not all stages of an insider attack can be safely 
predicted.  Some of  the  previously mentioned  attributes  are  difficult  to  qualify by an  Intrusion 
Detection System. The ‘motivation’ adversary attribute is one of them. 
It  is  very difficult  to  establish  a  set  of  sensors  that  could  reliably deduce  when an  individual  
becomes motivated to misuse a system.  For instance, let us suppose that IDS sensors record that a 
commercially important file is transferred from a disk to an external storage medium in the early 
morning hours. The fact that this particular file transfer took place could be related to a malicious 
act or an innocent file backup process performed by the system administrator as part of a system 
recovery process. It is important to maintain a record of these types of events, but their existence 
does not necessarily indicate an insider misuse event in progress. The plethora of the potential 
origins of such an event would increase the amount of information to be evaluated. Consequently, 
the complexity of the algorithms to capture and evaluate this type of information would deem this  
attribute’s exploitation impractical. 
If someone observes the different stages of the ‘process’ insider-modelling attribute, it becomes 
clear that the closer we get to the actual attack itself, the stronger the indicators of insider threat. 
Although detecting motivation might be tricky, with a carefully chosen quantification scheme of 
ITQAs,  someone could  sense  an  adversary during  the  target  identification  and attack  planning 
stages. This strategy goes along the line of thinking of our proposed misused taxonomy being based 
on system-level factors.
In addition, other attributes seem to be so closely related that might be redundant. For instance, it  
would be more logical to combine the attributes of ‘access’ and ‘privileges’ into one ‘insider access 
rights’.  The issue of obtaining a privilege to mount an attack should include logical and physical 
means of interacting with the systems. The same could be said for the attributes of ‘knowledge’ and 
‘skills’, because the ways in which a legitimate user gets to know a system and what can be inferred 
from the insider’s system knowledge are issues that are closely interrelated.
A more recent research effort by Schultz [32] presents a preliminary framework for understanding 
and predicting insider attacks by providing a combination of behavioural and system usage ITQA 
metrics.  The paper mentions the detection of system usage patterns that may act as “signatures” of 
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a  legitimate  user  or  certain  indicators  of  an  attack  preparation  (“deliberate  markers”  and 
“preparatory behaviour”). Legitimate users might also make noticeable mistakes in the process of 
misusing a system (meaningful errors). Finally, “correlated usage patterns” refers to sequences of 
actions that might not be detected in individual systems but they could certainly indicate misuse 
when considered against multiple systems.
Schultz also suggests that certain aspects of a legitimate user’s personality could serve as threat 
indicators.  In  particular,  on-line  (e-mail,  IRC or  other  forms  of  computerised  human-to-human 
communication) verbal behaviour with signs of aggression, dominance towards particular people 
might serve as a good prognosis factor of certain attacks (“verbal behaviour”). Furthermore, based 
on  the  works  of  Shaw  et  al  [33],  the  research  suggests  that  it  is  possible  to  examine  other 
“personality traits” as potential threat indicators. 
The Schultz preliminary framework even suggests a way to quantify all these metrics by means of a 
multiple regression equation that consists of the summation of the ITQA metric variables multiplied 
by their weightings. If X1, X2, X3… XN represent the quantified ITQA metrics,  Wi (i=1, i=N)  
their respective weights and C an arithmetic offset constant, then the expected estimated threat Xe is 
derived in figure 7 below:
Xe = (Σ WiXi) +C = W1.X1 + W2X2 + W3X3 + …+ WNXN  + C
Figure 7:Schultz threat model equation
One notable  absence  of  the  Schultz  insider  threat  prediction  scheme  is  that  there  is  no  direct 
association  between  the  estimated  level  of  threat  and  the  legitimate  user’s  level  of  technical 
knowledge. Although the proposed metrics can provide evidence that could be used to infer the 
level  of  user  sophistication,  there  is  no  mentioning  of  a  mechanism  that  takes  that  into 
consideration. Given the fact that, at the time of writing, the field of Insider Threat modelling is 
premature to reveal any usable results, it is difficult to prove the real impact of user sophistication 
on the threat level. On the other hand, Wood’s model, a number of case studies and the survey 
results (section A) provide strong indications that there is a direct relationship between these two 
concepts. In that sense, the lack of a legitimate user sophistication gauging component could present 
a serious omission of the Schultz framework.
In addition, the exploitation of future mechanisms that will associate personality traits to potential 
misuse threat levels raises certain ethical and feasibility concerns. It is outside the scope of the 
thesis to examine ethical issues and the various laws that are associated with them. Nevertheless, 
the process of designing a model that is going to be employed in the real world should take into 
consideration its troublesome aspects.  A metric that penalises real people in terms of their character 
traits will be considered unethical by many and depending on regional legislation may be also not 
feasible to implement.  
In summary, the Schultz framework is more refined than Wood’s earlier Insider Threat model in 
that  it  provides  more  concrete  examples  of  ITQA  metrics  as  well  as  a  basic  quantification 
mechanism for them. However the framework is still in its infancy. The author acknowledges that 
the chosen metrics need further refinement in order to prove their usefulness in a threat estimation 
process.
Brancik's [34] seminal work on the insider threat modelling should be referenced as a good source 
of  information.  Brancik's  efforts  center  around  information  alteration,  which  is  an  important 
element of insider fraud,  despite the fact that insider misuse surveys indicate that the frequency of 
these incidents are lower than other most common misuse incidents (web and email abuse).  His 
Tailored  Risk  Integrated  Process  (TRIP)  is  the  most  important  contribution.  However,  a  risk 
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management process deviates from traditional modelling approaches. This is because it focuses on 
factor evaluation. Detection of threat metrics is not addressed extensively.
Finally,  all  of  the  aforementioned  research  efforts  do  not  address  the  issue  of  managing  the 
representation  of  the  data  that  feed  the  model  component  functions.  One  could  argue  that  a 
preliminary model design needs to focus more on the scope, quality and quantity of its insider threat 
modelling functions. On the other hand, a well-thought definition of the procedures that represent 
and  store  the  data  that  feed  the  threat  modelling  functions  may have  a  notable  impact  on  the 
computational efficiency and acceptance of the model. The reasons that support the need for this 
requirement are going to become apparent in the following paragraphs.
For all these reasons, we need a more formalised and broader model description. an Insider Threat 
Prediction Model that attempts to overcome the shortcomings of previous research work  has been 
published by Magklaras and Furnell [35]. 
Considering  a  legitimate  user  population  that  has  access  to  various  components  of  an  IT 
infrastructure,  the  core  of  the  Insider  Threat  Prediction  Model  is  a  three-level  hierarchy  of 
mathematical functions evaluated in a bottom-up approach. At the top level, the Evaluated Potential 
Threat (EPT) function provides an integer value that quantifies and classifies the potential threat for 
each legitimate user into three different categories. If x denotes the computed EPT for a legitimate 
user, EPT_MAX a threshold EPT value for considering the user a threat and EPT_MIN a threshold 
EPT value for considering the user’s on line presence as suspicious, then:
 Important internal threat (x ≥ EPT_MAX): It indicates a high potential of a particular user 
misusing the system.  
 Suspicious (EPT_MIN ≤ x < EPT_MAX): This flags a condition where a particular user 
behaves in a manner that does not constitute a substantial threat but it is still a concern.
 Harmless (0 ≤ x < EPT_MIN): To indicate that the potential of misuse is nearly non existent 
for a particular user. 
EPT = ∑ FITPQA ⇒
EPT = Fattributes + Fbehavior ⇒
EPT = Crole+Faccessrights+Fbehavior ⇒
EPT =  Crole  + Csysadm + Ccriticalfiles + Cutilities +       
Cphysicalaccess + Fsophistication + Ffileops + Fnetops + Fexecops
Figure 8: The Magklaras and Furnell model equation
Each of the threat component functions models particular aspects of insider attributes and behavior. 
At  the  moment,  in  order  to  devise  a  well  structured  organization  of  threat  components,  the 
suggestion is to provide two threat component functions. The first one considers legitimate user 
attributes such as access rights and professional role, whereas the second evaluates potential threat 
simply by examining aspects of user behavior at the system level, as shown in Figure 8.
Table 1 lists the maximum weights of the nine top-level EPT formula components that are explained in detail 
in latter sections of this chapter.  Some of these components are constants (Crole, Csysadm…etc) that belong 
to the Fattributes function, whereas others constitute sub-functions of the Fbehavior function that address the 
assessment of the legitimate user on-line behavior. 
It should be emphasized that the proposed maximum weights on table 1 are not meant to be fixed. A system 
administrator/security specialist can re-define the maximum weights, in order to reward a particular metric 
that he trusts more than the others. For this reason, the nine weights of Table 1 constitute the Weight Matrix, 
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a very important concept of the ITPM system. The Weight Matrix allows a specialist to further tune the 
sensitivity of the model, depending on the way he constructs misuse signatures, his confidence on the various 
metrics and the nature of the incident he is trying to predict. This feature enhances the adaptability of the 
proposed model scheme and enables to represent decision theoretic information.
EPT Component Maximum Weight Meaning
Crole 6 What is the documented 
role of the user inside the 
organization?
Csysadm 6 Has the user access to 
Operating System 
administration utilities?
Ccriticalfiles 6 Is it meant for the user to 
access commercially 
sensitive files? 
Cutilities 6 Can the user execute 
application critical 
utilities? 
Cphysicalaccess 6 Has the user physical 
access to critical parts of 
the IT infrastructure? 
Fsophistication 10 How capable is the user in 
terms of his computer 
system knowledge?
Ffileops 20 What are the signs of 
forthcoming insider misuse 
at file-level?
Fnetops 20 What are the signs of 
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forthcoming insider misuse 
at data network level?
Fexecops 20 What are the signs of 
forthcoming insider misuse 
at program execution 
level?
Table 1: A sample Weight Matrix in the Magklaras and Furnell model 
The reader can refer to the Magklaras Mphil thesis [36] for more details of the model and the 
reasoning behind the design of the proposed threat estimation functions. Two important things from 
this model should be emphasize here: 
 the inclusion of various ITQAs at various levels (file, network, process execution) to 
represent a variety of system detectable user events.
 The introduced Weight Matrix concept as a mechanism of expressing different levels of 
confidence for the various ITQAs for a particular threat description.
Both of these things play a great role in the design of the ITPSL. The next section will explore the 
ITPSL relationship to the threat model process, as well as the overall scope of its inception.
B3) The scope of an Insider Threat Prediction Specification Language (ITPSL):
Information  security  surveys  and  notable  insider  misuse  cases  reported  by  mass  media  were 
discussed  in  section  A  of  this  report.  The  earlier  paragraphs  of  section  B  introduced  a  more 
systematic presentation of the insider misuse domain by presenting a suitable insider taxonomy and 
a resulting insider threat model. However, how a threat model fits with a threat description language 
is not very clear. Figure 9 illustrates the relationship of the ITPSL and the proposed ITPM model.
The flow of information starts with a security analyst writing a description of the particular insider 
misuse scenario, using the ITPSL semantics. The signature is validated by a compiler that translates 
the signature directives to query commands and makes use of an event logging infrastructure, in 
order to examine whether the ITQAs the signature mentions exist in the system. Apart from the 
semantics  that  qualify/quantify  the  ITQAs,  the  signature  embodies  a  Weight  Matrix  statement 
which indicates the confidence of each specified ITQA. The results are passed to the ITPM engine 
which then derived an EPT value, indicating that a likelihood of a particular threat. 
Figure 9 also includes the security analyst/system specialist both at the beginning of the information 
flow  (signature  construction)  and  at  the  final  stage,  where  the  final  assessment  is  done.  This 
emphasizes that the analyst is in charge of the process, both in terms of defining what constitutes a 
threat and also in terms of judging whether the likelihood expressed by the model is accurate. 
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Figure 9: The relationship between ITPSL and ITPM
This places the foundation of the context of ITPSL as a component of an entire Insider Threat 
management architecture [36]. The model estimates a threat which is described by a language and 
the likelihood is  judged by the IT specialist.  The emphasis is  on the description and thus,  the 
language   addresses the lack of case repositories that express details of insider misuse incidents is 
apparent. An early report outlining aspects of the insider threat to the US government information 
systems published by the NSITSSAM Committee [37] considers the absence of case repositories as 
one of the limiting factors in the field of insider IT misuse mitigation research. In addition, the 
Carnegie Mellon University CyLab’s ‘Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider 
Threats’ publication [38] states clearly the need to keep detailed records of employee actions in 
relation to file access, application usage and network connection matters.   
ITPSL could  also  be  a  tool  for  digital  forensic  investigators.  Digital  forensics  is  an  important 
research discipline of the information security field that is concerned with providing evidence to 
legal proceedings by means of gathering data to determine exact details of various types (internal 
and external origin) of system attacks. Brancik [34] mentions the importance of suitable tools to 
produce Key Fraud Signatures (KFS) to aid insider threat mitigation and thus signifies the overlap 
between insider misuse and the field of digital forensics.  
The most widely used form of data forensic investigation is quiescent or static analysis. For such 
type of analysis, an investigator would utilize a number of toolkits  to make a forensically valid 
copy  of  the  affected  system's  non-volatile  data  storage  media  and  perform  a  “post-mortem” 
examination of the copied media. The goal is to examine static data (documents, images, email and 
system files) for digital  evidence.  AccessData's Forensic Toolkit [39] and Guidance Software's 
Encase [40] are two well known toolkits that perform, amongst other things, static digital forensic 
analysis.
However, static digital forensic analysis reveals an incomplete picture of the system in question. It  
cannot  portray accurately the  non-quiescent  (dynamic)  state  of  the  system under  investigation. 
Information such as active network endpoints, running processes, encryption keys for decrypted on-
disk content, user interaction data (number of open applications per user, exact commands), as well 
as the content of memory resident processes may not be recorded accurately on non-volatile media. 
Hay et al. [41] discusses the shortcomings of static digital forensics analysis in detail. In order to 
overcome the barriers of static analysis, Adelstein [42] discusses the virtues of non-quiescent or live 
analysis,  which  essentially  gathers  data  while  the  system  under-investigation  is  operational. 
Microsoft's Computer Online Forensic Evidence Extractor (COFEE) [43] and FATkit [44] are two 
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examples of tools that are able to extract live forensic data from volatile storage locations of a 
computer system. 
Live  data  forensics  analysis  fills  the  gap  of  static  examination  methods,  but  it  has  its  own 
disadvantages. Carrier [45] and Hay et al [41] discuss the risks associated with acquiring live digital 
forensic data. In particular, live analysis methods suffer from three basic problems:
 Investigator privileges: The investigator needs administration or escalated privileges to run 
the live analysis utilities. This could present a number of problems in environments where 
access policies prohibit escalated privileges from external entities to computer systems.
 System  and  data  integrity:The  data  gathered  during  the  live  analysis  phase  might  be 
compromised  due  to  system  (due  to  rootkit  infection,  misconfiguration  or  intentional 
alteration of data by one or more system users). Whilst the memory data retrieval issue has 
been addressed by some complex hardware  configurations  whose  purpose  is  to  reliably 
acquire volatile data from system memory, the rest of the data acquisition issues are serious 
and they stem from the fact that data are logged on the system under investigation and not  
on a safer area before they are analyzed.
 The “observer effect”: When static analysis methods are used, the investigator can examine 
the data without affecting the source media state. Unfortunately, that is not true for live 
analysis where the investigator's actions can affect the data. One would have to separate 
carefully the implications of the investigator's actions from the original data. 
The previously mentioned needs  shape the scope of  the Insider  Threat  Prediction Specification 
Language (ITPSL): A specialized language that is able to encode system level data that concern 
legitimate user actions, in order to aid the process of misuse threat prediction and assist computer 
forensic officers in the process of examining insider misuse incidents.  As such, ITPSL’s target 
audience is the security analyst/expert, as well as the seasoned IT administrator in charge of system 
operation and security issues. Both of these types of domain experts  should be able to express 
insider misuse scenarios by using the language semantics to construct signatures of threat scenarios. 
More specifically, the ITPSL language should be able to meet the following high level functional 
requirements.:
 FR1:Separate  the  analysis  data  from  the  target  system(s)  to  minimize  issues  with 
maliciously or accidentally altering the data.
 FR2:The architecture of the language should facilitate the creation of suitable insider threat 
signature repositories, so that security specialists/system administration could easily browse 
for signatures of various threat scenarios. This feature aims to address the lack of suitable 
case repositories discussed in the earlier paragraphs of this section. 
 FR3:Its semantics and logging mechanisms should facilitate the description of both static 
and live forensic insider misuse system data at the network, process and filesystem layer, in 
response to the issues discussed . 
 FR4:The semantic description of user actions should encompass temporal indicators so that 
sequences of events could clearly be expressed and logged.
 FR5:The language should be able to represent decision theoretic information to address the 
criticisms of earlier intrusion specification examples such as CISL [12]. This implies the 
ability to  consistently  express  various  potentials  scenarios  of  insider  actions,  giving  the 
signature polymorphic properties.
 FR6:The semantics of the language should offer a consistent hierarchical way of describing 
a variety of scenarios and should be easily readable by humans and software modules. 
 FR7: Finally, ITPSL should have an operating system agnostic scope. The signature author 
should use the same semantics to express the various misuse threat scenarios regardless of 
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whether the underlying operating system is Microsoft Windows, Linux/Unix, MACOSX or 
other  applicable  platform.  The  language  semantics  should  bridge  any  gaps  created  by 
operating system esoteric  peculiarities  that  could affect  the  process  of  expressing threat 
indicators. 
B4) The Domain Specific Languages (DSL) programming paradigm:  
The ITPSL scope defines clearly a specific task of expressing insider threat metrics. This paves the 
way for the selection of a mechanism that allows the language designer to focus on the problem in 
question. A Domain Specific Language (DSL) is a semantic mechanism tailored specifically for 
describing the details of a particular task. The main goal is the usage of appropriate semantics to  
reduce the effort required to reference and manipulate elements of that particular domain.  
Spinellis [46] defines a Domain Specific Language as “programming language tailored specifically 
to an application domain: rather than being for a general purpose, it captures precisely the domain's 
semantics”. DSL schemata have been employed successfully in a number of different areas. Consel 
[47] discusses the range of applications that have employed a DSL which includes device driver 
construction, active networking and operating system process scheduling. Moreover, Eric Raymond 
[48]  outlines  some widely known ‘mini’  languages  employed  in  the  Unix  community (regular 
expressions,  awk,  m4)   and  beyond  (Postscript,  SNG,  Glade)  as  examples  of  domain  specific 
languages.  This list is by no means exhaustive, as many more DSLs exist today. A DSL is really a 
framework that offers the ability of building specific and concise notations to express a problem 
domain, as well as safe (as predictable) code due to semantic restrictions. Both of these properties  
are very desirable in the process of developing insider threat specifications.
DSLs are also categorized as external and internal in terms of the way they are implemented [49].  
External DSLs are discrete systems, independent from any host language and they contain their own 
interpreter or compiler to parse the language statement and perform post interpretation/compilation 
actions. In contrast, internal DSLs are semantics embedded inside a general purpose programming 
language and thus are dependent from the interpreter/compiler of the host language. Examples of 
external DSLs are the ‘mini’ Unix languages mentioned by Raymond in [48], whereas internal DSL 
languages tend to be embedded in programming anguages such as Lisp [50], Smalltalk [51] and 
Ruby [52]. 
The process of deciding which DSL approach to follow for  implementing ITPSL is  important. 
External DSL approaches offer a greater freedom to experiment with the process of constructing 
insider threat semantics but they provide a higher overhead when it comes to development issues 
combined with a higher learning curve for the language users. On the other hand, internal DSLs 
offer less development overhead as parsing, interpretation and compilation issues are handled by the 
host language environment. If one takes into account that the host general programming language 
will  have already mature semantics and an established user base, it  is easy to conclude that an 
internal DSL would have less steep learning curve than an external DSL approach.   
However, the internal DSL dependency on the host language environment might create problems 
for the language designer.  The most important  issue might  arise from a mismatch between the 
symbolic integration of the embedded DSL and the general vocabulary of the general purpose host 
language. General purpose language vocabularies are rich enough to express a variety of scenarios 
in an abstract way. For example, on a network access scenario, a general purpose programming 
language vocabulary can express details of the origin and destination of a network connection but 
not express network access patterns. In that case, if one tries to engineer the additional functionality 
into the general language, the process of constructing meaningful semantics might be impaired due 
to the general language syntax or due to the host language underlying data structures that might not 
be able to represent fully the required domain information.
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A secondary practical  problem of  adopting  an internal  DSL approach might  include parameter 
evaluation and performance issues. An insider threat prediction operational environment requires 
the evaluation of various parameters at runtime. If a statically compiled host general language is 
used (such as C/C++), runtime evaluation of parameters might pose a challenge. There are of course 
scripting languages [53] where runtime evaluation is not an option, but they might be slow. Ways to 
combine compile and runtime languages do exist (i.e. a Perl Script calling a C/C++ library via API 
wrappers), however the complexity of combining domain specific semantics with more than one 
language should not be underestimated.
For all these reasons, ITPSL follows the external DSL approach allowing for freedom to create the 
semantics from scratch with commonly changed parameters to be altered without recompilation 
issues and no dependence on host language idiosyncrasies. The issue of the learning curve for a 
domain expert to learn yet another language is of course considerable. However, the narrow scope 
of  a  DSL language combined with carefully crafted  semantics  should create  a  low complexity 
interface of relatively few (when compared to a general purpose language) statements and thus 
make the language easy to learn. This approach has been followed by a number of security related 
research DSLs such as CISL [12] and Panoptis [13], as discussed in previous sections. For now, it  
should be noted that both of them can be categorized as external DSLs using configuration files to 
encode statements that have no resemblance to general purpose programming languages. 
There are also a number of external DSLs that utilize XML [54] to convey information. Using XML 
as a markup to construct DSLs is a common approach and thus XML-enabled DSLs are the subject  
of the next section.
Conlusion
The ability to specify insider threat scenarios can be a useful threat mitigation technique. Starting 
with suitably crafted insider misuse taxonomies, we develop a standardized vocabulary to describe 
system-level aspects of insider threat scenarios. This qualifies suitable Insider Threat indicators. 
Insider Threat models help to quantify the threats and provide a measure of the likelihood of the 
occurrence of a particular misuse scenario. Finally, a Domain Specific Language Insider Threat 
Prediction Language (ITPSL) designed to describe these scenarios will be the focal point of a threat 
mitigation technique. Such a language could also complement forensic tools, acting as a repository 
of events capable of replaying certain threat scenarios.  
The design and construction of ITPSL is a work in progress.
References:
[1] Pfleeger C., Pfleeger S. (2003). “Security in Computing”, 3 rd edition, Prentice Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ.: Page 6 contains the definition of the term “threat” in an information security context, 
pages 198-200 and 451 explain the concept of the Access Control List (ACL).
[2] Caelli, W., Longley, D. and Shain, M. (1991), Information Security Handbook, Stockton Press.
[3] Probst C., Hunker J.,  Bishop M., Gollman D. (2009), “Countering Insider Threats”, ENISA 
Quarterly Review Vol. 5, No. 2, June 2009, pages 13-14.
[4] Computer  Security Institute  (2001),  “2001 CSI/FBI Computer  Crime and Security Survey”, 
Computer Security Issues & Trends, Vol. VII, NO.1.  In addition, the following readers should refer 
to the following technical discussion on the Slashdot web portal which reveals details of Hansen's 
data hiding techniques:Slashdot (2001), “Spying and Technology: Robert Philip Hanssen”, posting 
on Slashdot.org, 22 February 2001, URL:  http://slashdot.org/articles/01/02/22/0622249.shtml
[5]  Computerworld  Internet  Portal  (2000),  “The  Cyber-Mod  Squad  Sets  Out  After  Crackers”, 
Article written by Deborah Radcliff documenting the case of Abdelkader Smires
URL:http://www.computerworld.com/news/2000/story/0,11280,45927,00.html
355
Appendix C : Publications of the research project
[6]  Garfinkel  S,  Spafford  G.  (1996),  ‘Practical  UNIX  and  Internet  Security’,  Second  Edition, 
O’Reilly and Associates,  Sebastopol, CA, ISBN: 1-56592-148-1
[7] ZDnet Internet Portal (2001), “Firms shop around for Net law jurisdictions”, article written by 
Wendy McAuliffe 
URL: http://news.zdnet.co.uk/business/0,39020645,2085983,00.htm
[8] Gray P. (2002), “Australian Universities under fire from hack attacks”,  Zdnet portal,  article 
commenting on IT security procedural deficiencies in the academic sensor commens briefly on the 
University of Oslo hacking incident.
URL:  http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/security/soa/Australian-Universities-under-fire-from-hack-
attacks/0,130061744,120270076,00.htm
[9] Richardson R. (2008), “2008 CSI Computer Crime & Security Survey The latest results from 
the longest-running project of its kind”
URL:http://www.gocsi.com/forms/csi_survey.jhtml;jsessionid=PB1OETTDYEQFBQE1GHRSKH
WATMY32JVN
[10]  (2008)  “INFORMATION  SECURITY  BREACHES  SURVEY  2008  |  technical  report”, 
published by the Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR),
URL: http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file45714.pdf
[11] Magklaras G., Furnell S. (2004). “The insider misuse threat survey: investigating IT misuse 
from  legitimate  users”m  Proceedings  of  the  5th Australian  Information  Warfare  &  Security 
Conference, Perth Western Australia, 25-26 November 2004, pp. 42-51.
[12] Feiertag R., Kahn C., Porras P., Schnackenberg D., Staniford-Chen S., Tung B. (1999), “A 
Common  Intrusion  Specification  Language  (CISL)”,  June  1999  revision,  URL: 
http://gost.isi.edu/cidf/drafts/language.txt
[13]  Spinellis  D.,  Gritzalis  D.  (2002),   “Panoptis:  Intrusion  detection  using  a  domain-specific 
language.”, Journal of Computer Security, 10:159–176, 2002.
[14] Doyle J. (1999), “Some representational limitations of the Common Intrusion Specification 
Language”, Laboratory for Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 
MA 02139, November 1999 Revision.
[15] Amoroso, E. (1999), “Intrusion Detection: An introduction to Internet surveillance, correlation, 
traps, trace-back, and response”, Second Edition, Intrusion.Net books, NJ, ISBN:0-9666700-7-8, 
June 1999.
[16] The Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF), URL: http://gost.isi.edu/cidf/
[17]  Magklaras  G.,  Furnell  S.,  Brooke  P.  (2006),  “Towards  an  Insider  Threat  Prediction 
Specification Language”, Information Management & Computer Security, vol. 14, no. 4, pp361-
381.
[18] Somerville I.(2000), “Software Engineering”, Addison Wesley, ISBN: 020139815X
[19]   Furnell  S.,  Magklaras  G.,  Papadaki  M.,  Dowland  P.  (2001),  ‘A  Generic  Taxonomy for 
Intrusion Specification and Response’, Proceedings of Euromedia 2001, Valencia, Spain, pages: 
125-131.
[20]  Tuglular  T.  (2000),  “A  preliminary  Structural  Approach  to  Insider  Computer  Misuse 
Incidents’, EICAR 2000 Best Paper Proceedings: pages 105-125. 
[21]  Aslam T., Krsul I., Spafford E.(1996), “Use of a Taxonomy of Security Faults”, Technical 
Report TR-96-051, COAST Laboratory, Department of Computer Sciences, Purdue University, IN, 
1996.
[22]  Bach M.  (1986),  'The  design  of  the  UNIX Operating  System',  Prentice  Hall  International 
Editions, NJ, 1986. Page 10 defines the term “process” in an operating system context.
[23] Richter J. (1997), 'Advanced Windows', Microsoft Press, Redmond, Washington.
356
Appendix C : Publications of the research project
[24] Papadaki M., Magklaras G., Furnel S., Alayed A. (2001), ‘Security vulnerabilities and System 
Intrusions  –  The  need  for  Automatic  Response  Frameworks’,  Proceedings  of  the  2001  Small 
Systems Security International Conference, Las Vegas, USA, September 2001.
[25] Moore, D., Voelker, G. and Savage S. (2001), “Inferring Internet Denial of Service Activity”, 
Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Security Symposium, Washington D.C, August 2001, pp. 9-22.
[26] Frykholm, N. (2000), Countermeasures against Buffer Overflow Attacks, White Paper, RSA 
Laboratories.
[27] Postel, J. and Reynolds, J. (1983), TELNET Protocol Specification, Request For Comments 
(RFC) 854, IETF Network Working Group, May 1983.
[28]  Ylonen,  T.  (1995),  The SSH (Secure  Shell)  Remote  Login  Protocol,  Internet  Draft,  IETF 
Network Working Group, 15 November 1995, Available http://www.free.lp.se/fish/rfc.txt
[29] Ziegler, R. (2002), LINUX Firewalls, Second Edition, New Riders Publishing, Chapter 2, pp. 
48-50.
[30] Sharda, N. (1999), Multimedia Information Networking, Prentice Hall Inc., Chapter 12.
[31]  Wood  B.  (2000).  “An insider  threat  Model  for  Adversary Simulation”,  SRI  International, 
Research on Mitigating the Insider Threat to Information Systems - #2: Proceedings of a Workshop 
Held by RAND, August 2000.
[32]  Schultz,  E.E.  (2002).  “A  framework  for  understanding  and  predicting  insider  attacks”, 
Computers & Security, vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 526-531.
[33]  Shaw  E.D.,  Ruby K.G.,  Post  J.M.  (1998),  “The  Insider  Threat  to  Information  Systems”, 
Security Awareness Bulletin, No. 2/98, Political Psychology Associates Ltd.
[34]  Brancik  K.C.(2008),”Insider  Computer  Fraud  An  in-depth  Framework  for  Detecting  and 
Defending Against Insider IT Attacks”, Auerbach Publications, Taylor & Francis Group, ISBN 1-
4200-4659-4.
[35] Magklaras G., Furnell S. (2005), “A Preliminary Model of End User Sophistication for Insider 
Threat Prediction in IT Systems”, Computers & Security, Volume 24, Issue 5, August 2005, Pages 
371-380. 
[36] Magklaras, G. (2005), An Architecture for Insider Misuse Threat Prediction in IT Systems, 
MPhil Thesis, School of Computing,  Communications and Electronics, University of Plymouth, 
UK.
[37]  NSTISSAM. (1999),  The  Insider  Threat  To  US  Government  Information  Systems, 
NSTISSAM  INFOSEC  /1-99,  U.S.  National  Security  Telecommunications  And  Information 
Systems  Security  Committee,  Available  http://www.cnss.gov/Assets/pdf/nstissam_infosec_1-
99.pdf.
[38]   Cappelli  D.,  Moore  A.,  Shimeall  T.J.,  Trzeciak  R.   (2006).  “Common  Sense  Guide  to 
Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats”, 2nd Edition Version 2.1, Carnegie Mellon University 
Cylab, URL:http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/CommonSenseInsiderThreatsV2.1-1-070118.pdf
[39] AccessData Inc. web portal, URL: http://www.accessdata.com/
[40]Guidance  Software  Inc.  web  portal,  URL:http://www.guidancesoftware.com/computer-
forensics-ediscovery-software-digital-evidence.htm 
[41] Hay B., Nance K., Bishop M. (2009), “Live Analysis Progress and Challenges”, IEEE Security 
& Privacy, Volume 7, Number 2, pages 30-37.
[42]  Adelstein  F.  (2006),  “Live  Forensics:  Diagnosing  Your  System without  Killing  it  First”, 
Comm. ACM, vol.49, no.2, 2006, pages 63-66.
[43] The Computer Online Forensic Evidence Extractor (COFEE), Microsoft Corp.
URL: http://www.microsoft.com/industry/government/solutions/cofee/default.aspx
357
Appendix C : Publications of the research project
[44] Petroni N., Walters A., Fraser T., and Arbaugh W.(2006), "FATKit: A Framework for the  
Extraction  and  Analysis  of  Digital  Forensic  Data  from  Volatile  System  Memory"  ,Digital 
Investigation Journal 3(4):197-210, December 2006.
[45] Carrier B.D.(2006), “Risks of Live Digital Forensic Analysis”, Comm. ACM, vol. 49, no. 2, 
2006, pages 56-61.
[46] Spinellis D. (2001), “Notable design patterns for domain-specific languages”, The Journal of 
Systems and Software Volume 56, Issue 1 (2001), pages 91-99.
[47] Consel, C. (2004), “From A Program Family To A Domain-Specific Language”, in Lengauer, 
C.;  Batory,  D.;  Consel,  C.;  Odersky,  M.  (Eds.),  Domain-Specific  Program Generation,  Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science  3016, Springer-Verlag, pp. 19-29.
[48]  Raymond  E.S.  (2003)  “The  Art  of  UNIX  Programming”,  1st Edition,  Addison-Wesley 
Professional.
[49]  Fowler  M.  (2005).  “Language  Workbenches:  The  Killer-App  for  Domain  Specific 
Languages?”,  URL: 
http://martinfowler.com/articles/languageWorkbench.html#ProsAndConsOfLanguageOrientedProgr
amming
[50] The association of LISP users portal, URL: http://www.lisp.org/alu/home
[51] The Smalltalk Programming Language Portal, URL: http://www.smalltalk.org/main/
[52] The Ruby Programming Language portal, URL: http://www.ruby-lang.org/en/
[53]  Ousterhout  J.  (1998).  “Scripting:  Higher  Level  Programming for  the  21st  Century”,  IEEE 
Computer magazine, March 1998 issue, pages pp. 23-30.
[54]  The W3C Extensible Markup Language web page:  URL:http://www.w3.org/XML/
358
Appendix C : Publications of the research project
Towards an Insider Threat Prediction Specification Language
G.B.Magklaras1, S.M.Furnell1 and P.J.Brooke2
1 Network Research Group, School of Computing, Communications & Electronics, University of 
Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom
2 School of Computing, University of Teesside, Middlesbrough, United Kingdom
nrg@plymouth.ac.uk
Design/Methodology/Approach
Various information security surveys indicate that misuse by legitimate (insider) users has serious 
implications for the health of IT environments. A brief discussion of survey data and insider threat 
concepts is followed by an overview of existing research efforts to mitigate this particular problem. 
None  of  the  existing  insider  threat  mitigation  frameworks  provide  facilities  for  systematically 
describing the elements of misuse incidents, and thus all threat mitigation frameworks could benefit 
from the existence of a domain specific language for describing legitimate user actions. The paper 
presents a  language development  methodology which centres upon ways to  abstract  the insider 
threat domain and approaches to encode the abstracted information into language semantics.
Research limitations/implications
Due to lack of suitable insider case repositories, and the fact that most insider misuse frameworks 
have  not  been  extensively  implemented  in  practice,  the  aforementioned  language  construction 
methodology is based upon observed information security survey trends and the study of existing 
insider  threat  and  intrusion  specification  frameworks.  The  development  of  a  domain  specific 
language  goes  through  various  stages  of  refinement  that  might  eventually  contradict  these 
preliminary findings.  
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Practical implications
This paper summarizes the picture of the insider threat in IT infrastructures and provides a useful 
reference for insider threat modeling researchers by indicating ways to abstract insider threats. The 
problems of constructing insider threat signatures and utilizing them in insider threat models are 
also discussed.
Keywords: Intrusion  Detection,  Insider  Threat,  Insider  Misuse,  Domain  Specific  Language, 
Intrusion Specification
Introduction
The Information Security world often focuses on analyzing and counteracting threats of external 
origin. However, the problem of insider IT misuse is also an existing headache for the health of IT 
infrastructures.  Surveys  published  by the  British  Department  of  Trade  and Industry (DTI)  and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers  (PWC,  2004)  as  well  as  the  San  Francisco-based  Computer  Security 
Institute (Richardson, 2003) are good sources for getting a qualitative and quantitative feeling of 
computer security incidents. Relevant information derived from these surveys is presented in the 
following section. 
Amongst  the  various  research  and development  issues  related  to  the  process  of  mitigating  the 
problem of internal threats lies the ability to describe the actions that constitute the elements of the 
threat in a consistent manner. This goal can be achieved by constructing a suitable Insider Threat 
Prediction  Specification  Language  (ITPSL),  in  order  to  facilitate  ways  of  standardizing  the 
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description of Insider IT Misuse incidents and thus aid tools designed for detecting and preventing 
them.
After introducing the problem by quoting incident statistics, basic terminology and discussing some 
of the Insider IT misuse mitigation frameworks, this paper focuses on the methodology required to 
construct  the  language  itself,  by  examining  ways  to  classify  insider  incidents,  as  well  as  the 
suitability of pre-existing intrusion specification schemes for insider threat specification. 
  
The Insider IT Misuse Threat
An ‘insider’ is a person that has been legitimately given the capability of accessing one or many 
components of the IT infrastructure, by interacting with one or more authentication mechanisms 
(plain text password, PKI, biometric or smart card token). The word ‘legitimately’ is a key term, as 
it emphasizes the main difference between an insider and an external cracker. An insider should 
always be able to have at least a point of entry in one or more computer systems. The implications  
of having such a point of entry is that an insider does not usually need to consume as much time and 
effort to obtain additional privileges as an external cracker does, in order to exploit IT infrastructure 
vulnerabilities and mount an attack. It also means that an insider is less likely to get caught by 
implemented security measures because of the level of trust that she enjoys.
The other side of the insider IT misuse problem relates to what can be considered as misuse activity. 
Although  the  great  majority  of  the  people  are  familiar  with  the  generic  meaning  of  the  word 
'misuse', when we try to map it to an insider IT context, there is a need to clarify certain issues. 
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Insider IT misuse can be a very subjective term. In fact, one of the most challenging tasks is to draw 
a clear  line that  separates  an IT misuser from a person that  uses the available  resources  in an 
acceptable way and for  an approved purpose.  The words  'acceptable'  and 'approved'  imply the 
presence  of  rules  that  qualify  (or  quantify)  conditions  of  allowable  usage  for  the  resources 
concerned. These rules are often embodied within an IT usage policy. Part of this organisation-wide 
policy is the information security policy, defined as the 'set of laws, rules, practices, norms and  
fashions  that  regulate  how  an  organisation  manages,  protects,  and  distributes  the  sensitive  
information and that regulates how an organisation protects system services' (Caelli et al. 1991).
After defining the terms ‘insider’ and ‘misuse’, we also need to discuss the context of the term 
‘threat’. Pfleeger et al. (2003) define the term threat in an IT infrastructure context as “a set of 
circumstances that has the potential to cause loss or harm”. As a result, in legitimate user context, 
these circumstances might  involve intentional  IT misuse activities  such as  targeted information 
theft,  introducing or  accessing  inappropriate  material,  and accidental  misuse  (e.g.  unintentional 
information leak).  In addition, there is also potential for flaws in the design and implementation of 
the computer system, which could render it susceptible to insider misuse.  Such flaws may include 
improper  filesystem  permissions  or  relaxed  information  security  policies,  and  in  conventional 
information security parlance these are termed vulnerabilities. 
The widespread manifestation of insider IT misuse incidents is an existing problem for the health of 
IT infrastructures. The DTI/PWC 2004 survey (PWC, 2004) mentions that that Insider Misuse has 
doubled since the year 2002, mainly driven by the increased adoption of World Wide Web and 
Internet related technologies. The same survey shows that the gap between insider and outsider 
incidents  is  smaller  for  respondents  of  medium and  large  scale  organizations  (Figure  1).  The 
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CSI/FBI survey (Richardson, 2003) also indicates closer margins between the occurrence of internal 
and external incidents (Figure 2).
Take in Figure 1
Take in Figure 2
Magklaras and Furnell  (2004) discuss in greater detail the manifestation of the Insider IT Misuse 
based on the results of a small scale survey.. The survey queried 50 IT professionals of various 
specialties,  including  respondents  in  system  administrator,  IT  security  and  management  roles. 
Despite the small number of respondents, their  majority had a technical background on various 
aspects of the insider IT misuse, providing an insight on notable trends of the problem and thus 
establishing a profile of a misuser.
In particular, some important highlights of Magklaras and Furnell (2004) include the fact that the 
three most frequent types of IT misuse for the respondents of the survey were the downloading of  
pornographic material, the abuse of email resources, and the theft or malicious alteration of data. In 
direct  comparison,  the  DTI/PWC  2004  survey  (PWC,  2004)  highlights  the  incidents  of  web 
browsing misuse, misuse of email, and unauthorized access to systems or data as the major system 
misuse categories (Figure 3).
In addition,  all  of  the  professionals  surveyed by Magklaras  and Furnell  (2004) indicated some 
preference  towards  the  existence  of  certain  pre-employment  security  checks  for  prospective 
employees.  The  DTI/PWC  survey  (PWC,  2004)  indicated  that  the  majority  (66%)  of  the 
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respondents usually perform some sort of general employee background check during the recruiting 
stage, checking. This survey also comments that the absence of these security checks from company 
procedures is clearly a serious omission.  
Finally, the profile of an insider threat was also refined by indicating that sophisticated users are 
more likely to misuse an IT infrastructure than less IT-literate users (Magklaras and Furnell, 2004).
The frequency of occurrence is not the only indicator of the impact of insider incidents. There are 
also substantial financial costs attributed to legitimate user actions. However, due to a combination 
of  factors  (such  as  the  smaller  percentage  of  respondents  willing  to  state  financial  losses  in 
information security surveys and the way some of the surveys associate stated losses to incident 
types) the process of safely estimating true insider costs is rendered infeasible.
Take in Figure 3
The various survey results  combine to suggest that internal incidents are here to stay and their 
mitigation should be a priority issue for IT professionals.
Insider IT misuse mitigation frameworks
There  are  numerous  research  and  development  efforts  that  attempt  to  address  the  problem of 
legitimate user misuse. All of them focus on predicting or sensing insider threats.  The process of 
predicting  a  particular  set  of  events  in  order  to  prevent  their  occurrence  and  provide  a  better 
understanding of their underlying mechanisms does not represent a new methodology in the field of 
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science. The utilisation of game theory in financial forecasting (Gibbons, 1992), in order to predict 
the  value  of  shares  in  the  stock  exchange  market  and  the  processing  of  seismic  data  for  oil 
discovery purposes (Helbig, 1993) are notable examples of methodologies that already serve our 
world and used on a daily basis by analysts, as value-added tools that help their activities.
The  insider  IT  misuse  mitigation  framework  suggested  by Wood (2000)  is  one  of  the  earliest 
examples of qualifying a set of metrics addressing the insider threat. The framework suggests that a 
malicious insider can be qualified in terms of distinct attributes such as the amount of access she 
has  on  some part  or  all  parts  of  the  IT infrastructure  (physical  and logical  access  in  terms  of 
privileges), her level of familiarity with the internal workings of the target systems, her motives as 
well as the skills, tactics and processes she uses to mount an attack.
A  more  recent  research  effort  by  Schultz  (2002)  presents  a  preliminary  framework  for 
understanding and predicting insider attacks by providing a combination of behavioural and system 
usage related metrics. The paper mentions the detection of system usage patterns that may act as 
“signatures” of a legitimate user or certain indicators of an attack preparation (“deliberate markers” 
and  “preparatory  behaviour”).  Sequences  of  actions  that  might  not  be  detected  in  individual 
systems, but which could certainly indicate misuse when considered against multiple systems are 
discussed. There is also a discussion of aspects of a legitimate user’s personality that could serve as  
threat  indicators.  In  particular,  on-line  (e-mail,  IRC or  other  forms  of  computerised  human-to-
human communication) verbal behaviour with signs of aggression, dominance towards particular 
people might serve as a good prognosis factor of certain attacks (“verbal behaviour”).
365
Appendix C : Publications of the research project
Magklaras and Furnell (2002) discuss an alternative framework for insider IT misuse mitigation, 
focusing  on  insider  threat  metrics  that  could  be  collected  at  system level.  The  Insider  Threat 
Prediction  Model  (ITPM)  is  a  three-level  hierarchy  of  mathematical  functions  evaluated  in  a 
bottom-up approach.  Each of the threat component functions models particular aspects of insider 
attributes and behavior. The end result is an integer, the Evaluated Potential Threat (EPT), which 
classifies the level of potential threat a particular user represents for the IT infrastructure and could 
be used as an indicator of whether the user poses a threat or not.
While  each  of  the  aforementioned  frameworks  has  is  its  own  theoretical  advantages  and 
disadvantages, they also have something important in common. Whether one places emphasis on 
verbal behaviour, gauging of user knowledge, or the observation of user action sequences in order 
to sense or predict insider threat, all of these metrics could benefit from a standardized way of 
describing them efficiently, in order to make insider IT misuse threat signatures. This is the subject 
of the following sections.
Insider Threat Prediction Specification Language: The need and its construction 
methodology
Information  security  surveys  and mass  media  might  report  accurately the  outline  of  an  insider 
misuse case. They do not provide a complete picture about the exact conditions under which the 
incident occurs, nor they always reveal in detail the sequence of user actions. As an example, one 
should consider the high-profile case of Robert Hanssen (CNN, 2002). A 56-year old trusted FBI 
veteran,  Hanssen abused his trusted access to the Automated Case Support System that contained 
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classified  information  about  ongoing  investigations  and  handed  critical  information  to  Russian 
agencies. In return, he was receiving large sums of money, inflicting a great deal of damage upon 
the prestigious image of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the national security of his country. 
The motives and the outline of Hanssen’s methodology were covered by the mass media. Some of 
the details related to his data hiding techniques were also mentioned in computing sites (Slashdot, 
2001). However, even the later details are not enough for someone to re-construct the case in a 
laboratory for the purposes of experimenting and developing insider threat prediction techniques.  If 
one is not a member of the forensic specialist team that handles an insider misuse case, he will be 
able to only speculate about the actions and the attack path a malicious insider had followed. This 
creates a lack of suitable case repositories noted by (NSTISSAM, 1999), and is one of the limiting 
factors in the field of insider IT misuse mitigation research. 
The establishment of a world-wide insider case repository would be of great aid to researchers. 
However, apart from the coordination, the building of such a repository would require a way to 
unambiguously describe the insider misuse actions in a standard manner. This paves the way for the 
shaping of a Domain Specific Language (DSL),  a semantic mechanism tailored specifically for 
describing the details of a particular task. The main goal is the usage of appropriate semantics to  
reduce the effort required to reference and manipulate elements of that particular domain.  
DSL schemata have been employed successfully in a  number of different areas.  Consel  (2004) 
discusses  the  range  of  applications  that  have  employed  a  DSL  which  includes  device  driver 
construction, active networking and operating system process scheduling. This list is by no means 
exhaustive and it really concerns all domains that consist  of software entities that have enough 
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common elements to be considered as a whole. A DSL is really a framework that offers the ability 
of  building  specific  and  concise  notations  to  express  a  problem  domain,  as  well  as  safe  (as 
predictable) code due to semantic restrictions. Both of these properties are very desirable in the 
process of developing insider threat specifications. 
Thus, a methodology for deriving a Domain Specific Language includes three important steps:
- the abstraction of the domain, which involves the removal of all the unnecessary details of 
the environment;
- the systematic categorisation of the necessary (abstracted) details into language semantics;
- the process of engineering the developed semantics into software.   
The  derivation  of  the  necessary  abstractions  is  achieved  partly  by  the  establishment  of  the 
aforementioned insider  threat  mitigation  frameworks.  These  frameworks  rely on two important 
elements that achieve the abstraction. The first is a careful classification of the Insider IT threat 
elements. The classification schemes (or taxonomies) enhance the ability to examine the problem in 
a more systematic way, could certainly form the core of a specification language and are a common 
occurrence in the Information Security literature. The second element is a model that combines all 
the threat elements and provides an estimate for the magnitude of the threat. 
Whilst the models are discussed in detail by various researchers (Wood, 2000; Schultz, 2002; and 
Magklaras  and Furnell,  2002),  the  section  that  follows  will  focus  on the  taxonomy issue.  The 
formation of a structured way to identify insider IT misuse threat elements forms a key component 
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of a threat specification language. The language semantics and the process of engineering them into 
software will also be discussed in later sections.
A taxonomy for Insider Misuse Threat Prediction 
An overview of intrusion specification taxonomies is provided by Furnell et al. (2001). Amongst 
these taxonomies, one that specifically addresses insider IT misuse incidents is given by Tuglular 
(2000).  This  taxonomy  integrates  an  established  security  policy  to  the  process  of  classifying 
computer  misuse  incidents  in  three  dimensions:  incident,  response  and  consequences.  These 
dimensions  can  be  divided  into  additional  sub-dimensions  that  further  classify  a  particular 
misfeasor. Tuglular’s paper is one of  the first to suggest a ‘target-type of threat’ association as a 
way to prevent insider misuse. The target is an ‘asset’ and the rule is called a ‘strategy’ in the 
terminology he proposes. The suggestion is mentioned in a single sentence and forms the basis for a 
methodology to predict insider misuse threats. If one can associate successfully certain actions to 
threats then it establishes the first step towards systematizing insider IT threat prediction. 
Most research efforts in the field of intrusion taxonomy classification are still at an early stage. The 
Tuglular taxonomy, and others mentioned in (Furnell et al.  2001), are useful for the systematic 
study of intrusions, but they offer little help to a process designed to automatically detect intrusive 
activities.  This  is  because  the  classification  criteria  employed  by  these  taxonomies  cannot  be 
qualified or quantified very easily by an Intrusion Detection System with the level of information 
they exhibit.  Moreover,  none of  these  taxonomies  is  tailored  for  the  process  of  estimating  the 
likelihood of Insider Threat.
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The best way of enhancing the expressiveness of an intrusion taxonomy scheme for insider misuse 
activities is to focus on the human actions and how their consequences impact the elements of the 
IT infrastructure that  are  being targeted.  The idea is  that it  is  easier to detect  which particular  
element is affected by a potentially intrusive action, rather than focusing on the task of sensing the 
motives for initializing an attack.
Another important property of a suitable Insider IT misuse prediction taxonomy is the freedom of 
the security architect to choose what can be considered as an Insider IT misuse threat indicator. 
Most  taxonomies  enforce  a  rigid  framework  for  classifying  phenomena  with  clear  borders  of 
distinction that offer little space for subjective or varying interpretation of facts. This schema does 
not fit the case of Insider IT misuse prediction. The previous section of this paper argued that there 
are  different  views  for  what  is  considered  as  legitimate  user  misuse  amongst  the  various 
organizations. Consequently, there are also different views for what is perceived as an insider threat 
prediction indicator and a taxonomy tailored for the needs of a threat prediction process should be 
flexible enough to accommodate this fact.
Take in Figure 4
As a result, one can construct a suitable threat prediction taxonomy based around consequences 
detected at system level. Figure 4 above displays the top level of the taxonomy structure indicating 
the three primary, non-mutually exclusive levels that address these consequences. 
The Operating System (O/S) based consequences are branched down to two sublevels of file-system 
and memory manipulation, illustrated by Figures 5 and 6 respectively.  A justification for this is that 
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a large number of security faults (Aslam et al. 1996) involve filesystem and memory management 
issues, and indeed the core modules of UNIX (Bach, 1986) and Windows-based (Richter, 1997) 
operating systems provide (amongst others) specific support for the related functions. Hence, it is 
safe to assume that these two kernel functional attributes can be used as a strong criterion for further 
classifying legitimate user activities.
Take in Figure 5
At File/Directory level, a misuser may attempt to read or alter (write/create) certain files. These 
files  might  contain  sensitive  or  unauthorised  information  (information  theft  or  fraudulent 
modification of vital information). A knowledgeable insider might also attempt to read or modify 
file information that is not directly related to its content. Bach (Bach, 1986) and Richter (Richter, 
1997) emphasize that most Operating Systems allow a file to contain additional information such as 
access/creation/modification  times  as  well  as  information  that  relates  the  file  to  its  owner  and 
permits access to it under certain conditions. Although the mechanisms that implement these file 
attributes are different amongst Operating Systems, they are collectively known as file metadata and 
they are  vital  mechanisms to secure  the privacy,  availability and integrity of  the file  contents.  
Consequently,  they  are  good  candidates  for  exploitation  by a  legitimate  user  who  is  about  to 
perform a deliberate or accidental misuse act. 
The points mentioned in the previous paragraph are also valid for ‘filesystem’ related data. Every 
Operating System organizes its files and directories by means of a specific set of rules that define 
how a file (contents and metadata) are about to be stored on the physical medium. The Operating 
System sub-modules that handle these issues are known as filesystems. Attempts to read or alter the 
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physical medium’s Master Boot Record (MBR), intentional or accidental modification of partition 
table data are some of the most notable auditable actions that could point to legitimate user misuse 
acts. Robert Hanssen’s case is a classic reminder of this kind of activity. His specially modified 40-
track floppy disk was created by a set of filesystem modification actions, in order to create a hidden 
area to store the sensitive information (Slashdot, 2001).
In addition to filesystem content and metadata modification, a survey of insider misuse conducted 
by the authors (Magklaras and Furnell,  2004) showed that excessive disk space consumption is 
perceived as a problem for many of the respondents. Under certain conditions that depend on the 
configuration of the IT infrastructure, a legitimate user might produce a deliberate or accidental 
Denial of Service attack (DoS). 
Take in Figure 6
In addition to filesystem content and metadata modification, a survey of insider misuse conducted 
by the authors (Magklaras and Furnell,  2004) showed that excessive disk space consumption is 
perceived as a problem for many of the respondents. Under certain conditions that depend on the 
configuration of the IT infrastructure, a legitimate user might produce a deliberate or accidental 
Denial of Service attack (DoS). 
Memory inspection is the best  way to see if a legitimate user attempts to run or even install a 
suspicious  program.   Indeed,  it  is  one  of  the  core  techniques  used  in  the  detection  of  overtly 
malicious code, such as viruses and Trojan horse programs.  However, software threats do not end 
here,  and  a  problem  originating  from  end-user  actions  was  highlighted  by  the  authors’ 
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aforementioned survey. The majority of the respondents (76%) claimed that an attempt to install 
one or more unauthorized applications is also classified as a misuse act for their  organizations . 
Hence, this could be used as a strong criterion for the purposes of sensing insider threats in an IT 
environment.  The  execution  or  installation  of  these  programs  could  be  intercepted  by  either 
recognizing a program’s footprint in memory or by intercepting a well-known series of system calls 
produced by various suspicious programs. For example, the fact that a non-advanced user is trying 
to compile an advanced vulnerability scanning tool is an event that should be noticed, and serves as 
a good indicator of potential misuse activities that are about to follow.
In addition, attempts to consume large memory portions of an operational system that are related to 
a legitimate user account can serve as good indicators of (intentional or accidental) insider misuse at 
Operating System level. One might argue that the ‘irregular memory usage’ sub-categories should 
really  belong  under  the  ‘Program execution’  hierarchy of  events.  However,  it  is  possible  that 
someone will produce a quick and easy Denial of Service attack on a running system by forcing the 
host to commit large portions of system memory to a process, as demonstrated in various case 
studies  described in  (Moore  et  al.  2001).  Moreover,  a  large  category of  security faults  can  be 
achieved by means of  accessing normally restricted memory areas,  creating what  is  commonly 
known as a “buffer overflow” attack (Frykholm, 2000). As a result of these issues, it was felt that a 
separate sub-category hierarchy should exist to describe these events.
The filesystem and memory manipulation consequences conclude the O/S consequence category of 
the proposed taxonomy. The next category, “network consequences”, represents another distinct set 
of factors that could be taken into consideration in order to classify insider misuse threat indicators. 
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Figure 7 illustrates the network-related consequences of acts that could be used as legitimate user 
threat indicators. 
The authors’ insider misuse survey indicated that 26% of the surveyed IT professionals consider the 
content  of  web pages  that  a  legitimate  user  visits  to  be  an  important  Threat  Indication  factor. 
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that URLs that contain a ‘promising’ link to sexually explicit  
content or to illegal software downloads should be noted as distinct ways of indicating potential to 
misuse the system (suspicious URLs).   
Take in Figure 7
Network packets that are associated with certain legitimate users and indicate the usage of a variety 
of network protocols and applications that might introduce certain vulnerabilities are also distinct 
ways of accidental or intentional IT misuse. For example, it could be said that a user that employs  
the TELNET (Postel and Reynolds, 1983) protocol to login to a multi-user system is more likely to 
have her  account  compromised than a  user  who logins  via  the Secure Shell  (SSH) application 
(Ylonen, 1995) due to the fact that the earlier application transmits the user password in clear-text 
form across the network, whereas the latter one encrypts it.
Someone might also like to differentiate between TCP and UDP based applications/protocols. From 
a potential threat point of view, UDP services are less secure than TCP based ones. For example, 
Ziegler (2002) discusses in detail how UDP’s lack of flow control and state mechanisms can create 
various data security problems. Consequently, the distinction between the usage of UDP and TCP 
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services can serve as a potential insider misuse threat indicator, on the basis that UDP services are 
more likely to be accidentally (or intentionally) abused by a legitimate user.
The participants in the authors’ survey indicated that resource over-utilization is an existing issue in 
IT infrastructures. Although the ‘Filesystem Manipulation’ subcategory of the taxonomy indicates 
ways with which disk storage capacity can be misused, the results of over-utilisation can also affect  
network capacity. For instance, a legitimate user could start downloading massive quantities of data, 
exceeding the network bandwidth cost budget of a business (Downloading over X Mbytes of data in 
a period Y). The X and Y number limits can be selected by the network administrator according to 
the company budget requirements.
In addition, a legitimate user might also cause network congestion by exceeding the data network’s 
‘burst’  or  throughput  capacity  or  exhausting  the  number  of  available  network  endpoints,  as 
described by Sharda (1999). Bandwidth hungry applications, such as video streaming players, and 
multiple data transfers can cause congestion that can severely impact the performance of a data 
network or affect the Quality of Service (QoS) of certain applications that require sustained data 
network throughput.
Finally, incoming or outgoing SMTP headers or attachments might indicate activity related to e-
mail misuse that can certainly be traced in network or host level. Outgoing e-mails that contain a set  
of particular files as attachments (e.g. password database files, other sensitive material) and have 
unusual destination addresses (e.g. unknown Hotmail accounts, a large number of recipients) should 
serve  not  necessarily  as  intrusion  indicators  but  as  insider  threat  estimators.  The  plethora  of 
malicious  code  efforts  and  phishing  techniques  may have  an  external  origin,  but  the  threat  is 
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realized by the actions of unsuspecting legitimate users. In addition, proprietary information theft 
could also be realized by means of emailing sensitive material to non-authorized external entities. 
The  last  system  consequences  category  (“hardware”)  plays  an  important  role  in  preventing  a 
number of computer system threats. Insiders can often access the physical hardware of the machine 
very easily. Thus, removal or addition of hardware components, as well as modifications of their 
default configuration are some of the events that may act as important indicators of insider misuse 
prediction in a computer system.
From a taxonomy to encoding and language semantics
After identifying and characterizing the insider IT misuse threat factors, the next issue concerns the 
development of the encoding schemes and semantics of the desired language. Earlier sections made 
reference  to  the  concept  of  Domain  Specific  Languages  (Consel,  2004)  and  the  first  steps  for 
devising  a  suitable  threat  specification  language  have  been  made.  The  Common  Intrusion 
Specification  Language  (CISL)  (Feiertag  et  al.  1999)  consists  of  a  semantic  framework  to 
unambiguously describe intrusive activities together with proposed data structures that store the 
event information and can form standardized messages exchanged by various Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) components.
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The  CISL  framework  could  be  re-used  for  producing  a  suitable  Insider  Threat  Prediction 
Specification  Language.  However,  the  framework  would  require  substantial  re-engineering  to 
achieve this goal. The existing CISL framework and the latest related research are summarized in 
the paragraphs that follow.  The discussion then proceeds to  present the CISL major flaws from an 
insider threat specification perspective, and suggests an approach to overcome these problems.
In CISL, the semantic representation of intrusive activities is achieved by the formation of an S-
Expression.  This  is  a  recursive  grouping  of  tags  and  data,  delimited  by parentheses.  The  tags 
provide semantic clues to the interpretation of the S-Expression and the data might represent system 
entities or attributes. For this reason, the tags are also called Semantic Identifiers (SIDs). 
The best  of  way of  illustrating how CISL works  is  by considering an example.  The statement 
(Hostname ‘frigg.uio.no’)  is  a  simple  S-Expression.  It  groups  two terms,  without  semantically 
binding  them.  One  can  guess  that  it  refers  to  a  computer  system  with  the  FQDN  name 
‘frigg.uio.no’, but the true meaning of the statement is still vague. In fact, the full semantic meaning 
of S-Expressions becomes apparent when one forms more complex S-Expressions, by means of 
combining several SIDs into a sentence.
Figure 8 illustrates a suitably crafted CISL intrusion specification which could be translated in the 
following plain English translation:
“On the 24th of February 2005, three actions took place in sequence in the host ‘frigg.uio.no’.  
First, someone logged into the account named 'tom' (real name ‘Tom Attacker’) from a host with  
FQDN  'outside.firewall.com'. Then, about a half-minute later,  this  same person deleted the file  
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'/etc/passwd' of the host.  Finally, about four-and-a-half minutes later, a user attempted but failed  
to log in to the account 'ksimpson' at 'frigg.uio.no'.  The attempted login was initiated by a user at  
'hostb.uib.no'.”
The particular CISL sentence describes a malicious attack that erases an important system file of a 
UNIX system and consists of three multi-SID S-Expressions. In general, a sentence can be formed 
by one or more S-Expressions nested at different levels. However, there are strict rules that allow 
the nesting of S-Expressions. The rules are defined by the nature of the SIDs, as there are several 
different types of them.
Take in Figure 8
Verb SID’s are joined together in a sentence by conjunction SIDs. In the previous example of 
Figure 8, ‘And’ is the conjunction SID that holds together the three SIDs that form the sentence. In 
addition, a CISL sentence might employ role, adverb, attribute, referent and atom SID types. Role 
SIDs indicate what part an entity plays in a sentence (such as ‘Initiator’). Adverb SIDs provide the 
space  and  time  context  of  a  verb  SID.  Attribute  SIDs  indicate  special  properties  or  relations 
amongst the sentence entities, whereas atom SIDs specialise in defining values that are bound to 
certain event instances (for instance ‘Username’).  Lastly, referent SIDs allow the linking of two or 
more  parts  of  a  sentence  (‘Refer  to’  and ‘Refer  as’).  There  are  additional  SID types,  but  the 
aforementioned ones are the most commonly employed.
One can clearly observe a structural hierarchy for forming complex sentences that also contributes 
to the semantic meaning. This semantic structure is inspired by the syntax of natural languages. A 
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verb is always at the heart of every sentence and is followed by a sequence of one or more qualifiers 
that  describe  the  various  entities  that  play parts  in  the  sentence,  or  qualify the  verb  itself.  In 
addition, a similar hierarchy is also reflected in the formation of the previously described insider 
misuse taxonomy. 
CISL (Feiertag et al. 1999) is not only about semantic rules. Its authors were concerned with the 
encapsulation  of  the  structured  semantic  information  into  the  ‘Generalised  Intrusion  Detection 
Object’ (GIDO), data structures that hold the encoded event information. The purpose of encoding 
the information in a standard way is to make the process of exchanging the information amongst 
various IDS components easy. 
The Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) that embodies CISL (Feiertag et al. 1999) 
considers an IDS as a group of discrete functional components that exchange messages.. Some of 
the components intercept an intrusion event (E-boxes) or organise them into searchable collections 
(D-boxes), whereas others analyze it (A-boxes) to determine whether the event is worth looking and 
event take some sort of action (R-boxes). One of the major objectives behind this conceptual IDS 
view  was  to  enable  seamless  integration  that  accommodates  for  inevitable  differences  in  IDS 
implementations. This is another important issue that concerns the formation of an ITPSL. 
Unfortunately, despite the well-conceived interoperability target, the CISL GIDO encoding process 
introduced many problems. Doyle (1999) has criticized many of the aspects of the CISL GIDO 
structure. Although the purpose of the document was to evaluate the fitness of CISL for use in the 
DARPA Cyber Command and Control (CC2) initiative, the paper identifies serious inadequacies 
that  concern  the  CISL time resolution  data  representation facilities,  as  well  as  data  throughput 
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limitations caused by the fixed size of the GIDO data structure. Finally, Doyle comments on the 
lack of support for the next generation Internet Protocol (Version 6). Whilst these points are fair,  
they could easily be corrected by making the necessary changes to the relevant data types and 
overcome the perceived obstacles. In fact, section 7 of the CISL standard (Feiertag et al. 1999) 
contains specific guidelines that explain how to add information to a GIDO, to clarify or correct its 
contents. This suggests that the encoding principles are certainly extensible.
A more serious aspect of Doyle’s critique in (Doyle, 1999) refers to the semantic structure of the 
CISL language. In particular, his criticism that CISL has “no facilities for representing trends or 
other complex behavioral patterns; ill-specified, inexpressive, and essentially meaningless facilities 
for representing decision-theoretic information about probabilities and utilities” indicates that the 
language would be a bad choice for describing information about a threat prediction model. The 
basic  reasoning  behind  this  critique  is  that  CISL is  too  report-orientated  and  threat  mitigation 
requires a different level of information, not just mere report structures of what is happening on one 
or more systems. These indeed represent more serious limitations that would require a more radical 
re-design of the CISL. 
In  response  to  the  CISL encoding  limitations,  the  IETF Intrusion  Detection  Exchange  Format 
working group (see www.ietf.org/idwg) took over the scope of the CIDF work. It addressed most of 
the  GIDO  encoding  issues  by  introducing  a  new  Object  Oriented  format  for  encoding  and 
transmitting Intrusion Detection related information. The Intrusion Detection Message Exchange 
Format (IDMEF) (Curry et al. 2004) enriched the type of standardized information that IDS sensors 
may represent, as well as the process of standardizing the exchange of messages using protocols 
such as IDXP (Feinstein et al. 2004) and data exchange languages such as XML (W3C, 2006). For 
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example,  the IDMEF ‘Confidence’ and ‘Impact’  classes can now be used to represent decision 
theoretic information (Curry et al. 2004). The earlier can assign a confidence and thus a probability 
to an observed event, whereas the latter relates privilege escalation consequences to three broad 
severity levels. This functionality can serve as the basis for encoding probabilistic information, in 
order to use it in an ITPSL concept. 
These standardization features were lacking from the previous CIDF platform and they constitute a 
very important  step towards establishing better  interoperability amongst different IDS products. 
However, at the time of writing, the working group has not managed to expand on the semantic 
scope the CISL language and address the various expressiveness issues that Doyle mentioned. The 
IDMEF draft standard (Curry et al. 2004) proposes more extensive encoding and data structures, but 
it  does  not  suggest  semantic  guidelines  like  the  ones  proposed  by the  CIDF  framework.  For 
IDMEF, the term ‘language’ refers to the data types and encoding principles for IDS data and not to 
the syntactical guidelines of an Intrusion Specification Language.
Hence,  the  establishment  of  an  Intrusion  Specification  Language  tailored  to  Insider  Threat 
Prediction could be achieved by adopting the basic syntactic guidelines of the CISL framework and 
address the syntactic inadequacies indicated by Doyle (1999). After the semantic refinement step, 
an effort to match the suggested event expression statements to the IDMEF data structures should 
take place. This will ensure that the ITPSL scheme would be fully compliant with the relevant IETF 
standards of the research field.
Figure 9 below illustrates the process of turning an ITSPL-based text description into a multi-level 
threat signature. A high-level text description of the threat is parsed by a suitably crafted compiler 
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and turned into network, file and memory-level (multi-level) statements that detect the different 
threat  components  at  system level.  The  produced  signature  could  then  populate  a  database  of 
signatures, such as the one Magklaras (Magklaras, 2005) proposes for the Insider Threat Prediction 
Model (ITPM). This process could also facilitate the building of a world-wide case repository of 
insider threat cases, such as the one mentioned in (NSTISSAM, 1999). This would benefit computer 
security analysts and forensic specialists as well as IDS vendors. 
Take in Figure 9
The process of refining the original CISL semantic schema would enrich the original language by 
adding  new  atom  and  adverb  SID  types  that  represent  decision-theoretic  and  probabilistic 
information. For example, user privileges related to authorized or not network, file and memory 
level operations can be represented by the IDMEF ‘Impact’ class. In addition, there are plenty of  
IDMEF data structures that can represent information related to the file, network and command 
execution ITPSL expression components. The ‘FileList’ and ‘FileAccess’ classes contain adequate 
attributes to represent the file attributes. The ‘Address’ class can represent network related data, and 
lastly, the ‘Process’ class could accommodate most of the requirements of the command execution 
data of the ITPSL schema. 
Such a language would help one to establish more easily insider threat signatures that could be used 
in various IDS implementations and computing architectures. Figure 10 illustrates how the language 
interacts with the ITPM model (Magklaras and Furnell, 2002). The ITPSL encoded threat signature 
is  fed  into  a  module  that  translates  its  contents  to  Operating  System  specific  Application 
Programming  Interface  (API)  directives.  Each  OS/Computing  platform  implements  different 
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mechanisms to facilitate the monitoring of filesystem, network and memory related events. The 
translation of the ITPSL encoded statements to platform specific instructions achieves the desired 
platform independence feature. The monitoring modules feed the ITPM model with the necessary 
data, in order to establish whether a user constitutes a threat with respect to the signature contents.  
Whilst the ITPM is shown here to interact with ITPSL, the scheme could also prove useful to other 
threat modeling efforts. The produced positive or negative result could then be used by an IDS or 
IPS system, in order to further increase (or reduce) the intensity of monitoring various operational 
aspects of a system or react to prevent/block intrusive activity respectively.
Take in Figure 10
For  instance,  let  us  consider  the  hypothetical  case  of  a  malicious  insider  stealing  proprietary 
information and forwarding it to a rival company. Assuming that the misuser gets caught, a security 
specialist normally gathers forensic evidence from the computing infrastructure. He might look at 
the media used to transfer information, the information access patterns, the contents of emails and 
personal storage media. He could then establish the ITPSL text level description of the incident on a 
repository database. A researcher or IDS vendor product engineer could then acquire the posted 
signature, recreate the misuse threat and see how he could improve the detection of the threat at 
different stages and computer architecture levels (network, file and memory level). He could also 
refine the signature, in order to include undiscovered variations of the incident, as the language 
framework  should  provide  a  good  way  to  structure  insider  threat  information.  The  produced 
signatures could then be re-used in future systems to model and warn about eminent threats  of 
similar nature. 
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ITPSL in comparison to currently available security tools
Earlier  sections  of  the  paper  discussed  the  lack  of  facilities  for  systematically  describing  the 
elements  of  misuse  incidents  in  current  threat  mitigation  frameworks.  Nevertheless,  there  is 
currently a variety of tools that help IT practitioners monitor and respond to insider activities. The 
variety of commercial and open source solutions is too large to include an exhaustive discussion of 
all available tools here. However, a comparison of the proposed language features and the currently 
employed  IT  security  tools  will  indicate  where  this  research  effort  fits  in  the  overall  field  of 
practice.
Internet  firewalls  (Zwicky et  al.  2000)  are  commonly  employed  tools  looking  closely  at  data 
passing  through  today’s  networked  IT  infrastructures.  There  are  many  types  of  firewalling 
mechanisms, ranging from stateless and stateful packet filtering to more sophisticated application-
aware network filters. Irrespective of the mechanism employed, the basic idea is that network traffic 
is  inspected at  protocol and possible  payload level  in  search of patterns or trends that indicate 
malicious traffic.  Although firewalls  were traditionally employed to protect an IT infrastructure 
from attacks of external origin, they are currently utilized to block traffic from the inside to the 
external world and in that respect they can act as mechanisms to mitigate insider threats. In fact, 
most of the networking consequences of the proposed taxonomy (Figure 7) could be mapped to 
firewall toolkit rules. 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) are some of the latest tools that provision 
more refined mechanisms to detect and prevent an information security breach (Endorf et al. 2003). 
IPS devices exercise access control mechanisms to protect computer systems from malicious acts. 
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They  were  originally  developed  in  an  attempt  to  increase  the  accuracy  of  passive  network 
monitoring  techniques  and  provided  large  improvements  over  the  aforementioned  firewall 
mechanisms.  IPS devices  could  be  viewed as  extensions  of  IDS mechanisms.  IDS are  devices 
designed not  only to  prevent  and (where  possible)  respond to  a  plethora  of  computer  security 
incidents, but also to integrate the operation of other security components (anti-virus, firewall and 
cryptographic applications) into one overall system. The implications of this integrated approach 
are that IDS/IPS approaches examine both host and network based data to mitigate threats.
The File-system manipulation O/S consequences (Figure 5) as well as the Memory Manipulation 
O/S consequences (Figure 6) of the proposed taxonomy are typical examples of concepts that are 
today directly applicable to  IDS/IPS solutions targeting insider attack vectors.  Thus,  one might 
wonder about the necessity of the proposed language. If most of the proposed detection criteria of 
the taxonomy that abstracts the problem are already employed in available solutions today, what is 
the need for yet another language?  The answer to this  question lies in how the signatures are 
encoded and how easy it is for a security administrator to encode a scenario using current security 
tools targeting insider incidents. Firewalls, IDS/IPS, antivirus and anti-spyware solutions have rule 
writing conventions that could to some extent be viewed as mini DSL constructs. Examples of these 
rule  writing  conventions  are  the  IPTABLES  firewalling  rules  (Ziegler,  2002)  and  Sourcefire’s 
SNORT rule parser engines (Beale et al. 2003), which are widely employed to encode intrusion 
signatures for their IPS/IDS product series. Similar examples can be found on other firewall and 
IPS/IDS product offerings, as well as antivirus solutions. In fact, anti-virus vendors construct the 
signatures and offer them as part of their product, with their customer not engaging at all in any 
stage of the virus signature construction.
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The common traits of today’s available solutions indicate proprietary coding schemes or schemes 
that require a substantial amount of system-specific level of knowledge, in order to encode a threat 
signature, with evident cross-vendor boundaries. A threat signature from product vendor A will 
generally not be usable with the product of vendor B, and when it is, the effort and the compatibility 
nightmares will always make the task of porting signatures an undesirable overhead.  This is exactly 
where ITPSL fits into the picture. It can provide not only the means for constructing a structured 
repository of insider misuse cases but also act as a complement of IDS/IPS and other frameworks or 
tools  (Figure  10),  providing  a  high  level  ‘glue’  to  describe  insider  threat  components.  This 
component could be used by commercial vendors not only as an information repository but also as a 
tool that eases the porting of signatures and scenarios to their product platform.  
Conclusions 
Insider Threat is a problem that affects the well being of IT infrastructures. Various frameworks for 
mitigating  insider  misuse  exist  following  different  philosophies  of  approaching  the  problem. 
However,  all  frameworks lack a way of describing precisely acts  of legitimate user misuse,  an 
important  ability for  every researcher  in  the  field.  A domain specific  language tailored  around 
insider misuse incidents can facilitate this need and enhance the capabilities of these frameworks. 
Although the paper has presented the concept of the language, the development of the proposed 
approach is currently a work in progress. As such, it would be premature to attempt to convey more 
specific details at this stage.  Indeed, constant refinement of the semantics and language interface 
mechanisms is expected, especially during the early stages of its development.  An important first 
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step in the process of constructing such a language is the abstraction of the problem domain by 
means of classifying insider misuse incidents. Insider taxonomies are frequently encountered in the 
research literature. However, the building of an insider misuse language requires a threat taxonomy 
based on consequences detected at system level. This design approach would allow the language to 
fit easily around events that can be captured in an automated fashion and not on parameters that  
need to be deduced such as motive, for example. 
The  proposed  taxonomy  could  then  pave  the  way  for  encoding  threat  signatures.  The  CISL 
(Feiertag et al.  1999) and the IDMEF (Curry et al. 2004) frameworks are examples of previous 
research attempts to provide standardized semantics for specifying intrusions, as well as ways to 
encode intrusion specific information. By adapting their semantics and data structures to the field of 
insider misuse, one could produce a mechanism to encode insider threat specific information and 
make use of it in insider threat modeling frameworks.  
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Figure 1: External versus internal incidents in terms of report frequency (PWC, 2004)
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External versus internal attacks incident 
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Figure 2: External versus internal attack incident frequency (Richardson, 2003)
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Type of misuse versus frequency of reporting
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Figure 3: Types of misuse reported by UK businesses (PWC, 2004) 
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Figure 4: Top level of an insider threat prediction taxonomy
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Figure 5: File-system manipulation O/S consequences
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Figure 6: Memory Manipulation O/S Consequences
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Figure 7: Network consequences of the insider IT misuse prediction taxonomy
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(And
        (OpenApplicationSession
            (When
                (Time 14:57:36 24 Feb 2005)
            )
            (Initiator
                (HostName 'outside.firewall.com')
            )
            (Account
                (UserName 'tom')
                (RealName 'Tom Attacker')
                (HostName 'frigg.uio.no')
                (ReferAs 0x12345678)
            )
            (Receiver
                (StandardTCPPort 22)
            )
        )
        (Delete
            (World Unix)
            (When
                (Time 14:58:12 24 Feb 2005)
            )
            (Initiator
                (ReferTo 0x12345678)
            )
            (FileSource
                (HostName 'frigg.uio.no')
                (FullFileName '/etc/passwd')
            )
        )
        (OpenApplicationSession
            (World Unix)
            (Outcome
                (CIDFReturnCode failed)
                (Comment '/etc/passwd missing')
            )
            (When
                (Time 15:02:48 24 Feb 2005)
            )
            (Initiator
                (HostName 'hostb.uib.no')
            )
            (Account
                (UserName 'ksimpson')
                (RealName 'Karen Simpson')
                (HostName 'frigg.uio.no')
            )
            (Receiver
                (StandardTCPPort 22)
            )
        )
    )
Figure 8: CISL sentence syntax example
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Figure 9: From ITPSL text description to a threat signature 
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Figure 10: ITPSL/ITPM relationship
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